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Editors’ Introduction 
 
Anssi HALMESVIRTA — Heino NYYSSÖNEN 
 
 
This collection of studies is a by-product of the research project 
Kádár’s Hungary – Kekkonen’s Finland, c. 1956 – 1989 financed by 
the Academy of Finland (2000 – 2003). It is mostly based either 
on original archival research and hitherto not consulted mate-
rial and tries to approach the subject-matter from fresh point of 
view. Although historians have completed comparative studies1 
and scholars from various disciplines have published essays on 
almost every aspect of contacts,2 an opportunity to dig deeper 
and encompass wider issues had arrived with a rise of a more 
critical attitude and freer access to the relevant archives in both 
countries. A more general rationale behind the research has 
been that the relations of small capitalist and socialist countries 
such as Hungary and Finland during the Cold War era are still 
a largely neglected field of historical study.3 They seemed to 
remain in the shadows of Great Power politics and ideological 
arms-wrestling over world supremacy. Hungary and Finland 
have been deemed as suitable examples of ‘politics of survival’ 
since both of them had not only a special modus vivendi relation 
to their big neighbour, the Soviet Union, but had cherished tra-
ditions of co-operation in many scholarly fields, broken only 
during and after World War II. Until 1956 contacts had already 
been revived and their extension was motivated by a pragmatic 
policy: the Hungarian leadership strived for more room to ma-
noeuvre while showing off loyalty to Moscow whereas Finnish 
leaders struggled in between ‘finlandization’ and Realpolitik. 
Kádár’s and Kekkonen’s tasks were not easy ones, and they 
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understood each other’s difficulties well. In spite of being geo-
graphically situated in very different European spaces and po-
litical cultures, Hungary close to the middle and Finland in the 
far north, they soon found common political, scientific and cul-
tural interests. The endless mission to build paternalist social-
ism in Hungary and the steady ‘progressivism’ of the Finnish 
democracy did not, after all, seem altogether antagonistic. In 
both systems the rule of reason over the people (population) 
and environment signified expansion of rational control and 
social policy. Modern methods of persuasion and indoctrination 
were applied in education and socialization. It was as if Hungari-
ans and Finns could learn something from each other. The latter 
part of the old saying ‘next to knowing yourself is to know your 
enemy’ was gradually transformed to ‘[…] to know your friend’. 
In this spirit, the concepts of ‘peaceful co-existence’, ‘bridge-
building’ and ‘progressivism’ could be given new content and 
more accurate and many-faceted meanings. They seem to charac-
terize the period from the year 1956 to the 1980s which was 
deemed a natural but critical time span for the purpose.  
In the Cold War era there was at times high tension in 
Europe and in the wider world, and it could be lamented that 
the urge of different zones, peoples, blocs and generations to 
understand each other was doomed to failure because there 
was no common language. Keywords such as ‘democracy’, 
‘freedom’, ‘human rights’ meant different things for different 
ideologies. It was only gradually that the idea of dialogue be-
tween the East and the West became marketable. The Helsinki 
Summit of 1975 did not – albeit Kádár and Kekkonen felt it was 
the climax of their careers – abolish the ‘Jalta-Europe’. In the 
end it was Hungary that had been seeking for more room of 
manoeuvre and credit from the West whilst Finland remained 
more independent and could start steering towards European 
economic integration. These concomitant efforts and the com-
mon aim at securing ‘peace in Europe’ – the Helsinki Summit of 
1975 was regarded as a success by its promoters Kádár and 
Kekkonen – gave a special direction to the co-operation of the 
two countries which, after all, was of minor political impor-
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tance than usually proclaimed in official meetings of the 
statesmen. However, was quite exceptional that constructive 
bridge-building could be pursued between Hungarians and 
Finns. It was all very practical at first, Hungarian communists 
realizing the usefulness of the old idea of ‘kinship’ (finno-ugric 
origin) in their propaganda work, and magyarophile Finns, 
Kekkonen as their patron, enjoying cultural and scientific ex-
change opportunities. The parties involved benefited from co-
operation in multifarious activities from the diplomatic level to 
individual contacts. It was only the bilateral trade that did not 
prosper and remained so insignificant that its analysis has here 
been spared for future economic historians.  
In stead of a very carefully thought-out research plan, we enter-
tained a few general ideas around which to build the research 
framework. In the first chapter Heino Nyyssönen studies political 
cultures in Kekkonen’s Finland and Kádár’s Hungary but not in 
their ‘traditional’ contexts. In stead of taking political culture as 
stable or of being in a constant change, it offers different pers-
pectives on both societies. A new ‘historical’ definition of political 
culture is delineated, when Nyyssönen argues that the ways in 
which a nation or groups of people deal with their past also be-
long to a political culture. Priority of foreign relations in both 
countries made an impact on domestic politics as well. It leads us 
to study also history and commemoration and to focus on a few 
‘peculiar features’ in both countries like the ‘personality cult’of 
Kekkonen and the images in Finland on Hungary and vice versa. 
In the next three chapters the political relations and images 
of the countries are analyzed from three different and comple-
mentary angles; the external Western, the high politics (state 
visits) and the internal (diplomacy) ones. First Juha Pohjonen 
explores the background of the 1940s and first of all how Fin-
nish diplomats saw the current political situation and Finnish-
Hungarian relations from Budapest until the late 1960s. Next 
Vesa Vares compares images of Kekkonen and Kádár, basically 
defined by the strategies in the Cold War. As years went by, 
both improved from the image of ‘an old foe’ to an astonishing-
ly similar mixture of some sort of appreciation, satisfaction and 
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respect. As Mari Vares reminds us, in 1963 Kekkonen was the 
first Western leader, who visited Hungary after the uprising of 
1956. Nevertheless, Kádár’s trip ten years later was not less ‘his-
torical’ as it was his first visit to a capitalist country. 
The second part of the book concentrates on cultural and scien-
tific relations, which deserve their own extensive treatment because 
they brought in tangible, but at times contradictory achievements 
and opened unexpected vistas of co-operation and dialogue. They 
also show some of the tensions between the two systems, conspicu-
ously in the use of ‘propaganda’ and ‘know-how’. But as usual in 
Hungarian-Finnish relations, the co-operation also of cultural and 
scientific elites was not seriously disturbed by the contradictions 
between the values of the capitalist and the socialist system. This is 
typically ‘liberal’ attitude which largely ignored or found its way 
around marxist criticism thus avoiding open confrontation.4 The 
marxists, for their part, did not want to force the issue and make the 
kind of politics of science that would upset or estrange their part-
ners. As Anssi Halmesvirta and Raija Oikari show in their articles, 
co-operation went on surprisingly smoothly. Psychology and its 
applications to control human behaviour in society’s sore points 
were equally useful in both countries. In cultural contacts, for the 
Hungarian intellectuals who felt stymied at home, Finland occa-
sionally gave some breathing space. A few Finnish suspicious critics 
and journalists learned from them about the less respectable aspects 
of the Hungarian cultural politics. However, the power structure 
embedded in the discourse of cultural relations usually limited the 
ways how ‘things could be said and done’.  
Finally, in the third part of the book two case-studies, com-
parative and specialized, have been included which, if taken 
together, demonstrate differences and certain out-of-context 
similarities between the two societies. As Péter Porkoláb’s com-
parative article about Hungarian and Finnish village farming 
shows, people still found ways to go around the restrictions or 
live with them. In both countries the state let the peasant live, 
but in Finland the smallest farmers left their homesteads for 
good, and in Hungary all of them, huge or small, were called to 
collective work. In Finland, as Jari Ojala’s special article on agri-
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cultural ‘evolution’ testifies, the development has led towards 
specialization and to building of ever bigger production units.  
What was common to the two systems, socialist and capital-
ist in the 1960s – 1970s was the belief in the secular religion 
called ‘progress’, be it evolutionary or marxist. In that they ri-
valled: human reason was promiscuously applied in regulating 
human affairs and cultural and natural environment. The con-
trol of populations was rationalized and conscious planning of 
social policy was to be based on sociological and psychological 
knowledge. These remained ideologically different in socialist 
Hungary and capitalist Finland – at times the Hungarians com-
plained of the expansion of American values and culture in 
Finland, too. Propaganda-makers exploited modern mass-
media. Psychologists who would not study social structures 
and milieu as deeply as individual behaviour became useless. 
In Finland canvassing and ‘policy of satisfying’ directed at the 
consumer appealed to irrational traits of the man, in Hungary 
irrationalism was to be rooted and a ‘new, really social man’ 
was to be created. Both systems were wary of stagnation and in 
the ‘progressive’ atmosphere social engineering was not only a 
matter of adjusting of this or that minor problem in social adap-
tation, it had to cater for overall social development. In its 
name, in Hungary during the whole period under scrutiny and 
in the late 1960s and 1970s also in Finland,5 ‘reactionary’ ide-
ologies were deemed futile.  
In its due course, as the coercive nature of total social plan-
ning and control became transparent, rude ‘progressivism’ was 
exhausted. The uncontrollability of huge social processes – 
forced industrialization and urban development in Hungary, 
the plight of the countryside and migration waves to south and 
Sweden in Finland – was gradually understood. Corrective con-
trol took their place, for instance, when such phenomena as un-
employment, crime and booming traffic with its terrific accident 
numbers started to worry the decision-maker in both countries. 
In scientific and technical co-operation between Hungary and 
Finland quite a few common problems were found and up-to-
date correctives were applied to the advantage of both sides. In 
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certain fields of culture, technology, science and scholarship – 
the traditionally dominating finno-ugric studies were chal-
lenged by ‘new, hard’ and social sciences – quite successful 
common projects were launched. 
Now that both Finland and Hungary are members of the 
European Union, they may realize that political and scientific-
technological co-operation of small countries is paramount in 
preserving and promoting their common interests. In science, 
the political leadership tries to prepare the ground for joint 
European projects and promote tighter co-operation of higher 
education and administration which is a precondition for freer 
movement of ideas and people. In this ‘movement’ the Hun-
garians and Finns have cherished a well-established tradition of 
their own: the flow of delegations between the countries was 
already in the 1960s so steady that the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry at times wanted to restrict it.  
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Political Cultures in Urho Kekkonen’s Finland and 
János Kádár’s Hungary 
 
Heino NYYSSÖNEN 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Comparing Finland and Hungary is a fruitful task despite the ap-
parent historical differences: after the Second World War the for-
mer remained a democracy whilst the latter became a dictatorship. 
Also their relation to their greatest and most powerful neighbour, 
Soviet Union, seems to be different. Hungary belonged to the 
same military pact as the Soviet Union, but Finland’s foreign pol-
icy was based on the idea of neutrality. However, the difference 
between the most eastern country of the West and the most west-
ern country of the East is not that evident. 
According to an old standpoint Finns and Hungarians are re-
latives and with special relationship. We can, however, doubt 
that the structural similarities in language and common roots 
6,000 years ago hardly make sense, when we study recent po-
litical culture. Rather than ‘kinship’ the concept of national in-
terest gained a more important role in mutual co-operation af-
ter 1945. Nevertheless, maintaining the old idea of a relation-
ship, defined as ‘scientific truth’, made communication easier 
between these two nations. Already in the end of the 1960s 
Hungary had most connections with Finland among capitalist 
countries. In Europe Finland became a forerunner also in the 
1970s, when visa between the two countries was abolished.  
The purpose of this article is to compare political cultures in 
Finland and Hungary during the Urho Kekkonen and János 
Kádár era. The critical question is, what kind of results we can get, 
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when we compare these two countries to each other and not to 
their ‘traditional’ frames i.e. Nordic countries and the Eastern Bloc. 
After a few theoretical and historical remarks we will focus on the 
post-1956 era until the late 1980s. In Hungary János Kádár was 
superseded in May 1988 and he died in July 1989. President Urho 
Kekkonen resigned in October 1981 and passed away in the end of 
August 1986. Less than a year later a new type of a political coali-
tion emerged, which argued to be representing a new political cul-
ture in Finland. In Hungary, on the contrary, the first government 
change in twelve years took place in 1987.1 
My thesis is that in spite of structural differences we can find 
things in common on the level of politics. Pragmatic Realpolitik 
united the two small nations of Europe despite their different politi-
cal systems. The years 1986–1987 will be mentioned in this article so 
often that they can be regarded as a certain closure of an epoch.2 
Signs of new thinking emerged in both countries but became inter-
nationally acknowledged and observed a few years later. 
The main focus is on comparative aspect and on two countries 
during a historical period. Beside historical similarities and theo-
retical approaches I will study foreign relations, history and com-
memoration but also more peculiar features such as traveling, 
sport and personality cult. These phenomena can be found in the 
source material and they labeled under the concept of political 
culture, a highly contested concept itself. The comparison, how-
ever, is not one to one. Because of the nature of the source mate-
rial I concentrate sometimes more either on Finland or Hungary. 
In addition to documents and historiography I will use peri-
odicals as my main source material. In the course of years the 
periodical Suomen Kuvalehti has institutionalised its position in 
Finnish politics and in the history of journalism. In Hungary 
Magyarország was founded in 1964 as a political and social 
weekly. Although both more or less represented the ‘official po-
litical culture’, nothing prevents us to ‘read between the lines’ 
as well. Because of a comparative approach we would pay a 
particular attention to the way in which these weeklies de-
scribed the other country and mutual relations to their readers. 
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2 Remarks Concerning the Concept of Political Culture 
According to John Street, there is a tendency to treat political 
culture like a familiar piece of furniture. Everybody is vaguely 
aware of its existence but hardly anyone makes the question, 
how it came to be there. Already Plato and Aristotle discussed 
the problem implicitly, but the discussion began in particular 
after Almond and Verba’s book Civic Culture, published in 
1963. For Almond and Verba political culture was linked to a 
strong civic culture, which made democracy possible.3 
However, Almond and Verba have been widely criticized 
since then, and even the supporters of the concept of political 
culture find it problematic. Already the idea of ‘political’ could 
be highly contested, and ‘culture’ is not less complicated. We are 
facing a serious problem, if we only accept political culture as a 
conceptual umbrella, which in its broadness is finally leading us 
to a deadlock.4 
In political culture there are two general views to approach the 
topic. On one hand there is the subjective orientation to a political 
structure and on the other hand political behaviour. We do not 
need to be marxists by arguing that structures influence on politi-
cal thought. Instead we should ask how they influence and how 
people signify structures and symbols in different cultures. Thus, 
political culture might include ideas varying from attitudes to dif-
ferent authorities or education, family, government etc. Further-
more, various signs reveal the world of political images, symbols, 
myths and traditions, which frame and define everyday life. 
Hence, we could focus on culture as values and beliefs, which are 
taken as granted and which signify politics.5 
One of the most famous definitions of political culture derives 
from Archie Brown (1979): ‘The subjective perception of history 
and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identi-
fication and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectation 
of nations and groups’.6 This rather complicated definition in the 
strictest sense means how people define their own surroundings 
and attitudes to politics and analyse their own notion of politics. 
Frequently political thought comes into being with less rational 
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simplifications and stereotypes. In effect the concept of stereotype 
was invented to substitute concepts like ‘national character’ or 
‘modal personality’ – to simplify complicated social phenomena 
by organ metaphors.7 
We will use Brown’s category as a point of departure. His criti-
cism of Almond and Verba was based on the idea that instead of sta-
bile political cultures we meet political cultures in constant change. 
Moreover, Brown separated a dominant political culture from an of-
ficial one. Communist states in particular promoted official political 
culture in mass media, education and other bodies of socialisation, 
which, however, did not necessarily dominate in ‘the minds of the 
majority’. In studying the cases of Finland and Hungary we will also 
discuss characteristics and problems of monolithic and unified politi-
cal cultures during the Kekkonen-Kádár era. 
Brown distinguished a dominant political culture which has 
various political subcultures. Unquestionably, an official politi-
cal culture existed also in Finland and in Hungary but it is more 
difficult to define the dominant one. Also ethnic and cultural 
minorities existed to represent political subcultures. Finally, 
Brown discussed about a fragmented political culture. This oc-
curs when there is no state-wide political culture that emerged 
to dominate political cultures or subcultures, which were based 
upon tribe, locality or social or national group.8 
Nevertheless, we do not locate Hungary or Finland in any of 
Brown’s categories described above as such. It leads us to doubt 
that the whole idea of a single political culture, which Almond and 
Verba’s book implicated, is a stereotype. Instead I will use all those 
categories to analyse both countries from several perspectives. In 
the following chapters I shall analyse current political customs and 
practices as political peculiarities in the twentieth century. I do not 
understand politics only as a universal phenomenon but also as a 
phenomenon bound to different cultures. In what follows I will ask 
what was considered ’political’ or ’normal’ in these cultures and 
relate it to our present context. 
Finally I would like to broaden Brown’s category further and ex-
amine historical political culture as well. Since the late 1980s Hun-
gary and Finland have faced such fundamental changes in their po-
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litical system that both Kádár and Kekkonen seemed to represent 
already another, past era. However, the recent past is still present 
and makes itself felt in current political debate. There are those who 
would like to charge, reckon and deprecate the era, while the others 
defend and understand the era relating it to current policy making and 
political culture. We could argue that the ways in which a nation or a 
group of people deal with their past also belong to a political culture.  
 
3 Historical Similarities and Differences Before 1956 
In the twentieth century Finland and Hungary have belonged 
to small countries of Europe. Both appeared as independent na-
tions on the map in the end of the First World War in the belt of 
new states between Germany and Russia. Contrary to the Finns 
Hungarians, however, do not celebrate Independence Day but 
the foundation of the ‘state’ in the year 1000. In this sense Fin-
land’s nationhood and the state are essentially younger.  
Historical Hungary could be considered a medieval great 
power of Europe. After the battle of Mohács in 1526 the Old 
Kingdom was divided into three parts. The country was occu-
pied by Turks and later by Habsburgs, who ruled Hungary sin-
ce then – in co-operation with the Hungarian aristocracy. In 
Finland the experience of being between two powers meant be-
ing located between Sweden and Russia, which both conquered 
Finland. Until the Napoleonic wars Finland belonged to Swe-
den – although some Finnish nationalist historians later tried to 
name this territory as Sweden-Finland for further stability. Par-
ticularly Finland’s eastern border was constantly on the move – 
some parts were inhabited only in the sixteenth century by the 
order of the King of Sweden. Since 1808 Russians occupied Fin-
land, their Napoleonic ‘reward’, and added it to the Empire as a 
Grand Duchy until 1917.  
In 1918–1919 both countries faced a failed revolution. Finland had 
gained one of the most radical franchises in the world based on uni-
versal suffrage in 1906. However, the Russian Tsar suppressed the 
activity of the Parliament until 1917. Partly as a consequence of the 
defeat in the elections in autumn 1917 and the revolution in Russia, 
radicalized socialists started the revolution. In Hungary the revolu-
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tion began as a bourgeois liberal one in October 1918. It encountered 
the hostility of the neighbouring countries with their allies. In March 
1919 it led to the establishment of a Soviet Republic – lasting rela-
tively as long as the Finnish ‘Red’ experiment a year earlier.  
The commanders of the winning armies emerged from the old 
elites: Miklós Horthy had served in the Austria-Hungarian army, 
whilst Carl Gustav Mannerheim belonged to chevalier officers of 
the Tsar. In Finland, however, the liberal minded K.J. Ståhlberg 
drafted the new constitution and the Parliament appointed him for 
the first President of Finland. Ståhlberg represented a softer line to-
wards the revolutionaries, and even social democrats supported 
him. In the 1920s Finnish governments were based mainly on the 
parties in the centre, agrarians and liberals, although even social 
democrats had an opportunity to form a short-lived minority gov-
ernment in 1927.  
In Hungary Horthy remained in power and ruled until 1944. In 
the early 1920s his conservative Prime Minister István Bethlen con-
solidated power, raised the age limit to vote and restricted political 
activity of social democrats. A reader of Magyarország noticed in 
1986 that this development could have been parallel for Finland 
had Mannerheim held power until the Second World War.9 Neither 
in Finland did emerge such a unity party, which would have 
gained a majority in parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, both 
faced a threat of a more authoritarian rule in the 1930s. The Hun-
garian attempt, failed de facto because of the unexpected premature 
death of Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös in 1936. 
In Finland the principle of legality became prevalent in the 
ruling circles after the 1932 right-wing Mäntsälä mutiny, and 
the governments became stabilized. In 1937 a new type of gov-
ernment was formed, when social democrats and agrarians 
formed a coalition. This red-green, ‘red ochre’, ‘workers-
peasants coalition’ built the axis in the ‘second republic’, i.e. af-
ter 1945, as well. No doubt this co-operation with other signs of 
political compromise influenced the integration of the country. 
This became apparent in the Winter War (1939–1940), when nei-
ther the former rebels nor their heirs put the Soviet attack in 
question. At that time Finland gained international admiration 
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– volunteers arrived even from Hungary. In March 1940 Fin-
land had to cede areas, particularly the Karelia isthmus to the 
Soviet Union. These losses helped leading Finnish politicians to 
agree with Hitler’s Germany and participate in another war and 
this time with Nazi-Germany in 1941.  
In Hungary the question of borders played an important role al-
ready since the end of the First World War. In Trianon 1920 Hungary 
lost two thirds of her former territory to the new neighbours. This 
political tragedy led to a policy of an open revisionism, at first with 
the support of Italy and then Germany. With the help of her new al-
lies Hungary managed to gain some territories back but had to par-
ticipate in the attack against Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1941. 
In the end of the war Hungary tried to follow the Finnish path to get 
out of it. Finnish attempt had led to a cease fire in September 1944 but 
Hungary faced a coup d’état and fascist rule until the Soviet army 
liberated the country in April 1945. 
The year 1945 meant a turning point in whole Europe – also in 
Finland and Hungary. Although Helsinki was not occupied, like 
Budapest, Allied Control Commissions defined and restricted 
political space of former enemies. In spite of this, bourgeois par-
ties were able to gain a majority in the elections of 1945. In Fin-
land the centre and the right-wing parties won an extremely 
slight majority of two seats. In Hungary bourgeois forces gath-
ered in the tiny Smallholders’ Party, which gained a landslide 
victory of 57 per cent. In both countries communists with their 
allies became as strong as social democrats: Hungarian commu-
nists received 17 per cent of the votes, whilst social democrats 
had to be satisfied with 14 per cent. In Finland the new Finnish 
People’s Democratic League (FPDL) gained 49 seats and social 
democrats 50 out of total 200. 
A coalition of the centre and left governed in both countries 
during the years 1945–1948. In this sense we could find similari-
ties, because communists, social democrats and agrarians were the 
leading forces in the new political circumstances. However, the 
Hungarian smallholders remained considerably more heteroge-
neous than Finnish agrarians and gained much support in urban 
areas, too. 
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After the election defeat in 1948 FPDL was ousted from the 
government. A social democratic minority government guided 
Finland out of the ‘years of danger’. In 1950 Finland returned to 
the age of ‘red ochre’, this time under the direction of the agrar-
ian Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Until then Hungary had 
followed the path of the rest of ‘Eastern Europe’, in which social 
democrats were merged into communist parties, and other par-
ties were either suppressed or subjugated to communist power.  
 
4 Capitalist Finland, Socialist Hungary – Unified Political Cultures? 
In European comparison countries like Finland, Sweden, Britain 
or Switzerland belong to a minority, which have not experi-
enced a radical change of political system since the 1920s. De-
spite her domestic cleavages Finland remained a political de-
mocracy also in the ‘second republic’. New politicians emerged 
but the presidential system and the old civil servant stratum 
did not essentially change after 1945. 
According to the Finnish constitution of 1919, the President 
had the right to dissolve the Parliament, led foreign policy and 
was the commander in chief of the army. On the European level 
the rights of the Finnish President resembled those of the Presi-
dent of the French Fifth Republic. Thus, the question of the per-
sonality of the President has been one of the most essential in 
Finnish politics. Before 1994 people voted in presidential elec-
tions particular electors nominated by parties or movements, 
who finally were not committed to support their original candi-
date. The system caused a lot of speculation and made it possible 
to choose a so-called ‘black horse’, i.e. an unknown candidate as 
a potential compromise. 
In Hungary the 1945 turn was more revolutionary and wiped 
away the old rulers and the state. The red army occupied the coun-
try, and a wide land reform changed the structure of the society. In 
contrast, Finnish land reforms in 1922 and 1945 integrated poten-
tially revolutionary rural proletariat into the traditional peasant so-
ciety rather than changed the society. The idea of reconstruction 
worked until the 1960s, when migration to cities and Sweden 
started. Although transformation took place all over Europe, in the 
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OECD-countries only Greece faced a more radical structural change 
than Finland between 1950 and 1980. We cannot, however, play 
down the Hungarian situation either: villages on the Hungarian 
pusta lost 800,000 people, ca. 10 per cent of the country’s population 
in 1949–1990. Although this does not reach the Finnish level either 
in per cents or in absolute numbers, it is likely that the change influ-
enced on political cultures in both countries.10 
Beside traditional peasant societies the post-war era became fa-
mous of significant industrialization, which created new political 
cultures as well. In Finland, industrialization became a victory in 
defeat: the country had to develop industry to pay her war repara-
tions. At the same time new industry laid the basis for further bilat-
eral trade with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister of the time, 
Urho Kekkonen even wrote a pamphlet, in which he asked whether 
Finland could keep her temper to gain prosperity. 
A unified political culture, according to Brown, has been a goal 
almost for all political cultures but has usually not been realised. This 
task could be found in Finland and Hungary. A unified political cul-
ture in Kekkonen’s Finland meant support first of all to Kekkonen’s 
foreign policy. In many ways Kekkonen achieved this but remained 
as contested a person as János Kádár, who also could somehow unify 
Hungary’s political culture. First and foremost the politics of Finland 
was based on détente and peaceful co-existence of two different politi-
cal systems. In April 1948 Finland and the Soviet Union had signed a 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), 
which essentially defined Finland’s political culture. The draft ver-
sion was based on treaties with Hungary and Rumania.  
In Hungary the whole idea of Soviet security zone and the 
contemporary form of Socialism were questioned in the upris-
ing of 1956. According to Kádár and his colleagues a counter-
revolution had taken place. Although the revolution was 
crushed, the idea of a political unity did not vanish from the 
minds of the people. Since then Hungarian political leaders 
tried to praise the unity. Under the concept of socialist patriot-
ism, patriotic and progressive values were put together in 1959. 
The idea was further developed in the 1960s – Socialism for 
some, patriotism to others. In 1974 the party accepted also ‘pro-
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gressive bourgeois’ and ‘democratic peasant’ legacies to a part 
of ‘national tradition’11. 
According to Realpolitik, Hungary remained a socialist state 
ruled by a communist party dictatorship. Kádár, like Kekkonen 
in Finland, became personal guarantor of stable relations with 
the Soviet Union. In Hungary the policy meant supporting So-
cialism and the policy of small steps. A period of recovery in 
the 1960s, economic reform between 1968 and 1973 or finally 
the growing stagnation since the late 1970s, are features of the 
unifying Hungarian ‘goulash Communism’. 
Finland finally remained the only capitalist and non-aligned 
neighbour of the Soviet Union in Europe. Finland represented the 
‘show window’ of Soviet policy in public and maintained her inde-
pendence. However, it happened with the cost of ‘finlandization’, a 
contested term of the de facto Soviet right of veto in Finnish politics. 
Some have argued that even Kekkonen believed in the triumph of 
world Communism (cf. pp. 44-45). If this were the case he was not 
alone in the 1960s. However, he dared to argue to Khrushchev that 
Finland would remain a traditional Nordic democracy even if the 
whole Europe would become communist. Khrushchev’s replied 
that Finland would remain a museum of Capitalism.12 
Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were com-
mon goals for unified political cultures in both countries. 
Kekkonen and Kádár – like Khrushchev – believed in progress 
in the course of history but understood it in a different way, one 
in Marxism-Leninism and in the vanguard of the party, the 
other in a society with a mixed economy. In fact, ‘progress’ was 
an idea, which could be found in many different, even antago-
nist political systems, in the twentieth century. 
 
5 Dominant Political Culture with Various Political Subcultures  
Kekkonen and Kádár represented not only progress and social justice 
but also official political cultures in their countries. However, one of 
the starting points in Politics and Political Culture in Communist States is 
the idea that official political culture is not necessarily also the domi-
nant one. Therefore we have also to ask the question concerning the 
relationship of official and dominant political culture. 
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Traditionally religion has been an essential feature of culture. 
Hungary has been a Catholic country with significant Protestant and 
Jewish minorities. Finland on the contrary belongs to Protestant 
countries, in which over 90 per cent of the population belonged to the 
church at least formally. In Finland we could discuss about a national 
ethos, which was based on peasant culture, Christian and Protestant 
virtues combined with quietness and high work ethics. This longing 
for the nature and silence are still present and proved by ever-
increasing amount of summer cottages in the middle of wilderness. 
National but progressive peasant ethos had consequences for 
political culture. After the Second World War agrarians – from 
1965 the Centre Party – participated in every political government, 
except two minority governments by social democrats, of the 
country. Social democrats were their most favored partner, and 
nearly every second coalition has included also social democratic 
ministers. In 1966 this dominant axis emerged again and lasted 
with some variations until 1987, when a new type of coalition 
came to being. 
In addition to the social democratic-agrarian coalitions, efforts 
of integration have dominated. Still in the mid-1970s Kekkonen 
considered it important that the dividing line was not found be-
tween socialists and non-socialists.13 In practice the idea was more 
difficult to carry out. At the European level only in Italy there 
were more governments than Finland during the post-1945 pe-
riod14. Attempts to dismiss a government have belonged to con-
stant power struggles. Kekkonen himself used his right to dissolve 
the Parliament three times, and nominated six non-political gov-
ernments. A new era, a more parliamentary political culture came 
into being in the 1980s during the Presidency Mauno Koivisto. 
Stability of parties has been another dominant feature in 
Finnish political culture. Most of political parties emerged in 
the beginning of the twentieth century in a reaction to questions 
of mother tongue, social or the Russian question. The composi-
tion of the Parliament has remained stable: if a party won more 
than 10-15 new seats – more than 5 per cent of the seats – in the 
Parliament, it was a landslide victory in the Finnish context. 
Two such victories have taken place by parties already in the 
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Parliament, and they are still unbeaten: in 1966 social democrats 
won 17 new seats as did the populist Veikko Vennamo’s rural 
party four years later. 
Furthermore, non-socialist parties and their political cultures 
have dominated in the Parliament: only in 1916, 1958 and 1966 
the left has gained a majority. Particularly, the dominance of a 
powerful agrarian party has been a Finnish phenomenon. In 
spite of structural changes in the society the support of the 
party has not declined. On the other hand, a particular Chris-
tian party remained relatively small as in Scandinavian coun-
tries. The Centre Party absorbed also Christian conservative 
values and more or less is still compatible to Christian democ-
rats. Christian, national and right wing features dominated in 
the National Coalition Party (NCP), too. In the 1970s party’s 
support outdid the Centre Party, which was the ideological 
home of Kekkonen. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to argue that patriotic and 
Christian values did not exist – or even dominated – in the ranks 
of the left-wing parties. When explicating dominant political cul-
ture, we argue that social democrats were integrated into the Fin-
nish society already in the 1930s and 1940s. Religion and patriot-
ism played essential role in the party although they emphasised 
political slogans like ‘Home, Religion and Country’ less, which 
were popular in the right. Symbols and their memories, anyhow, 
live longer: for the first time in 1978 social democrats participated 
in the elections without red flags and used only the national flag, 
traditionally monopolised by the political right.  
The other left-wing party, FPDL, was forced into opposition 
in 1948, in which it grew to be the biggest party in 1958. Con-
trary to Scandinavian countries social democrats were, thus, not 
the absolutely leading political force of the left. Partly this was 
due to legalisation of the communist party in 1944, which since 
then functioned in the frame of the FPDL, and gathered some 
former social democrats in its ranks. Although there are simi-
larities with other big communist parties of France and Italy, 
there communists did not form such a rigid alliance with left 
wing socialists which they did in Finland. 
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In 1966 Finland became an interesting laboratory of the old Peo-
ple’s Front tactics. There has been some speculation of the possible 
future of Finland, but already in November 1966 even the Radio 
Free Europe commented that the FPDL ‘has contributed to the 
growth of political stability in that country’.15 With a few variants 
this experiment lasted until the end of the Kekkonen era. At that 
time the majority of communists and their sympathizers had either 
fully integrated in the society or politically split and marginalised. 
Thus, Protestant virtues combined with national progress 
and integration gave special flavour to the dominant political 
culture in Finland. In this process of political integration 
Kekkonen was an essential initiator. Young Kekkonen had 
made a long run first from the ranks of the ‘Whites’ and nation-
alist circles to support ideologies of national unity between so-
cial classes. In the agrarian left wing Kekkonen found a suitable 
political platform to cross political gaps hindering the unity. 
Frankly speaking, the dominating political culture had quite 
conservative, moralist social features until mid-1960s. This is 
evident in moralist ‘book wars’, i.e. cultural struggles of the 
1960s; blasphemy, intercessions prohibiting dancing, beer 
available only in state shops, etc. Times, however, changed 
quickly: for example, in 1970 Viikkosanomat reported how the 
small county of Kitee had became famous nation-wide, because 
of official use of Christian names in the municipal assembly16. 
Kekkonen’s role was essential in the dominant political culture 
and its liberalisation, which finally modernised and ‘social de-
mocratised’ Finland. 
When we compare Hungary with Finland, we realize that 
the state and the political structure were different. Stability of 
parties dominated in Finland but in Hungary a continuity of 
parties did not exist at all. The role of the Parliament has fre-
quently been viewed as a rubber stamp, without any real politi-
cal significance – they enacted approximately only five laws a 
year in 1950–1986.17 The election system favoured one candidate 
for one seat until 1966, then running two candidates in the same 
constituency. However, we could not idealise the previous Hor-
thy era either: open ballots were abolished as late as in 1938, 
HEINO NYYSSÖNEN 
 26
when unambiguous secret voting became possible. During the 
Kádár era they defended the existing system by presenting fig-
ures of a progress such as constantly broadened franchise. 
However, the progress was compared only to history not to 
other current models and states18. 
Even if Hungary was a one party state it is interesting to notice 
that not all the MPs needed to belong to the ruling party: the 
amount of party members was the lowest in 1953, 69.1 per cent 
and in 1958, after the revolutionary attempt, the highest 81,6 per 
cent. The amount of women remained always under the interna-
tional 11 per cent, contrary to Finland, in which the amount grew 
rapidly since 1966 from the level of 15 per cent up to 38.5 per cent 
at the highest in 1991. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian Parliament chosen in 1985 in-
troduced essential changes. Only 36,8 per cent of the old MPs 
were re-elected – compared to 65 per cent still in 1980. Accord-
ing to Gabriella Ilonszki, the election brought with it the biggest 
change after 1949. In 1985 new legislation concerning the elec-
tion was used for the first time. It made the existence of more 
than one candidate in every electoral district compulsory.19 
A Hungarian curiosity was the Patriotic People’s Front, although 
different ‘fronts’ existed also in other socialist countries. One of its 
founding fathers was Prime Minister Imre Nagy in 1954 for whom 
the front represented the role of the multiparty system in Socialism. 
The organisation tried to integrate social classes, published the 
newspaper Magyar Nemzet, and thus offered a means to act in the 
frame of official channels outside the party. The most important 
task of the front was to organise elections. Officially candidates rep-
resented the front, the political programme of which all candidates 
had to accept.20 
Hereafter the point, however, is not to stress further such fun-
damental differences but to outline some less known features of 
the systems and how they were linked to dominant political cul-
ture. Whilst the great amount of governments is striking in 
Finland, there were only seven governments during the whole 
Kádár era. Particularly two of them lived long: Jenő Fock held his 
position over eight years (1967–1975) and his successor György 
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Lázár (1975–1987) over twelve years. Although this reveals a 
growing stability, at the same time we could doubt the whole po-
litical role of the government. In the party state the Parliament and 
the government were linked to the bureaucratic state apparatus 
under the leading party. 
In public the role of the state bureaucracy remained obscure 
and eternal. A clear symptom was Toma’s and Völgyes’s survey 
from 1977: only 17 per cent of the 300 persons inquired knew the 
name of the Chairman of the Presidium. This is amazing for at the 
time Pál Losonczy had filled the post already over ten years. Even 
less, 12 per cent could name the highest organ of state power, the 
Presidential Council.21 The party itself, its Central Committee and 
finally the Political Bureau formed the core of political power in 
the state.  
From historical point of view the party state was quite a new 
phenomenon. However, a broader consensus dominated that the 
state as such was not identical with the communist rule – it with 
its glorious past had existed through centuries. The historical con-
tinuity of the Hungarian State was essential as well as the role of 
the Hungarian nation within that state. In addition, Hungarians 
retained a strong sense of their national or ethnic uniqueness, 
which was most obviously felt in the isolation of their language in 
the region.22 
The relation between the society and the state remained alien in 
the dominant political culture. Contrary to Nordic countries an am-
biguous law was not to be changed but to be utilised (kijátszani) 
with protection and personal relations.23 Services needed other ser-
vices, clients, unofficial networks and intrigues to cope with in the 
society. These created the ‘small liberties’, and in fact, passive accep-
tance of the ‘eternal’ Kádár system. Phenomena had historical pre-
decessors, because also both the post-1867 k.u.k. and neo-k.u.k sys-
tems also had been étatist authoritarian regimes with a constitutio-
nal facade. It is striking how only three influential men have ruled 
Hungary over a decade since 1848: Francis Joseph, Miklós Horthy 
and János Kádár. None of them was a democrat in the proper sense 
of the word but represented a paternalist centralist rule.  
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Moreover, there is the question of various political subcultures in 
Finland and Hungary. In 1977 Toma and Völgyes complained 
about the difficulties to describe Hungarian political culture in the 
lack of empirical material. However, they considered it ‘reasonable 
to estimate’ that two general subcultures existed in Hungary. The 
first was a dedicated and ideologically motivated left. Secondly, 
there were few but strong, anticommunist proponents of national 
independence. Toma and Völgyes did not discuss about great 
masses; both these subcultures together amounted to five per cent 
of Hungarians.24 In addition, a few representatives of Jewish and 
nationalist populist peasant cultures survived during the Kádár era. 
According to Ignác Romsics, the impression of a distinction be-
tween Jew and non-Jew was identified but mainly only in the ranks 
of the Budapest intelligentsia.25 
When we still discuss subcultures and concentrate on the 
parties in the government, we surprisingly note that in Finland 
the Swedish People’s Party has, in fact, participated more often 
in the government than social democrats. Heterogeneous 
groups have supported the party, among them cultural liberals, 
Kekkonen’s early supporters but also true right wingers. Al-
though the party has successfully defended minority rights in 
Finland, we have to bear in mind that there are two official lan-
guages, Finnish and Swedish, in the country. In spite of some 
separatist efforts in 1918 or the question of Aland Islands, we 
should not speak about ‘Swedish’ minorities but Swedish-
speaking Finnish citizens. Evidently the old ‘language strife’ i.e. 
opposing bilingualism belonged already to the past during the 
long presidency of Kekkonen. At that time fluent Swedish was 
a great advantage particularly in the Parliament and the high 
societies of the capital.  
Obviously the Finnish Swedish-speaking minority forms a 
political subculture of their own. By contrast, the Lapp people 
did not have ethnical rights, cultural autonomy or popular as-
sembly before the 1990s. In Finland they were considered Finns, 
not really ethnic or aborigines of the country. This is in spite of 
the dominant ideas of progress and integration, which changed 
and further modernised Finland during the Kekkonen era. 
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6 Dichotomy and Fragmentation  
Integration in the name of progress had historical reasons in 
Finland and Hungary. Class conflict had existed in both countries 
although ‘class’ was not the only reason for all antagonisms. How-
ever, the rhetoric dichotomy of ‘people’ and ‘rulers’ is still essential 
in politics. Finns even have a concept for hate of masters, herraviha. 
It usually reveals a suspicious attitude to bosses, politicians, capital-
ists or even academics making prognoses (roknoosiherra) concerning 
the results of parliamentary elections. Thus, the narrative of integra-
tion is only one part of political culture, when we analyse beliefs, 
values and political knowledge of nations and groups. 
In Finland the most serious clash had taken place in 1918, when 
the young republic faced a civil war between the ‘Reds’ and the 
‘Whites’. No doubt the terror in Hungary also divided people and 
left a trauma in the Hungarian society. Compared to contemporary 
Hungary the revolution in Finland, however, demanded more casu-
alties. Although the Winter War in 1939–1940 forced former enemies 
to a united front, the memory left a long shadow. In this sense the 
historical dichotomy ended only in 1982, when the first social democ-
rat, Mauno Koivisto, was elected the leader of the country. 
Thus, at first we study dichotomies concerning the nature of 
the political system. Since 1956 it became clear that Hungary’s 
political structure would remain ‘socialist’, which was con-
firmed in the constitution in 1972. According to Kádár, the vast 
majority of Hungarians had understood and accepted his activi-
ties – if not immediately, at least quite soon.26  
On the basis of the famous speech of Kádár those who were not 
against the Hungarian People’s Republic, were in fact with it. By 
contrast Jenő Bangó argued after the collapse of Communism that 
the whole concept of dissident was too narrow, because in Hun-
gary everybody was against. Bangó suggested a concept of non-
conformism instead, which in principle could be found in every 
sector of a society. The third definition comes from George Schöp-
flin, who wrote about opposition and para-opposition. The latter 
did not overtly question the ideological bases but accepted the 
semi-autonomous political role permitted by the system.27 We face 
a difficult question: which kind of activity should be interpreted as 
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of being against. In the lack of trustful sources we do not know, 
who ‘supported’ or ‘opposed’ the system in the end. In any case, 
existing bureaucracy was a matter of fact and framed the political 
field. Finally, the amount of proper dissidents and activists re-
mained small. 
However, one of the most obvious dividers emerged in the 
party membership: a member and a non-member. According to 
Lenin’s theory, the party represented the vanguard of the peo-
ple and not everybody was allowed to join in the ‘elite’. How-
ever, the other side of coin reveals how this dichotomy retali-
ated in the 1970s and 1980s. The ruling party began to offer a 
competitive channel to develop the country inside the existing 
structures. One of the striking features of the later Kádár era 
was how cultural intelligentsia, literature as its medium was 
supplanted by economists, sociologists, historians and jurists. 
In principle Socialism and the New Economic Mechanism 
had to provide the entrepreneurial spirit of Capitalism and the 
egalitarian ideas of communism simultaneously. As long as the 
system functioned to the satisfaction of the new bourgeoisie, 
interests in alternative political models tended to remain incho-
ate. In the 1980s the crisis started to feed ideas which on one 
hand stressed Hungary’s own identity as a model and on the 
other hand showed Western Capitalism as a possible way.  
Elemér Hankiss (1989) found another dichotomy, when he de-
fined two societies, the first and the second society. The first, the 
official, society organised vertically, in which the state and ideology 
played essential roles. These principles did not work in the second, 
in the unofficial society, in which also alternative principles, like the 
second public, started to grow.28 However, it seems that both socie-
ties needed each other – finally even as good ‘enemies’ to 
strengthen one’s own identity. People played many roles, thus, offi-
cial intellectuals read samizdats and the ‘opposition’ i.e. critical intel-
lectuals published in official newspapers etc.  
In Finland the idea of Socialism and the political system caused 
serious debates in the mid-1970s for the last time. According to an 
opinion poll in 1977, one third of the population supported Social-
ism. It was less than the current per centage of the leftist parties in 
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the Parliament. Relation to ‘Socialism’ divided the social democratic 
party most. In the summer of 1975 SDP had accepted the task to 
nationalise commercial banks, insurance companies and drug-
stores. However, socialist ideas were in the air internationally as 
well, and an independent weekly revealed some current expecta-
tions in 1975: in standard interviews Viikkosanomat systematically 
asked what would be the nature of the political system in ten years 
from now. Before the general elections of 1975 the National Coali-
tion Party tried to revive an ideological aspect and defined itself as a 
firm counterbalance of Socialism.29 
However, we should not only concentrate on history or left-
right division, when we study dichotomies during Kekkonen’s 
reign. In 1956 Kekkonen was elected mainly by the votes of the 
agrarians and the FPDL, when the members of the coalition party 
in the electoral council were even ready to support a socialist can-
didate. For a traditional bourgeois supporter Kekkonen appeared 
to be too leftist and pro-Soviet. Some right-wingers stressed com-
panionship in arms and the wartime unity with the social democ-
rats, which still worked well particularly in some southern cities. 
Agrarian Union and the pro-communist FPDL were stronger in 
the eastern and northern part of Finland and the others in the 
south and west. Thus, one dichotomy in Finnish political culture 
has dealt with regional policy, the relations between the south and 
the north and the capital and the other regions of the country. The 
division between the more agrarian north and the richer south 
was noticed by Hungarians in Magyarország as well30. 
In 1956 Kekkonen had been elected with an extremely nar-
row margin in a clearly divided situation. An essential change 
took place in the 1960s. In 1968 also the Social Democratic Party 
bent to support him. Five years later the majority of the NCP 
backed him as well. In the course of the 1970s the ‘dichotomy’ 
concerned only pro-Kekkonen forces and the small remnants of 
his opponents. Finally in the 1978 elections Kekkonen did not 
represent parties anymore but the association Paasikivi-Seura, 
which since 1958 propagated Finnish foreign policy. Whilst real 
dichotomies disappeared, undemocratic features emerged in 
official political culture, too. Not only monarchist metaphors 
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like hovi (court), perintöprinssi (successor/prince) emerged but 
even the word dissident (toisinajattelija), which usually referred 
to communist counties. First in 1978 Suomen Kuvalehti specu-
lated on possibilities whether one of Kekkonen’s early support-
ers, Jouko Tyyri, was a dissident in Kekkonen’s Finland or not.31  
Moreover, age became a political force and represented a di-
chotomy even in countries like Hungary and Finland. Margaret 
Mead argued in the 1970s that the gap between generations had 
become permanent in modern society. It was already questionable 
whether children could understand their parents and their stories 
concerning the past anymore. For example, in 1968 Kekkonen un-
derstood the importance of radicalism and argued that he was 
closer to radical youngsters than their ‘academic fathers’. Also 
Magyarország had noticed how new forms of patriotism started to 
appear in Finland in the 1960s.32 
In Hungary news agency UPI used the phrase ‘youngster ques-
tion’, when a journalist interviewed Kádár in 1971. According to 
Kádár, problems of finding own career, lack of experience and pa-
tience were basically the same all over the world. However, Kádár 
stressed differences between capitalist and socialist countries, and 
the fact that the vast majority of Hungarian youngsters accepted 
the socialist ideas and the aims of the society. Of course, according 
to Kádár, there were ‘radicals’ or ‘leftist’ petit bourgeois people 
but them he branded as a small minority – supporters of Capital-
ism could only be found with a torch.33 
Still, as János Bródy later argued, the agenda was somehow dif-
ferent in the East: it became paradoxical to oppose the war in 
Vietnam, because the government already did it. The party wor-
ried about the tenacity of pre-communist attitudes, thus, a dichot-
omy between collective and petit bourgeois values. The latter was 
supposed to belong to the remnants of the pre-war era but at the 
same time the 1968 reform had strengthened those values. Tal-
ented rock bands like Omega and Illés or film makers Jancsó and 
Szabó became relatively famous at the same time. On the other 
hand, also the origins of New Left emerged in the Budapest Uni-
versity during the years of the economic reform. 
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In Finland 1960s radicalism led soon to domination of parties. 
Relatively soon emerged the era of over-politicisation and party 
mandated territories. Political balance became a slogan in the 
1970s: even the Finnish Broadcasting Company, Yleisradio, made a 
decision that beside journalistic criteria, reporters should be hired 
according to the ‘amount’ of existing political opinions of the soci-
ety. Impartiality and balancing found many ways: when the right-
wing reformer Harri Holkeri was asked to join the Finnish-Soviet 
Friendship Society, he joined the Pohjola-Norden, the Finnish-
American and the Finnish-Hungarian Societies on the same day.34 
Little by little the idea of political balance created also certain 
consensus and responsibility in the main parties. In the midst of 
economic depression consensus was raised as an official politi-
cal aim in 1977. Consensus-oriented policy gained upper hand 
in economy but parliamentary elections could no longer bring 
clear political alternatives. Erkki Tuomioja noted this growing 
unanimity, which was typical for the main parties and coali-
tions during the late Kekkonen era.35  
However, in the 1980s political consensus started to break Fin-
nish political cultures. The disintegration of the broadcasting mono-
poly is a good example of this development. A commercial TV-cor-
poration could finally establish its own news service in 1981 – coin-
cidentally in the same year when organised samizdat publishing, 
Beszélő, emerged in Hungary. Local commercial radios began their 
broadcasting four years later in 1985. Even the already repeated year 
1987 is significant in this field as well: the third national TV-channel 
and satellite televisions started their broadcasts in Finland.36 
In Hungary, compared to Finland, it would be wrong to 
speak about general fragmentation in the 1980s. Although an 
open terror had not existed in decades, free speech was still lim-
ited, informers were being uncovered and people were kept 
under surveillance. Instead of fragmentation, politics began to 
(re)culminate between the dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Also 
the party’s ‘social contract’ started to grow old: in 1987 for the 
first time the samizdat publication Beszélő demanded Kádár’s 
resignation. We cannot underestimate the years 1986–1987, 
when critical intelligentsia could still debate. Particularly, this 
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concerned historical ‘questions of life and death’ (sorskérdések) 
such as the fate of 1956 in 1986 or in Lakitelek a year later. In 
1987, 100 intellectuals also boycotted the new programme of 
Károly Grósz’s government. Even the youth organisation of the 
party demanded different kind of Socialism. 
 
7 Catching the Rainbow 
When we explicate political culture we cannot ignore general tech-
nological optimism of the era or the frames of the Cold War either. 
‘Keeping up with the Joneses’’, the consumer society in the making 
evidently influenced on political cultures in different countries, too. 
At the end of the 1960s Sweden – in many sense considered the 
older ‘brother’ and a model for Finns – was still twice as rich as 
Finland. At that time Finland’s national GNP, 1399 dollars, was less 
than both Germanys’ but more than, for example, Hungary’s which 
stood at 1031 dollars, per year.37  
On the other hand, expectations of the future were high in the so-
cialist camp in the early 1970s. Hungarian communists and officials 
expected the growth to be around 30-35 per cent. Thus the current 
Western level was assumed to take approximately 15–20 years.38 
Nevertheless, Hungarian political optimism vanished by the begin-
ning of the 1980s if not even before. In 1985 Hungarian standard of 
living decreased for the first time. A sign of new thinking was a new 
weekly Heti Világgazdaság, which since 1979 concentrated on fluctua-
tions in the world economy and reflected a more open and business-
oriented political culture. In 1980 the magazine reported, for exam-
ple, how McDonalds’ had 5,700 restaurants in the world.39 In Finland 
the company landed four years later, in 1984, for the first time. Three 
years later Budapest was the first city in the former Eastern Europe to 
accept this vanguard of globalisation.  
Increasing commercialism and consumer oriented way of liv-
ing could be found both in Suomen Kuvalehti and Magyarország. 
In 1964 Magyarország advertised ‘television to every house’, 
while Suomen Kuvalehti argued in 1977 that colour television 
would in five years be as cheap as the current black and white 
one. Catching the rainbow meant also the dream of a private car. 
In the late 1970s every fourth Hungarian car was the Soviet made 
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Lada.40 In Finland Lada became relatively cheap and popular 
particularly among the working class – in 1981 Toyota, Datsun 
and Lada were the three most popular cars sold in Finland. 
There were even years in the 1980s, when civil servants in both 
countries used vehicles coming from the Soviet Togliatti factory. 
Soviet trade and particularly Soviet oil played an important 
role in the relative welfare of both – two thirds of the Finnish oil 
originated from the Soviet Union as the journalist of the Heti 
Világgazdaság observed in 1981. During those days the Soviet 
Union was with its 25 per cent of import Finland’s strongest 
trading partner. The amount had increased close to the Hungar-
ian level, 28-29 per cent in 1979.41 Pictures of Soviet delegations 
raising toasts after successful negotiations became current col-
lective experience of Finns. However, prosperous trade was 
linked with political relations as later will be emphasised.  
On the contrary, trade between Finland and Hungary re-
mained small. In the 1970s Hungary and Finland signed an 
agreement and abolished customs in the transition period of 
1975–1985. In spite of some progress Finland remained only 
among the dozen most important trading partner of Hungary. 
The export consisted of tubes and textiles while the import in-
cluded mainly paper and chemical pulp. In addition to Finland, 
Mexico and Iraq had entered into an agreement with COME-
CON in the mid 1970s.42 
‘Keeping up with the Joneses’’ presupposed hard work and 
did not always succeed. In the 1960s ’kicsi vagy kocsi’ i.e. the 
choice between a baby and a car became a slogan in Hungary. 
On the other hand, the state could not offer enough of some 
consumer goods either. For example, in 1978 there were only 
103 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants. The amount was seven 
times less than in the leading countries United States and Swe-
den. In this sense Czechoslovakia was the most advanced in the 
socialist camp and outstripped Hungary almost two times.43 
The slogan ‘Csak egy telefon’ – just a call – could have solved 
many problems but the lack of telephone became itself a prob-
lem in everyday life. 
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A five-day working week was established in Hungary in 1981, 
balanced to 40 hours three years later, modelling on other coun-
tries in the Soviet bloc. Not only one or two Hungarians noticed 
that they needed several jobs to maintain their standard of living 
in the 1980s. The idea of the ‘second economy’ was officially ac-
cepted in 1980 to complete state socialist structures. Reforms 
were re-activated in 1983 to encourage small scale private busi-
ness. Those known as the ‘new rich’ had either connections and 
networks around the party, worked abroad or participated in 
private business already at that time. The first income tax in the 
former Soviet bloc was enacted in 1987. According to a slogan, 
Hungarians had Ethiopian wages but Swedish taxes. 
Hungarians had started to rethink their reforms in 1983 at the 
same time, when one of the Finnish leading bankers began to de-
mand liberalisation of the money markets for the first time.44 In the 
1980s Finns had already more self-confidence – not least because dur-
ing the first half of the decade the economy grew as fast as the Japa-
nese. The expression ‘the Northern Japan’ originates in Suomen Kuva-
lehti from 1984 and was a few years later spread out even into Hun-
gary. In general we could read the idea in between the lines of Magyar-
ország that Hungarians were rather surprised that Finns had industri-
alised their country since 1960s and done it surprisingly silently.  
Although Finland was not a command economy, planning had 
existed in Finland as in many other capitalist mixed economies. Par-
ticular community planning came to the fore in 1960s and broad-
ened in the sectors of economy, too. It is important to emphasize 
that in the first place community planning concentrated on the fu-
tures of different communities, not on the society as a whole. Plan-
ning took place in provinces, counties, schools etc. The first ‘five 
year plan’ came into being in 1968 and it dealt with the economy of 
the country, drawn by the Ministry of Finance.  
 
8 The Priority of Foreign Relations 
In the 1970s Brezhnev argued that if political relations were in or-
der, also other relations will be good.45 In the Finnish case this 
meant first of all the interpretation of the 1948 FCMA, a corner-
stone of Finnish post-war policy. Therefore we study in the follow-
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ing chapters the influence of foreign relations on political culture in 
Finland and Hungary. A fundamental point in FCMA was the idea 
that if Germany or her allies would attack to Finland or the Soviet 
Union through Finland, Finland will fight with all of her forces 
available. They would do it inside Finland’s borders, and ‘in case of 
need assisted by the Soviet Union or together with it.’46  
When the West integrated Germany in the late 1950s, indi-
rectly the FCMA concerned NATO operations as well. Accord-
ing to the second paragraph of FCMA, Finland and the Soviet 
Union ‘will negotiate with each other, if the threat of a military 
attack […] has been noted’. These words introduced the key to 
understand Finland’s post-war policy, political culture and 
power struggles. The questions how the threat of a military at-
tack should be defined, when it should be noted, and by whom, 
became highly essential issues in sophisticated political debate. 
From the Finnish point of view the best alternative was to 
keep the initiative in Finnish hands. It was a hard task for the 
Finns to persuade the Soviets to trust that the treaty was 
enough and no other means were needed to secure the Soviet 
border. For the first time the treaty was tested before the presi-
dential elections in 1961. Khrushchev had warned earlier that 
those who do not vote Kekkonen, vote also against the friend-
ship of Finland and the Soviet Union. The conflict known as the 
note crisis was solved by a personal meeting and mutual talks. 
The incident further strengthened Kekkonen’s position, and the 
importance of personality in the political culture. 
In politics words matter and when dealing with the Soviets 
they were particularly important. Diplomatic culture was based 
on communiqués which became an essential part of political 
culture. They defined Finland’s international position and, thus 
played a great role in the ‘struggle of neutrality’, as Juhani 
Suomi named his book. By recognising the idea that the country 
was not neutral Finland would have deteriorated her own posi-
tion in negotiations. Finnish negotiators had to maintain their 
trust in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. At the same time, they 
had to persuade them to accept the Finnish view, i.e. to believe 
that the state of affairs was as Finns wanted it to be.47  
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Instead of neutrality the Soviet Union recognised only Finland’s 
efforts to be neutral until 1989. Crucial point in the debate was 
whether neutrality or the FCMA should come first. The Soviets 
doubted, whether by emphasizing neutrality Finns would diminish 
their military commitments expressed in FCMA. In 1957 negotiat-
ing parties accepted a communiqué, which highlighted neutrality. 
However, in 1969 the communiqué did not mention the word at all 
but stressed the idea of FCMA for the first time. After a long politi-
cal wrist-wrestling a new definition of ‘peace loving neutral policy’ 
emerged in 1971. These formulas belonged to diplomacy with the 
other communist state leaders as well. Among them the GDR 
seemed to be a more loyal follower of the Soviet path than Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria.48 
On a metaphoric level the struggle of words in foreign policy 
started to resemble the trinity schism in the medieval church. 
Policy was known as the ‘line’, named after its high priests 
Paasikivi and Kekkonen, and had its ‘liturgy’, ‘heretics’ and ’or-
thodox’ followers. There were even Mauno Koivisto’s ‘fortune-
tellers’, a concept which tried to cut down speculative com-
ments concerning the potential threat of nuclear weapons on 
Finnish territory. Features of mysticism and ‘occultism’ 
emerged in political culture in the fear that open discussion 
leads to speculations, which could come true and finally harm 
the country. Instead, it was frequently more convenient only to 
turn to ‘liturgy’ and repeat old but well-known phrases of 
friendship and policy of good neighbourhood. 
In spite of the FCMA Finland strove to represent herself as a 
neutral country for domestic and international audiences. 
Finland’s political leaders described the policy as an exception 
and neutrality ‘of a particular kind’. At the international level 
Kekkonen’s Finland liked to act with the metaphor of a doctor 
and avoid direct judgements and moral statements. In the UN, 
for example, this policy led to abstaining from voting if a state-
ment interfered to matters, in which the interests of the super-
powers were in contradiction. The policy caused also problems 
and speculation like in the case of Hungary 1956, of Afghanistan 
1979 or of US policy in Vietnam. 
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However, Finland’s international position was not as stable as 
the contemporary public wanted to see it. The Soviet Union op-
posed Finland’s western integration including criticism for joining 
the EFTA and the OECD – or even the membership in the Nordic 
Council. Although nothing ‘very serious’ happened the last major 
attempt to bind Finland tighter to the Soviet sphere of influence 
took place in 1978. At that time the idea of joint military practices 
was floated, but was not presented for the greater public, for exam-
ple in contemporary Suomen Kuvalehti.49 
The idea of Finnish neutrality was very significant for small so-
cialist countries.50 This is one of the reasons why Hungary, Bul-
garia and Czechoslovakia were reluctant to accept the Soviet for-
mula of ‘peace loving neutral policy’, when they were dealing 
with Finland. They desired to maintain and increase their own po-
litical space. However, we must acknowledge that already the 
whole point of departure was different. Hungary and the others 
belonged to a military alliance and participated in military co-
operation in the frame of Warsaw Pact. Moreover, Soviet troops 
did not leave Hungary as they had left the base of Porkkala in 
Finland in 1956. 
Internationally Hungary had become quite isolated during 
the first post-1956 years. The situation changed essentially in 
1962, when the Hungarian question was lifted from the UN’s 
agenda – reciprocally a general amnesty of 1956 revolutionaries 
took place in March 1963. The year 1964 particularly seemed to 
promise a new era. Several new embassies opened in Budapest, 
the weekly Magyarország was launched and even Finns started 
organised tours to Hungary that year. 
In Hungary communist ideology was not the only factor to de-
fine international relations. Already in 1957 Kádár had made the 
distinction between capitalist and imperialist countries: If Sweden 
was not imperialist; Finland was even less so.51 However, the Soviet 
Union, the first state-socialist state and a superpower, was without 
doubt in a privileged position in relations to other states. The Cen-
tral Committee defined several times its fundamental theoretical 
thesis, i.e. the tight co-operation with the Soviet Union.52  
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Until 1967 USA was one of the last three countries in the 
world with whom Hungary maintained diplomatic relations 
only at the level of legation. After the Cardinal Mindszenty’s 
case was finally closed in 1973, relations with the Vatican also 
normalised. Finally the Hungarian government gained a moral 
victory when the old crown, the crown of Saint Stephen was 
returned from the United States in 1978, where it had been 
stored since 1945.53 
In Europe Hungarians started to open relations with Finland 
and Austria, and even with West-Germany in the 1970s. In fact, 
both Finns and Hungarians had had a troublesome relation 
with the FRG and her strengthening role in the NATO. The 
Western countries had established relations to the Federal Re-
public and the Eastern Bloc with the Democratic Republic, but 
Finland did not have normal relations to either of them. Finally 
both Hungary and Finland confirmed diplomatic relations with 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1973. At the same time 
Finland set up the relations with the GDR as well. 
In the 1970s Hungary’s foreign policy was further activated by 
the visits of Gandhi, Tito, Kreisky and Mitterrand in 1982, and 
Bush in 1983. When Margaret Thatcher prepared for a visit to 
Hungary in 1984, mutual communication with the two super-
powers was reduced to a minimum. Years later, in 1993, Thatcher 
recalled her trip that ‘it was through eastern Europe that we 
would have to work.’ Her message to Kádár (read: to Kremlin) 
was that ‘the West and Reagan personally were genuinely seeking 
disarmament’. However, Thatcher noted how she had to take se-
riously Prime Minister Lázár’s caution that the worst thing she 
could do ‘was to cast doubt on Hungary’s remaining part of the 
socialist bloc’. Hungary had gone the ‘furthest along the path of 
economic reform, although they (sic!) were anxious to describe it 
as anything but Capitalism’.54 
Thatcher’s notes disclosed not only limits of political space or 
how good relations to the East opened more space in the West. In 
addition, they revealed the Cold War political context, in which 
also rash and unwise statements of the West could harm small 
countries. Particularly during the first half of the 1980s it is strik-
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ing how Magyarország is full of concern of the consequences of 
the armament.55 Both in Hungary and Finland the Soviet rela-
tions played a decisive role although their military relations were 
based on different policy. Despite the FCMA there are no signs 
that Hungarians would have considered Finland as a ‘brother 
country’, viz. neutral, in the weekly Magyarország. 
 
9 A Few Peculiar Features 
In fact, relations with the Soviet Union limited political space in 
both countries. In Hungary Kádár stressed that the domestic 
status quo was the best Hungarians could achieve. Kekkonen re-
ferred to John F. Kennedy’s words that foreign and internal affairs 
were inseparable. However, if either of them was not in order, in 
Kekkonen’s interpretation it had always to be domestic politics.  
In Finland say in foreign relations increased domestic politi-
cal power. Politicians divided each other to goats and sheep on 
the basis of how they could cultivate friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union. At first FPDL tried to monopolise the idea of 
friendship arguing that they were the true friends of the Soviet 
Union.56 Mediating political role between the states subse-
quently increased the power of the agrarians. Until 1968, social 
democrats had adjusted their foreign relations, and thus be-
came ‘fit for the court’, hovikelpoinen as Finns used to say. The 
right wing NCP tried to follow the path and reformed itself to-
wards the end of the 1970s. In spite of these efforts it could not 
participate in the government between 1966 and 1987.  
Building trust in the eyes of the Soviets was one of the most 
peculiar phenomena in Finland. Politicians tried to find out the 
Soviet point of view in advance and estimate what the Soviets 
might think. A glimpse of this was noted also by the Hungarian 
reporter Endre Sümegi: if the trust is missing between Helsinki 
and Moscow, everything remains a dead letter in spite of inter-
national agreements.57 Kekkonen was the prime example of 
building personal relations, whose behaviour was followed 
gradually by other politicians. Numerous consultations in the 
Soviet Embassy at Tehtaankatu in Helsinki are already a concept 
in the laity discussion of the Kekkonen era. 
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Politicians aiming at reaching the top level of national poli-
tics needed special relations and had to build connections. In 
politics everybody needs connections, but in Finland an unoffi-
cial institution came to being: kotiryssä, the ‘home Russian’. 
Kotiryssä made friends only with the most significant politi-
cians to exchange information. For the greater public the ‘habit’ 
of unofficial form of political friendship was unknown until the 
pamphlet Tamminiemen pesänjakajat was published in 1981. In-
stead of normal newspaper channels journalists of the national 
daily Helsingin Sanomat published this ‘samizdat’ under the 
pseudonym Lauantaiseura. Journalists needed anonymity just at 
the time, when Kekkonen finally resigned and the struggle over 
his successor tempered political agenda. In Kekkonen’s Finland 
many journalists had accompanied official political culture and 
avoided critical publicity contrary to Britain, for example. 
The second peculiarity in Finnish official political culture con-
cerned the KGB. Until the beginning of the 1990s politics of trust 
was carried out not only through normal diplomatic channels but 
also with the more direct ‘party channel’, the KGB. Intelligence and 
counter-espionage had belonged to the traditions of Kremlin and 
even Kekkonen himself had served in the Finnish secret police in 
the 1920s. Although rumours and pieces of information belong to 
everyday diplomacy, there is also the grey area dividing national 
interest from high treason. As Seppo Hentilä has noted, the major-
ity of discussions stayed in the frame of normal, official diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, some politicians crossed the borders of propriety, and 
information was received in the embassies particularly of both 
Germanys, United States and the Soviet Union. More typical, how-
ever, was it to maintain good relations with the kotiryssä than to spy 
him or her.58 
The Soviet influence increased after Kekkonen had personally 
solved the night frost crisis of 1958. At that time the FPDL had 
won the elections but other parties refused to co-operate with it. 
The crisis broke out, when the Soviet leaders did not hold trust in 
the new broadly based government. Since then Finns have de-
bated whether Kekkonen crossed a Rubicon and let the Soviet Un-
ion intervene on domestic political agenda. One of the most obvi-
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ous examples is the 1979 elections, when the Soviet Ambassador 
to Finland wrote in Pravda, which parties were acceptable in the 
government and which, like the National Coalition Party, were 
not. Although the Ambassador had to leave Finland after the elec-
tions, the winner of the elections, the NCP did not participate in 
the government. 
However, election victory constitutes only one factor in the 
formation of government. The fact was not typical only for 
Finland but for the whole Western Europe after 1945. Victory 
has only guaranteed positions in the negotiating table. Particu-
larly in Italy those who lost the election participated also in the 
new government.59 In 1979, the left was not yet ready to co-
operate with the NCP, and Finnish traditions did not favor 
purely left-wing or bourgeois coalitions. Although some MPs 
welcomed the idea of a ‘red-blue’ coalition already in 1979, so-
cial democrats were only ready to co-operate with the NCP in 
1987, which also ended the era of ‘red-ochre’ and is considered 
a closure of the ‘second republic’. 
These phenomena could be placed under the umbrella of 
‘finlandization’, a highly contested concept since its appearance 
in the FRG in the 1960s. In 1978 Walter Laqueur threw further 
oil into flames and argued that Finland’s internal adaptation 
had exceeded its geographical limits. Scholars have found sev-
eral origins to ‘finlandization’ since then: already the end of war 
in 1944, the Hungarian crises of 1956 and the night frost crisis in 
1958. The most clever politicians, however, have understood 
the political realities, and the whole situation appears more Ma-
chiavellian in both Paasikivi’s and Kekkonen’s diaries.60 
Still, the years 1978–1981 provide more or less serious exam-
ples for further discussion of ‘finlandization’, either referring to 
the Soviet influence and its consequences in Finland or in the 
use of foreign policy as a weapon in domestic power struggles. 
For example, the subscription of the comic Aku Ankka (Donald 
Duck) was cancelled from some public libraries in Helsinki, ef-
fectively sending a negative image of the country to the interna-
tional community. A year later, in 1979 leading politicians re-
fused to give an interview to the BBC, the President refused to 
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comment on the experiences of the Winter War in Swedish ra-
dio. The way in which Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen in-
trigued with the Soviets to gain support in the President cam-
paign of 1982 is the striking example of this practise.61 How-
ever, on the eve of the elections Mihail Suslov anticipated that 
there were no essential differences between the candidates 
Koivisto and Holkeri, the former chairman and the reformer of 
the NCP. The statement was not a clear recognition for 
Koivisto, whose opponents reminded of the lack of his personal 
connections with the Soviets.  
At the time, however, even the Radio Free Europe criticized 
the concept of ‘finlandization’ in its background materials. Its 
commentator Kevin Devlin argued how this ‘complex of poli-
cies is sometimes viewed in oversimplified terms as being 
based on special relationship with Finland’s superpower 
neighbour, the Soviet Union. In fact, it involves much more 
than that, which is why the use of that vaguely evocative word 
“finlandization” generally contributes a lot more heat than light 
to discussion of international affairs […]’. Devlin concluded his 
report by stating: ‘(I)f commentators insist on using the abrasive 
term “finlandization”, they may perhaps be reminded that so 
far it has been successfully exemplified only in Finland’.62 
For the Hungarian public ‘finlandization’ (finnesítés) was a 
positive concept. In Hungary Kádár tried to strike a balance be-
tween international commitments and national interests, be-
tween principles of socialist internationalism and Hungarian na-
tional consciousness. In principle, foreign relations had to be ad-
justed in the frames of communism, the ultimate interpreters of 
which were in Moscow. In 1971 Kádár argued to news agency 
UPI that international laws existed in building Socialism, but at 
the same time the work was done in national frames. Kádár con-
tinued that Hungarians were developing socialist democracy, 
finding proper answers to the contemporary questions. He de-
nied consistently the existence of a certain ‘Hungarian road’. 
When the same question was asked again years later, Kádár re-
ferred again to the ‘international laws in building Socialism’, but 
also to historical examples, to socialist patriotism and interna-
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tionalism, which hinted that socialist models could not be cop-
ied. Nevertheless, in 1982 and 1983 he still denied the existence 
of a particular Hungarian model.63  
Compared to the Finnish policy of trust, the constellation in 
Hungary appeared more complicated. Why should the Soviet 
Union trust Hungary? After all, Imre Nagy had declared Hun-
gary’s sovereignty in 1956 and withdrew from the Warsaw 
Pact. The burden of testimony became even harder, because 
Stalin had named the Hungarians ‘a guilty nation’ referring to 
the Second World War. Kádár stressed that no anti-Soviet 
Communism had existed, exists or will exist. The emergence of 
Euro-Communism particularly in France and Italy was a par-
ticular theme in official political culture. When Kádár replied an 
inquiry of New York Times, he used the term ‘so called Euro-
Communism’. Still in 1986 the concept was put in brackets in 
the political dictionary together with the concept of national 
Communism.64 In Kádár’s political culture ‘national’ emerged 
only in the framework of the party and in co-operation with the 
Patriotic People’s Front. 
Although Soviet comrades guided the interpretation of the 
principles of Communism, the bloc itself did not appear as a 
model for all Finnish supporters of Socialism, for example. Ac-
knowledging it publicly, however, caused protests by the Soviet 
authorities. When right-wing parties opposed Socialism in gen-
eral, they could defend the status quo even by the reversed 
Brezhnev doctrine: only a capitalist Finland could remain inde-
pendent, a socialist would slide into the Soviet bloc. Contrary to 
many other countries, FCP did not split until mid-1980s but main-
tained an artificial unity with the help of the Soviet Communist 
Party.65 Radio Free Europe observed carefully the steps of the dis-
pute, but Magyarország did not pay much attention to it. Interest-
ingly, the weekly referred frequently to the more ‘national’ and 
‘Euro-Communist’ Kansan Uutiset, instead of the clearly pro-Soviet 
Tiedonantaja. Finally, the Moscow oriented Democratic Alternative 
participated in the parliamentary elections in 1987 for the first time 
– also symbolising the end of the ‘second republic’. 
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In the 1990s, Hungarians have argued that taboo topics ex-
isted during the state socialist era. Among these were Trianon, 
1956 or the Soviet troops in the country. Furthermore, there was 
the question of Hungarian minorities. In fact, a demonstration 
supporting Hungarian minority in Transylvania in the summer 
of 1988 was the biggest gathering since 1956. Kádár’s Hungary 
was vigorously careful not to provoke neighbouring countries 
in minority questions. In fact, early statements in 1958 helped to 
deteriorate minority statuses in Czechoslovakia and Romania. 
In the end of 1960s the situation had recovered in some sense. 
In the Helsinki Summit of 1975 Kádár was ready to give an ac-
count of the losses in Trianon for the first time.66 
In Finland, politically delicate matters were leaked to Swedish 
newspapers whilst Hungarians learned to use Western press to 
publish certain information. Instead of pre-censorship, the decision 
depended on individual journalists and publications in both coun-
tries. For example, György Aczél denied censorship but finally ad-
mitted that he might have had some kind of influence on matters.67 
In Finland there are some delicate cases related to foreign relations, 
when either the publisher refused to publish the book or later with-
drew it from the markets. Still in the mid-1980s publishing 
Paasikivi’s diaries or general Syrjä’s book Gruppa Finlandija recalling 
his experiences in the Soviet military academy caused debates in 
political leadership. We cannot generalise the extent of Soviet con-
trol, but at least one case is known when the Soviet Ambassador 
himself checked the supply of bookshops in Helsinki.68 
On the other hand censorship existed in Finnish film industry 
and mostly concentrated on sex and violence. Also a few political 
cases of censorship occurred, such as films full of anti-Russian pa-
thos before 1945, films reflecting presumptions of the Cold War or 
finally the debut action film of the Finnish director Renny Harlin 
in 1986. Although Hungarian cultural policy was dictated by the 
party, it could deal with relative delicate topics as well. Beside 
Hungarian pop classics and literature, we should definitely men-
tion one of the best but not the most famous political satire in the 
socialist bloc A tanú (The Witness, 1969/1979). Although the film 
drifted between the categories of ‘forbidden and tolerated’, it is 
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likely that the making of the film could not have been possible in 
Kekkonen’s Finland.  
In the light of the earlier chapters, it is not surprising that the 
high-budget film of Finnish-Soviet co-operation was titled Luot-
tamus (Trust, 1975). The film tells a story of Finnish independ-
ence and Lenin’s role as a guarantor of it. Particularly after 
1989, this mass production has become a symbol of ‘finlandiza-
tion’, not least because it was shown at schools as a part of a 
teaching curriculum. However, we ought to bear in mind that 
co-productions existed also in other countries as a part of dé-
tente, for example in Yugoslavia. Hungarians had some experi-
ences from these already in the 1960s. Finally, even Hungarians 
and Finns worked together in Vámmentes házasság (Duty-Free 
Marriage, 1980), a script of a delicate nature: a Hungarian wo-
man and a Finnish man entered into matrimony on paper in 
order to get the woman out of Hungary.69 
In the 1970s Suomen Kuvalehti noted that Finns ‘enjoyed’ at 
least twice as much eastern TV programme as the other West-
European countries. Generally speaking the ‘East’, however, 
bought three times more television programme from the ‘West’ 
in the beginning of the 1970s than the ‘West’ from the East’. The 
amount took ca. 10 per cent of the broadcasting time in the 
‘East’ contrary to two per cent in the ‘West’. However, a large 
number of ‘Eastern’ films represented new cinematography art 
in the West, among them many Hungarian films.70 
Evidently the Soviet shadow led also to peculiar features 
both in Finland and Hungary. In Hungary, however, culture 
flourished on the outskirts of the officially supported and unof-
ficially tolerated. Despite ‘Eastern’ signs, in Finland we have to 
admit that in the late 1970s, ‘punks’, ‘teddies’ or ‘duskiness’ i.e. 
the strong Western influence could not have been further es-
tranged from official political culture.  
 
10 Politics, History and Commemoration 
In the late 1980s some Finnish journalists and publishers tried to 
argue that the Winter War had been ‘forgotten’. At the time a new 
spectacle film Talvisota (The Winter War) was under way. Although 
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filmmakers and the media concentrated more on the new version of 
the film Tuntematon Sotilas (The Unknown Soldier, 1985), historical 
information about the Winter War was also available. Moreover, a 
long TV-serial Sodan ja Rauhan miehet (The Men of War and Peace) 
was seen on television in the end of 1970s. Peculiar to Finland was 
also that novels on the World War II were published annually, a 
phenomenon absolutely absent in Kádár’s Hungary.71  
These examples lead us to focus on public representations of 
history and history writing. They certainly are tied to politics 
and political cultures. The education system in general takes a 
stand on how the past should be remembered and understood. 
In addition to these, there are deeper culture based differences. 
These existed even inside the socialist bloc: communist regimes 
re-built badly damaged Royal Castles in Budapest and Warsaw 
contrary to Berlin, in which they blew them up. A difference 
was found between Finland and Hungary when reception of 
literature was studied in the late 1980s. An experience of the 
presence of history was part and parcel of being a Hungarian, 
whereas committing oneself to history was surprisingly insig-
nificant for Finnish readership.72 
Hungarian Miklós Szabó considered the legacy of Romanti-
cism a part of political culture of the region: in East Central 
Europe people express their political views through historical 
examples and myths. The stalinist system between 1948 and 
1953 created its own historical myths and progressive traditions 
of the poor and oppressed people. According to Szabó, how-
ever, Kádár’s system denied and annihilated the whole his-
tory.73 This is not true, but, as later will become clear, relation to 
history and politics was problematic in Hungary. 
In Finland the recent history, the era since the independence 
in 1917, has been studied particularly well – in this comparison 
Hungarian perspective is essentially longer beginning already 
from the 10th century. Especially two contested eras have come 
to being in Finland: the years 1917–1918 and the period of the 
Wars. What was studied in the first period was the Finnish in-
dependence and Lenin’s role in it, the controversial civil war in 
1918, both of which were revisited in Kekkonen era.  
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Lenin’s role in being the first to recognise Finnish independ-
ence, was – whether only of tactical nature and temporary or not – 
important in creating an excellent model of stabile co-existence 
between two political systems. President Kekkonen used this ar-
gument a couple of times since he unveiled a plaque in Leningrad 
in 1959 which commemorates Lenin’s recognition of Finnish inde-
pendence. The fact that Finnish independence was recognised by 
the founder of the Soviet state could be used to propagate the 
country’s position to the contemporary Soviet leadership. This in 
mind, Kekkonen criticized Finnish historians, who had doubted 
the genuineness of Lenin’s motives. More or less Lenin’s role was 
praised in diplomatic speeches until late 1980s. In 1987 historian 
Eino Ketola argued in Suomen Kuvalehti that Lenin’s views should 
be forgotten – a standpoint which still caused to ban his lecture.74  
The second and more controversial topic, the war in 1918 and 
particularly bloody reprisals afterwards, gained new perspectives 
in the Kekkonen era. Until the 1960s, the history of losers was ne-
glected until Väinö Linna published a trilogy Täällä Pohjantähden 
alla (Under the North Star). The book was filmed on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the war and shown in television in 1970. At the 
time one million Finns saw the film, which, according to Viikko-
sanomat, was roughly the same number as saw the popular con-
temporary American soap opera, Peyton Place. Not only did the 
film influence people’s views of the conflict but also the new stud-
ies, which similarly reflected the views of the losers. It seems evi-
dent that even Kekkonen himself had participated at least in one 
of those executions, which moulded his later political thought and 
ideas of integration.75 
The second period that preoccupied historians and politi-
cians was the one of the Wars (Winter and Continuation). Since 
the 1960s Finns committed self-criticism and speculated, 
whether the war in 1939 could have been avoided. In a speech 
for the 25th anniversary celebration of the FCMA Kekkonen 
dealt with the topic, and on the 30th anniversary of the armi-
stice in 1974 Kekkonen criticised the theory that Finland had 
just drifted like a log in a river to the German side in the Second 
World War. These speeches raised a political storm in conserva-
HEINO NYYSSÖNEN 
 50
tive circles.76 According to Kekkonen, Finland’s policy of neu-
trality was possible, but at the expense of disengaging and 
breaking with the past, the ‘political 1930s’. In this sense 
Kekkonen represented historical thinking, in which future was 
definitely more important than the past. Recent history was 
seen as a story of success whilst more critical light was cast onto 
earlier decades. In his role as a President he used history several 
times in the service of foreign policy. In this he was not alone, 
as Dieter Langewiesche has noted, all Presidents of the German 
Federal Republic used to interpret history in their speeches.77 
Moreover, the lessons of the World War played a role in con-
temporary policy as well. The threat that ‘history repeats itself’ 
flavoured with subjective conclusions of the war influenced on 
political thought. Kekkonen emphasised Prime Minister Kosygin’s 
words about the shock how German troops could push until the 
river Volga in the Second World War. In Magyarország Kekkonen 
stressed that the Soviets will never forget it and will not let it hap-
pen for the second time. Kekkonen feared particularly that the up-
rising of 1953 would repeat in the GDR and nationalists in the 
Federal Republic would join them.78 In Hungary open mourning 
of the Second World War did not happen. On the contrary, erect-
ing memorials to the liberating Soviets had been one of the first 
activities of the new Hungarian state after the war. Plaques com-
memorated resistance and martyrs but not in general those who 
had fell in the fronts or vanished in the catastrophe of Don, when 
the whole army perished. It is amazing to notice that the idea of a 
memorial was brought up so late as in February 1989 in the Cen-
tral Committee.79  
The Day of Liberation, 4 April, was defined the most impor-
tant official festival, although it did not appear to attract sub-
stantial popular identification.80 The provisional government 
declared it a public holiday immediately in April 1945. The an-
niversary of the 1848 Revolution, March the 15th and the Inter-
national Labour Day, May the 1st, were also declared holidays 
at the same time. However, 15 March became complicated for 
the new rulers and partly for its ‘bourgeois’ nature. In the 1950s 
they abolished the holiday status of the day but Imre Nagy re-
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stored it during the 1956 uprising, and in 1957 Kádár and his 
companions restored the former practice. Instead, Kádár 
wanted to found the new Communist Youth Organisation, 
KISZ, precisely on 15 March. The appeal was finally published 
on 21 March, which was the anniversary of the establishment of 
the Soviet Republic in 1919.81 Politicians struggled about the 
legacy of Hungarian history and about who could complete 
these historical demands in the present. 
No doubt communist regimes carefully prepared themselves 
for different celebrations and anniversaries. We cannot under-
estimate May the 1st or the anniversary of the Russian Revolu-
tion 7th November either, a holiday as well as a public square 
in Budapest. Contrary to Hungary, the day did not have the 
same status in Finland. Political elite participated in the celebra-
tions in the Soviet Embassy, which was also the custom on the 
anniversaries of the FCMA.  
The most important feast in Finland, however, takes place on the 
Independence Day, 6 December. The President of the Republic or-
ganises a reception in the President’s palace. Beside foreign Ambas-
sadors, prominent citizens have the honour to receive an invitation 
to this pseudo-Monarchist event. Moreover, days for national Great 
Men have been striking in Finland. The army marched in parades 
on the birthday of Mannerheim, and Johan Ludwig Runeberg, J.W. 
Snellman and Aleksis Kivi had all their special days. In politics 
Snellman’s birthday, 12 May has also had a nationalist flavour as 
the ‘Finnish Day’, whilst the death of Swedish King, Gustavus the 
Second was commemorated as the ‘Swedish Day’. 
In addition to public commemoration, we must ask also the 
opposite: what was not commemorated in official political cul-
tures. In Hungary the new meaning of the Saint Stephen’s Day, 
20 August, is a good example. In 1949 the new constitution of 
The People’s Republic was timed and celebrated on that day. In 
official political culture the day was dedicated for new bread as 
well, which tried to diminish the religious meaning of the day. 
In Finland Mannerheim’s birthday was more suitable for the 
whole nation after 1945 and it substituted the 1918 victory pa-
rade of the white army. In the 1970s there was a proposal to 
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celebrate the day of the 1944 armistice as a second Independ-
ence Day. The idea was quickly shot down and nowadays 
represents a clear symptom of ‘finlandization’. Another failed 
attempt came from the Soviet side in 1986: the seventieth anni-
versaries of the October revolution and Finnish independence 
could be celebrated together.82 
In the Hungarian code of law there are particular memorial 
statutes, which since the nineteenth century have ‘codified’ ex-
traordinary events or persons. During the Kádár era the Soviet 
liberation was enacted into law both on the fiftieth and twenti-
eth anniversaries. The memory of the first Soviet Republic was 
codified on its fortieth anniversary in 1959. A peculiar form of 
commemoration emerged in the Academy of Sciences, which 
organised particular sessions to commemorate anniversaries of 
historical Great Men. The fiftieth anniversary of the October 
revolution was honored in the Academy as well. 
When we deal with commemoration, we could notice that Hun-
garians had to come to terms with a loss of an empire. As Schöpflin 
formulated it, ‘a substantial proportion of Hungarian opinion feels 
that the body of the nation […] has been cut off from it’.83 This his-
torical experience has ignited wider historical debate as well. In 
1960 historian Erik Molnár demystified the concepts of nation, peo-
ple and homeland, which he considered as unities which had not 
been questioned even during the stalinist years. Aladár Mód an-
swered that patriotism had not been false consciousness, and thus 
influenced on the further development of the concept of socialist 
patriotism. Another debate became public in 1987, now between 
Hungary and Romania, when Hungarians had published a history 
of Transylvania. In the socialist Hungary a public commemoration 
of the losses of Trianon, such as Transylvania, was not allowed.84 
Evidently lost territories have influenced mentality and 
political culture also in Finland. The first award of selling 
30,000 records was given away in Finland in 1960 for the 
song Muistatko Monrepos’n? (Do you remember Monrepos?), 
which referred to a park in the city of Vyborg, which was lost 
to the Soviet Union, in 1940 and 1944. In official political cul-
ture the question of regaining Karelia to Finland did not exist 
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during the Kekkonen era, although it still played a small role 
in his election campaign in 1956. Lost territories were a deli-
cate matter: for example, Mauno Koivisto and Björn Alholm 
have told in their autobiographical writings a humorous de-
tail, how the Soviet Ambassador disapproved of Karjala (Ka-
relia) beer, which was served at a reception in the late 1960s.85  
We should not dramatise these nostalgic signs, but there is no 
use to underestimate them either. Particularly this is true for the 
memory of 1956 during the Kádár era. As late as in 1988 the party 
prohibited ‘a commemorative procession to memorialise the events 
of 23 October 1956’. First black mourning flags had appeared on 15 
March, 1957, and some placed candles in their windows for the 
honour of 1956. In this sense, All Souls Day on the 1st November 
repeated commemoration to feed political expectations.  
In Kádár’s Hungary public commemoration of 1956 repre-
sented official political culture and history of winners, who con-
sidered the event as a counter-revolution. For the ruling HWSP, 
the attack on the party headquarters at Köztársaság tér on 30 Octo-
ber 1956 had been the most important evidence of the counter-
revolutionary character of the rebellion. Laying wreaths at the 
square and the cemetery of Kerepesi, became a part of annual 
communist rituals. Although Kádár could emphasize socialist 
achievements and boasted to Kekkonen in 1973 that 1956 was 
hardly remembered anymore86, forgetting was not that simple. 
Between 1957–1962 ca. 22,000 people were sentenced in courts, 
among them 250-350 to death including the former Prime Minister 
Imre Nagy. Beside these also earlier injustices caused bitterness as 
discrimination ‘for political reasons’. 
Challenging openly the history of winners would have en-
dangered an individual’s career. Beside general dissatisfaction, 
1956, however, was finally the main factor in unifying various 
groups, including former neo-marxists in the 1980s. The years 
1986–1987 repeat again here: in December 1986, non-conformist 
activists organised the first illegal conference in a private apart-
ment. The organisers collected a bibliography of 1956, used a 
pseudonym and published it as a samizdat. Political nature of his-
tory became even more apparent, when the Committee for His-
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torical Justice, Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottsága, was founded ille-
gally in June 1988. In the founding document they insisted on 
‘the full moral, political and juridical rehabilitation of victims, 
both alive and dead, from the revenge which followed the revo-
lution’. They demanded reliable history writing on the post-1945 
period, documents from 1956 to be published, and national me-
morial as well as the reburial of the executed persons.87 
In general, history writing in Hungary had more room for ma-
noeuvre than in other socialist countries. Still recent history and 
particularly 1956 were the most difficult topics of all, in particular, 
because of the origins of the existing power structure and contem-
porary leadership and their responsibility in 1956. In political cul-
ture, there was an atmosphere of secrecy and concealment, because 
not everyone had the access to documents or Western literature. 
Such literature was branded in libraries with the letters Z.A. (closed 
material) and required a special permission.  
The questions of power and its relation to history writing 
were not unknown in Finland either. The law concerning 
documents was changed a couple of times since 1952. Par-
ticularly documents concerning foreign policy have been the 
Achilles heel. In 1986 Juhani Suomi, a civil servant in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, received exclusive rights, in fact 
a monopoly, to Kekkonen’s papers. Suomi, a professional his-
torian, had made a political career in the same party as 
Kekkonen. Suomi’s role in the history writing of Kekkonen 
has been a constant topic after each volume, which he has 
published.88 Although Suomi has completed a good job, we 
cannot avoid the conclusion that his priviledged situation re-
sembled the position of party historians in Kádár’s Hungary. 
 
11 Cult and Sport as Politics  
In addition to history writing and commemoration we have to 
study different forms of cult more closely. Particularly when we 
deal with the political cult of death and Great Men, there are 
numerous examples to commemorate. We can speculate that 
even the naming of national broadcasting channels reveals some 
differences between Finnish and Hungarian (political) cultures. 
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In Finland they used quite pure and simple naming Yleisohjelma 
and Rinnakkaisohjelma (‘General Programme’ and ‘Parallel Pro-
gramme’), whereas Hungarians stressed their bold national history 
and Great Men. Their national radio channels were named after 
revolutionary heroes of 1848, Lajos Kossuth and Sándor Petőfi. In 
1987 the third programme was named after composer Béla Bartók. 
In the late 1950s the construction of a special Workers’ 
Movement Memorial got under way at the Kerepesi Cemetery 
in Budapest. From then on, communist politicians and other 
high officials were buried in the same cemetery in which other 
important figures in Hungarian history, such as Lajos Bat-
thyány, Lajos Kossuth and Ferenc Deák. They represented the 
1848 tradition and were visible all over Hungary alongside with 
the National Poet, Vörösmarty, military hero Hunyadi, nobles 
Rákóczi and Széchenyi. Although Lenin Boulevard and the 
Road of the Red Army existed in the centre of Budapest, the 
above mentioned national heroes were the most popular street 
names in the capital. In other words the number of national he-
roes commemorated was striking also in Kádár’s Hungary.89 
However, we could not underestimate the value of Great 
Men in Finland either. The Russian Tsar Alexander the Second 
still stands in the centre of Helsinki. The vast majority of late 
Finnish Presidents have their statues in the capital. During the 
Kekkonen era, five of Kekkonen’s predecessors received a me-
morial statue near the Finnish Parliament. From the remaining 
two Risto Ryti was more problematic, because he had been sen-
tenced to imprisonment on the basis of responsibility in the 
Continuation War. As late as in 1989 his case was politically 
delicate, and Prime Minister Harri Holkeri was reluctant to 
make a speech at his tomb on the centenary of his birth.  
According to the current Suomen Kuvalehti, politics in Finland 
was still made at graveyards. However, the case of Holkeri on 
Ryti's grave was quite insignificant compared to Hungary of the 
time where the past was literally dug up. In spring 1989, Imre 
Nagy and his compatriots were exhumed and reburied. The cere-
mony took place on the Heroes Square, which is also the site of the 
unknown soldier and had symbolic value as well. In Finland So-
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viet leaders used to commemorate and lay a wreath on Paasikivi’s 
tomb – Kádár followed the same path in 1983 – until Yeltsin hon-
oured Mannerheim during his visit in 1992. Until then Manner-
heim had represented reactionary traditions for the Soviets: in the 
1960s the Soviet Union sent a note to the Romanian government, 
when Romanians had laid a wreath on Mannerheim’s grave.90  
When we deal with the political cult of living political lead-
ers, it seems that it was not the stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi, 
who brought personality cult to Hungary. Roots of the phe-
nomenon are older: it is enough to study Hungarian legislation 
during the Dual Monarchy and Horthy era. Although Rákosi 
celebrated his own 60th birthday in 1952 in a pure stalinist pat-
tern, the Hungarian party ‘de-canonised’ him in September 
1956. At the same time they changed the name of the factory, 
named after him. Party organs also pushed through a principle 
that streets should not be named after living persons.91 
Kádár seemed to follow this line of thinking and lived relatively 
modestly compared to some other communists. Contrary to his pre-
decessor, Kádár’s 60th birthday was neither compatible to Rákosi’s 
nor were there as many pictures of contemporary leaders hung on 
party conventions92. Neither did Kádár reveal much of his personal 
life; Hungarians themselves did not know much about their leader. 
In Magyarország Kádár only once disclosed something about of his 
free time: if there was any time left he used to read books93.  
However, it seems evident that in this sense a wider cult of a 
leader existed in Finland than in Hungary. Kekkonen was ‘pop’ 
and an idol in Finland. He was presented as a superman, who 
skied, fished and even might have been able to dance rock and roll 
– as Jarkko Laine and his band crystallised it to the public in the late 
1960s. Kekkonen, already called with the nicknames ‘UKK’ and 
‘Urkki’, won three times the title of the ‘most popular Finn’ pub-
lished by the periodical Viikkosanomat since 1953. De facto, he was 
the only politician who could compete with writers, sportsmen or 
the Finnish Miss Universe Armi Kuusela. For example, in 1970 Viik-
kosanomat wrote that ‘UKK is still pop and the second popular Finn’ 
– when a javelin-thrower had passed him.94 
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No doubt Kekkonen was popular, and particularly among peas-
ants and working people. Kekkonen did not behave like a ‘master’ 
but rather like a ‘lumberjack’, who met ordinate people and spent 
his leisure time out in the nature. A public image of a common man 
has been an advantage for a prominent leader in Finland. Biogra-
phers and journalists, for example, stressed Koivisto’s working class 
background and noted his big ‘worker’s hands’. Still Kekkonen and 
Koivisto essentially helped their own careers through academic 
channels and degrees, whilst Kádár’s working class background 
was combined with some self-education.95  
Kekkonen was a democrat in his principles but an autocrat of 
his character, as Max Jakobson has pointed out. Still many peo-
ple considered the President as a counterpart to ‘party power’, 
who should take positions beyond party intrigues pelin politiikka 
(‘politics of game’). Many understood this Bonapartism and ex-
pected their leader to use his power. This mentality could be 
read, for example, from numerous delegations, which arrived 
from provinces and asked an audience from the President. Even 
the activity of the leading protest singer, Irwin Goodman, 
seemed to culminate in an intention to write a letter to 
Kekkonen, who should stop unemployment in Finland.96 
When Kekkonen’s period in office was prolonged by an ad 
hoc law, the leading political cartoonist Kari Suomalainen com-
mented the event with his cartoon, set in a school: ‘If we do not 
behave ourselves, the Principal would come’.97 Thus, we ought 
not to underestimate the mentality of subjection; people be-
lieved that they need a higher authority, which to honour, to be 
afraid of but also to use against political rivals. Finnish political 
culture resembled a play of children on a sandpit boasting and 
giving a fright to each one of their potential and powerful pals. 
Kekkonen represented the continued tradition of powerful 
leadership in which a Russian Tsar had substituted Swedish 
King. Loyalty to ruler helped the nation. In these circumstances 
it was no wonder that a street was named after Kekkonen in the 
capital, when he celebrated his 80th birthday. The same year 
also an institute, National Park and a medal bore his name. An 
icebreaker Urho had been christened years earlier. Suomen Ku-
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valehti also participated in the building of this personality cult. 
In the autumn of 1975 the magazine published a supplement 
with 165 photos to the honour of the 75 years old President.98 
However, more embarrassing is the fact that Kekkonen’s face 
was found in the new 500 Fmk banknote. Contemporary banknotes 
had the pictures of two other presidents, Ståhlberg and Paasikivi, as 
had ‘Finland’s National Philosopher’, J.W. Snellman. They repre-
sented the canon from the mid-1950s to mid-1980s, in fact the 
Kekkonen era. When new notes were put in circulation in Decem-
ber 1986, they introduced composers and scientists, not Presidents 
anymore, not even Kekkonen. In Hungary artists and rebels repre-
sented the canon of the era, culminating in Béla Bartók in 1983. In 
the 1990s they had to give space for older kings, which further 
strengthened the canon of historical Great Men.  
However, Kekkonen’s critics should not forget how the ex-
tensive rights of the President were guaranteed by the constitu-
tion. The constitution was created only a year after the civil war 
as a compromise between the leftist and rightist political forces, 
the latter of which had favoured a king. In fact the constitution 
fed to the idea of leader cult in political culture and allowed for 
the concentration of political power to one person. Even more 
essential is to bear in mind that the 1973 extraordinary law was 
not as extraordinary as usually thought to be. Instead, it de-
rived from political culture in which national interest was con-
sidered the highest value and surpassed the idea of democracy. 
Already the first President Ståhlberg was chosen by the Parlia-
ment in 1919, and the 1937 electors were used also in 1941 (Ryti) 
and 1944 (Mannerheim). In 1946, the Parliament chose Presi-
dent Paasikivi by an extraordinary law. The undemocratic idea 
further appeared in discussion several times: in 1949 by 
Paasikivi, and then by other politicians in 1955, 1966 and 1976, 
thus somehow before almost all elections.99 
Evidently Kekkonen was perceived as a great and a startling 
man in his time. According to Magyarország ‘still at the age of 69 
there is posture and lightness in his step’. In 1970 the periodical 
told how Kekkonen had surprised international journalists in 
Helsinki. Kekkonen had gone to skiing and could be reached 
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only after two days.100 The periodical claimed that as a young 
man Kekkonen had become a national champion in skiing. Al-
though this is not true – Kekkonen won the championship in 
high and triple jump – he, nevertheless, also led a national sport 
organisation in the 1930s and 1940s. Two nation-wide sport or-
ganisations, Finnish Central Sports Federation and the Workers’ 
Sports Federation represented Finland’s dichotomic political 
culture for many decades after 1918.  
Definitely, sport played a role in both countries and represented 
political strength on national and international scene. Particularly in 
the Cold War, world-wide competitions were more than sports. 
Some of the Hungarian highlights concern particularly the stalinist 
era of Rákosi like the Olympics in Helsinki 1952 or the football match 
against England in 1953. The water polo game between Hungary 
and the Soviet Union in Melbourne 1956 represented already a trag-
edy. The boycott of Los Angeles 1984 only continued the tradition to 
use international arena for political purposes. At this time most 
communist ruled countries stayed home – Romania participated but 
Hungary supported the initiative of the Soviet Union. 
Finns were on the top specially in skiing: before 1968 de facto 
Scandinavian countries and Finland had shared the medals. 
Skiing was also the most popular winter sport among citizens 
and it was encouraged by the state. No wonder if ‘Finns were 
born with skies’: particular skiing holidays were organized at 
schools and even the Parliament, Eduskunta, had skiing cham-
pionships. During Kekkonen’s reign collective phenomenon 
kansanhiihto (people’s skiing) challenged men to ski ten kilome-
tres, women five, and three kilometres was the norm for chil-
dren. In 1970 a record number over 1.3 million Finns partici-
pated in the competition. A mass skiing event, Finlandia-hiihto, 
existed since 1974, and because of Kekkonen was a diligent 
skier, sport happenings were even named after him.  
When Koivisto was elected President, even the cover of Suomen 
Kuvalehti introduced the brand new President and his wife with 
skies.101 Thus, definitely skiing had also to do with political cul-
tures of Finland. Even a pejorative concept of perässähiihtäjä (liter-
ally, the skier who follows in the shadow) emerged in the political 
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vocabulary. He/she was a person, who waited his/her own 
chances next to the President, – might even have skied with him 
but did not dare to win. Frankly speaking, ageing actualised the 
question of successor, which then shadowed politics in the 1970s. 
In Hungary the same problem personified a decade later in Kádár, 
who was twelve years younger than Kekkonen.  
Besides skiing, sauna and bathing belonged to Finnish political 
cultures. A Hungarian commentator even pointed out in Magyar-
ország that Finns did not have only work lunches or diners but the 
sauna as well: in its heat they decided the questions of the coun-
try.102 Particularly Kekkonen’s sauna in Tamminiemi and the 
sauna in the Parliament became famous. In addition, the sauna 
was an excellent place for silent unofficial negotiations. According 
to Kekkonen, gentle atmosphere created a mood of reconciliation. 
The core of Finnish political culture, however, did not always be-
come clear outside the country. Minister Max Jakobson wrote that 
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk joined only with great difficulties 
the other bathers, when he visited Finland in 1966.103 
Although the sauna has become a concept in Finnish political 
culture, it has raised also criticism against politics and politi-
cians. Sitting in the heat and intriguing outside the session hall 
was not considered work in the proper sense. Like hunting and 
other unofficial networks in the socialist countries, the sauna 
frequently ousted women from ultimate decision process. The 
sauna united but evidently created inner circles and other ob-
scure cliques, who could agree the political agenda in advance. 
In other words, the sauna is a peculiarity in Finnish political cul-
ture. Also sport was considered particularly important, and Kek-
konen himself posed as a vital sportsman. Not only in sport but in 
many other ways Finland’s personality cult reached startling dimen-
sions, when we compare it to Kádár’s Hungary, in which the cult of 
historical Great Men was striking even during the communist rule. 
 
12 Travelling Politics 
When Archie Brown explored political culture, he paid atten-
tion also to tourism and workers travelling abroad for employ-
ment. Both lead people to compare living conditions in differ-
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ent countries. Moreover, travelling is a structural phenomenon 
to influence on the change of political culture: between 1950 
and 1990 international passenger traffic grew 18 times. The 
semi-official trips between particular friendship cities are im-
portant, too. The idea of friendship towns resulted in the Fin-
nish-Hungarian case in the first agreement between Lahti and 
Pécs in 1956, followed by many other contacts. 
In Finland the high amount of visits Kekkonen made to the So-
viet Union is striking. In fact Kekkonen visited Soviet Union an-
nually after 1958, representing Finland either in state visits or 
combining unofficial discussions to his holidays. Partly this was 
due to his task to create personal contacts to Soviet leaders, partly 
as a consequence of the night frost crises in 1958. The number of 
official and unofficial visits reached already 30 in 1977. The East-
ern ‘orientation’ strengthened even, when Kekkonen visited first 
GDR in 1977 and then FRG two years later.104 
In Britain and in the USA Finland’s foreign policy was un-
derstood better after Kekkonen’s first visits in 1961. Kekkonen 
was also the first West-European leader to travel to Hungary in 
the 1960s. Kekkonen arrived unofficially only a few months af-
ter the general amnesty in 1963, and before UN General Secre-
tary U Thant’s visit. When Kekkonen arrived for the second 
time in 1969, the status of the visit was raised to a state level at a 
time, when détente was a general slogan of the date. Mutual dia-
logue continued at the highest level in Finland four years later 
and again in Budapest in 1976. In the 1980s Koivisto visited 
Hungary twice, during his first year in office 1982 and later in 
1988, whilst Kádár returned the call in 1983.  
Kekkonen’s visits were highly valued in Hungary. In 1976, ac-
cording to Magyarország, his name had become a concept. On the 
contrary, a report of Koivisto’s first visit was surprisingly lacking in 
the magazine. The question was not of any disagreement. Accord-
ing to Kádár a year later, Koivisto and Kádár did not need many 
words to understand each other. After Kekkonen, Koivisto seemed 
to remain somehow more distant and ‘abstruse’ also for Hungari-
ans, for example, in an interview of Magyarország in 1986.105 
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When Kádár met the Finnish Ambassador Jyrkänkallio in 
1973 he told he regretted that he was not one of the most diligent 
travellers.106 If this was the proper reason, Kádár made an effort 
in the subsequent years: Austria 1976, Italy, West Germany and 
Yugoslavia in 1977 and France a year later. To Britain he trav-
elled for the first time in autumn 1985 as a return visit Thatcher’s 
visit. The new Prime Minister of 1987, Károly Grósz was in 1988 
the first Prime Minister to negotiate with the British PM. The 
new party leader Grósz visited United States also in the summer 
of 1988. In the Soviet Union and particularly at the receptions of 
the anniversaries of the Great Socialist October Revolution Kádár 
was present alongside other communist leaders. 
In addition to their Presidents, Finnish politicians loved to 
travel, particularly to Hungary. Suomen Kuvalehti noticed the 
popularity of Budapest already in the beginning of 1975. After 
Moscow Budapest had become the second most visited city by 
Finnish ministers in the mid-1980s. Between 1983 and 1986 offi-
cial visits were directed to Hungary more often than to Wash-
ington. Budapest was four times more popular than Bonn and 
surpassed three times East Berlin.107  
In addition to this ‘Eastern deviation’ there has been some 
popular disapproval of this whole ‘privilege’ of travels the poli-
ticians had. Beside Risto Ryti the President who had no statue 
in the capital and therefore was not particularly famous but in-
stead remembered of his travels as ‘Reissu-Lassi’, the Traveller, 
President Lauri Relander. However, travelling belongs to the 
duties of politicians but evidently both countries also ‘re-
warded’ their representatives in terms of trips. Therefore we 
cannot underestimate the question of who was able to travel 
and was invited. The argument whether a politician had an of-
ficial invitation to Moscow was repeated in the 1981 presiden-
tial campaign. The official delegation of the NCP did not re-
ceive invitation to the Soviet Union until 1988.108 
In Hungary, it became possible to travel to the ‘East’ without 
visa in the 1960s. Travellers needed a so-called red passport, whilst 
a blue passport entitled a journey to the ‘West’. One tourist trip was 
possible in three years, for seeing relatives the limit was two years. 
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Organised tourism, i.e. by the tourist agencies was not included to 
these limits. Since 1982, Hungarians could do travel abroad once a 
year, but hard currency was guaranteed only every three years. 
New passport without any restrictions was introduced in 1987.109 
Despite these restrictions, tourism was an important topic in 
Hungary. For example, Magyarország published annually adver-
tisements of the state owned tourist company, which reached 
their peak in the end of the 1970s. On the first three-quarters of 
1964, 1.077,909 Hungarians had travelled abroad, although a 
small minority, 56,143, to non-socialist countries. Organised 
tourism had, however, quite different rates: 120,000 already in 
1963. In 1975 five days in Krakow cost 1950 forints and two 
weeks in Kiev-Riga-Tallinn-Moscow 6,900ft – compared to 
monthly salary of 3,100 forints of a salaried staff.110 
On the other hand we should not forget those, who travel into 
the country. For example in January-August 1973, around 5.1 mil-
lion tourists visited Hungary. Two years later Finns dominated mu-
tual rates more than nine times: 2,500 Hungarians visited Finland 
whilst 23,000 Finns travelled to Hungary. When visa between both 
countries was abolished in 1970, for Hungarians Finland was ‘the 
only one from the so-called Western countries without a visa’ at the 
time. In 1978 compulsory currency exchange was cancelled, and 
Austria became a visa-free country the following year.111 
No doubt, holidays abroad and possibilities to increase political 
knowledge by travelling were luxury in both countries. In an in-
ternational comparison from 1967, Finland did not belong to the 
top 12 countries (10 European, USA and Canada) from where the 
103.9 million out of the total 139.1 million tourists originated. In 
the 1970s economic growth brought with it upstarts as well, for 
example, Kalevi Keihänen, a bohemian businessman, who started 
his own charters to ‘the South’. According to current Finnish Tour-
ist Office, travelling abroad was considered either a status symbol 
or a fashion at the time. Towards the 1980s the status slowly van-
ished and mass tourism topped in around two million.112  
Soviet Union was the most popular country to travel from 
Hungary in the beginning of the 1980s. Finns, with 15 per cent, 
formed the biggest group arriving from capitalist countries – 
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every fourth trip from Finland was directed there during those 
years. Some of the visitors became politically even more critical 
towards the Soviet Union, whilst the others explained short-
comings as labour pains, and the rest did not care. After 1945, 
Finnish official political culture did not use the pejorative world 
‘ryssä’ (ruskie) but travelling warmed these memories up. Also 
a special concept, vodkaturismi, vodka tourism, emerged in Fin-
nish political vocabulary. For example, in 1969 44,000 Finns vis-
ited Soviet Union, among them 700, one and a half per cent, 
who caused some disorder during their travel.113  
Finally, traveling was part of ‘the youngster question’ i.e. re-
lated to the post-1945 generation. In Hungary the number of these 
travellers doubled to 180,000 between 1967 and 1972. When inter-
rail train ticket was established in 1972, also GDR, Poland, Hun-
gary and Yugoslavia participated in the agreement. In 1973 inter-
national discount ticket was sold also in Hungary: Rail Europe 
Junior gave discount in 11 eleven European countries.114 
So, Kádár-Kekkonen era has been significant in travelling and 
mass tourism. Unfortunately, no information was found how trav-
elling was connected to travellers’ or their parent’s political and eco-
nomical status. Still we can suppose that tourism, cheaper travelling 
possibilities and student exchange programmes helped to open po-
litical views or even the systems and political cultures as well. In the 
Finnish case we must bear in mind that new methods in education 
started to stress more international views in the 1980s. Internation-
alism in education (kansainvälisyyskasvatus) was still a quite contro-
versial idea in the 1970s. In Hungary there is some evidence that 
travelling encouraged samizdat literature. Finally some ‘voted with 
their feet’ and did not come back from abroad. For example, in 1986 
3,295 Hungarians did not return – which was under 0.5 per cent out 
of 708,000 who travelled.115 
 
13 Finns and Finland in Hungarian Eyes and Vice Versa 
When Kekkonen described Finnish foreign policy in Kremlin in 
1958, he used an expression of ‘national character’. According to 
Kekkonen foreign policy was in congruence with some essential 
features of Finnish national character: it reflected seriousness, 
POLITICAL CULTURES IN FINLAND AND HUNGARY   
 65
peaceful, moderate and realistic approach to political matters. 
Many, many years later a Hollywood script writer of Hungarian 
origin, Joe Esterhas described his ex-countrymen’s character of 
being aggressive and passionate bordering self-destructive. More-
over, they judge their opinions too hastily, are narrow-minded 
and even anti-semitist and racist.116 
We may consider both statements extreme, and, in the latter 
case coloured by the bitterness of an emigrant. Nevertheless, in 
Finnish literature there are metaphors of a quiet, little slow but 
pig-headed figures like Runeberg’s Sven Dufva or Topelius’s 
servant Matti, who was not a beautiful man contrary to Tope-
lius’s image of brave and high-minded Hungarians. On the 
other hand, as Elek Fényes has pointed out, temperament, 
haughtiness combined to friendliness and hospitality character-
ised Hungarians of the same era in the 19th Century. Even if 
these are rough generalisations and stereotypes, they express 
something about preconditions and circumstances, in which 
people live. In political culture they reveal also attitudes and 
prejudices of the rhetorician itself and how people relate them-
selves and their history to other cultures.117 
For example, a Hungarian journalist wrote in 1971 that accord-
ing to a Hungarian popular belief Finns belong to world’s calmest 
(leghiggadtabb) peoples and travelling to Finland confirms it. The 
writer wondered particularly the nature of ‘the silently functioning 
parliament’, in which they dealt with social and domestic problems 
without particular emotions.118 Therefore, finally, we study how 
Finns and Hungarians saw each other, and their political cultures, 
in Magyarország and Suomen Kuvalehti respectively. It seems possi-
ble that Mauno Koivisto’s idea of keeping ‘low profile’ reveals 
something essential from Finland and her recent political culture. 
The low profile in a discussion made it possible to leave sharper 
stands in reserve for potential use. By contrast, the Hungarian way 
to debate seems to take a more ‘provocative’ profile.  
In politics Magyarország considered Finland’s constructive policy 
to be a stabilising element in Northern Europe representing peaceful 
coexistence between different political systems. The weekly also con-
firmed the essential idea of this article, i.e. how important the word 
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ulkopolitiikka, foreign policy, was in Finland. Rapid development of 
the country was considered as a good example of achievements of 
rational, peaceful and realistic politics. In 1978 they defined Paasikivi-
Kekkonen line already as ‘political realism based on historical lessons 
and the acknowledgement of the geographic situation.’119 
Although the reports sometimes praised Finland, the whole 
picture is still much more realistic than idealistic. Crisis in the 
government was not considered extraordinary and the question 
of Presidency essential in Finnish political system. A Hungarian 
observer emphasized in 1973 that not even the French president 
had such a political power as his Finnish colleague. In 1977 
Kekkonen had already become ‘the symbol of the country’s in-
ternational position’. The picture of the Finlandia House, the 
venue of the 1975 European Summit in Helsinki, repeated in the 
stories, thus, symbolized the country itself. ‘Finlandization’ was 
explained positively, i.e. from the point of view of Finnish lead-
ership and as a phenomenon, which was insulting Finns.120 
A critical point was found in tourism: for the Hungarian ob-
server Finland’s paradoxical attraction was based on the fact 
that it did not have any attraction at all. Moreover, prices in ho-
tels and restaurants were high, ‘beyond Hungarian pockets’. 
The writer concluded that Hungarians should carefully con-
sider to which country to travel once in following three years. 
At the time, 1976, a week in Finland cost more than ten days in 
Vienna or London. Finns themselves were described positively: 
a tourist cannot feel any discrimination in spite of economic 
limits, as it is ‘alien for Finnish mentality’ (lélektől idegen). Finns 
were ‘silent, modest people, who do not boast and brag.’121  
However, we must bear in mind that Magyarország and Suomen 
Kuvalehti wrote to their domestic audiences in the first place – usu-
ally only a few times a year appeared an article concerning the 
other country. In some reports there were, naturally, simplifications 
– like the Finnish economy ruled by 20 families, Swedish People’s 
Party representing big capital, etc. Maybe more serious was the ar-
ticle on Kekkonen’s 70th birthday, when they tried to make him 
‘one of the most determined opponents of the war’ referring to the 
Second World War. In spite of these defects the weekly concen-
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trated on world politics dedicating usually one page for a country. 
More ideologically tainted language was used in the editorials, and 
particularly in the mid-1970s.122 
Advertisements in Hungary were considered such an extraordi-
nary thing that they were worth a story in Suomen Kuvalehti. At the 
time, 1972–1973, the fate of the market mechanism was speculated in 
the weekly. When related to increasing mutual cultural connections, 
Hungary was, however, more or less absent in the magazine. The 
few articles between 1975 and 1979 dealt with the end of free abor-
tion and the literature scandal (see Raija Oikari’s article), Hungarian 
children, letters from Balaton and Budapest and its spas in 1979.123 
On the other hand, the first years of the 1980s seemed to be some-
how more active. Suomen Kuvalehti noticed how Kádár had admit-
ted that the country could not reach the aims of five-year plan, and 
the norms for the years 1981–1985 would be more moderate. Al-
though Hungary would be loyal to her foreign political commit-
ments, the country liked to decide its standard of living and culture 
itself. According to journalist Marketta Kopinski, intellectuals in 
neighbouring countries envy relatively broad freedom of speech.124  
Thus, economy was one of the most focused points in Hun-
gary in the 1980s. Already in 1981 Finnish Broadcasting Com-
pany’s reporters paid attention to Hungary ‘Toisenlainen talous’ 
(Another kind of Economy). Two years later Hungary was al-
ready ‘a surprise in the socialist camp’, foodstuffs ‘overflowed’ 
in the market-hall. The ‘old beauty’ was ‘almost like a Western 
city today’. The good image of Hungary further developed, and 
political commentator Knud Möller already could estimate in 
1983 that Kádár would probably be chosen in free elections as 
well. A year later Suomen Kuvalehti noted first forint million-
aires in a country without a feeling of ‘the big brother’ – even 
the general greyness of socialist environment had vanished.125 
On the other hand, particularly critical or ‘hostile’ articles 
were not published in Suomen Kuvalehti in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Journalists viewed Hungary in the frame of socialist countries – 
not in the context of Nordic countries or West Germany. In 1976, 
the anniversary of 1956 was present as well, when they inter-
viewed István Nemeskürty, the later grey eminence of the Hun-
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garian conservatism. At the time Nemeskürty had the view that 
Kádár was the most glorious statesman in Hungary in three 
hundred years. Nemeskürty stated that he did not belong to the 
party but was ‘on the same side with Kádár […] Kádár’s chosen 
road was maybe not the best but it was the only one’. Ten years 
later non-conformist László Rajk had his turn in Suomen Kuvaleh-
ti. According to Rajk, Hungarians did not speak about their ac-
tions in 1956. None of Rajk’s friends had mentioned whether 
their father had been a freedom fighter. For the non-conformist 
activist the reason was that they were still afraid.126  
In 1986 Hungary was the country which already ‘tosses on 
the borders of Socialism’. A ‘turbo era’ had arrived in Socialism 
in the form of the first formula competition. Other new phe-
nomena paid attention to were ‘Hungarian Rambos’, body 
building and punk rock. Later, in March 1988 the weekly fore-
told political crisis and how the trust in Kádár was eroding. A 
peaceful revolution was observed already in March 1989, by 
journalist Harri Saukkomaa, thus before the negotiations in the 
round table and the reburial of Imre Nagy. Finally, according to 
Saukkomaa, the MDF won the elections in 1990 by stressing na-
tional consciousness and history, compared to free democrats, 
who had favored more rational and European values.127 
 
14 Conclusion 
In this piece of research I have studied political cultures in Finland 
and Hungary. Instead of a seeing political culture as a single unit, 
I have taken the concept as a methodological tool and a starting 
point to compare both societies. At the same time comparative as-
pect has been a great challenge simply because political culture 
could not be separated from culture in a wider sense.  
Evidently the idea of progress and social justice were com-
mon tasks for unified political cultures in both countries. The 
idea of a dominant political culture in Kekkonen’s Finland em-
phasized integration and avoided sharpening conflicts and di-
viding people. In Hungary, the old statehood, ’small liberties’ 
combined with passive acceptance of the Kádárism character-
ised the system since the 1960s. 
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At structural level there are more differences than similari-
ties between presidential democracy of Finland and Hungary’s 
‘soft dictatorship’. Although Hungary showed signs of market 
mechanism, Kádár could still argue in the 1980s that 98 per cent 
of the means of production were in social ownership, which is a 
huge difference compared to a mixed economies. However, 
similar phenomena and problems existed at the level of politics, 
although the answers to current problems differed. Both lived 
in the shadow of the Soviet Union, had a common border with 
it and faced the political interference of the super power.  
Communication between Finland and Hungary increased 
considerably since the late 1960s. However, it is striking that in 
Magyarország the special relationship was not given special atten-
tion. The Hungarian weekly concentrated on world politics and 
referred to the most important events, usually dedicating one 
page for one country. Sometimes Finland was considered 
‘friendly’, however, not a brother country, a concept, which was 
reserved for communist ruled countries. Although some liturgy 
and rhetoric of friendship repeated in speeches of occasion, com-
pared to Soviet friendship they were at much more equal level. 
Concepts like ‘realism’, ‘national interest’ and ‘spirit of Helsinki’ 
appeared beside ‘kinship’ to describe mutual relations. 
Finland’s personality cult reached startling dimensions, 
when compared to Kádár’s Hungary. Although politics and po-
litical cultures became personified in both countries, Hungary 
at the time was lacking these outer signs of strong personal 
leadership. At a personal level Finnish and Hungarian leaders 
seemed to understand each other very well. Kekkonen com-
mented in his diary already during his first visit that Kádár had 
made an impression of a really pleasant and reasonable man 
with a sense of humour and quiet irony.128 When Kekkonen 
passed away, it was Kádár, who commemorated him at a re-
quest of a Finnish publisher in an article, which was published 
both in Finland and Hungary.129 
The relation to national history in political cultures is reveal-
ing in both countries. Finnish independence and ‘statehood’ 
were considered young, whilst Hungarians stress their long-
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standing medieval traditions. Moreover, it seems evident that 
traditional historical thinking, in spite of communist indoctrina-
tion, remained stronger in Hungary than in Finland. We can 
find a difference in political cultures, which was confirmed in 
the comparative study of literature in the late 1980s. An experi-
ence of the presence of history was a part of being Hungarian, 
whilst committing oneself to history was surprisingly insignifi-
cant in Finland. However, national identity did not ‘vanish’ in 
Finland either but compared to earlier decades it was revisited 
during the Kekkonen era. Hungarians have been – and may still 
be – ready for more radical changes than Finns on the basis of 
their political cultures, subjective views of politics and history. 
Finally, as Seppo Kääriäinen has noticed, 1987 ended the 
‘red-ochre’ agrarian-industrial project, which he considered as 
the answer on the challenges of the Finnish ‘second republic’.130 
The same year was essential also in Hungary, although the 
proper Rubicon was not yet crossed. In this sense Kekkonen’s 
death in 1986 – he had resigned in 1981 – finally closed an ep-
och in Finland, whilst Kádár’s burial less than three years later 
belonged already to a new era. Finally, Finland was the last 
‘most eastern country of the West’ to become a member of the 
Council of Europe in 1989. Hungary, ‘the most western country 
of the East’, was the next to join a year later. 
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1 The Years of Evil 
In Hungary there are two political lines: the first one is trying to 
get out of the war and eager to get into the Anglo-American sphere 
and the other one is willing to fight with Germans because Hun-
gary’s destiny will anyway be bad when Germany loses the war.1 
This is one of the last messages Finnish authorities got from 
Budapest in April, 1944, before the Allied forces started 
bombing it. In these bombings the residence of the Legation of 
Finland was also destroyed and the last official information 
channel from Hungary to Finland silenced although the last 
Finnish diplomats left the country as late as in October. 
Diplomatic relationships had already been cut off in September 
due to the regulations of the peace treaty Finland had 
concluded with the Soviet Union on September 17th 1944.2 By 
this time Hungary fell under the Red Flag. Finland was still 
waiting for her destiny. 
Politically and militarily Finland and Hungary were in a 
somewhat similar situation in spring 1944. Both countries had 
German troops on their soil and both were under the threat of 
becoming occupied by the Red Army. During the year 1944 the 
Finns succeeded in preventing the Russian troops from entering 
Finland, but according to the peace treaty, Russians leased the naval 
base of Porkkala near Helsinki and occupied it. The Hungarians 
were forced to accept Red Army occupation. If we seek any 
similarities between post-war Hungary and Finland, one of them 
was the Allied Control Commission. In Hungary it was led by 
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Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and in Finland the authority was 
exercised by General Andrei Zhdanov, both high in the Soviet 
Union’s nomenklatura. However, politically the differences were 
striking. During the era 1945–1948 Finland succeeded in securing 
her political position both internally and also partly in foreign poli-
tics but Hungary glided rapidly towards communist dictatorship. 
The Finns did not know what was going on in Hungary right 
after the War. The reasons were obvious. First, there was the 
armistice agreement with the Russians which dictated that Finland 
break off official relations with Hungary. Finland lost its only 
reliable source of information from Hungary. Second, Finland had 
enough domestic problems of her own and there was not much 
time or capacity to follow what was going on in Hungary. The 
Allied Control Commission – run determinedly by Russians – was 
the actual authority in Finland. Domestic policy was in turmoil. 
Communists gained power and there were serious doubts whether 
Finland would remain an independent country or not. In these 
circumstances the problems in the eastern part of Central Europe 
were not so very interesting in Finland. Nevertheless, the free press 
mentioned pieces of news which told the depressing fact. At the 
same time when Finland was struggling for her independence, 
Hungary was losing it.3 
The years 1945–1949 are crucial when we start to evaluate 
two different processes of the two small countries. In Finland a 
unique political development was started but Hungary became 
one of the Eastern European communist states, one of the Soviet 
Union’s European satellites.  
Finland and Hungary did not have any official relations during 
the years 1945–1949.4 The Finnish press was concerned about what 
was going on in Eastern Europe in general but it did not worry so 
much about the destiny of Hungary, because the looming fear in 
Finland was all the time the same. If the Russians were bold 
enough to act in the way they did in the Central Europe, what 
would happen to Finland? This was the point and the mood, 
which can be sensed in President Paasikivi’s diary in which he 
quotes Anthony Eden’s speech in the British Parliament printed in 
The Times 20 June 1947: 5 
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Where was the next move to be? Would it be in Finland, hitherto 
comparatively free from external pressure? There have already 
been rumors of threats [of Russians] against the right-wing Agrari-
ans and to a lesser degree against the Social Democrats. 
Paasikivi himself was more confident about Finland’s future 
when he met a representative of Agence France-Press, Maurice 
Chourot in November 1947. The President pointed out that Finland 
is in a totally different situation compared to Hungary and other 
central Eastern European Countries. The range of difference was 
wide, it was philosophical and intellectual. Paasikivi emphasized 
that in his opinion Finland would never become occupied by the 
Red Army.6 He based his political thinking on the long experience 
of dealings with the Russians and thought that the geopolitical 
position of Finland was not a reason why Russians would occupy 
Finland. Later studies have proved his view correct. Russians 
hoped that Finland would eventually become a communist 
country, but only if the Finnish communists themselves could 
accomplish it. However, they failed.7 In the heart of Europe the 
situation was quite different. Hungary among other small countries 
of the Eastern part of Europe was in trouble. 
Hungary made an unofficial request to Paasikivi in November 
1946, asking to re-establish diplomatic relations because Finland’s 
political position was better than theirs. The President was not 
interested in the idea. Hungary and Finland were waiting for the 
Peace Conference to be held in Paris and before that it was practically 
impossible even to think about restoring official relations. The 
request can be seen as a desperate gesture to gain more appreciation 
from the West. It was only after the Peace Treaty that relations could 
be re-established on the 20th of May 1947.8 By that time Hungary 
was already under the harsh leadership of Mátyás Rákosi.9 
It is worthwhile studying the attitude of the Rákosi regime 
towards Finland especially in the late 1940s and particularly 
how Hungary reacted to Paasikivi’s re-election in February, 
1950, and to the Finnish survival story. It was obvious that the 
Hungarian post-war political society would be different 
compared to the one in Finland. How to explain this to the 
Hungarians? One may assume that Paasikivi was a respected 
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figure in Hungary, not because of his non-socialist political 
background but because he was known to be a peace-maker 
and a man who was evidently respected by the Russians. 
Surprisingly the attitude was completely the opposite. The 
Finnish chargé d’ affaires, Uno Koistinen, who arrived in 
Hungary in February 1950, seems to have been extremely 
surprised by the writings he read in the Hungarian news-
papers. Actually he was so astonished that he wrote his first 
report from Hungary as a secret one and not in the series of the 
normal confidential reports from Budapest.10 
Koistinen was very annoyed by the way the Hungarian 
Press wrote about Paasikivi. Basically, Paasikivi should have 
been a good choice but that was not the opinion of the 
Hungarian press. For example, Szabad Nép wrote: ‘The Finns 
have chosen a President for the next six years. He is J. K. 
Paasikivi who represents the reactionary powers and the 
capitalists’. The paper also mentions the names of two other 
candidates, supposedly more suitable ones; they were Finnish 
People´s Democratic League’s (FPDL) Mauno Pekkala and 
Urho Kekkonen (Agrarian Party). Another newspaper, 
Világosság, was even cruder. It told to its readers that Paasikivi 
was a butcher of the Finnish working class; it was he who was 
responsible for killing 40,000 workers and for torturing 84,000 
more in internment camps.11 Világosság referred with these 
false accusations to the losses of Reds during the Finnish Civil 
War of 1918 in which Paasikivi played an insignificant role. 
Why did the official Hungary see Paasikivi as an advocate of 
evil capitalism and ‘reactionary’ forces. Did Rákosi’s regime 
collect political points from the Soviet Union? This cannot be the 
reason. Even though Paasikivi was a capitalist he was after all a 
realist. To Paasikivi the foundation of foreign policy was the fact 
that the Soviet Union was Finland’s neighbour, had won the war, 
and the only way Finland could survive as an independent state 
was to achieve good and mutually reliable relations with the new 
superpower. The Russians appreciated this and a man such as 
Paasikivi.12 A more likely explanation is that the official, ultra-
communist ideology hated everything that came from the West. 
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This could be coupled with the bitterness Paasikivi had caused in 
resisting the Russians and the Finnish communists in particular. 
The most obvious reason, however, was the Soviet attitude 
towards Paasikivi; the Russians did not want Paasikivi to be re-
elected.13 To summarize the situation: Finland did not follow the 
Hungarian road to Communism and it was easy to put the blame 
on the President. The communists had started to persecute various 
enemies from ‘old’ social democrats to freemasons and the church. 
Hungary had turned inwards; the world outside was either an 
enemy or a friend. Paasikivi was a capitalist enemy. 
In view of this background the meeting of the first post-war 
Finnish diplomat in Budapest with the representatives of the 
Hungarian government in February 1950 must have been filled 
with expectation. At first Koistinen met Foreign Minister Gyula 
Kállai in an uninformative meeting, filled with protocol, and a 
few days later he met the President of the Council of Ministers, 
István Dobi. Discussions with him were longer and the 
atmosphere was good but it was clear that Dobi had very little 
political power. Later on Koistinen met quite a few minor civil 
servants and the discussions were polite but lacked substance. 
Politicians did not talk politics, and nobody seemed to be really 
interested in Finland with only one exception. The Minister of 
Finance, István Kossá, had visited Finland in the previous year 
as a guest at the congress of the Finnish Communist Party and 
he was very excited. Koistinen never met Ernő Gerő, Zoltán Vas 
or Mátyás Rákosi.14 Nevertheless, the arrival of the new chargé 
d’ affaires made a new start in the relations, and the Finnish 
government started to get updated information from Hungary 
for the first time in six years. 
Although the political development in the countries was 
different, both Hungary and Finland aimed at stabilizing the 
political atmosphere although the methods were totally different. 
Finland had secured her political credibility in the eyes of the 
western world in the general election of 1945. The election was 
free and also the communists participated in it. After the wars 
Finland had three majority governments, the first two lead by 
Paasikivi and the third one led the by a left-wing socialist, Mauno 
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Pekkala. There were rumours and fears concerning the aims of 
Finnish communists but the truth was that they lacked both 
power and the Soviet support in order to attain a coup. Finland 
remained a democratic country. In Finland it was the people who 
chose their representatives, not the Russians while in Hungary 
Rákosi and his comrades stabilized the communist regimé with the 
Soviet support and Hungary became a loyal member of the 
Eastern bloc. Consequently, in the beginning of the 1950s both 
countries, different though they were, were politically stable, 
Finland as a Soviet-oriented democratic country and Hungary as a 
communist country controlled by the Russians.15 
For the Finns the attitude the Hungarian press had towards 
Paasikivi as a person did not cause any depression. Hungary 
was so negligible a county that it was insignificant what the 
Hungarian press wrote. If the Finns had read the same kind of 
evaluations in Pravda, as they did for a moment, the situation 
would have been different but not serious.  
The next step in Hungarian plans to re-establish relations 
with Finland was to launch the Finnish-Hungarian Society 
(FHS) in October 1950. The initiative came from Ferenc 
Münnich, the Ambassador of Hungary in Finland. His idea was 
to create a society whose members would feel kinship towards 
Hungary. A correct attitude of the members of the society was 
the main point. The society should be led by well-known leftist 
politicians and the members could be from working-class as 
well as from academic circles.16 Now the scene had been set; 
Finland had a charge d’ affaires in Budapest and Hungary had 
her representative in Helsinki. The society enabled the 
communication between countries, both at the official and 
partly at the unofficial level. The state of the Finnish-Hungarian 
relationship was as good as it could be in those circumstances. 
 
2 Koistinen as an Observer  
Uno Koistinen was possibly the best man to reopen relations with 
Hungary. He did not speak Hungarian but he spoke Russian 
fluently. The only thinkable disadvantage was his age, Koistinen 
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was already 62 years old. He was a career diplomat who had 
served in Tallinn, Moscow, St. Petersburg and at home.17 
When Koistinen arrived in Budapest in February 1950 Rákosi 
had recently secured his position and Hungary was 
transforming rapidly and violently into a totalitarian society. 
For example, the clergy was under heavy pressure, legal 
proceedings based on political accusations were part of 
everyday life and nobody knew who would be the next one to 
face a random arrest by the feared security police, ÁVH. Did the 
Finns get to know about these measures?  
In October 1950 Koistinen wrote a splendidly informative 
report. In his opinion, Hungary had achieved a remarkable 
status as a leading communist country among the satellites of the 
Soviet Union. Rákosi was definitely the leading politician with 
Moscow’s absolute and unchanged support. The former 
President, Árpád Szakasits, disappeared, Prime Minister István 
Dobi had lost his post and hard-line stalinists were in power. The 
most important men behind Rákosi were the Minister of 
Defence, Mihály Farkas and Minister of Economics Ernő Gerő. 
Koistinen noticed also the basic problem Hungary had to face. 
Koistinen considered that the country’s economy was in 
shambles. Agriculture was neglected because of huge invest-
ments which were concentrated on heavy industry. The country-
side was lacking a labour force, the harvest was poorly organi-
zed and Hungary had serious problems with the food-supply. 
Koistinen also marked the huge impact the Russians had. They 
were everywhere: in ministries, universities, hospitals and even 
in ordinary farming jobs. And there was also the question of 
language: Russian was compulsory in every school.18  
Koistinen’s report of October 1950 was the most informative 
one written before his sudden death in January 1951. It con-
tained all the basic elements of Hungary’s situation after the 
communists had taken power. Its conclusion was: Hungary had 
become a satellite of the Soviet Union. 
Koistinen did not mention the kinship between the Finns and 
the Hungarians that was so very strongly emphasized before the 
Second World War. Neither the Hungarians nor the Finns used it 
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as an instrument to deepen relations. No one in Hungary pointed 
it out, but it was only natural that they denied the old rhetoric. 
Communists wanted to secure their political position both 
internally and externally and operate in general in the way the 
Russians told them to. The Finnish diplomats did not cherish the 
kinship either but the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki, working 
very hard to get more members into the FHS, emphasized the 
importance of the kinship in a very strange way. Anybody could 
not become a member, and the Embassy tried to use the theme of 
kinship as a bluff to keep the Finns interested in matters of 
Hungary. The problem was the huge difference between the 
Hungary of the 1930s and the Hungary of the 1950s. Many Finns 
turned down the request to join the Society because Hungary had 
become a communist country. The Society had a suitable 
chairman, a genuine socialist, Ele Alenius, but that was not 
enough. Alenius lacked the charisma and authority to make the 
Society ‘presentable at the court’.19 The FHS did not grow in the 
same way as the Finland Soviet Union Society did, for example. 
The main idea of policy-making of the FHS had to be changed.  
Hungarians returned to the basics. The good old kinship-
romance was reinstated. The FHS started to distribute 
Hungarian films, books and other materials, it arranged a range 
of discussions and even special meetings for kids. Folk art was a 
natural choice and one of the exhibitions was opened by a well-
known cultural personality, Prime Minister Kekkonen’s wife, 
Sylvi Kekkonen. By the year 1953 the society had stabilized its 
main function to organize cultural activities. It was planned that 
Finns should be told about the new Hungarian mentality, 
movies, folk art, ethnography, literature and music. In addition, 
Finns got information about the new five-year plans, and about 
the new politics of Hungary in general. One could say that the 
FHS changed drastically in a few years and became a very 
effective channel of distinctive propaganda. In this sense it was a 
success. By the beginning of the year 1952 the number of the 
members of the FHS had increased to 839. Hungarians 
categorized them according to their ideological scales: 433 were 
workers, 195 intellectuals, 136 petty-bourgeois and 75 students.20 
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These figures seem impressive but the truth was that the FHS 
remained marginal without real political importance.  
Evidently the year 1952 meant a breakthrough in Finnish-
Hungarian relations. Finland and Finnish politicians were 
becoming familiar to the Hungarians. Or, at least one politician, 
Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen. Why was that? The political 
system in Hungary – as in every communist county – con-
centrated on emphasizing one personality at a time. In Finland 
that could not be Paasikivi but Kekkonen who was neither a 
communist nor a socialist, he was an Agrarian and a prominent 
new figure in Finnish political life. The main reason for his 
success was Kekkonen’s new political line which suited the 
Hungarians. Kekkonen’s way of thinking was a mixture of 
modern political realism and patriotism. Furthermore, he was 
appreciated by the Russians. The statement Kekkonen made in 
the newspaper Maakansa in January, 1952 about peaceful co-
existence was widely quoted in the Hungarian Press and it was 
regarded as a very important opening in constructing a peaceful 
status quo in Europe. In April 1952 Kekkonen was featured again; 
this time it was because of the speech he gave on the 4th 
anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance with Russians in Helsinki. Kekkonen 
emphasized the advantages the agreement had given to Finland 
and pointed out that it was clear evidence of how two countries 
with different political systems and sizes could live in peace and 
could both gain politically and economically from it.21 
It is obvious that Hungary’s leaders saw that the man of the 
future in Finland was Kekkonen. Everybody understood that 
Paasikivi who was in his eighties was too old to continue as 
President after 1956. The most prominent candidate was 
Kekkonen. Others would not do; a member of the National 
Coalition Party (NCP) would be a capitalist and social 
democrats (SDP) were regarded as anti-Soviet. The SDP was 
considered ideologically reactionary since the Soviets regarded 
Väinö Tanner, who had led Finnish workers to the war against 
the Soviet Union, a war criminal. Only the communists were 
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left but their support among the voters was too weak. The only 
choice was Kekkonen. 
It is noteworthy that during the period 1950–1952 Finnish-
Hungarian relations were very formal and lacked discussion 
about the kinship of the two nations. Hungarians were so 
concentrated on their domestic policy that it looks like they had no 
room for manoeuvring in the field of foreign policy. Hungary did 
not have its own foreign policy in the Rákosi era. Rákosi himself 
represented the Kremlin, not Hungary, and the relations with the 
other socialist countries and especially with the Soviet Union were 
paramount. The West was imperialist and among capitalist 
countries there was only one country that could be considered 
slightly different. It was Finland. Not only were Kekkonen and his 
speeches noticed, but also the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 
made Finland known in Hungary. At the time, the FHS used 
kinship as a tool to create a positive image of Hungary in Finland, 
but in Hungary this rhetoric was not popular at all.22 The situation 
was rather irrational during the 1950s before Rákosi fell: in 
Hungary nobody talked about kinship but in Finland the 
Hungarians dedicated their efforts to promoting it. 
 
3 The New Beginning  
The successor of Koistinen, Lauri Hjelt, in Budapest since May 
1951, reported to Helsinki at the end of December 1953 about 
rather radical changes in Finnish-Hungarian relations. The Finnish 
Embassy in Hungary had been engaged in prolonged negotiations 
with the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry 
concerning the visit of Hungarian journalists to Finland and 
reciprocally about their Finnish colleagues’ trip to Hungary. 
Nothing seemed to happen, but suddenly in April 1953 
everything was clear. The Hungarians visited in Finland and at 
the end of the same year the Finns paid a return visit to Hungary. 
It was a modest but important beginning; the countries opened 
mutual communicative relations. Even more surprising was the 
interest Hungarians suddenly showed in the idea of kinship 
between the Finns and the Hungarians at the highest political 
level. Hjelt was flabbergasted by this development. And what was 
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more: Finland and Hungary started to expand their very modest 
commercial relations with each other. Finland had proposed a 
tripartite trade agreement with Hungary and the Soviet Union 
and there were no problems in the negotiations.23 
Why did Hungary start to open? The simple reason was that 
the first five-year plan (1950–1954) had led Hungary into an 
economic crisis. The stalinist model of industrialization saddled 
Hungary with an autarchic industry, which functioned at high 
cost and at the same time weakened the existing industrial 
structure. The result was that the standard of living decreased 
significantly, below the level reached before the five-year plan.24 
People were still randomly arrested, the secret police was an 
instrument of terror, intellectuals and clergy were under sur-
veillance and party control. In the countryside the situation was 
even worse. The soil of Hungary was very fertile and in normal 
circumstances it had been able to provide plenty of foodstuffs. 
After brutal collectivisation, the level of production collapsed, 
the peasantry fell into apathy and suffered famine.25 
From the Finnish point of view the changes in Hungary were 
drastic. After Stalin’s death a short relaxed period ensued but al-
ready in June, 1953, Hjelt reported new arrests; people who had 
been waiting for general amnesty, were disappointed. Actually, the 
system of justice was tightened by replacing about 250 judges by 
new ones who all had a working-class or peasant background.26 
Hjelt’s conclusions from the period following Stalin’s death 
were far too optimistic. Although the political situation in 
Hungary had not changed much, the attitude towards Finns and 
the atmosphere in general was quite different. Hjelt observed the 
rise of political activity and heard of open criticism of the 
government’s policy – at least in Budapest. Also propaganda and 
the line of the communist party had become slightly more 
moderate, visible in minor events. One of these was Christmas, 
which the Hungarians were allowed to celebrate for the first time 
since Rákosi came to the power. A most surprising phenomenon 
for Hjelt was the rebirth of the old kinship theme. He noticed that 
even high rank politicians started to stress the importance of the 
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common ancient history of Finland and Hungary. This was the 
very first time Hjelt heard about it.27 
Obviously the Hungarians re-evaluated their attitude 
towards Finland. Because Hungary was both politically and 
economically isolated something had to be done, although the 
basic political line could not be changed. Hungary was to re-
main a communist country but it could establish closer relations 
with Finland under the banner of ‘kinship’ Common roots and 
linguistic kinship served the purpose well. Kekkonen’s foreign 
political opening of the years 1952 and 1953, Hungary’s econo-
mic crisis and Stalin’s death, which shook the world, all helped 
to accomplish this. 
 
4 The Turbulent Years 
Great changes followed the death of Stalin. Stalin’s best pupil, 
Rákosi had to confess his mistakes and to step down. Imre 
Nagy, who had advocated a reform programme, became the 
Prime Minister.28 His almost two year period in power yielded 
many corrections of economic, social and cultural policy. More 
investments were allocated to agriculture and housing at the 
expense of heavy industry. A slackening of oppression brought 
relief to the general mood of the population. Rákosi and his 
supporters did their best to bar Nagy’s reformist policy. 
During the change, diplomatic circles of Budapest were filled 
with rumours. Everybody was waiting with great interest what 
would happen. It was widely known that Rákosi and Farkas 
had been in Moscow. Some informants mentioned that 
Voroshilov had visited Budapest. Hjelt could tell Helsinki in 
July 1953 that most of the former ministers had lost their posts. 
But this was not the real news; more significant was the 
analysis Hjelt made right after the official announcement of 
Stalin’s death. He was sure that the change of government 
would make a deeper impact on Hungarian society than was 
generally expected. The end of Hjelt’s report was far-sighted:29  
A significant change has occurred in Hungarian politics. It can be 
detected from the inauguration speech of the new Prime Minister. 
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What was Nagy’s message to the Hungarians? It can be said 
that his visions were critical. First, there was the five-year plan, 
which was deemed to be a mistake, one of the many Rákosi had 
made. It was time to slow down industrialization, give up the 
idea of being self-sufficient and to focus on the existing 
resources of the Hungarian economy and on lighter industry. 
Nagy stressed the importance of peasants and intellectuals and 
he was ready to bring back law and order: no more illegal 
arrests, no more proceedings based on false accusations and no 
more internment camps. It seemed as if Hungary was waking 
up from a bad dream. There remained the question, what was 
the difference between a promise and real life? Nobody knew it, 
Hjelt himself was hopeful but suspicious. He took Nagy’s 
speech as an indication of the new political spirit of the 
Kremlin, not an idea that emerged from the hearts of the 
Hungarian people.30 
The dry comments Hjelt made continued at the beginning of 
the year 1954. The economic situation of Hungary was a 
mystery to him. During the session of Parliament Hjelt heard 
quite a different economic analysis than he had heard from 
various unofficial sources. The director of the Board of 
Planning, Béla Szalai’s figures were contradictory with the ones 
Nagy had made public. Hjelt was abashed as to whether the 
situation was getting better or worse or from bad to even more 
depressing. His conclusion was that Hungary’s national econo-
my was in a deadlock and the easing of terror had made the 
situation worse.31 During the spring 1954 his reports became 
even more alarming. When the government decided to reduce 
the investments to heavy industry and at the same time the 
army and security police were cut the result was that a new 
problem appeared in Hungary, unemployment. The govern-
ment did try to move unemployed people to the countryside 
but also this caused trouble. During the Rákosi era the peasants 
were forced to work at new industrial sites. Now they had to go 
back to the countryside which in many cases they did not want 
to do. This caused upheaval because people were no longer 
afraid of the security police. Nagy did not want to force the 
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people into the agricultural sector. He tried to repair the 
mistakes made in the late 1940s and early 1950s but he 
simultaneously created more problems. These were Hjelt’s 
quite accurate conclusions, and he was almost gleeful in 
pointing out that indeed there could be unemployment in a 
communist country.32  
The year 1955 was not the easiest one for a foreign diplomat 
to estimate what was going on in Hungary. The essential point 
was the question of leadership. Who was the most powerful 
man in Hungary? Hjelt did not know. Sometimes it looked like 
Nagy had secured his position, sometimes it was Rákosi who 
made very powerful statements and for a while the most 
prominent politician seemed to be Gerő The one and only 
specific conclusion Hjelt made was about the difference with 
the period of Nagy to the one of Rákosi: ‘If the old regime could 
have had possibilities to continue, the situation would have 
been much worse both to the government and to the 
communist party.’33 
At the beginning of the year 1955 Hjelt was quite confused. 
The basic combination of political power in Hungary appeared 
to be impenetrable. This impression was issued from the 
speeches given in Debrecen during a celebratory meeting of the 
Parliament. On the spot there were all the top politicians: the 
Chairman of Parliament, Sándor Rónai, Chairman of the 
Speakers’ Council, István Dobi, and Nagy and Rákosi. Nagy 
spoke enigmatically emphasizing the importance of the role of 
workers and peasants but he neither referred to the middle-
class or intellectuals nor mentioned the economic mistakes. 
Rónai was on the same line and Dobi said nothing new by 
praising the kolkhoz-system. Rákosi instead was back on his 
feet with a powerful harangue in which he stressed three issues: 
the importance of the heavy industry, the significance of the 
Party as the leading political power and the importance of the 
security of the nation – or as Hjelt understood it, strengthening 
of the secret police. Rákosi spoke as if nothing had happened 
after the year 1952. To Hjelt this was very hard to understand: 
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was Hungary looking backward or forward?34 The internal 
policy of Hungary remained a mystery to an external observer. 
What could have been the reason for the different opinions 
of the leaders of Hungary? The most obvious must have been 
the definition of policy Moscow had made. By the year 1955 it 
was clear that the strong man in the Soviet Union was Nikita 
Khrushchev who had not only initiated the détente in Europe 
but also machinated the Warsaw Pact in April 1955.35 There 
were two contradictory elements in the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union. By stressing the importance of better relations 
with the West, Khrushchev also forced the Hungarians to re-
evaluate their policies towards moderation but because of the 
Warsaw Pact and re-armament of West-Germany, military and 
political tension had increased in Central Europe. This meant 
that Hungary did not have too much moving space in the 
political sense. The result was an unfathomable mishmash of 
political rhetoric. The West was still the main enemy but what 
kind of enemy? It looks like Rákosi’s line of tight internal and 
external policy might have been winning, even thought there 
was still a possibility of more fruitful détente. Hungary’s 
decision was to sit on two chairs. Rákosi kept a hard line and 
Nagy was the more conciliatory man. 
The economic decisions and re-evaluations made after the 
year 1952 had not improved Hungary’s economic situation. If 
détente would continue there could be possibilities to increase 
trade with the West, but if the Cold War was to continue it 
would inevitably mean that Hungary’s economy was tied solely 
with the economy of the Soviet Union. 
The year 1955 was to show the direction. In January both Nagy 
and Rákosi attended the meeting of the Soviet Presidium in 
Moscow. There the definition of policy had changed. The man 
who was criticized was not Rákosi but Nagy who was considered 
to be guilty of ‘rightist deviation’.36 This accusation must have 
been very hard for Nagy to accept. What he had been trying to do 
was to reorganize the Hungarian economy after the devastating 
years of the Rákosi regime 1949–1952. There was not a hint of 
rightist deviation or slipping away from the road towards 
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Socialism. Nagy was seeking some alternatives to Hungary’s 
economic structure and had tried to expand trade with foreign 
countries. This automatically predicated a slightly more open 
attitude towards the Western countries. 
Presumably accusations levelled against Nagy in Moscow 
were the cause of Nagy’s his mild heart attack in February 1955. 
The field was now free for Rákosi’s comeback. The Central 
Committee of the HWP (The Hungarian Workers’ Party) 
decided on the 18th of April to dismiss Nagy from all his 
offices.37 By the end of the spring 1955 Nagy was politically a 
persona non grata. For Hjelt Nagy’s illness was naturally big 
news. The diplomatic circles were uncertain whether Nagy 
really was ill or suffered from a ‘political disease’ called morbus 
Malenkovensis’, but soon they found out that the news about 
Nagy was correct. In his first report on the Politburo’s meeting 
in April Hjelt made a correct estimate: It was only a question of 
time when Nagy was to retire. Understandably Hjelt could not 
have any specific information about what was going on behind 
the scenes but when the retirement was announced on the 18th 
of April he was not surprised but wrote: ‘The dismissal of Nagy 
was an awaited fact’ More to the point were the estimates Hjelt 
made about the reasons for the overthrow. In his view, the most 
important reason was his behaviour which showed humility, 
self-criticism and apology – Nagy did not act by the established 
rules of the communist movement. Self-flagellation was a virtue 
in those circumstances. The other reason why Nagy had to go 
was linked to his personality. Hjelt supposed that Nagy was too 
democratic a person and because of that trait he also had some 
support among the members of the HWP, i.e. a respectable 
rival.38 Actually Hjelt did not see any drama in the events that 
occurred during the spring 1955. It was just another episode of 
the communists’ political game. 
The annual publication of the budget was an occasion Hjelt was 
always interested in. Even the astronomical figures could not hide 
the fact that Hungary’s economy was in tatters. Hungary did not 
have enough capacity to maintain the prevailing standard of 
living. There was no economic boom in sight and the government 
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did not have means to solve the problem. The Parliament had 
only one option to save face: the year 1955 was declared as an 
experiment year and the big economic rise should start next year, 
when the new five-year plan should come into effect. The only 
saviour was the Soviet Union.39  
There was one incident during the year 1955 that 
significantly increased both Finland’s and Kekkonen’s visibility 
in Hungary. The incident was the Soviet Union’s decision to 
return the Porkkala Naval Base to the Finns. The lease was due 
to end in the year 1994 but the Soviets decided to give up the 
base after ten years. Historians have debated the motives of the 
Soviet leaders. Did they want to ensure Kekkonen’s election as 
the President? The election was to be carried out in March 1956. 
Was Porkkala a gift to the retiring President Paasikivi or was 
the gesture just a part of a larger political manoeuvre? 
Evaluations have been made, but according to Khrushchev’s 
memoirs the reason was both economic and practical: the naval 
base was expensive to maintain and because of the rapid 
development of armament technology it was useless in safe-
guarding Leningrad. Long-range missiles could destroy 
Leningrad irrespective of whether the Russians had a naval 
base in Porkkala or not. There was also the international 
political situation. By giving up the base the Soviets could 
imply that they were aiming at peace and could ask why the 
West was not doing the same. And if there was a possibility to 
boost Kekkonen’s campaign, all the better. Kekkonen was the 
only choice in the Kremlin’s eyes and surely the Soviets wanted 
the new President to be someone they knew and could trust. 
The decision to give Porkkala back to the Finns was a very 
skilful political and tactical move by the Soviets.40 
In Hungary the Porkkala affair was big news. It was not a 
surprise that the role of the Finns was played down and the 
peaceful attitude and forgiveness of the Soviet Union was highly 
admired. The return of the base was interpreted as yet another 
proof of the Soviet Union’s consistent policy of peace and as an 
example of peaceful co-existence of the two countries with 
different political and economic systems. In other words, all the 
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credit was given to the Russians. All the major newspapers (Esti 
Budapest, Szabad Nép, Magyar Nemzet, Népszava) wrote with a 
similar overtone: the Russians are good, the West is bad. But what 
about Finland and the Finns? President Paasikivi was described 
earlier in 1950 as an evil man and an ultimate enemy of the 
Finnish working class. This time he was featured as the head of 
the Finnish deputation in the negotiations but now the papers 
made no evaluations at all concerning Paasikivi’s person or past. 
The other man mentioned was Kekkonen. Nobody gave any 
special credit to him but, for example, the Ambassador of East 
Germany was very pleased about the fact that Kekkonen was 
among the negotiators in Moscow. But what about the ordinary 
Hungarians? Hjelt got some information from the grass and root 
levels. The message was: ‘Why is there not happening anything 
such as this in Hungary?’41 A very good question with a simple 
answer: Hungary was not an independent country but a solid part 
of the Eastern block and geographically in a precarious location. 
Both Finland and Hungary gained membership at the United 
Nations in December 1955, an achievement which should have 
stirred political commentators. Surprisingly, Hjelt gave to 
Finland very diverse information about the feelings in 
Hungary. The official Hungary was naturally pleased, but the 
general public was depressed. The interpretation of the decision 
was that the West had recognized the fact that Hungary was 
and would also in the future be a communist society.42 In the 
context of Finnish-Hungarian relations there were new 
elements of political developments in sight, although the basic 
situation remained static: the countries were geographically far 
away from each other, their political systems were different and 
they built their foreign policy on the idea of cherishing good 
relations with the Soviet Union. The novelty was that the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern bloc as a whole started to pursue the 
policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy Finland and Kekkonen 
in particular supported. The result was that Finland became one 
of the most popular non-communist countries in Hungary, 
which was made visible during the celebration of Finland’s 
Independence Day in December 1955. The Hungarian 
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delegation was exceptionally eminent: the new PM András 
Hegedűs, two deputy PMs, members of the government and of 
the politburo, highly-ranked civil servants and other minor 
officials, altogether about 300 guests took part in the reception 
at the Embassy of Finland. The delegation was a thermometer 
of the friendship with Finland showing relations were cordial. 
But as Hjelt reported, they had no real importance. It was better 
that in Hungary Finland was not regarded as an enemy. But if 
things had been different, would it have caused any stress in 
Finland? No. This attitude can be sensed in Paasikivi’s diaries. 
The only serious remark on Hungary is dated from the 10th 
October 1955 and the only matter was Hjelt’s complaint that it 
was very hard to get any accurate information from Hungary.43  
The year 1956 began in a depressing mood in Hungary 
because Rákosi seemed to have regained his position and the 
Hungarians appeared to be tired with politics. Hjelt’s 
assumption was that the hope of a possible liberation had faded 
away. The Hungarians had acquiesced to their destiny. But there 
was still something in the air: 44 
There is the same expectant mood in Hungary just as all around 
the world in the beginning of the new year. 
Then came the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 
1956. At first nobody knew exactly what was said in Moscow 
but the basic note was clear: the crimes of the Stalin era were 
disclosed and the stalinist ideology was deemed an incorrect 
one. The thesis of an intensifying class struggle and the doctrine 
of the inevitability of war were abandoned. There could no 
longer be only one wise leader as Stalin had been. The times of 
total despotism were over45 which meant for Hungary that the 
Rákosi era was reaching its end. 
Before the dramatic events of the autumn 1956 Finland got 
more publicity in Hungary than ever before after the Second 
World War. The reason was the presidential elections in 
February 1956 and Kekkonen’s victory by an extremely narrow 
margin. The result caused a flow of enthusiastic comments from 
the Hungarian press. They show concretely how an historical 
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event can be interpreted so very differently in a different 
political environment. In Finland Kekkonen’s victory was far 
from being a stunning event. Actually, it had divided the 
country and created bitterness. In spring 1956 there were in 
Finland almost as many winners as there were losers. Seen from 
the Hungarian point of view the situation was totally different: 
the election of Kekkonen was definitely the best thing that 
could happen to Finland and Kekkonen was without any doubt 
the best and probably the only man who could be the President 
of Finland. 
From the early 1950s Kekkonen had been an eager advocate 
of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The Eastern block 
adopted it after Stalin’s death. Thus Kekkonen was the man 
who accidentally, ´invented´ the political doctrine Khrushchev 
asserted into international political discourse in the mid 1950s. 
Another fact that secured Kekkonen’s fame was his active 
participation in the most important negotiations between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. Whenever there was something 
peaceful going on in Finnish-Soviet relations, Kekkonen was 
there. His election contributed to the reincarnation of the old 
idea of kinship. As Hjelt reported discussions about this subject 
had previously caused only uneasiness among the leading 
Hungarian politicians and high-ranked civil servants.46 
After the election of Kekkonen the retiring President 
Paasikivi also gained some respect from Hungary. Apart from 
Kekkonen, he was the only other official person Hungary 
recognized in spring 1956. Formerly he had been compared 
with Miklós Horthy but now he became one of the key-figures 
in creating Finland’s peaceful foreign policy. Hungarian papers 
explained that it was Paasikivi who was the founder of this 
policy, Kekkonen had only participated in the process.47 After 
the spring 1956, Finland had gained the status of an example for 
peaceful coexistence between a big and a small country and 
between a capitalist and a communist system. Correspondingly, 
Hjelt sensed a Hungarian tendency: it was unofficially or 
indirectly hoped that their country could also achieve a position 
similar to that of Finland, both in the eyes of the Western block 
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and the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the Hungarians remem-
bered quite well that Finland and Hungary had been in a simi-
lar political situation after the Second World War but now the 
countries were politically and socio-economically far from each 
other, and the comparison did not favour Hungarians. The sta-
tus Finland had and the position of Kekkonen was something to 
strive for. 
During the spring 1956, when the internal political situation 
in Hungary was getting more charged, Finnish politicians 
gained an exceptional opportunity to make observations. The 
PM Hegedűs had invited in February a delegation of the 
Finnish Parliament to Hungary. The visit took place in June 
1956, which was only a few weeks after Rákosi’s public speech 
of self-criticism. He had admitted to an adequate amount of 
mistakes: the personality cult, illegal activities of the secret 
police etc. The message was clear: there had been some 
mistakes but it was all past. Now it was time to go ahead and 
keep the wheels of Socialism rolling. According to Hjelt, the 
Hungarians were disappointed; Rákosi had confessed his 
mistakes but was not going to resign. Hjelt thought that the 
Hungarians had lost their interest in politics and surmised that 
Rákosi might be able to hold on to his position, but for how 
long was unforeseeable.48 
The visit of the Finnish delegation took place just after the 
Hungarians had recovered from Stalin’s death and Rákosi’s mild 
self-criticism. Its delegation had been chosen on the basis of 
parliamentary importance. Three of the members were 
communists, two from the Agrarian Union, and one from the 
Swedish People’s Party, NCP and People’s Party respectively.49 
Could the delegation have had any opportunities to make sense 
of the situation in Hungary? Highly unlikely as the programme 
of the visit was planned by the host and everybody had to travel 
from one place to another in the group. The Finns saw what the 
Hungarians wanted them to see. What did they see? Museums, 
factories, and they made short trips to Debrecen, Hortobágy, 
Lake Balaton and the Mátra mountains. The hosts were as 
generous as the Hungarians could be and everything the Finns 
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wanted – or asked to be shown was shown to them – except the 
massive industrial site Sztálinváros. The Finns and the 
Hungarians became friends and now everybody talked about the 
kinship between Finns and Hungarians, but the facades of 
Potemkin were too obvious. The hosts tried, for example, to 
demonstrate that Hungary was a liberal state when it came to 
religion but unsuccessfully. There were also disputes about the 
methods of education but, on the whole, the visit was a success 
for the Hungarians. Because the Finns found the best Hungary 
had to offer there was not too much room for criticism and the 
table speeches were all the time cordial. It was a propaganda 
tour, the Finns got new experiences and representation but the 
Hungarians scored the propaganda points.50 
It was remarkable how the Hungarian press wrote about the 
visit. Before the year 1956 Finland had been mentioned quite 
seldom, and especially about Finnish politics the papers wrote 
only the basic incidents: who was elected President and what 
were the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. There 
had been news but no actual contact with the men and women 
behind it. Now the Hungarians had a group of living politicians 
from the North in their country, and what was the most 
important thing, not only communists but also some capitalists, 
even one member of the NCP, a true reactionary. For example, 
Szabad Nép wrote immediately after the Finnish delegation had 
arrived in Budapest the following: 51 
Yesterday morning our beloved guests arrived in our country. We 
are cordially happy to welcome the representatives of our relative 
country, Finland, and we wish that throughout their visit the rela-
tions of our countries will become even closer. 
The paper stressed three main themes as cornerstones in 
Finnish-Hungarian relations. Those were the suddenly so 
popular idea of kinship, the ultimate friendship and as the most 
important matter, the burning desire for peace. The last one was 
the urge that brought Finland and Hungary even closer to each 
other. Because of this task, it was irrelevant whether a country 
was communist or capitalist.52 In a wider political perspective, 
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the timing of the visit was interesting because Mihail Suslov, a 
far more important visitor than any of the Finns, had 
simultaneously talks with HWP leaders, including János 
Kádár.53 One can assume that there was some tension in the air, 
but the Finns knew nothing about it. 
Before 1955 Finland had been a country which could not be 
considered a ‘friend’ The only friends Hungary had were the 
other members of the communist block and neighbouring 
Austria. Hungary needed a window to the West. Finland was 
just what Hungary needed. It was on good terms with the 
Soviet Union, with the West, and it was gaining reputation as 
an international mediator. In 1955 the leaders of Hungary 
started to put forward the idea of kinship. In contrast, in 
Finland Hungary aroused little interest. It was still a minor 
communist country and it seems that the Finnish authorities 
were fully satisfied with the information they got from Hjelt 
who regularly wrote quite competent reports – the evaluations 
he made were seldom totally wrong. During the summer 1956 
the events in Hungary ran rapidly for Hjelt, actually too rapidly 
for almost everybody. 
Finnish authorities were always concerned about the risk of an 
open conflict, and if it would develop in Europe that was even 
worse. In 1956 the Suez crisis broke out, in which the USA, Great 
Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Egypt were involved. It did 
not cause any real problems for Finnish foreign policy. There had 
been symptoms of disharmony in the Eastern bloc, at first in East 
Germany and then in Poland, but they were solved more or less 
peacefully or at least in a way which did not shake the balance of 
the Cold War. 
In July 1956 Hjelt wrote to Helsinki about the internal situation 
in Hungary. He knew of Suslov’s visit and rumours circulated. 
Was Rákosi falling? The information Hjelt was able to gather, gave 
him a wrong impression; he wrote that the most likely option 
would be that Rákosi would stay in power even though there was 
heavy pressure on him. Hjelt found several reasons to back up his 
supposition. The most important source of information seems to 
have been the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, who told Hjelt that 
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Rákosi could stay in power. Hjelt could not see anyone replacing 
him and assumed that the most important matter to the Kremlin 
was to maintain peaceful conditions in Hungary and that Rákosi 
was the right man to secure that.54 Continuity was the key issue 
for the Soviets. 
Just a week after Hjelt’s prediction Anastas Mikoyan, a 
member of the CPSU CC Presidium, visited Budapest for the 
meeting of the HWP Mikoyan was in Hungary to get a clear 
picture of what was going on. The Party was losing its authority 
and support, and practically all the problems focused on 
Rákosi. He had lost credibility in the eyes of the Hungarians. 
After lengthy discussions Mikoyan wrote to the CPSU CC on 
the 14th July 1956. The letter was devastating. The HWP was 
losing its leading impetus. Rákosi was politically a dead man 
and the first thing the Hungarians should do was to get rid of 
him. All the HWP CC members who were not on the same line 
with the Soviet Union would be dismissed and new, young and 
loyal members would be recruited from the cadres.55 The Soviet 
Union planned a controlled transfer of power. 
Hungarian politicians did as their masters had told them to 
do. The HWP CC announced Rákosi’s resignation on the 18th 
July 1956. They not announce any official reason, but only 
hinted at Rákosi’s bad health and high age. The new first 
secretary of the HWP CC Politburo was the former vice-PM 
Gerő. Hjelt tried to disentangle what was behind this political 
manoeuvre. What were the reasons that forced Rákosi to 
resign? After all he had been the leading figure of Hungarian 
politics for almost a decade. Now it was time for Hjelt to 
explain and show whether he understood anything about the 
country where he was posted.  
Hjelt’s analysis was a sharp one. He saw four main reasons 
why Rákosi had had to go. First, there was the general 
development in the Eastern European communist countries 
after Stalin’s death. Second, Rákosi’s reluctance to adjust his 
politics to suit to the policy lines created after Stalin’s era. 
Third, the great economic problems which Hungary had, and 
fourth, the dissatisfaction with Rákosi’s policy in general. 
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Surprisingly, Hjelt assumed that Moscow would have desired 
Rákosi to continue, although in the letter to CPSU CC Mikoyan 
had said that both the Soviet Union and quite many of the 
members of the HWSP Politburo agreed with the idea that it 
was time for Rákosi to resign. Also Rákosi himself was willing 
to give up his position. In the meeting with Mikoyan and the 
leaders of the HWSP on the 13th July 1956, Rákosi had said that 
the only reason he had stayed in power was that he wanted to 
correct the mistakes he had done and then resign. But now the 
time for an effort such as this had passed. Hjelt made one very 
clever observation by pointing to the role of the new member of 
the HWSP CC whose name was János Kádár. On the base of 
Hjelt’s report, the Finnish authorities were quite well-informed 
about the transfer of power in Hungarian internal policy. The 
things Hjelt did not know were of the kind that only very few, 
if any, knew.56 
 
5 The Uprising and Aftermath 
The pressure against the HWP was growing during the summer 
1956. Students and intellectuals gathered in the Petőfi Club. In 
almost every town there were discussion groups, and Hjelt 
noticed that the rise of popular movements did not aim at 
getting out of the Soviet orbit but it created a totally new forum 
for debate and criticism. In his estimation in September 1956, 
Hjelt was pessimistic. Although a freer atmosphere was a good 
thing in itself and the Hungarian government was at least 
accepting some criticism, there were also dangerous factors. 
The more people were given freedom, the harder it would be to 
control their movements, but if the government chose a harder 
line, the reaction would be incalculable. For the Soviets the 
situation was clear: the people in the Petőfi Club represented 
counter-revolutionary forces.57 The leaders of Hungary were 
not able to deal with the dilemma on their hands. What is the 
tolerable amount of freedom in a communist country? This is a 
question to which no communist dictatorship has ever found a 
satisfying answer. 
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Disturbances also hit Poland in 1956. The workers’ uprising in 
Poznan in July 1956 forced the Polish United Workers’ Party to 
make changes in its leadership. A formerly imprisoned highly-
ranked party member, of Wladyslaw Gomulka, returned to 
power. The Poles and the Soviets eventually reached a peaceful 
solution in October, 1956.58  
The uprising in Hungary started 23 October 1956 and 
practically ended during the first weeks of November. The 
history of the revolution has been studied thoroughly; here we 
concentrate on Hjelt’s reports on it. In one of them, dated 10th of 
November, he expounded on the reason for the uprising: the 
Hungarians wanted to root out stalinism, they wanted de-
mocratisation of Hungarian society, and there were also 
demands to investigate what had happened during the Rákosi 
era. According to Hjelt people also wanted to know what was 
Hungary’s economic situation, what was wrong with Com-
munism, where were the promised better times? The demons-
trations and fighting started the 23rd of October and Nagy was 
elected the PM. The next day the hated Gerő resigned and a 
general strike was started. By the end of the month the violence 
was over and the Soviet troops left Budapest. Days of chaos 
started and there was confusion about who was in charge in 
Hungary. Nagy was the PM but he could not control the masses. 
A few days later, 4th of November the Russian troops started the 
invasion and fighting broke out again, now mainly in Budapest. 
The uprising was practically over on the 9th of November, and 
the new PM was János Kádár.59 
A few days later, 14th of November Hjelt was able to write a 
careful analysis: the impulse for the uprising had come from 
Poland. Polish communists could remodel the leadership of their 
party even though ideological changes were very moderate. This 
was an example for Hungarians. When they took to the barricades 
they gained a minor victory – the Soviet troops withdrew – but not 
from Hungary, only from Budapest. The most significant matter for 
Hjelt was the composition of the revolutionary forces: they were 
basically students, soldiers and workers, the key groups which 
should have been the most loyal supporters of communist power. 
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He made also one very important observation: the uprising as a 
whole was not against Socialism or Communism; it was against the 
Soviet model of Communism. What was at stake was not a change 
of the political system but to reform it. There was only one thing 
which Hjelt did not notice, when he compared Poland and 
Hungary. Poland was in the middle of the communist camp, the 
Soviet Union lies in the East, and the GDR in the West and 
Hungary in the South. Hungary was geopolitically in a precarious 
position, situated on the front line of the communist bloc. Capitalist 
Austria had a common border with Hungary, Tito’s Yugoslavia 
was nearby and so was the feared FRG. According to Hjelt it was 
impossible for the Soviet Union to allow the liberation of 
Hungary.60 In this way Hjelt gave the Finns a reasonably correct 
and detailed analysis about the uprising of 1956. 
How was it possible for Hjelt to write such a competent 
analysis about the events in Budapest and elsewhere in 
Hungary? Hjelt actually referred to radio broadcasts many 
times but they could not tell everything and it is quite obvious 
that he went to the streets and saw it all, broken windows, 
collapsed walls, destroyed barricades and so on. He must have 
heard local informants, too because he could report about 
fighting in the countryside, for example, in Pécs, on the island 
of Csepel, in Dunapentele and in Miskolc. He knew who was 
fighting and who was not. He followed the high-level political 
manoeuvres without any illusions, and he saw that Nagy was a 
weak leader of the masses he could not control. For Hjelt, he 
was no better than Kádár whose position was based on the 
Soviet army, or as Hjelt wrote: ‘Kádár´s government hangs in 
the air at least as much as Nagy’s did, or, in other words, it sits 
on the Russian tanks.’61 
For Kekkonen the violence in Hungary was a shock. He 
made a very exceptional gesture by contacting the Soviet Em-
bassy in Helsinki and offering himself as a mediator between 
the Hungarians and the Soviets. He even offered to travel to 
Budapest so that the bloodshed could be ended. It is hard to 
find any rational reason for Kekkonen’s action. Did he really 
think he could have had enough political capital to make any 
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impact on the dramatic situation in Hungary? Undoubtedly 
not. However, his initiative can also be seen from another 
perspective. For Kekkonen and especially for his closest friends 
such as Kustaa Vilkuna, the kinship with Hungarians was 
emotionally a sensitive matter. When far-away located relatives 
were in trouble, Kekkonen felt he had to do something, whether 
it was useful or not. After the uprising Kekkonen commanded 
the Finnish Ambassador of the UN very strictly in every vote 
the General Assembly had. His line was clear: in the resolutions 
which condemned the Soviets Finland abstained but in the ones 
which emphasized the right of freedom and independence of 
the Hungarian nation Finland voted for them. At the moment 
nobody knew that this definition of policy would be the Finnish 
line at the UN for the next forty years.62 
In Finland the brutalities carried out by the Red Army 
caused intensive debate and the person in the eye of this 
whirlwind was Kekkonen. The majority of the Finnish news-
papers expected Finland to react on the Soviet occupation more 
strongly both domestically and internationally. The way the 
Finns reacted was very emotional and unwise. Should there 
have been any reason to do damage to the ‘friendly’ relations 
with the Soviet Union because of the dramatic events in 
Hungary? Finland could not have been able to do anything. 
Hungary was one of the Soviet Union’s satellites, a frontline 
country especially in view of the fact that the FRG had just 
started to rebuild its army. Considered in a wider political 
perspective or only from the point of Finnish-Russian relations, 
the Finns and Kekkonen did everything they had in their power 
to do. In the UN Finland did not accept the military 
intervention but, on the other hand, there was no real-political 
reason to judge everything the Soviet Union had done. The 
decisions concerning the policy towards the uprising were 
made by Kekkonen but he was not alone. The Hungarian 
uprising was the one and only foreign political issue about 
which Kekkosen asked advice from a higher Finnish authority. 
This authority was former President Paasikivi who told 
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Kekkonen: ‘There is no reason for us to slander the Soviets now; 
that does not benefit us at all, rather it might harm us’.63 
The Hungarians tried unilaterally to change their political 
position in the divided Europe with catastrophic consequences. 
It was self-evident that the Soviet Union would not give any 
chance to change the power political balance in Europe. It was 
ready to take brutal actions in order to maintain this situation 
and this was a fact the Finns should have also taken into 
consideration. There was only one superpower in Europe and it 
was right next to Finland. Thus the uprising in Hungary was a 
reminder also to the Finns. 
 
6 The Kádár-Kekkonen Era Begins  
President Kekkonen had made his stand clear: Finland would 
not accept violence but at the same time he accepted the fact 
that the Soviet Union could not allow any kind of dissident 
actions from her satellites. The constellation that was created in 
Europe after the Second World War was immutable. After the 
year 1956 this idea was widely accepted both in NATO and 
especially among the so called non-aligned countries.64  
The Finnish chargé d’affaires was there at the focal point of the 
events in Hungary and he was able to report on the situation 
after the uprising. Especially the meeting of the Warsaw Pact 
countries in January 1957 was worth looking at. Restless 
Poland, the uncertain GDR and China-oriented Albania were 
absent and only the most loyal communist countries, Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and Hungary 
were represented. According to Hjelt, the other communist 
countries agreed to give Hungary all material aid they could 
and the Soviet Union gave at least one solid promise: the Red 
Army would stay in Hungary.65 The last promise must have 
been a pleasant one for the new leader, Kádár, whose position 
was on very shaky ground. 
Kádár´s first definition of policy that was given in his name 
was harsh: all counter-revolutionary activities would be rooted 
out. In Hungary there was room only for one party, the HWP, 
which had changed its name to Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
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Party (HSWP). All political liberalization was to be recalled. A 
declaration like this was no surprise for Hjelt and he did not 
comment on it in any way. The most significant estimation Hjelt 
made was about Kádár’s personality: he was not a strong man in 
political rhetoric and it was not at all clear whether Kádár would 
stay in power. At the moment he seemed to be just another 
puppet-leader and his power was based on the sad fact that the 
Soviet Union had occupied the country.66 
Hjelt turned out to be wrong since Kádár soon demonstrated 
his ruthlessness. The period of reprisals started in April 1957 
and ended in summer 1961. The new leader showed that there 
was no room for active opposition in ‘his’ country and all sub-
versive elements were destroyed both physically and mentally. 
Hjelt already reported the executions and internments. In 
reality they amounted to 341 hanged in 1956–1961, while 22,000 
Hungarians were sentenced to prison, about 13,000 persons 
were interned, and many others lived with panic and fear in 
their minds.67 It was as if the times of Rákosi’s terror were back. 
Hjelt saw the beginning of the dark chapter of Hungary’s post-
war history. The mood as a whole was depressing. Kádár com-
menced his policy of eradicating the memory of October 1956. Hjelt 
pointed to the hasty court proceedings – almost anybody could be 
prosecuted and sentenced to prison for a minor offence. There was 
also new legislation which made it more difficult to leave the col-
lectives. The new government and its servants were everywhere. 
The Hungarian Literary Union was abolished as was the Union of 
Journalists. Universities were closed and the news about executions 
caused depression. The first victims of Kádár’s reprisals were 
former members of the Smallholders’ Party, József Dudás and 
József Szabó, the hero of Széna Square. Hjelt heard that the prisons 
were filled with members of intelligentsia; writers, journalists, 
students and members of the Workers’ Councils. As Hjelt had it, 
there was a kind of witch-hunt going on in Hungary.68 The country 
was again on its way to year zero, to the times of revenge. 
The spring 1957 was the last for Hjelt in Budapest. He 
concentrated on observing the policy of the new regime. The 
propaganda against Nagy was bitter and aggravating; now he 
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was nothing but a traitor, a puppet of the Western counter-
revolutionary movement. The biggest issue for Kádár was the 
reorganization of the HSWP, which had serious problems in 
increasing membership. Hjelt’s estimate was that the old party 
(HWP) had had at least one million members but the new one 
only about 170,000. Another serious problem was that the ideas 
and the memory of October 1956 still lived vividly among 
students. Kádár’s policy did not make the atmosphere any better. 
One example of the pronouncements Kádár made was the claim 
that there were no foreign troops in Hungary because the soldiers 
of the Red Army were not foreigners but only guests or sons of a 
friendly nation who came to help in times of trouble. Hjelt played 
the Hungarians down quite strongly even though he had seen the 
passionate fighting only a few months ago, because he estimated 
that there could be some resistance still coming, but it would have 
been in Hjelt’s words ‘typical Hungarian stargazing’.69  
Consolidation of the Kádár regime was agreed in Moscow in 
March 1957 when Kádár met the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a 
result of the negotiations it was decided that Rákosi would not come 
back to Hungary and that the ex-party-leader would resign from all 
his public offices. The most important issue was the CPSU’s support 
for Kádár. The Soviets agreed that he would restore the status of 
Hungary. Kádár himself raised the question in the Kremlin and his 
outlook can be crystallized in one sentence: ‘To pull out a bad tooth, 
we cannot wait from eight to ten months, or years.’70 
Hjelt’s opinion of the consequences of Kádár’s visit to Moscow 
was well-founded. The need of liquidation of the ‘counter-revolutio-
nary elements’ from the Hungarian society was imminent and there 
would be no essential changes in Hungarian policy; it would not, for 
example, follow the Yugoslavian model, Polish model or any other 
alternative. Hjelt reported on the financial support the Soviet Union 
had promised and how Kádár’s regime suppressed dissidents. 
Internment camps were in use again, capital punishments were 
carried out and the propaganda in general was rude – consequently, 
Hjelt did not appreciate Kádár very highly. To him he was still a 
marionette, a leader who was lacking the support of his countrymen. 
One matter had not changed: Finland was still counted in Hungary 
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among the friendly countries. Kádár told the session of the executive 
committee of the HSWP in April 1957 that there had been only a few 
representatives of the friendly nations at the reception in the 
Hungarian Embassy in Moscow during Kádár’s visit: from Western 
Europe there were only the Ambassadors of Finland and Sweden, 
not the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, for example.71 
In his last report in May 1957 Hjelt made some observations 
which in the long-term proved to be far-sighted. According to 
it, Kádár had made a totally different public appearance, his 
image was changing. The forum for this change was the 
Parliament, which was one of the few places where foreign 
diplomats could hear the Hungarian leaders talking live even 
though it had only symbolic political power. Hjelt, who was 
present during the session, realized that politically Kádár’s 
speech did not have any new content. The line chosen by Kádár 
had not changed: no general election, no multi-party system 
and no changes in the policy of ‘restoration of order’. However, 
Kádár´s tone was not the same, he spoke very warmly about the 
new Polish leader, Gomulka, and in general he was friendly, 
joyful and the audience seemed to like the man. Hjelt reported 
that Kádár had possibly increased his popularity among 
ordinary people. But as Hjelt sarcastically added: there was still 
lot to do in that area.72 
What did Hjelt actually see? He might have seen the first 
glimpse of the future Kádárist Hungary. Law and order would be 
severe, but Kádár himself was relaxed, filled with internal peace 
and amusement, a real contrast to Rákosi and Nagy. One reason for 
Kádár’s relaxation might have been that he had secured his position 
as a definite leader of the HSWP. During the meeting of the HSWP 
CC in December 1957 the Party made all the essential decisions 
regarding the punishment of the counter-revolutionaries and of the 
amnesty. First, there would be the period of more severe sentences 
followed by years of forgiveness. Afterwards Kádár could create an 
image of a firm leader who could reunite the quarrelsome nation 
and become a congenial and respected father-figure to the nation.73  
In Finland there was a leader who had similar ideas regarding 
his own future. The victory by a one vote margin in 1956 had 
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plausibly brought Kekkonen more enemies than friends. To 
compare Kádár with Kekkonen may sound tasteless, but there are 
some basic similarities. Both had bitter enemies; Kádár was brought 
to power by the Soviets and there were also in Finland some 
discussions regarding whether the Soviets had exercised some 
influence on public opinion in favour of Kekkonen before the 
elections. Some political observers suspected that the Soviet Union 
had restored the Porkkala just to boost Kekkonen’s election. Both 
Kekkonen and Kádár had a lot to do if they wanted to become 
respected leaders of their nations. However, one very significant 
difference remains: Kádár’s hands were bloody and his way to 
power was covered with corpses whereas Kekkonen left only 
political corpses behind.  
 
6 From the Night Frost to Mutual Understanding 
The new Finnish chargé d´affaires was a very experienced and 
respected career diplomat T. H. (Toivo Heikki) Heikkilä He had 
been posted in Berlin as an attaché as early as 1934 and after 
that in Budapest during the Second World War in 1941–1943. In 
Finland Heikkilä was Paasikivi’s secretary during the critical 
years 1944–1948. Before arriving at Budapest he had been in the 
GDR a few years and was well aware of the circumstances in 
the smaller Eastern European communist countries. The years 
as Paasikivi’s secretary taught him how the communists 
operated when they were aiming to gain power in a democratic 
society. One can state that Heikkilä was a man who also knew 
all the essential facts of Finnish domestic politics.74 
Heikkilä’s start in Budapest was promising. The first highly-
ranked Hungarian official Heikkilä met was the Foreign 
Minister Imre Horváth. It did not take long before they realized 
they were old friends from years in East-Berlin from the late 
1940s. There were no problems with language because both 
spoke German fluently. The message Horváth gave to Heikkilä 
about the policy of Hungary was unambiguous: The best friend 
Hungary has is the Soviet Union and the other countries which 
were members of the ‘peace-group’ were not the best friends 
but very good ones anyway. Among these peaceful nations was 
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no other Western capitalist country but Finland. Heikkilä put 
this down as a compliment or as an insult. The Hungarians had 
created this classification according to a respective country’s 
policy towards Hungarian emigrants. For example, in all the 
other Nordic countries – especially in Sweden – there were very 
active Hungarian emigrant groups but not in Finland. The 
reason was that Finland did not accept Hungarian political 
refugees on her soil. Actually, Finland did not grant asylum to 
refugees no matter where they came from. Later Heikkilä had a 
long discussion with an old friend of Finland, the vice-Prime 
Minister Ferenc Münnich who also clarified to Heikkilä the 
situation in Hungary after the uprising. Münnich spoke 
relatively openly about the political problems Hungary was 
facing and admitted that there was still some active resistance 
against the government but the worst was over. Probably the 
most disinterested statement was Münnich’s estimate 
concerning the Hungarians themselves whom he said to be a 
nation with a very peculiar character. Heikkilä construed this to 
mean that Hungarians were not easily converted to 
Communism. Münnich, who had also been posted in Finland 
talked about Kekkonen and emphasized his great admiration 
for the Finnish president stating that Hungarian leaders had 
been following his career with great interest.75  
Even though Heikkilä’s arrival in Budapest had been made 
warm and pleasant by the Hungarians, Heikkilä was not 
bluffed. He was well aware that there was another life behind 
the curtains of the political elite. The repression of the 
participants of the uprising was reaching its peak and it was 
impossible for the foreign diplomats not to hear about it. As 
early as in July 1957, in his second report to Helsinki, Heikkilä 
told about the depressing events occurring especially in 
Budapest, of which he knew best because the countryside was 
practically isolated from the capital. Heikkilä wrote that 
random arrests, long interrogations which included also torture 
and deportations were familiar for almost everybody who 
could have been linked somehow with the events of the 
autumn 1956. The ambience in general was depressing.76 
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During the summer 1957 Heikkilä tried to find out what kind of 
men the new leaders of Hungary were. The picture he 
conveyed to Finland was not a very positive one. In late August 
1957 he travelled to Kisújszállás where the Hungarian leaders 
had decided to celebrate the day of the constitution. Both Dobi 
and Kádár appeared in public, a rare occasion at the time. 
Kádár was the only speaker who made a neutral impression to 
Heikkilä: he was a blond, tall, youngish (Kádár was 44 years of 
age) Hungarian whose eyes and voice were devoid of 
fanaticism. In his speech Kádár admitted that there were people 
under house arrest but justified the ‘method’ by saying that 
these people were protected from a possible death in freedom. 
Regarding foreign policy, Kádár insisted that the UN had no 
right to interfere in Hungary’s domestic affairs, and pointed out 
that the Soviets had not intervened in Hungary; they had only 
fulfilled their obligation to ‘help’ another socialist country 
against counter-revolutionary rebellion. It is hard to say 
whether Heikkilä was disappointed or not at Kádár’s 
performance; he was a pragmatic diplomat and understood that 
there had been so much bloodshed on the streets of Budapest 
that even the idea of loosening control was impossible. In any 
case, Heikkilä was convinced that there would not be any 
disturbance in Hungary, and if anyone else could not guarantee 
peace, the Red Army could.77 The personality of Kádár haunted 
Heikkilä: in the last analysis he was still a ‘petty district ex-
secretary’ whose position as the leader was uncertain and his 
government seemed temporary, although Kádár himself might 
become a figurehead for future leadership. His wisest decision 
was to postpone court proceedings against former Deputy 
Minister of Defence, Pál Maléter – Heikkilä’s informants could 
not know that he was doomed. In all, Heikkilä’s forecast was 
not quite amiss: 78 
This discussion enhanced the impression that the consequences of 
the uprising will have a very deep and far-reaching impact on the 
future. It will be especially difficult for the HSWP to recover from 
the setback it has suffered. It is quite possible that the Party will 
never fully get over the autumn 1956. 
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It was as early as in October 1957 when Heikkilä was able to 
report of the first visible signs of Kádár’s new ‘stick and carrot’ 
policy; private business was allowed, for example, for doctors, 
restaurant- and coffee shopkeepers, and there was also some 
relaxation of the regulations concerning travelling abroad for 
students and scientists. Also ‘ordinary people’ were allowed to 
have contacts with foreigners.79  
The relations between Finland and Hungary in the late 1950s 
remained ‘miraculously good despite the political ‘earthquakes’ or 
they became better after ‘the shattering intermezzo’ of 1956, as 
Heikkilä viewed it. One reason was that Finland condemned the 
Soviet occupation and violence, but the Soviet Union itself was not 
criticized. In the resurrected atmosphere of kinship, Heikki Hosia, 
the Minister of Education, renewed the agreement of cultural co-
operation in 1959 and the PM V.J. Sukselainen and the Second 
Spokesman of the Finnish Parliament, Johannes Virolainen, visited 
Hungary. Henceforth dealings between Finland and Hungary 
became more intensive and the journalists had more opportunities 
to observe life over the Iron Curtain.80 
The proof of who dictated Hungary’s foreign policy was given 
to Finns during the so-called night frost period in the end of 1958 
and at the beginning of the year 1959 when a new government was 
formed in Finland. It was a ‘normal’ one, based on the co-operation 
of the Agrarian Union and social democrats, but it had one serious 
drawback: the Kremlin did not accept it and Finnish-Soviet 
relations practically broke up and with Hungary Finland could not 
progress in negotiations for wider trade because the official 
Hungary assumed a very calm attitude; the Independence Day of 
Finland was celebrated in ‘an intentional coolness of atmosphere’ in 
the Embassy of Finland,81 but finally, at the beginning of January 
1959, the new agreement of trade payments was signed, and 
Heikkilä decided to organize a festive occasion. The date for this 
was well set: Fagerholm’s government resigned on the 13th of 
January and the new one, Sukselainen’s government, started its 
work on the very same day, and Heikkilä had decided to have the 
celebration on the 14th. Information about the occasion was given 
to Hungarians, but until the 13th only the representatives of the 
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non-aligned countries had answered. Heikkilä called the Protocol 
Department of Hungary’s Foreign Ministry. At first, the answer 
was a cryptic one: ‘Maybe somebody is coming’ but, in the end, a 
couple of vice-Ministers, would attend. On the successful occasion, 
the Hungarian guests were hilarious, and the atmosphere was 
much better than during the celebration of Independence Day. 
Heikkilä estimated quite correctly that the resignation of 
Fagerholm’s government and the inauguration of the new 
government had made a positive impact on the Hungarian 
attitude.82 
The warm breath of mutual understanding reached the 
highest level in 1963. Finns frequented Hungary; FM Ahti 
Karjalainen, Johannes Virolainen, Minister of Foriegn Trade, 
Olavi J. Mattila, and Kekkonen’s friend, Vilkuna with his 
clients.83 The climax was to come; Kekkonen was planning an 
official visit to Yugoslavia in May 1963, and thereafter an 
unofficial visit to Hungary. It was time for Kekkonen and 
Kádár to meet for the first time.  
One must keep in mind that in Kekkonen’s program meeting 
with Tito was the most important item. He set himself to 
publicising more widely his idea of the Nordic non-nuclear zone 
and explored if the rather self-opinionated Tito would support him. 
According to Kekkonen’s diary, Tito thought the idea was sensible. 
Before leaving Yugoslavia Kekkonen requested Tito characterize 
Kádár. Tito’s answer was: ‘Kádár is a very good and wise man’.84 
There is no direct evidence as to whether Kekkonen had 
much information about Kádár in advance. Official representa-
tives had written their characterizations and possibly Vilkuna 
had told Kekkonen something. Even though the visit was a 
private one, Kekkonen was an old friend of Hungary and he 
must have been curious to see what the situation was in the 
country. Kádár just might engulf the fresh idea of the Nordic 
nuclear-free-zone.85 
In Hungary Kekkonen’s visit was a big event and the new 
Ambassador – Finland and Hungary had elevated their 
diplomatic relations to the highest level in 1960 – Reino Palas 
had a demanding task. He had arrived in Hungary at the 
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beginning of May 1963, only two weeks before Kekkonen’s 
visit. The reception organized in his honour was imposing. The 
accreditation took place in the Parliament; Palas left his letter of 
appointment to Dobi on the 6th of May. Soon Palas met three 
persons: the Spokesman of the Parliament, the Mayor of 
Budapest and Kádár. The first two meetings did not excite the 
experienced diplomat but the last one did. As Palas put it: 
‘Kádár is a very well-known and world famous man, whose 
policy of destalinization is well-reputed and closely watched 
around the world.’ Possibly Palas knew that this might be the 
only occasion when he could meet him privately. Unfortuna-
tely, the meeting was not a discussion but a monologue. Kádár 
talked a lot and Palas listened. The first topic was the kinship 
between Finland and Hungary, already taken up by Dobi. 
Kádár then pointed out that Hungary wanted to maintain good 
relations with every country, both in the East and the West. 
This message was rather familiar from the policy of Kekkonen 
who had introduced it in Finland. For Kádár, Yugoslavia and 
Austria were ‘friends’ even though Yugoslavia was a revisionist 
country and Austria a capitalist one. This was not a matter of 
ideology but of realistic policy. The way Finland conducted her 
foreign policy was highly appreciated by Kádár. Especially, the 
manner Finland had managed the relations with the Soviet 
Union was also internationally remarkable, and Kádár was 
looking forward to seeing Kekkonen in Hungary.86 
Thus there were only good omens for Kekkonen’s visit. Both 
Kádár’s and Kekkonen’s arguments concerning international 
politics and the position of small countries in the duopolic world of 
the Cold War were very similar. Small countries should try to 
maintain good relations with at least their close neighbours. Once 
again Kádár emphasized the kinship of Finns and Hungarians, 
which enabled good cultural and trading relations.87  
How accurate were Palas’s estimates? For him Kádár was an 
example of a new style leader in a communist county, a man 
who was testing the limits of the Kremlin’s attitude towards the 
liberalization of society while remaining a loyal friend of the 
Soviet Union. This was parallel with Kekkonen’s policy. The 
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main difference between Hungary and Finland was the fact that 
Hungary was a true satellite of the Soviet Union and a 
communist country, whereas Finland was a solid friend of the 
Soviet Union and a capitalist country. Yet both were hoping 
and searching for peace, good relations with neighbouring 
countries and no change in political systems. 
Palas’s report was truly professional showing wide general 
knowledge. He had previously been posted in Stockholm, in 
Copenhagen and in Washington, and he had been in service 
since 1941. He was also very well educated; he had a Ph.D. in 
psychology and good language proficiency: he knew English, 
French and German.88 Basically, he was a diplomat to the bone 
and capable of preparing the ground for Kekkonen. 
Kekkonen arrived in Hungary on the 12th of May 1963 and 
met Kádár in Debrecen. The meeting must have been a pleasant 
surprise at least to Kekkonen. According to the information 
received by Finnish diplomats from Budapest, Kádár was 
expected to be dull and uninspiring. It should be remembered 
that Kekkonen could not have seen Palas’s rather positive 
report which was dated 20th of May which had dealt with the 
meeting in Debrecen during which Kádár spoke very openly 
about the painful period after the year 1956 and also about the 
background of the uprising. He had found Rákosi the main 
culprit. Dobi, who was also present in Debrecen, made similar 
remarks. ‘Better times are coming’, was what both Kádár and 
Dobi emphasized. How did Kekkonen react? He was positively 
impressed. Afterwards he wrote in his diary:  
Kádár seems to be a really likeable and sensible man. He spoke 
openly about the year 1956. Rákosi had made big mistakes but the 
promises of the West made a crucial impact on the developments 
that caused the uprising. 89 
What was the meaning of the visit? The difference between the 
official visit to Yugoslavia and the unofficial visit to Hungary is 
apparent. In Yugoslavia Kekkonen was conducting international 
politics and in Hungary he was the leader of a kinship country. All 
the notes made by Kekkonen and all the documents and press 
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releases demonstrate the visit’s apolitical nature. And again: Kádár 
talked a lot and the visitor listened.90 For Kekkonen the visit had no 
special political goals. He was genuinely interested in Hungary and 
appreciated the way his trustee, Vilkuna, had created cultural 
relations with the country for years.  
The Hungarian press was fascinated: the readership could not 
but be aware of Kekkonen’s career and of his liking of Hungary. 
Even though the visit lacked political dimensions, the visit was 
interpreted as an approval of the Kádár regime.91 But Sándor 
Kurtán, Hungary’s Ambassador in Finland, was critical. There 
had been some disappointments, especially the trip to Hortobágy 
and Debrecen were unsuccessful; the interpreter had been poor 
and Kekkonen had not met enough important persons. The 
Hungarians had wanted personal contacts with Kekkonen, and 
they saw Kekkonen’s closest advisor, Permanent Secretary Reino 
Hallama, as the best source of introduction on the lines of Fin-
nish foreign policy. The Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Veli 
Merikoski, was not in the eyes of the Hungarians a man who had 
any political power. Kurtán knew quite well that it was 
Kekkonen himself and his close friends whose words were worth 
listening to.92 And his estimate was completely correct. All came 
to this: possibly in the future there might be even closer relations 
between Hungary and Finland, but not yet. At first, Hungary 
had to re-establish its international position. 
When Kekkonen started to lift his profile in the field of 
international politics, Kádár’s reputation among the leaders of 
the West was getting better. His new domestic policy was 
bearing its first fruits. Palas wrote to Helsinki in June 1963 
about the ‘new line’, as he put it. The atmosphere in Hungary in 
general was rather free, ordinary citizens were able to travel 
even to the West, tourism was taking its first cautious steps, 
almost everybody had an opportunity to study at the 
universities, and political prisoners were gradually released. 
Even the churches were allowed to operate quite freely. Palas 
had the courage to make a rather radical estimate that Hungary, 
Poland and Yugoslavia might be planning to form a more 
liberal group within the communist camp.93  
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One sign of the new attitude of the West was the growing 
number of high-level visits to Budapest. The General Secretary of 
the UN, U Thant, paid a visit to Budapest in July 1963 and after 
him came Richard Nixon. Especially the visit of U Thant was 
important. The General Secretary and Kádár had a three hour 
private discussion, and Palas estimated that Kádár’s personality 
had made a great impact on the visitor. It was quite obvious that 
Hungary was slowly getting out of the cornered position in the 
field of international politics. As U Thant had it: ‘The discussion 
with the PM Kádár contributed to a better understanding of Hun-
gary in the UN and to an improvement of the relations between 
Hungary and other member states of the world organization’. No 
wonder the Foreign Ministry of Hungary was very pleased about 
the positive development which made its impact also at the 
diplomatic level because after 1963 the status of most of the 
Western delegations in Budapest was elevated to embassy level.94 
In the early 1960s Kádár and Kekkonen had one especially 
good mutual friend, the General Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita 
Khrushchev. He had repeatedly declared his good relations 
with Kekkonen and through Kekkonen with Finland. To 
Khrushchev they were a fine example of the peaceful co-
existence of two different nations and two different political 
systems. In April 1964 Khrushchev visited Hungary, an 
occasion which was the peak of Kádár’s political career. The 
relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were perfect. 
Palas’s evaluation at the meeting is worth quoting: 95  
It seems as if it were important to Khruschev to show to the world 
that there is at least one ally which is 100 percent behind him 
[Kádár]. On the other hand, it was important for Kádár to gain 
Khruschev’s approval of his “socialist democracy”, so called 
Kádárism which was politically a sort of middle-way between 
“right-wing” and “left-wing” Communism. 
The similarity of Kádár´s and Kekkonen’s reactions to 
Khrushchev’s dismissal was salient. Kekkonen wrote in his 
diary about a great shock. He continued: ‘He [Khrushchev] was 
a friend of Finland and I was able to discuss openly with him’. 
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Kádár, for his part, praised Khrushchev’s achievements and 
recalled that the Hungarians had admired the fallen leader. 
Kádár took it personally, too, because it had been Khrushchev 
who had made Kádár the leader of Hungary. The Ambassador 
of the Soviet Union in Budapest, Denisov, told Palas that also 
he understood the sadness of the Finns, because Khrushchev 
had been a great friend of Finland, and consoled him by saying 
that there were now two leaders in the Soviet Union, Leonid 
Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin who followed the politics of 
friendship and trust. Kekkonen himself was more than worried 
and cynical. He knew the new Soviet leaders and Kosygin was 
a kind of friend of Kekkonen’s, but about Brezhnev he had not 
much to say. And there was the possibility of a bigger danger if 
the main ideologist, Suslov, could get an important position. 
For Kekkonen, Suslov was the worst choice because he was ‘a 
fanatic’, without any sense of humour. According to Kekkonen 
he did not even drink alcohol. For Kádár the adaptation to the 
new situation was not a problem at all. He bluntly stated that 
every leader of the Soviet Union was a friend of Hungary and 
that no great political changes were in sight.96  
For Kekkonen Khrushchev had been the first (and 
presumably the last) reliable link to the Soviet regime and it 
was hard to see how personal contacts with new leaders would 
develop. This was an important question because Kekkonen 
had realized that the best way to manage with the Soviets was 
to depend on personal, mutual trust. Also for Kádár the loss 
was big but he was a leader of a communist country and had 
less to loose. The Soviet Union would anyhow maintain good 
relations with her small satellite and it was very unlikely that 
Kádár’s position as a leader of Hungary was in danger.  
 
7 On the Way to CSCE 
Although Kekkonen had secured his second term as a President 
in 1962, problems in internal politics remained there. For the 
SDP Kekkonen was still the main enemy and vice versa. The 
leader of the SDP, Väinö Tanner, was a fervent opponent of 
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Kekkonen, and there was distrust of Kekkonen even in his own 
Agrarian Union.97 
Kekkonen tried to win support for his foreign policy in 
Finland but the result was poor. Many politicians thought that 
it was too favourable to the Soviet Union and did not suffi-
ciently take into account the power of the Western bloc. Since 
1963 Kekkonen began to market his idea of a nuclear-free zone, 
at first for the Nordic countries and then in general. It was a 
question of regional peace to avoid mass destruction. This was 
an idea that also suited Kádár. Since gaining power Kádár had 
been talking about peace and had noticed that Kekkonen had 
similar ideas. On the ideological level, when it came to peace 
and peaceful co-existence, Kekkonen’s and Kádár’s political 
aims were congruous. 
The importance of Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary was proved in 
the Hungarian Parliament in November 1964 when Foreign 
Minister János Péter spoke long and warmly about Finland and 
Kekkonen. According to him, Finnish-Hungarian relations were at 
the moment much more than the old romantic kinship – the 
relations were good in every way, especially at an economic level. 
The most important factor in this development was, as Péter put it, 
the resent high-level ‘delightful’ meeting, Kekkonen’s visit.98  
It was not only the official Hungary that favoured Kekkonen. 
For example, Népszabadság published a long article in December 
1963 about Finland and him, in which it was evident that 
Finland’s foreign policy was the same as Kekkonen’s. Finland’s 
position on the playground of international politics was 
something special: ‘positive neutrality’ What did this mean? 
Simply that Finland could maintain good relations with every 
country, communist, capitalist and the neutral ones. The most 
important thing was that Finland was not a member of any 
military alliance. Among the Nordic countries Finland was the 
one that represented ‘most firmly the idea of international 
peace and security’, and it had been Kekkonen who had 
introduced the idea of nuclear-free zones. The most interesting 
point concerning the idea of the nuclear-free zone was that the 
Western bloc supposed that Kekkonen was acting on the orders 
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of the Kremlin, a claim that at the moment had no proof. The 
reason why other Nordic countries were not interested in it was 
simple: Norway and Denmark were members of NATO and 
Sweden was planning to build her own nuclear weapons.99 
Palas cited Magyar Nemzet: ‘Finland decides her foreign policy 
independently. It is not forced by the East or the West’.100  
In the mid-1960s both Kekkonen and Kádár had consolidated 
their positions both internally and internationally, but on a diffe-
rent scale. In Finland Kekkonen had won the last contested elec-
tions in 1962 (there were normal elections in Finland after that but 
the year 1962 was the last one when Kekkonen had real 
opponents) and in Hungary Kádár’s position was solid. Kekkonen 
established quite soon reasonably good relations with the new 
leaders of the Soviet Union. In 1963 he was unchallenged in 
Finland: his last powerful opponent retired and social democrats 
chose a new leader, Rafael Paasio, and the man the Soviet Union 
hated most, Väinö Tanner, was history. The SDP was united and it 
became one of the leading powers of Finnish internal politics and 
was finally accepted by the Soviets by the end of the 1960s.101 Now 
Kekkonen was free to conduct the policy he wanted, although he 
had at the same time to remember or guess the Soviet attitude. 
Kekkonen became an international politician. At the same time 
Kádár’s Hungary was gradually accepted by the West and Kádár 
had slightly more room to carry through his own policy.  
The politically relaxed years in Europe ended on the 20th 
August 1968 when the troops of the Warsaw Pact invaded 
Czechoslovakia. The attitudes of Kádár and Kekkonen towards the 
events in Czechoslovakia were partly similar and partly quite 
different. The main concern for both was the destiny of their own 
nations but the vision of the future was different. For Kekkonen the 
Czechoslovakian crisis was a catastrophe. He wrote in his diary: 102 
It feels like a string has been cut. I have done all I could that our 
indispensable policy towards the East would became a clear policy 
of friendship and it would be a common persuasion for every Finn. 
The events in Czechoslovakia have destroyed these achievements 
and the ground for this development.  
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Kekkonen felt betrayed. The Soviet Union was using force 
again and highly-ranked Soviet diplomats had lied to him. Was 
there anyone to trust? What would be Finland’s fate? What 
would happen to ’peaceful co-existence’? The foundation of 
Kekkonen’s foreign policy seemed to have disappeared. No 
wonder Kekkonen was deeply depressed.  
Kádár took it differently. Naturally he was concerned about 
the brutal intervention in which also Hungarian troops took part. 
But what was paramount was that it re-established the status quo 
in the Eastern bloc. The Czechs had gone too far and there was 
always a danger that their ideas would reach Hungary. In 
Kádár’s view the year 1956 could not be allowed to repeat itself. 
This was the main concern he emphasized in discussions with 
Dubcek before the intervention. There was a serious danger of 
disturbances and the Hungarians would be obliged to participate 
in the action. Later he told the Soviets that the intervention was 
‘not worth the first prize’.103 One can ask whether Hungary had 
any other alternative than to accept the Soviet decision and to 
participate in the intervention. The Finnish Ambassador, E. O. 
Raustila, had heard a statement of a highly-ranked Hungarian 
politician: ‘Joining the intervention was for Hungary a most 
unpleasant duty, but one can ask whether we still existed as a 
nation if we had refused to do it.’104 
Actually Kádár´s foreign policy can be described as a 
communist version of Kekkonen’s foreign policy. Both Kádár 
and Kekkonen had two dimensions in their activities with other 
countries, the main difference being the emphasis of the context. 
For Kekkonen it was at least as important to stress to the West 
that Finland was a neutral state as to point out to the Soviets that 
Finland was a loyal friend of the Soviet Union.105 That was a 
strange doctrine but it worked. In Finnish-Soviet bilateral rela-
tions Finland’s policy of neutrality was included in the Treaty on 
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance from 1948 but 
internationally the idea of Finland being a neutral country did 
not cause any trouble with the Soviets. This was the state of 
affairs before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki.106 
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In April 1969 the Soviet Union send to all the European 
nations a letter in which it proposed actions to convene a 
European security meeting. This was not the first time the 
Soviet Union made a suggestion like this; the previous had been 
made in 1954 but it had failed. Finland refused to organize the 
meeting on the ground that all European nations would not 
participate in it. In 1969 the situation was different. Kekkonen 
had been very active during the 1960s and he saw the CSCE as 
an opportunity to secure Finland’s international position as a 
neutral country.107  
The CSCE meeting was designed to bring stability and peace to 
Europe. It did not bring peace but it finished indirectly the career 
of one Finnish diplomat. The man who fell was the Finnish 
Ambassador in Budapest. He had committed a majestic crime by 
accusing the Soviet Union of pressing Finland for four weeks to 
make a proposal for the CSCE meeting. Kekkonen was furious, 
and he immediately ordered Raustila to Finland.108 What was his 
mistake? It was the biggest one a Finnish diplomat or politician 
could make in the field of foreign policy. If Raustila’s statement 
had been true it would have meant that Finns were taking orders 
from the Soviets. 
The idea of the security meeting really came from the Soviet 
Union, and it had a certain political cue for Finland. It was the 
reason why Kekkonen took it seriously. There was only one 
problem; if Finland would say yes straight-away people would 
think that Finland was a Soviet Union’s advocate. Kekkonen 
decided that Finland should draft her own proposal, different 
from the one the Soviets had made and with the suggestion that 
the venue for the final summit would be Helsinki. This was the 
reason why the CSCE was so strongly attached to Kekkonen as 
a person.109 The Soviet Union made the initial proposition but 
Kekkonen made the idea agreeable to every European nation 
and also to the USA and Canada. Here we can spot the reason 
why Kekkonen acted so rudely when he heard about Raustila’s 
statements. The CSCE was becoming a mission for Kekkonen. A 
comic detail in this chain of events was that neither Kekkonen 
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nor his closest political advisers believed in the possibility that 
Helsinki indeed would be the venue.110 
In Hungary the idea of a large scale security conference was 
warmly welcomed and the attitude towards it was very optimistic. 
For example, Magyar Nemzet of the 30th October and Népszabadság 
of the 26th October were certain that the time had come to stabilize 
the security situation in Europe. The Hungarians were so 
enthusiastic that the Finnish PM Mauno Koivisto warned them 
during his visit to Budapest in October not to be overoptimistic 
about the conference.111 
Hope for a peaceful and politically stable Europe was in 
principle acceptable to every European nation. But there were 
other big issues twined to it: the question of two Germanys, the 
Soviet desire to maintain her political influence in Europe, 
NATO’s wish to secure Western Europe’s position so that there 
would be no fear from the Soviet Union. 
Finland’s aims can be reflected through Népszabadság’s article 
published on the 23 September 1969, shortly before Kekkonen’s 
first state visit to Hungary. It was an extensive and well-studied 
summary of Kekkonen’s public speeches and announcements by 
István L. Szabó According to him, Finland’s foreign policy was 
now entirely different compared to what it had been in the 1920s 
and 1930s when the basic line was isolation. But now, in the 
1960s, everything that happened in the world was also Finland’s 
concern and modern Finnish foreign policy could be described as 
‘a positive’ foreign policy. This meant that every conflict between 
the East and the West was a test also to Finland’s neutrality. 
Szabó wrote also that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen -line meant that 
Finland had tied her destiny on the question of peace. The 
concrete suggestions of creating nuclear-free zones were the 
clearest evidence of this policy. It was this very policy that was 
named by Szabó cryptically as ‘positive foreign policy’ Kekkonen 
who was a highly appreciated politician both in the East and 
West was its designer.112 Szabó’s estimate was quite accurate in 
view of the basic line of Finnish foreign policy; in his description 
we can find also the reason why Kekkonen hoped for success 
from the CSCE: he wanted Finland to become recognized world-
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wide as a fully independent, neutral country which was not 
under the Soviet Union’s command. This policy was welcomed 
also by the Hungarians, and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs immediately after the proposal made an analysis of the 
benefits the Eastern bloc could and would gain from the 
conference. First, the socialist countries would benefit from it 
because the original idea was proposed by the Soviets. Secondly, 
it could impinge on the unity of NATO and the Western 
countries in general.113  
Finnish politicians were able to discuss with their colleagues 
during Kekkonen’s visit in September 1969. Kekkonen and Kádár, 
who had become good friends appreciated each other very highly, 
had a long talk, but surprisingly not about the CSCE. Once again 
Kádár spoke, and Kekkonen listened to how Kádár explained 
Hungary’s policy before and during the Czechoslovakian crisis 
and the developments in the socialist camp in general. With 
president Pál Losonczi Kekkonen had discussions about the 
CSCE, and Losonczi pointed out that Hungary’s position differed 
from that of Finland only because of geography – Finland is far in 
the north and Hungary lies in the heart of Europe, and that was 
why, for example, the question of Germany was so important to 
Hungary. The Foreign Ministers, Ahti Karjalainen and János Péter 
had similar views about the security conference. The preparations 
had gone so well that even the NATO countries had reacted on 
the proposal positively.114 
If we study the aims Finland and Hungary had concerning the 
CSCE summit, there are many similarities. The most important 
motive both to Kekkonen and Kádár was peace. In the Second 
World War both countries had been on the ‘wrong’ side and after 
that Hungary had to endure the Soviet occupation since 1956. The 
crisis in Czechoslovakia had shown that the dangers of military 
action had not disappeared and in that sense a large conference 
with participants which could end the post-war political 
interregnum in Europe was a goal worth aspiring to.  
The Summit took place in Finlandia House in Helsinki in 
August 1975 and all the participants signed the final act. 
Everybody won something: the first ‘basket’ was a victory for 
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the Soviets because in it was the affirmation of the borders of 
Europe. The second ‘basket’ was balanced, being mainly about 
economical matters and in the longer term it proved to be use-
less. In the third basket there was the question of human rights. 
It was a point to the USA. The real winner, however, was 
Finland because this was the first time since the Congress of 
Vienna that every nation was granted the right to neutrality and 
Kekkonen utilized the situation fully by stressing that the 
summit was now being held on neutral ground.115 Nevertheless 
the Cold War was still lurking behind the curtains, as the US 
State Secretary Henry Kissinger put it: 116 
In Helsinki all the Eastern European countries increased their ma-
neuvering room and felt encouraged by Ford’s demonstrative visit 
to the most independent of them (These countries had, of course, 
invited the President precisely to make that point). 
Why was the summit important to Hungary? Henry 
Kissinger has an interesting quotation in his memoirs about the 
meeting with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, 
James Callaghan, who told Kissinger what Kádár thought about 
the conference. To Kádár the conference was a moral and 
political commitment to accept the status quo of the borders in 
Europe. Both Callaghan and Kissinger agreed that the CSCE 
could not prevent crises like in Hungary in 1956, but the Soviet 
Union could never again justify or explain invasion.117 It was 
evident that the CSCE was for Kádár a meeting where he was 
securing Hungary’s position as a sovereign socialist nation 
which did not have to fear brutal actions from the Soviet Union. 
It was a security guarantee within the Eastern European 
communist camp that Kádár aspired to, and that was what he 
got. The CSCE gave every nation in theory the permission to 
declare to remain a non-aligned and neutral country. The state-
ment can be found in the final act of the CSCE. The achieve-
ment for Hungary was to secure territorial integrity in prin-
ciple. Even though the future was to show that the declarations 
made in Helsinki had little bearing on political reality in 
Europe, in summer 1975 it gave to all the smaller countries in 
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Europe hope that there would be a longer period of peace 
ahead, albeit no one knew what kind of peace. Henry Kissinger 
put it in another way: ‘One conference does not change the 
Soviet Union a bit.’118 
 
8 The Aftermath 
After 1975 Kekkonen and Kádár met only once, in November 1976 
during Kekkonen’s state visit to Budapest. Two old, experienced 
and in their own countries very popular statesmen had a long 
discussion in the Parliament on the 17th and 18th of November. 
They explained the latest developments in their own countries’ 
internal politics. Kekkonen told of the troubles Finland had had in 
the economy and especially in the field of domestic policy. The 
conflicts had been mainly between the working class and farmers. 
Soon Kekkonen moved on to expound international affairs. The 
CSCE was naturally the main topic and there was some scepticism 
in Kekkonen’s tone. To him the détente was still the crucial 
question for small countries and that is the reason why everybody 
should, in his view, focus on the CSCE’s follow-up conferences. If 
Kekkonen spoke openly about Finnish domestic policy, so did 
Kádár of Hungarian. He informed Kekkonen about the situation: 
the country was ‘homogenous’ but there were also in Hungary 
different social classes; peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie, 
but no capitalists. The aim was, according to Kádár, the co-
operation between different classes, including the religious circles. 
The goal was to build a socialist society. In foreign policy Hungary 
and Finland had common aims. Finland was a neutral country 
and Hungary a socialist one. The most important friend Hungary 
was the Soviet Union but according to the agreements signed in 
Helsinki, Hungary was willing to have good relations with every 
country. The common interest was détente and because of it 
Hungary was willing to fight. In a nutshell: 119 
Primarily the leaders of Hungary seek the interest of their own nation 
because the Hungarians have gone through so many agonies that there 
is no reason for causing any more grief. This is what the Hungarians 
appreciate and that is the reason why they support the regime.   
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The principles Kádár explained to Kekkonen were very 
similar to the basic line Kekkonen had had during his long 
Presidency. Without good relations with the Soviet Union it was 
impossible to carry through one’s own foreign policy. It was not a 
question of whether the Soviet Union accepted everything but the 
relations had to be based on mutual trust. Finland and Hungary 
were secure because they were only not acting against the Soviet 
Union but also in the interest of their own nation’s future. This was 
the reason why Kekkonen and Kádár could understand each other 
so well. They both had been in politics for over 30 years in the 
shadow of the Soviet Union and both claimed credit for remarkable 
achievements. Hungary in the year 1976 was a totally different 
nation than it had been 20 years earlier and thanks to his reformist 
policy Kádár had gained a good reputation in the West. Finland 
had gone even further as it was widely accepted as at least a 
relatively neutral country. If Hungary was a model student of the 
socialist camp, Finland was an excellent example of how a demo-
cratic country could survive under the constant pressure of the 
Soviet Union. However, both success stories had their darker sides. 
In Hungary it was inefficient economy. As a member of the Soviet 
bloc Hungary was unable to develop her own industry the way it 
would have served the Hungarian economy120, and there was also a 
serious lack of democracy. In Finland the long Kekkonen-era dis-
turbed the domestic atmosphere and caused also a deficit of 
democracy. In Hungary it was impossible to see the future without 
the Soviet Union, in Finland it was impossible to see the future 
without Kekkonen. 
Hungary and Finland had ‘friendly’ relations, not only in 
political declarations but also on a personal level. Kekkonen and 
Kádár liked each other, they both were very pragmatic in their poli-
cy, especially towards the Soviet Union. Neither of them had illu-
sions about it. Finland and Hungary just had to live with it; there 
was no option. The influence of the Soviet Union could be felt also 
during the 1976 visit. The problem was the final communiqué. Kek-
konen wanted, actually demanded, that there would be a mention 
of Finland’s neutrality in the text. Kádár had told Kekkonen 
privately that he considered Finland a neutral country, but it was 
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not so easy to put it on paper. After lengthy and frustrating 
negotiations the magic word was added in the document, but later 
Kekkonen found out that the promise to use that word had come 
from Moscow.121 That was the price Kádár had to pay for his policy 
and that was the prize Kekkonen had achieved with his policy. 
No matter how good friends or relatives Finland and 
Hungary were, there was always the mighty Soviet Union 
somewhere there. The greatness (or to some scholars the 
weakness) of Kekkonen and Kádár was that they realized this 
perfectly and acted in the field of domestic and international 
policy precisely so that the Soviets could not find reason to 
criticize them publicly. They had no other alternative but to 
notice that in Kekkonen they could trust and in Kádár they had 
chosen to trust. Kekkonen and Kádár knew it. They both 
created partly different, partly similar political cultures: 
Kekkonen and Kádár believed that if the Soviet Union trusted 
them, they both had more space to carry out their own policy. 
There were two important sectors for both: international status 
and economy. For Kekkonen international recognition and 
neutrality were the most important but for Kádár the economic 
matters were more important because they thwarted the danger 
of internal unrest. They both managed their missions quite well. 
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Moral and Stability: The Image of János Kádár and 
Urho Kekkonen in the West from 1956 to the early 
1970s 
 
Vesa VARES 
 
 
1 Introduction: Two Statesmen as Symbols and Images 
 
1.1 The Countries Personified 
In 1975, as President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, became 75 
years old – and was as powerful as ever and as his era and po-
litical line seemed to go on indefinitely – a book Urho Kekkonen – 
a Statesman for Peace was published. It consisted of 12 articles 
and a foreword. Some of the writers were active politicians and 
diplomats, some were scholars, some of them were both. Four 
of the writers were Scandinavians. The book was to celebrate 
Kekkonen’s career and role in world policy.  
As such, the book naturally was not to be very critical – one 
Danish article perhaps excluded – but not hagiographic in any 
Eastern European sense either. Nevertheless, it was intended to 
influence foreign opinion and to disgrace the rhetoric of ‘finlandi-
zation’ in the West – it was originally in Finnish but translated into 
English. The foreword, written by a Foreign Ministry official and a 
university Professor, began a bit pompously and later went on to 
also praise the future of the statesman:1 
The name of Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland. Belongs to a 
category of names of European statesmen, who symbolize their coun-
try. Kekkonen is part of Finland’s international image. Finland’s for-
eign policy is synonymous with Kekkonen’s foreign policy. 
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Although Urho Kekkonen has already made history, he has, by no 
means, given up his active role. His vitality appears undiminished 
and he continues to remain an innovative statesman. At the moment 
it appears as if Kekkonen will continue to place his uniquely per-
sonal stamp on Finnish politics for a long time to come. 
Other articles went on to describe the difficulties, prejudices 
and opposition which Kekkonen had confronted, and how he 
had conquered them practically all, acquired historical wisdom 
and was now one of the true leading statesmen in Europe – in 
fact, one, who played an even wider role in world politics and 
was specifically advancing détente and world peace. It was in 
part a dialogue on the conditions for communication between 
states with different social systems and its goal was to ‘break 
the iron ring of fear and hate’.2 Kekkonen was in a unique posi-
tion: the West had recognized Finland’s neutrality, he had spe-
cial relations with Soviet leaders and could convey Western 
viewpoints to the East and Eastern viewpoints to the West. Un-
der Kekkonen, Finland had reached all the goals in foreign pol-
icy which it had set.3 
In short, Kekkonen was the symbol and guarantor of 
Finland. Even the slightly critical Dane, who expressed worries 
of what would come after Kekkonen – as he had become so in-
dispensable – actually emphasized Kekkonen’s importance and 
symbolic value; was it at all possible that anyone could replace 
him and be able to satisfy the Soviets as he had done?4 
Another, although smaller, example of the same kind, also 
published in 1975, was the issue number 2 of the Finnish peri-
odical on foreign policy, Ulkopolitiikka. It was dedicated to 
Kekkonen on his 75th birthday, and among the writers one can 
find the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the previous 
government (the government in office at the time was a civil 
servant government), the Swedish Prime Minister and the Edi-
tor of Izvestija (also a member of the Supreme Council of the 
Soviet Union), and there were congratulations of many big 
firms and businesses. Also 1000 hardbacks were issued.5 Also 
this can be seen as a part of an image-building project: 
Kekkonen was Finland. 
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In the same way János Kádár was Hungary. The similarity 
was even more underlined by the fact that both Kekkonen and 
Kádár had risen to power in the same year 1956, had become 
father figures and seemed to go on indefinitely without a seri-
ous domestic challenge. Both were believed to be genuine fa-
ther figures in their respective nations – without any real offi-
cial personality cult, if one compared it to, for example, Ruma-
nia or East Germany, let alone North Korea. 
Even a Leaders of the World series, which was published in the 
West and edited by Robert Maxwell, issued in 1985 a short bi-
ography of Kádár and published many of his speeches. The au-
thor also had had a chance to interview and follow Kádár for 
three days; so the message got more authority. Maxwell’s in-
troduction raised Kádár to an exceptional international level 
and thus helped very much to build the image of a real states-
man, especially in Western eyes: 
Last year there was a stream of visits between senior Western lead-
ers and Mr. János Kádár, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party. These were an indication of his stature as an East-
ern bloc leader willing to forge closer links with the West, and to 
adopt the profit motive wherever possible to help make the Marx-
ist Socialist State more efficient and productive. 
Sir Geoffrey Howe’s first official visit as the British Foreign Secre-
tary was to Hungary, as was Margaret Thatcher’s first visit to a 
Warsaw Pact country. Other Western leaders to travel to Budapest 
in 1984 have included Chancellor Kohl of the Federal German Re-
public and Signor Craxi, the Prime Minister of Italy. Mr. Kádár’s 
own highly successful visit to France was the first from a top-level 
Warsaw Pact leader to President Mitterand, and followed a visit to 
President Giscard d’Estaing in 1978. […] 
Steeled by a life of tumult, this tall, modest man with simple 
tastes has introduced changes over the last 20 years which are the 
marvel of his people and the envy of his neighbours. […] 
Kádár has given Hungary political stability and a high standard 
of living. Domestic reforms under his rule mean that there are now 
no political prisoners in Hungary, and internment without trial has 
been abolished. These advances have persuaded many of the emi-
grés of 1956 to return home. Kádár’s popularity is now at its 
height, and if a Western-style pluralist poll were to be held in 
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Hungary it would undoubtedly result in his re-election with a 
massive majority. […] 
He points out that Labour and the Conservatives in Britain and 
Democrats and Republicans in the USA share the same basic princi-
ples and views about the organisation of their State and its defence 
alliances, while the debate between them is restricted to the ar-
rangements for distribution of wealth and power within the State. 
Even the fact that Kádár had ‘invited’ the Soviet army to 
Hungary in 1956 was explained according to the official ver-
sion: it had been the only alternative to prevent a Civil War. 
Also the Introductory Biography section of the book (150 pages) 
painted a picture of a modest and principled, but extremely wise, 
cunning and pragmatic man. ‘He is a type mostly to be found 
among wise, old peasants who have lived to see much. […] Mod-
esty of the spirit is an inner imperative as strong as that of the 
body.’ Only his sense of duty accounted for the fact that he had 
been a leader since youth. It was also noted how Kádár had 
turned the tables also as far as the Western viewpoint was con-
cerned; the despised man of 1956 was now treated with respect. 
Among the Hungarians, his popularity was presented as genu-
ine and natural: ‘People do not adulate Kádár, do not idolize 
him, do not celebrate him. They love him. With an intimate, joy-
ful respect. Not only has Kádár identified with the country, the 
country has also identified with him. This is why I dare to write 
the bombastic sentence: János Kádár is Hungary.6 
The images were of course uncritical, and the image of modesty 
and of simple, self-sacrificing nature of the true statesman belongs 
to the oldest political commercial there is. But it can hardly be de-
nied that they served their purposes both in Finland, Hungary, in 
the Soviet Union and in the West. Kekkonen and Kádár were 
forces which were stable and well-suited in the big picture, espe-
cially during the détente, but also during the Cold War. Identify-
ing Kekkonen with Finland and Kádár with Hungary also made 
everything much simpler and prevented all unpleasant surprises. 
But how did these images come about, and were these per-
sons originally respected or at least regarded as useful? 
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1.2 Kekkonen and Kádár as Objects of Research 
First of all, it must be noted, that this is not a study of Kádár and 
Kekkonen as such; no attempt will be made to clarify what kind of 
politicians they were and what kind of policy they actually pursued. 
That issue is still very controversial in their countries and the sources 
available for this study do not offer a possibility to answer those 
questions. The purpose is to clarify the image they had in the West – 
the ‘West’ meaning in this case the United States and Britain.7 
The opposite direction – image-building was only briefly re-
ferred to in the beginning. Finland and Hungary did indeed try 
to use the personalities of Kekkonen and Kádár as symbols both 
to the East and the West: guarantors of good, reliable relations 
with the Soviet Union, but simultaneously letting the West 
know that actually the aims of Finland and Hungary also 
served its interests, or at least the interests of the world com-
munity. According to the famous phrase by Kekkonen, Finland 
‘did not want to be a judge, but a doctor’. 
This emphasis on the Western ‘feedback’ aspect also means 
that the results are not results on Kekkonen or Kádár as such, but 
on the Western superpowers. The Western opinions and views 
on these persons are the object. Kekkonen and Kádár are spectres 
and mirrors through which the Western policy is illuminated 
rather than the actual object of the research. The often very criti-
cal assessments on Kekkonen and Kádár are not taken as any 
value as such – the truth or falseness of those assessments is not 
as interesting as the attitudes which can be seen lurking behind 
them. The similarity between reality and the image is of minor 
importance, because it was the image, not the actual reality 
which stipulated the Western political line towards Finland and 
Hungary. In this sense the image was reality to the West, even if 
it was – as it often was – actually erroneous or at least one-sided. 
This image was based on the information the West had available 
– not on archives nor on benefit of hindsight.  
Kekkonen and Kádár are in fact quite good ‘tools’ for this 
kind of research. Neither Finland nor Hungary was a question 
which would have been crucial to Western interests, and both 
were geographically and also in many cases mentally distant. 
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Prejudices and expectations often prevailed and precise knowl-
edge was often lacking and gave way to stereotypes, so the 
statements reveal better the mental climate. Both Finland and 
Hungary were – as Neville Chamberlain notoriously com-
mented on Czechoslovakia in 1938 – distant countries, of which 
the British knew nothing – peculiar as such. And at the same 
time they were easily seen only in the light of the big powers, 
the assessments on them actually concentrated very easily on 
stereotypes of Russia or Germany. They were the ‘Others’ – a 
theme very up-to-date today, seldom passed by referring to 
such authorities as Stuart Hall, Benedict Anderson or Hugh 
Honour.8 It can also be asked whether Kádár and Kekkonen be-
came kinds of scapegoats in the Western psychology – espe-
cially Kádár for the tragedy and failure of the 1956 uprising but 
also Kekkonen in ‘wasting’ the Paasikivi heritage and letting 
the Soviets to also interfere in Finnish internal affairs.  
However, one cannot talk about a real ‘enemy image’ or a 
method with which the own bloc is made more solid by ‘creat-
ing enemies’. Both Kekkonen and Kádár were, after all, too in-
significant for this from the American or British viewpoint; the 
Soviet Union and world Communism were the credible ene-
mies. Finland and Hungary were only small pawns in the 
game, although Kádár especially also could be made ‘evil’ – re-
sponsible for the atrocities after 1956. Mainly one can say that 
there were expectations for both Kádár and Kekkonen, and 
their images differed in various periods, depending on how 
these expectations were fulfilled. Did the two statesmen live up 
to the expectation that they would at least try to keep the Soviet 
influence as low as possible with all the means at their dis-
posal? Or did they let the bear in? 
The period in question extends from 1956 to the mid-1970s, 
since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) marked an end of one period. The next phase of the 
Cold War in the 1980s was another matter for both Finland, 
Hungary and the super-powers and it was also ended with a 
totally new constellation, i.e. the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The study becomes even more illuminating by the fact that, 
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during the period under research here, there were remarkable 
similarities in Kekkonen’s and Kádár’s careers. As already men-
tioned, both Kádár and Kekkonen rose to power in 1956, the 
former after the Hungarian uprising was crushed, the latter less 
dramatically in a Presidential election. Both had also previously 
been among the prominent political elite in their respective 
countries. In 1975, during the CSCE, both Kádár and Kekkonen 
were still in power, seemed very likely to remain in power for a 
long time and in fact did, and the international situation had 
reached a new stage in which there was a real possibility that 
these former foes could be seen in a new role, as moderate sta-
bilisers. This was even more so because the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia had first marked a much more dangerous future which 
had then given way to a spirit of détente, and as the West was 
not thinking its strategy as aggressively and was not as confi-
dent of changes to its benefit in the near future as it had still 
been in the early 1960s. 
This research can be defined as a history of diplomacy and in-
ternational relations. As such it might represent the very thing 
which the so called post-modern philosophy abhors as old-
fashioned and elitist. Even though there can be truth in this, at 
least so far that concentrating on just diplomatic history would 
indeed be one-sided and neglect many valuable aspects, it must 
also be borne in mind that even ‘new histories’ sometimes be-
come ‘old’, and one should remember that a new trend cannot 
change the past as such. Finland and Hungary in Western policy 
actually do represent this old-school history of old-school diplo-
macy at a time when the aspects popular today were not yet con-
sidered as important by the contemporaries – especially during 
the Cold War years. A post-modern effort to stress contacts of 
‘civil societies’ in these cases and periods would be too trendy to 
be real. However, from the 1970s there are undoubtedly new 
possibilities in this area, but these will have to be considered in 
possible future studies. The fact is that the case for the study now 
at hand is ‘traditional’ because it would be quite artificial to pre-
tend that any post-modern or other state of affairs would have 
existed in this kind of case in 1956–75. 
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It must also be added that the old controversies of Primat der 
Aussenpolitik or Primat der Innenpolitik do not come to the fore-
front either. Domestic events in the United States and Britain 
are of course important when the overall picture of the Cold 
War is concerned but they did not play a big role in the analysis 
of the motives of these countries on issues concerning Finland 
and Hungary. This is due to the fact that the circles which had 
opinions on Finnish and Hungarian issues were very small and 
even these people knew that the Finns and the Hungarians did 
not actually decide the big issues, not on world policy and even 
not always in their own policy either. Domestic changes in the 
United States and in England influenced only bigger issues, like 
the Cold War, fear of Russia and Communism, Germany, the 
Third World and imperialism etc. In fact, it does not seem that 
the Western policy line was particularly dependant on the fact 
of which party – Democratic or Republican, Conservative or 
Labour – was in power in the United States or in England. Be-
cause Finland and Hungary were not vital to the West, the pol-
icy concerning them was usually decided by the desk officers in 
the State Department and Foreign Office; these issues seldom 
required a Ministerial decision or comment. And since it was 
also evident that not much could be done to help the Finns or 
Hungarians (or to change their leadership to a more pro-
Western one), continuity in these relations was very striking. 
As previously noted, the study ends in the mid-1970s. It must, 
of course be confessed that also the sources set the end to the 
early 1970s, and the CSCE can be seen as the one final point. The 
American material was first taken from the FRUS-Online series 
(Foreign Relations of the United States) from the web-sites and 
the original documents have been consulted at College Park in 
1997 and 2002. Whereas the British material is concerned, the 
original papers on Finland and Hungary in the Public Record 
Office, Kew Gardens, have been consulted. Finnish and Hungar-
ian9 documents have not been used since this would have re-
quired a new set of questions and themes for the research, and 
the limit of resources for the project did not allow this. 
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2 The Hard Line of the Cold War (1956-62): A Quisling and a Tenderfoot 
 
2.1 Hungary 
 
2.1.1 Aspect of the Cold War: Traitors to be Ostracized 
The factual events of the 1956 uprising and the biographical, 
personal history of Kádár will not be described here, since it can 
be assumed these are already known and since this study has to 
do with image, not with the actual events. More important is to 
remember the starting points of the West: Hungary was a coun-
try which had had a very strict stalinist control and which was 
in the enemy camp. Against such a country there could not be 
many causes for dissent between the Western countries. Even 
the simultaneous disagreements of crisis such as the Suez Canal 
were not relevant in the case of Hungary, where the West 
thought it could see the Cold War re-emerge violently from the 
Soviet side. 
After the national uprising was crushed it was crystal clear 
to the West who were the heroes and who were the foes. The 
Hungarian communists were considered Moscow’s puppets 
and henchmen, the real aggressor being the Soviet Union. The 
uprising was seen, as the British Envoy Leslie Fry defined it, as 
a ‘revolt of a nation’, and it had been directed against Soviet 
exploitation and communist oppression.10 
An American press release, issued to the Legation in Buda-
pest, was very typical: 11 
In a joint declaration with the Soviet Government at Moscow on 
March 28th the Kádár regime has again denied the competence of 
the United Nations in the problem of Hungary. It has again falsi-
fied the record by alleging that the Hungarian uprising of October-
November was a fascist counter-revolution unleashed by the 
United States. 
But the record is clear. The uprising was spontaneous. It was 
supported by the entire nation. It was crushed only by the inter-
vention of Soviet armed forces. In these circumstances, the contin-
ued presence of Soviet forces in Hungary and the systematic re-
pression of the Hungarian people constitute an open confession by 
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the Kádár regime that it does not have the confidence of the people 
and cannot exist without the protection of the Soviet troops. 
The Kádár regime has vengefully sought to identify, seize, and 
punish those who took any part in the uprising of October-
November. It has carried out arrests of Hungarian citizens on a 
mass scale. It has re-instituted by decree the cruel practice of ban-
ishment. It has ordered all residents of Hungary to report to the 
police for a check of identity cards. It has made clear in public 
statements that Soviet troops will remain in Hungary indefinitely 
for the purpose of protecting the regime and intimidating the 
Hungarian people. 
These events can only be regarded as further steps toward the 
complete suppression of all human rights and liberties in Hungary. 
They mark a reversion to some of the worst practices of the Stalin-
ist terror in that country and stand in ironic contrast to the celebra-
tion by the Communists on April 4 of the ‘Liberation’ of Hungary 
by Soviet Armed Forces in 1945. 
We believe that these developments will be of concern to the 
Special Committee established by the United Nations General As-
sembly on January 10 to investigate the problem of Hungary. The 
Committee will report its findings to the General Assembly, which 
remains seized by the problem of Hungary. 
In practice, the new Hungarian leaders, Kádár included, 
were boycotted after the crushing of the uprising. Especially the 
United States aimed to deny credentials from the Hungarian 
UN Delegation because of the atrocities in crushing the upris-
ing. The American view can also be seen from the motivations 
for a UN solution which the US Legation made known to its 
British counterpart in Budapest: 
a) It should comprise a series of steps, and not be a ’package’ pro-
posal. b) The measures proposed should be such that no formal ac-
ceptance of them either by the Russians or by the Hungarians was 
necessary. 
c) It should appeal to the ’uncommitted’ nations.  
d) It should consist of measures which could be carried out within 
the existing Hungarian constitution.  
e) It should, if possible, be able to show some advantage to the So-
viet Government. 
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As such, there was also an angle of Realpolitik; it was per-
ceived that not much could be done and that the Russians would 
need some face-saving measures. But on the whole the American 
line was strict. The American Legation suggested that it would 
also be demanded that Hungary would withdraw such legisla-
tion (it is illuminating that the word legislation was in parenthe-
ses) which made arbitrary arrests, incarcerations, summary trials 
etc. possible. The UN should also demand new negotiations 
about the stationing of the Soviet troops in Hungary, more cul-
tural freedom, reducing the pressure of the party in schools, in-
creasing the number of workers’ councils and widening of the 
government. It was of course taken for granted that these condi-
tions would not be met, but as the Soviets would reject them, it 
would be a propaganda victory for the West.12 
The American National Security Council – which drafted the 
policy lines to be approved by the President – also claimed that 
the uprising was a moral victory against Communism in the 
long run. This, of course, was partly an ideologically ‘compul-
sory’ interpretation and revealed in fact that the West had no 
means to influence events behind the Iron Curtain. The NSC 
considered, however, that there were possibilities for evolu-
tionary development of the satellites, and thus they could dis-
tance them more and more from old-time stalinism and the in-
fluence of Moscow. The future looked most promising in Yugo-
slavia and in Gomulka’s Poland. 
Compared to them, Hungary was totally black: 13 
The present Communist regime in Hungary, in consolidating its physi-
cal control of the nation, has followed a policy of terror and intimidation 
clearly intended to wipe out all resistance. Although the Hungarian 
people continue to despise this regime, a surface calm prevails and the 
normal pattern of life under Soviet Communism has resumed. […] 
Because Hungary has become an important psychological factor 
in the world-wide struggle of the free nations against expansionist 
Soviet Communism, U.S. policy must maintain a delicate balance; 
it must seek to encourage the same evolutionary developments as 
in the other nations of Eastern Europe, without compromising the 
symbol which Hungary has become. More restraint will be re-
quired in dealing directly with regime officials than in certain 
VESA VARES 
 148 
other nations of the area, and the timing of U.S. moves will be of 
great importance. 
In 1958–59 the NSC defined the Western goals in the Soviet-
dominated Eastern Europe. The general line was not totally mili-
tant without any shades. Of course, there would be a continuing 
refusal to accept the status quo of Soviet domination over the na-
tions of Eastern Europe as permanent, and there would be a con-
tinuing affirmation of the right of the dominated peoples to na-
tional independence and to governments of their own free choos-
ing. However, simultaneously it was assumed that the West had 
to deal with the present communist governments, not to expect 
them to be overthrown in the foreseeable future. Even so, also 
in this document Hungary was presented in the most negative 
light:14 
There has been no progress toward the achievement of U.S. policy 
objectives in Hungary. In the absence of any favourable change in 
the Hungarian regime’s defiant and uncooperative attitude toward 
the UN and its efforts to deal with the problems arising from the 
1956 revolution, U.S. relations with Hungary remain strained, and 
the United States has continued successfully its efforts to keep the 
Hungarian situation before World opinion and under active con-
sideration at the UN. 
In the UN itself, the outline was naturally more emotional, 
principled and strict. The US UN Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge referred in his speech in December 1959 several times to 
Kádár’s speeches as evidence of the dictatorship and added: 
‘And to the brave and suffering people of Hungary this resolu-
tion says: You are not forgotten.’ Another US representative put 
it even more plainly about a year later, throwing a sarcastic 
comment to the Soviet side: ‘Freedom and peace are indivisible. 
The day of freedom must come – not only in Asia and Africa, 
where it has been arriving with dramatic suddenness – but also 
in those areas of Europe and Asia which have been subjected to 
the new domination of alien matters’.15 
The British may not have disagreed with the general line but 
having far less superpower resources, they could usually rec-
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ommend no action. Sheer propaganda would not help much if 
nothing concrete would be achieved. As the British Ambassa-
dor in Moscow, Sir Patrick Reilly, pointed out to the Foreign 
Office, the Soviet Union would not care about international 
pressure, and if the UN tried to deny the Hungarian credentials 
in the UN, it would only reveal the impotence of the UN. The 
only possible way to get any results would be high level talks 
with the Soviets, for example, between the Secretary General of 
the UN and the Soviet Ambassador in the UN.16 
It is hardly surprising that Reilly’s colleague in Budapest, Leslie 
Fry, emphasized more the moralistic view, connected to the prag-
matic one: ‘While I agree that the Russians should logically be our 
main target, it seems to me to be going too far to say that “to take 
action against the Hungarians would be hitting the wrong tar-
get”.’ There was nothing illogical about hitting the secondary tar-
get, ‘the Hungarian puppets’, if you could not hit the main one, 
‘their Russian masters’. Fry did not take very seriously the threat 
that Hungary would in return expel the Western Legations from 
Budapest either.17 The atrocities which he had witnessed in Buda-
pest clearly made him the most militant representative of the Brit-
ish diplomatic corps. 
When Fry wrote to his superiors a critical evaluation of the 
UN plan of the Americans, he seems to have thought that even 
that was too moderate. According to him, the UN representa-
tive or group should not have been a negotiator in any normal 
sense of the word, but ‘an “educator” seeking to convince the 
Russians that concessions should be made to the Hungarian 
people’. Of course, the Russians would not accept proposals put 
to them; but they might initiate something else if they were 
convinced that world opinion demanded it and that they would 
not lose thereby.18 
On the whole, however, the British were more moderate or 
at least less convinced of the usefulness of propaganda ges-
tures. This became evident in a small scale when the Inter-
Parliamentary Union was summoned in London in 1957 and 
Hungary planned to send a hard-liner communist Sándor Rónai 
as the Hungarian representative. Fry recommended that he 
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should be turned out, and his further advice of how the Hun-
garians should be approached was not particularly diplomatic. 
He recommended to be expressed ‘that, as the Kádár govern-
ment was imposed on the Hungarian people by force of Rus-
sian arms, a delegation from a “Parliament” consisting solely of 
Kádár’s stooges can hardly expect to be recognised in this coun-
try as representing the people of Hungary’ and to complain to 
the delegation. 
This was too much for the desk officers: they admitted that 
the British could mention oppression and that the British peo-
ple regarded with horror ‘the executions, arbitrary arrests, po-
litical prisons and concentration and forced labour camps 
which are now such prominent features on the Hungarian 
scene’. But it was doubtful whether Fry’s suggestion would pay 
off in any way. In the first place, if the West wanted to be con-
sistent, there would be several other delegations at the confer-
ence to whom much the same thing could be said; and in the 
second place, it was hardly logical to tell people simultaneously 
that they were mere stooges and then go on to protest to them 
about what their government was doing.19 The weight of Real-
politik was getting more important as time went by. 
At least according to the British, the Hungarians, however, 
saw or wanted to see the British policy as more moderate than 
that of the other Western countries. Especially during Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan’s visit to the Soviet Union the Hun-
garian attitude towards the British approached, according to 
the British, ‘even cordiality and I was forced to listen to clumsy 
exercises in wedge-driving through contrast between British 
flexibility and American-German intransigence’.20 Naturally, 
the British did not want to see their moderation in this light or 
take the role of a deserter.21 Even so, their comments on Ameri-
can policy on Hungary were less and less enthusiastic: the 
standard British line was that, repulsive as the Kádár govern-
ment was, the American approach had been proven ‘sterile’, 
and it was in the interests of the West to do whatever they 
could to promote contacts with the Hungarian nation and to 
prevent the traditional links from being broken.22 When the 
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American line emphasised isolation of Hungary, the British 
thought the same goals could perhaps be reached better from 
within. 
The Americans held to their own line. When State Secretary 
Christian Herter approved in November 1960 that the Legations in 
Bucharest and Sofia would be raised to the status of embassies, he 
specifically stated that this would not apply to Budapest, since ‘our 
current relations with Hungary are anomalous and wholly nega-
tive’.23 
 
2.1.2 A Quisling in 1956 – or a Lesser Evil? 
Seen from the starting points and policy strategies mentioned 
previously, it is hardly surprising that the Western view on 
Kádár’s person was extremely suspicious and negative. In the 
reports he was more often than once ‘Quisling’, and his gov-
ernment was not always considered a government at all – 
sometimes it was called ‘terroristic’.24 
At best, Kádár was seen as a mediocrity and a victim of cir-
cumstances who had had no choice if he wanted to save him-
self. At worst, he was seen as a traitor and a quisling who had 
joined the Russians because of personal ambition. What was 
worst and most ominous – according to this interpretation – 
was that he had not done this because he had to, but because he 
had wanted to gain power in Hungary. Even his personal hon-
esty was in doubt because he had first joined the Nagy regime 
but then deserted it and seemed to have willingly adopted the 
role of a Soviet puppet. In this interpretation it was also taken 
for granted that Kádár had no popular support at all, he was 
universally considered a traitor. In fact, some of the Western 
spectators thought the Hungarian people were so disgusted 
with him that even the Soviets would have liked to replace him 
with another, less hated figure.25 
In January 1957, Envoy Fry elaborated the difference be-
tween Kádár and Nagy as he saw it: 26  
M. Nagy, his loyalty confronted during the brief days of freedom 
with a choice between Moscow and Hungary, stood steadfast by 
his own country. But his partner in power, M. Kádár, had already 
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betrayed her; and the Russians, as reward, set him up as head of a 
puppet government in the provincial town of Szolnok. 
A ‘Personality’-report on Kádár was hardly more merciful: 27 
Never of first-rate ability or great strength of character, Kádár on 
his emergence from prison (in 1954, VV) was unable to decide 
which brand of communism to support. On August 12, 1956, he 
publicly disassociated himself from the Rákosi-Gerő line, but when 
in the autumn he entered the short-lived second Nagy Govern-
ment, although himself a non-Muscovite, he made common cause 
with the Russians. It is worth noting, however, that after Nagy´s 
Government fell Kádár was called on to form a Cabinet while he 
was on a visit to the U.S.S.R. and he was thus without any freedom 
of choice whatsoever. […] the workers’ councils (banned except in 
the factories) which, though disembodied, are still influential, treat 
Kádár with complete contempt. Kádár, in short, is a leader without 
a following. His past record suggests that he would prefer Com-
munism shorn of its worst excesses, but that, although he owes his 
life to the Nagy reforms, he would not go further along the path 
towards ’liberal’ Communism. 
However, the most sinister interpretation of Kádár’s motives 
gave gradually way to a view which at least admitted that 
Kádár was not the most stalinist alternative: there were still 
even worse options among the old Rákosists.28 But even this 
might not be a cause to change opinion because in this case 
Kádár would hardly have space to manoeuvre. As one of the 
Foreign Office officials put it colourfully: ‘Thus, while it may 
still be true that there are moderate and extremist factions 
within the party, their interests at the moment largely coincide: 
they must hang together if they are not to hang separately.’ At 
any rate there was no hope to be seen.29 
But it seems that now, paradoxically and gradually, Kádár 
had come to represent some sort of ‘lesser evil’, compared to 
the old Rákosi guard. And if there would be hope of any im-
provement or even the end of deterioration and oppression, it 
would probably be connected to his name. A bit later the defeat 
of the molotovians in the Kremlin was seen as an advance for 
Kádár.30 However, in Western eyes his position was still very 
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unstable and there was certainly no respect connected with his 
name. And the bottom line was at the end of 1957 still that the 
resistance of the Hungarian people against communist oppres-
sion was strong.31  
 
2.2 Finland 
 
2.2.1 Moderate Goals: Keeping the Paasikivi Line 
Finland of the late 1950s was in many senses a very different case 
compared with Hungary. It was a neutral country or at least striv-
ing to be neutral; there were no Russian troops in Finland; the 
country was a democracy and had a multi-party system, free elec-
tions and mostly free press. However, there are astonishingly 
many similarities: the Soviet shadow, the tightening Soviet grip, a 
strong leader who remained in power for long, and suspicions in 
the West. 
In the case of Kekkonen, there are many interpretations on 
how successful he in fact was in maintaining Finnish independ-
ence and neutrality. According to his supporters, he was a 
genuine success: he managed to get the recognitions of Finnish 
neutrality also from the West and thus won also Western confi-
dence. This was something which the cautious predecessor J. K. 
Paasikivi (1946–56) had not dared even to try. Especially the 
American and British recognitions of Finnish neutrality in 1961 
are taken as evidence of Kekkonen’s success, the CSCE Summit 
and Final Act in 1975 in Helsinki being the jewel in the crown, 
and the declaration of how he had become a true European 
statesman of the first order. Many Finns seemed deeply aston-
ished and hurt when not he but a Russian dissident Andrei 
Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize. 
According to Kekkonen’s opponents and critics, these 
achievements were not necessarily the merits of Kekkonen but 
something which would have been achieved anyhow – possibly 
even before and at lower cost, had Kekkonen not been so pro-
Soviet in his speeches. The critics emphasize that Paasikivi had 
operated in much more difficult circumstances, held his own 
against the Russians in domestic policy and also enjoyed much 
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more personal respect and confidence in the West than 
Kekkonen. For example, there had been no communists in the 
Finnish government after summer 1948, and he had also de-
fended the social democrat minority government in 1948–50 de-
spite the evident Soviet opposition and displeasure. 
According to the critics, Kekkonen allowed the Soviets to inter-
fere into internal Finnish issues and domestic policy – the so-
called ‘finlandization’ – which Paasikivi had managed to avoid. 
The main point of the criticism is that the basic line had been set 
by Paasikivi and that Kekkonen had used the Soviet card to his 
own benefit to gain political hegemony in Finland. Kekkonen had 
also created a stifled mental climate in Finland and weakened the 
Finnish backbone by demanding that the friendship with the So-
viet Union should be treated as a virtue, not as an uncomfortable 
necessity. 
But what was then the Western view on Finland? How much 
did the internal conditions of Finland matter to it and what was 
expected from the Finnish leaders and thus also from 
Kekkonen? 
Finland was a sort of a reluctant test-case not only for the 
Russians but also for the West. As such it was not vitally impor-
tant to the West. It was useful mainly for the fact that its inde-
pendence denied the Soviets many military and political advan-
tages which the membership in the Warsaw Pact or the status of 
the Baltic provinces would have given them. It was useful also 
in that sense that the collapse of Finland would weaken other 
small nations threatened by Communism, as the American Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) concluded in the 1950s.32 But, not 
being vital, Finland might also be expendable if the achieve-
ment – such as Sweden’s possible membership in NATO – were 
tempting enough. In any case, Finland would never be de-
fended by NATO troops: it was recognized that the country lay 
in the Soviet-dominated sphere of interest. As the NSC stated in 
1954 its moderate goals concerning Finland:33 
To review NSC policy with respect to Finland with a view to continu-
ance of an independent, economically healthy, and democratic 
Finland, basically oriented to the West, (but with no attempt to incor-
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porate Finland in a Western coalition) neither subject to undue reli-
ance on Soviet Bloc trade nor vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure. 
In 1959 the NSC also stated: 34 
Furthermore, if Finland is able to preserve its present neutral status 
– that of a nation able to maintain its independence despite heavy 
Soviet pressure – it could serve as an example of what the United 
States might like to see achieved by the Soviet-dominated nations of 
Eastern Europe. 
Finland was a warning of what might become of a neutral 
Scandinavia, yet it was not Eastern Europe by any real stan-
dards, and it could be seen also as a positive prospect when the 
Eastern European bloc was concerned; perhaps it could be a 
model to ‘finlandize’ Eastern Europe? 
It was clear that more was expected and hoped for from 
Finland’s than from Hungary’s part because Finland had some 
space to manoeuvre which a Warsaw Pact country such as 
Hungary could not have, especially after 1956. So it was impor-
tant that Finland would not make too many compromises and 
put this space to jeopardy. The Finnish statesmen were ex-
pected to defend the degree of ‘Westernness’ they had. It was 
expected that they would preserve the status quo, make the 
necessary concessions to the Soviets to keep these content but 
simultaneously defend their right to take care of their own do-
mestic affairs alone without Moscow’s interference. Domestic 
slipping towards Communism would be a blow to the Western 
interests in the Cold War and would shake the whole balance in 
Northern Europe. 
A sort of a test case was the ability to keep the communists 
out of the government; as already noted above, this had been 
achieved since 1948. The standard American and British line in 
the 1950s and 1960s was to support co-operation and coalition 
governments between the SDP and the Agrarian Union, no 
matter how much they or their leaders might be distrusted as 
individuals. This was called ‘the red ochre’ government in 
Finland. 
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The essential aspect in grading the importance of the Finnish 
parties was ultimately not a question of which party was ‘right’ 
in internal disputes or even the most pro-Western one. The most 
important thing was to guarantee Finnish domestic stability and 
to avoid internal chaos, in which the trade unions and the farm-
ers’ union struggled for material and social benefits. This strug-
gle would undermine the democratic parties, strengthen com-
munists and thus make Finland more vulnerable to Soviet pres-
sure. This sort of stability was also the highest goal considered 
possible to achieve. 
It was accepted that the SDP and the Agrarian Union (from 1965 
the Centre Party) were the only forces imaginable which occupied a 
position to control the economic interest groups and make them 
stabilise the economy. The ‘red ochre’ government was also consid-
ered the only coalition strong enough to make a stand against 
communist and Soviet demands and threats. In theory, the National 
Coalition Party (NCP, the Conservatives) was clearly the most pro-
Western and anti-communist party as such but it was left to obliv-
ion due to pragmatic reasons. Co-operation with this party would 
provoke the Russians and antagonize leftist parties, the Agrarian 
Union and Kekkonen – and whereas these could do much harm to 
Finnish stability, if left in opposition, the NCP could not. Thus, it 
was expendable. The desirability of the ‘red ochre’ government was 
due to tactical considerations and was a means, not an end. This 
standard line did not even depend on what party was in govern-
ment in the USA or in Britain, neither on the personality of the Am-
bassadors nor on the desk officers in Washington and London. It 
remained dominant throughout the period in this research. 
This sort of government had been the rule in the 1950s; how-
ever, between 1959 and 1966 this coalition became impossible be-
cause of the bad relations between the SDP and the agrarians, or, 
between the SDP and Kekkonen. The West faced a dilemma: on 
the one hand, they disliked Kekkonen and his agrarian followers 
but on the other hand they knew they could not do without them, 
since there was no other useful counterforce against the commu-
nists. The social democrats were of course there, and usually it 
was easier for the Western diplomats to understand them and 
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sympathize with them than to appreciate the agrarians; but they 
were not enough. 
At the end of the day no pro-Western heroism was required 
from Finland because it was taken for granted that any ostenta-
tious move towards the West, let alone help from the Western 
Powers, would only provoke the Russians to demand even more 
than they had originally intended, and the Russians were in a 
superior position to compel Finland to submit if they regarded 
this as necessary. In short, it was expected that the Finnish Presi-
dent and government would maintain the status quo of the mid-
1950s. All changes would probably be changes for the worse. 
Paasikivi seemed to have managed all the essentials; of 
Prime Minister Kekkonen’s abilities and intentions or even of 
his bottom line sympathies one was not always equally sure. As 
a British memorandum which could be compared with the 
American NSC outlines stated in 1955: 35 
[…] the attitude of the Finnish government towards Russia has of late 
been unnecessarily subservient. This is principally the fault of Dr. 
Kekkonen, the Prime Minister, an able and an extremely ambitious 
man who, though no Communist or fellow traveller, is prepared to 
follow almost any policy which will suit his personal book and further 
increase his popularity with the weak and ageing President 
Paasikivi, whom he hopes to succeed at the next Presidential elec-
tions. […] there is a risk that he may allow his ambition to outrun 
his country’s interests. 
The West also seemed to appreciate a cartoon of the leading 
Finnish cartoonist in Helsingin Sanomat, Kari Suomalainen, in 
1954, when Kekkonen ousted Ralf Törngren from the Premier-
ship and became Prime Minister again. This can be assumed 
from the fact that both the American and the British ministers 
sent the cartoon to their foreign ministries. The cartoon de-
scribed a mass of Soviet-type soldiers carrying Törngren away 
and Kekkonen saluting the soldiers from a balcony. The text 
was: ‘Long Live the People’s Republic of Kekkoslovakia!’ 
Since the West could not do much to defend Finland politi-
cally, not at least in the foreign policy, the Finnish domestic fo-
rum was the only one in which the communist and Soviet influ-
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ence could be fought effectively – without a risk of an Ameri-
can-Soviet conflict over Finland. The best weapon would be to 
aid the non-communist parties and to further non-communist 
co-operation.36 And this should be done with as little noise as 
possible. 
Despite the criticism of Kekkonen it was mostly taken for 
granted in the Western diplomatic circles during Paasikivi´s 
Presidency that Kekkonen would become the next President. 
Kekkonen’s political talent was considered to be in its own class 
in Finland, he was clearly the favourite of the Soviets, and his 
opponents could not join their forces.37 But after he indeed was 
elected in 1956, the fears seemed to become true, and the first 
real evidence of subservience seemed to come during the Hun-
garian uprising. The Finnish attitude towards condemning the 
Soviet aggression was considered very evasive. As the British 
Ambassador asked the Finnish Ambassador if Finland would con-
tribute to the work of the UN Special Committee on the Hungar-
ian Uprising the Finnish colleague was reluctant. The London offi-
cials were not surprised: as one of them noted in the minutes with 
a short but illuminating sentence: ‘This is what we expected.’38 
And after Nagy’s execution it was yet again Kekkonen who was 
seen as the culprit in Finland or at least as the censor whose line 
prevented some of the moral outcry which the executions 
would have deserved from every democratic and free man.39 
 
2.2.2 Rock Bottom – Permitting Soviet Interference in 1958–62 
The convictions of Kekkonen’s sins were accentuated even 
more after the so called night frost crisis in 1958–59 and note 
crisis in 1961. It is not possible to describe these crises in detail 
here but in both cases the Americans and the British thought 
they could see their worst fears come true: they thought that 
Kekkonen was yet again making undue concessions to the So-
viets – concessions which Paasikivi would not have made. 
The Night Frost crisis came after the 1958 elections. The com-
munists became the biggest party (50 out of 200 MPs) but the 
negotiations to form the new government brought a pleasant 
surprise for the West. Instead of the dreaded popular front gov-
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ernment just the opposite emerged: a coalition government of 
all parties except the communists (and the Small Farmer’s Party 
of no importance). Even Kekkonen’s party, the Agrarians, par-
ticipated; the most influential position was held by the anti-
Kekkonen social democrats, and also the ostracism of the con-
servatives was ended. In the Western eyes, this was even better 
than the ‘red ochre’ government: a government this large 
would effectively isolate the communists. The Western diplo-
mats sensed Kekkonen’s reluctance against the new govern-
ment but as the American Ambassador reported to Washing-
ton, ‘all Emb[assy] contacts assume, and we agree, communists 
will not repeat not be admitted to government unless President 
Kekkonen in effect goes nuts’.40 It was recognized that 
Kekkonen could not prevent the government from being 
formed, and it was expected that the government would control 
his undue subservience to the East. 
However, when the West was satisfied, it was evident that 
the same reasons would make the government an anathema for 
the Soviets. The discontent was soon apparent: trade negotia-
tions were cancelled, and Ambassador Lebedev left the country 
without the usual courtesy visit to President. The relations of 
the two countries froze to a zero-point. 
Kekkonen’s own attitude towards the government had been 
negative from the very beginning since he regarded it as dan-
gerous in foreign policy and consisting of his most ardent op-
ponents in domestic policy. The question of his actual role in 
the making and breaking of the government is still debated 
among Finnish historians but the least what can be said with 
certainty is that he and the Soviets had at least some co-
operation against the government – and both were trying to 
bring about the fall of it. Kekkonen did not show the slightest 
sign of following Paasikivi’s example and defending a govern-
ment which was under pressure from Moscow, on the contrary. 
For example, he inquired through his political confident Ahti 
Karjalainen whether the Soviets would continue resisting the 
government without compromise to the end because only in 
that case could he throw his authority to the game against it.41 
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Kekkonen seemed to work against the government right from 
the start and then to give in to the Russians almost immediately 
– if not even to collaborate against the government. Finally, the 
government resigned. 
In the Western Embassies, Kekkonen was seen as the culprit. 
It was thought that the Soviet pressure would not have war-
ranted such submission from his part, especially since the 
Americans had promised to give economic aid. Now he had set 
a dangerous precedent and the Soviet interference in Finnish 
domestic matters had increased. As the British Ambassador 
Douglas Busk put it: 42 
President Kekkonen is apparently genuinely persuaded that the 
degree of submissiveness to Russian wishes indicated in his speech 
is necessary to the safety and prosperity of his country. […] the 
President is still playing party politics. […] apparently granting the 
Russians the right to object to any government and from that it is 
but a short step to a Russian right to choose a government. […] The 
President may think he is adopting ’divide et impera’ as his motto, 
but it may work out as ’divide et Russia imperabit’. At the very 
least the Russian appetite must surely have been whetted. 
The Western image of Kekkonen was of course partly a stereo-
type. But Kekkonen did not improve this image – of which he 
could hardly be ignorant – in his meetings with the Western dip-
lomats especially in the years 1959–60. He repeatedly stressed to 
them that the real danger to world peace was not the Soviet Union 
at all, but the unwise, revanchist policy of Western Germany. He 
also maintained that the Soviet Union was in ascendancy in the 
Cold War, whereas the West had suffered many setbacks.43 
It has often been said that the Western diplomats had too 
one-sided contacts and listened too much to Kekkonen’s oppo-
nents. According to their reports, however, Kekkonen and his 
supporters were listened to as well, and the arguments of 
Kekkonen’s opponents were not taken at face value. Moreover, 
it was not supposed that Kekkonen’s opponents had much of a 
chance to gain power in any case. It was especially those opin-
ions of Kekkonen mentioned above (given by himself) which 
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made the West most worried, not the horror stories of his op-
ponents which were taken with a grain of salt. 
The British or the Americans did not succeed in raising 
Kekkonen’s sympathies. On the contrary, his recently published 
diaries reveal that he considered most Western diplomats in 
Helsinki mediocre and did not appreciate their advice. Mostly 
he saw them, not the Soviets, as the troublemakers in Finnish-
Soviet relations. In his opinion, especially the Americans did 
not understand the Finnish policy. In his entries, he called one 
of them ‘the U.S. Gestapo man’, another one ‘a fool’, a third one 
‘more stupid than can be permitted’.44 Furthermore, State Secre-
tary Dulles also gave advice, which – according to Kekkonen’s 
diary – was ‘the advice of a foolish dilettante’; the US foreign 
policy was in ‘pitifully weak hands’.45 The West Germans were 
especially repulsive: in 1969 Kekkonen wrote, that President 
Lübke was ‘a big fool’, Franz-Josef Strauss ‘intimidating’, and 
even Willy Brandt, a social democrat, had spoken ‘like Hitler’.46 
These opinions Kekkonen naturally did not say aloud but the 
ones he did led, of course, to negative emotions in the West. It was 
difficult to decide whether Kekkonen had capitulated mentally or 
let fear or some sort of pro-Soviet conversion guide him. How-
ever, the Western conclusion was not that disenchantment should 
lead to distancing oneself from Kekkonen. It was taken practically 
for granted that he would be re-elected President in 1962, so the 
West had to find ways to influence him, not to discredit itself by 
backing his adversaries which scarcely had a chance to win. The 
West should rather try to improve his knowledge of the situation 
in the world and particularly make him aware of the American 
might compared to that of the Russians. At the same time the 
West should maintain a low profile in Finnish affairs in order not 
to provoke Kekkonen and the Russians.47 ‘Finland must walk a 
tightrope; the local Blondin [Kekkonen] is the only one avail-
able, so we must try to guide him’, was a sentence used by 
more than one diplomat. 
Even the question of inviting Kekkonen to a state visit to the 
United States and to Britain was seen in this light. So, paradoxi-
cally, when Kekkonen made these visits in 1961, this seemed to 
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be recognition of neutrality, and the Finns made the most of 
them. But, in fact, the invitations were not proof of Western 
recognition of Kekkonen’s policies or his success or authority 
but quite the reverse. 
How can this paradox be explained? One must bear in mind 
that Kekkonen was not accused of being a traitor or an agent of 
the Kremlin. He was almost always, also in the most critical 
Western analysis, considered to be a Finnish patriot. His great-
est error was not lack of patriotism but of judgement: he had 
made a wrong conclusion in world politics and the outcome of 
the Cold War, since he had over-estimated Russian might and 
underestimated the American one. State visits were considered 
the only means to try and influence him and to make him see 
that Finland had a chance to hold its own against the Soviets. It 
was also useful to talk about Finnish neutrality when it was 
considered to be weakest and in danger because this was the 
only way to make it as difficult as possible for the Soviet Union 
to crush it. So the invitations to state visits and recognitions of 
Finnish neutrality during these visits were paradoxically not 
the fruit of Kekkonen success in convincing the West but of his 
failure to do this.48 It was an effort to ‘convert’ him, and this 
would be done with a carrot, not with a stick.49 
The success, seen from the Western point of view, was meagre. 
Kekkonen maintained his official line and gave no signs of ‘hidden’ 
Western sympathies. A disillusioned British memorandum stated 
after the visit that Kekkonen had behaved in London as if he had 
recognised that the Soviets had a right to concern themselves with 
Finnish internal politics, and betrayed a leaning towards the Soviet 
point of view in world politics.50 Another one stated: ‘It must be 
hard to be a good Finn. What disappointed me most about the 
whole visit was the President’s pointed omission of any indication 
that he was basically on our side.’51 
In October 1961, while Kekkonen was still on his state visit to the 
United States, a crisis erupted which damaged his reputation even 
further in the West. The Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to 
Finland and suggested that consultations according to the 1948 
Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance should 
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be commenced due to the rising militarism and revanchism in West 
Germany. The ‘true’ motives of the note are a constantly debated 
issue in Finland, and the main question has been whether 
Kekkonen somehow collaborated with the Soviets in order to en-
sure his re-election. The Presidential Elections of 1962 were ap-
proaching, and the anti-Kekkonen forces, the social democrats, the 
conservatives, the liberals and the Swedish People’s Party and the 
Small Farmers’ Party, had nominated a former Chancellor of Jus-
tice, Olavi Honka, as a joint candidate. Even though the polls indi-
cated that Kekkonen would win, the front behind Honka was wide 
enough to cause worries in the Presidential Palace, the Agrarian 
Party – and the Kremlin. 
While it is not possible to describe the aspects of the note crisis 
more accurately here, the result was that even though Kekkonen 
finally came out as a winner of the crisis, his name became more 
suspicious than ever in Western eyes. First the West had considered 
that Finland was in true danger and that the note was a threat also 
to Kekkonen. Now, if ever, he should defend Finland; the Ameri-
cans were ready to give extensive economic and even diplomatic 
support – they had agreed on this with the British already in April 
1961. 
But when Kekkonen yet again gave in, travelled to Novosi-
birsk to meet Khrushchev in a manner which looked subservi-
ent in the West, admitted most of the Soviet arguments and at-
tacked his domestic political opponents in his speech both be-
fore and after Novosibirsk, suspicions rose. They gained more 
nourishment from a Soviet defector’s stories that Kekkonen and 
Khruschchev had arranged the note together in order to ensure 
Kekkonen’s re-election and to crush his opponents. When the 
Soviets dropped the suggestion of consultations almost at the 
same time when Kekkonen’s rival stepped aside from the 
presidential race, the Western analysis began to smell some sort 
of conspiracy. This time the West was disappointed not only 
with Kekkonen but the disappointment covered the whole na-
tion. Where was now the spirit of the stubborn nation of the 
Winter War? Was Finland now slowly and undramatically slid-
ing to the communist camp? 
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Kekkonen’s reputation had reached rock bottom in Western 
eyes. Even now he still was not suspected of being a secret commu-
nist, let alone an agent, but he simply was too ambitious and too 
timid. It is also noteworthy that this disappointment was deepest at 
the same time when the image of Kádár was slowly, even though 
without enthusiasm and almost without noticing it, improving. 
Kekkonen would become part of this rehabilitation process only 
later. 
 
3 A Gradual Change for the Better in the Mid-1960s 
 
3.1 Hungary – A Necessity Becomes a Virtue 
The improvement of Kádár’s image was extremely gradual. It is 
impossible to say any definite date or year, and it hardly devel-
oped into any positive emotion, let alone admiration as such. It 
was more a question of two unavoidable things: the ‘lesser evil’ 
and making an inevitable state of things a virtue. In a way it 
was, of course, also a sign of impotence in the matter. But even 
though the image of the state of things in Hungary was far from 
ideal, some reluctant recognition of improvement had to be 
given. The image of Kádár became rather an image of a cunning 
foe, a foe cunning enough to fool his Russian masters as well – 
he was not only a traitor with blood on his hands and without a 
will. He was rather a builder of the special Hungarian line. 
Since the West was experiencing problems of its own – Viet-
nam and the ‘anti-imperialist’ slogans in the decade of de-
colonization – it had to adapt itself to the situation. Besides, 
even though the Kádár regime was still considered emotionally 
repulsive no spectator could deny that the situation in Hungary 
seemed to be normalising, and the economy even prospering. 
Even the NSC admitted this as early as in 1958: 52 
A certain degree of moderation has been evident in the economic 
policy of the Hungarian regime. Collectivization of agriculture re-
mains the ultimate goal, but Kádár has asserted that this will be 
achieved by ‘Leninist’ persuasion rather than ‘Stalinist’ coercion. A 
degree of private enterprise among artisans and small tradesmen 
has been tolerated though not encouraged, and there has been an 
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effort to keep the market reasonably well supplied with consumer 
goods. With the aid of extensive grants and loans from the Soviet 
Union and the other Communist nations, the Hungarian economy 
has recovered from the effects of the revolution more rapidly than 
had been anticipated, though grave economic problems remain. 
Although the aspect of economic development was often 
partially belittled with the words ‘according to Eastern Euro-
pean standards’, it was still a fact. On the one hand, this was 
positive development. On the other, it could also be politically 
worrisome: would the Kádár regime thus be able to ‘buy’ the 
popular support which the people of Hungary had thus far de-
nied him? At the same time, the belief that the Hungarian peo-
ple would continuously resist an oppressive regime dimin-
ished. 
Also Kádár’s personal position and standing seemed to 
change. Even this was a dilemma in at least two aspects. On the 
one hand, if one took the moralistic view of 1956, it was not 
mentally comfortable to see how the quisling and demon of 
1956 was becoming tolerable. On the other hand, if Kádár 
gained more personal authority, it could be conceivable that he 
would some day be able to also stand up against the Soviets, at 
least on some issues. When Kádár visited the Soviet Union in 
1958, the West considered his domestic position safe.53 
The execution of Nagy in 1958 produced a shocked moral 
outcry but even that did not have any permanent effect. The 
Americans did not in fact blame Kádár for the execution in their 
own secret negotiations. The execution was considered a factor 
which would rather damage his position. The Head of the CIA, 
Allen Dulles, expressed his conviction that the signal for the 
executions had almost certainly come from Moscow and that 
they had been intended as warnings first to Tito and thereafter 
to Gomulka. ‘He thought it likely that in the sequel Kádár 
would drop out of the political picture quite soon.’54 
Despite Dulles’s comment above, at least the British did not 
expect Kádár to fall soon, and as already stated, when Kádár 
visited the Soviet Union in April 1958, the West considered his 
position in Hungary safe: the extremists had not gain the upper 
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hand.55 In late 1959 the British also concluded a new ‘Personali-
ties’-list in which they analyzed the leading circles of Hungary 
and even some of the potential opposition forces. It should be 
added that according to the information of the archive cata-
logue a more extensive list also exists but is still secret. 
The analysis of the list available is, however, very illuminat-
ing. Kádár is, of course, the obvious target of interest, but also 
some other personalities are worth mentioning. It is interesting 
that the personality of Gerő is not commented on at all, his ca-
reer is cited only in the form of an extended curriculum vitae. Of 
Kádár, the list says the following:56 
Kádár, János: Immediately after the revolution, Kádár offered 
many concessions to the workers and the revolutionary councils, 
including the principle of multi-party free elections and the with-
drawal of Soviet troops. At this time he did his best to represent 
himself as a moderate. But his term of power has been marked by 
steadily increasing repression in all fields and the elimination of 
most of the political concessions won by the Revolution. It has 
been rumoured that, particularly in the summer of 1957, he fa-
voured the introduction of a more moderate line but was over-
ruled. His speeches have been harsh, he accepted without protest 
the execution of Nagy and his associates in June, 1958, and, what-
ever his personal views, he appears to be a reliable tool in the 
hands of his Soviet masters, ready to carry out any excesses which 
are demanded of him. It is believed that his nerve and will-power 
have never recovered from his sufferings in prison; but his public 
appearances present a facade of confidence and determination. The 
great majority of Hungarians detest him as devoid of every vestige 
of political and moral integrity. 
On the surface, this was a moralist view, and the emotional 
repugnance was clear. Nevertheless, it is illuminating that the 
critical tone sounded like compulsory mental adhering to old 
values which, however, would no more be permitted to stand 
in the way of a pragmatic policy. It would have been too much 
to confess a wrong analysis, but the very fact that Kádár had 
remained in power and was likely to be the strong man also in 
the future made it essential to also find good sides of him. And 
at the very least his success had to be admitted. Even Fry, while 
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stressing that Kádár was ignorant of the events outside of the 
Soviet bloc and distorted them, and was ideologically as rigid 
as Rákosi and Gerő, said he displayed ‘frankness and a sense of 
realism’ in economy and agriculture.57 
Besides, the other characteristics showed that there was no 
better option. To take a couple of examples: 58 
Kiss, Károly: Kiss is one of the key figures in the party today and is 
thought to be in favour of repressive policies. He is the main party 
organiser and disciplinarian and has been largely responsible for 
carrying through the reconstruction of the party since the revolu-
tion. 
Marosán, György: He did not play a prominent role in the revolu-
tion of October, but has since repeatedly declared that he voted in fa-
vour of calling in Soviet troops at the outset on October 23. […] Ma-
rosán has been one of the Kádár régime’s principal spokesmen since 
its conception, although less has been heard of him in recent months. 
He has made numerous speeches at party meetings and Workers’ 
Conferences, the majority marked by their harsh uncompromising at-
titude. His style is extremely coarse and the published versions of his 
speeches are carefully edited. He has frequently stated that there can 
be no question of the revival of a separate Social Democrat Party […] 
He is uneducated and regarded as something of a buffoon; but he is 
dangerous. 
Münnich, Ferenc: He is a tough and determined Communist who 
would have been happy to share responsibility for the excesses of 
Rákosi but for his personal friendship with Rákosi’s victim, Rajk. 
He is still said to distinguish himself from those members of the 
leadership who are out and out Rákosists, but he is probably as re-
actionary and inflexible as they are. His allegiance to the Soviet 
Union is probably absolute. 
The difference between the British and the American attitude 
about tactics became clearer and the British were very conscious 
of it. The Head of the Northern Department, R. H. Mason, 
wrote to the Budapest Legation: ‘I entirely agree with your 
view that we must try to encourage a more forward policy to-
wards Hungary by the NATO powers as a whole. The Ameri-
can attitude has been an obstacle to this, but we must hope that 
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the new Administration (=Kennedy, VV) will be prepared to 
take a more positive view.’59 
Necessity became a virtue, and it is of minor practical conse-
quence whether this was due to a true conversion or tactics. A 
year later it was essentially Kádár’s authority and personal re-
spect which was emphasised in the British analysis and this 
trend became all the more obvious in the following years.60 A 
phrase which was frequently repeated was that it was accepted 
that although Kádár would never be able to win the real confi-
dence of the Hungarian people, the Hungarians thought Kádár 
to be the best Prime Minister they were likely to get. He was 
essentially a mediocrity who had risen to the top because of 
events, but Hungarian history was full of men who in similar 
circumstances had adopted the realistic policy of doing what 
was possible. One Hungarian writer had even called him the 
Hungarian Christ, because ‘someone had to save the Hungarian 
people’.61 And even after Khrushchev’s fall in October 1964 the 
British did not think that this would harm Kádár’s position.62 
Also the American image of Kádár was gradually changing, 
although the Americans were slower in this mental rehabilita-
tion process and did not concentrate so much on Kádár’s per-
son. They saw the case of Hungary in a grander scheme; as a 
part of the communist bloc and as a case in which only the So-
viet Union really mattered. When Kádár visited the United Na-
tions, the Americans did not meet him and restricted his trav-
els. Even so, after Kádár had visited the UN the American atti-
tude began to show more signs of interest in him. 
A report which was issued from ‘a reliable source’ in De-
cember 1960 described Kádár’s informal comments during this 
visit. They were thought to be interesting also because it was 
assumed that Kádár had actually wished that they would reach 
the Americans. This is most probably a valid guess, since the 
comments show Kádár’s desire to convince the Americans of 
two starting-points: he was in power to stay but he was also a 
pragmatic man. He would bear no grudge for the suspicions 
and the boycott and was a leader whom one could have deal-
ings with – only a few circumstances had to be understood at 
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first. And third: it paid off to take him seriously, since he was 
no puppet. 
Since the events of 1956, there have been a lot of childish (gyere-
kes) things going on between our two countries. I want to be frank 
with you. Both the U.S. Government and we Hungarians have 
been acting like a couple of kids. Periodically, we expel one an-
other's diplomatic representatives: one American for one Hungar-
ian. I don't think this is an intelligent (okos) thing to do. Let us ex-
plore the possibility of an understanding.  
I don't like the Germans (I mean Adenauer's Germany) but to il-
lustrate my feeling on this subject, I would use the German word 
`Realpolitik' to describe the way this matter should be treated. We 
do not hate the Americans. After all, let us be realistic: Who are 
we? We are only a `little louse' (kis tota [sic!]) in this big world. 
However, the prerequisite for normal relations is a willingness on 
the part of the U.S. Government to recognize the hard facts. The 
People's Republic of Hungary is an accomplished fact. It is here to-
day. It will stay here tomorrow. All you have to do is to recognize 
this fact. The rest is simple. We could then resume normal diplo-
matic representations instead of this ridiculous (navetaeges [sic]) 
Charge d'Affaires business. 
The U.S. Government talks about Hungary being a Soviet satellite. 
Now on this subject let me tell you the following. It has cost the U.S.S.R. 
a lot of money to help normalize our conditions after 1956. Today we 
are happily engaged in constructive work. Our people enjoy freedom. 
No more of the Rákosi terror. Believe me, we don't take people to prison 
in the middle of the night any more. If you don't believe me, then talk to 
our writers, our intellectuals who were released from prison. Talk to Ti-
bor Dary [Déry], the writer. And all this nonsense about Khrushchev 
dictating everything in Hungary – it is simply not true… 
Let me assure you, once the U.S. recognizes that there was such a 
thing as the People's Republic with Kádár as its leader, we would 
not have a single problem. I cannot emphasize that strongly 
enough. 
I must tell you in earnest: We have no illusions concerning the 
possibility that the U.S. will become a socialist or a communist 
state. We Hungarian Communists are realists. We know that your 
country is capitalist, and it will not adopt our system. (Source: Mr. 
Kádár, this does not seem to be in line with Mr. Khrushchev's re-
mark to the effect that our grandchildren in the U.S. will live under 
Communism.) 
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What makes you think that we have to go along with everything 
our Comrades say? We Communists like to argue with each other. 
That is the democratic thing to do. The principal thing is that the 
East and West must co-exist in peace and that we must negotiate. 
Take this present UN debate. It is much better to shout (kisbalai 
[sic!]) at each other than to shoot (loni [sic]) at each other.63 
The message is clear: Kádár wanted to show that he was not 
a man who would hang himself for any dogma. He even took 
the trouble to emphasize his peasantry (!) and love for nature 
and animals, even joke how he would not like to live in New 
York: ‘Not enough trees and (laugh) too many policemen.’ And 
then he appealed to the American nationalism by confessing his 
and his people’s admiration for Ulysses Grant. The document 
does not, however, reveal the American reaction. 
Even as the image of Kádár became better, one thing still an-
noyed even the British: they thought that Hungary was buying 
internal independence by being extra loyal and rigid in foreign 
policy.64 The Americans had even more to complain about, 
since according to their view Hungary was almost the most ea-
ger supporter of North Vietnam and condemned ‘American 
imperialism’ so vehemently. In 1965 there occurred a demon-
stration of Asian and African students in Budapest against the 
American Legation, and even the Legation premises were vio-
lated – according to the Americans, with no effort on the Hun-
garian part to control this.65 
But despite such things the American policy line had also 
softened remarkably. For example, the issue of Hungarian cre-
dentials in the UN became more and more a liability already in 
the beginning of the 1960’s as the years went by, since decoloni-
zation increased the number of the countries to which the Hun-
garian question was of no importance or which even had, if not 
sympathies with the Soviet view, even fewer sympathies for 
Western ‘Imperialists’ playing the role of liberators. 
In addition to this, the reluctant admission of the Hungarian 
domestic development was unavoidable also to the Americans: 
the Rákosists were pushed back and the standard of living was 
improving – even though it was reminded that because of the 
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physical and political restrictions put on it, the Legation could 
not test the situation adequately.66 
But slowly the tendency became clearer: ‘Kádár regime, al-
though a police state disliked by the overwhelming bulk of 
Hungarians who would sweep it away if able to do so, has gov-
erned better than thought possible in 1956. It is probably as 
good as can be hoped for in the immediate future.’ Kádár was 
sincerely interested in the welfare working class ‘rather than a 
pure Soviet stooge’. He gave the impression that he was not 
necessarily the most implacable of the bloc leaders in his atti-
tude toward the United States, particularly if he would be given 
evidence that the United States was not implacably opposed to 
him. 
In September 1961, Kádár had a collective audience for the 
Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions. Chargé Torbert had a discussion 
with him and seems to have got the same message as Kádár’s 
1960 comments described above. He analyzed: 
By nature a cold and withdrawn man, Kádár apparently finds it 
difficult, or else does not consider it worth the effort, to project his 
personality to a heterogeneous social group. The best indication of 
this was that after about twenty minutes of opening formalities the 
event died on its feet and Kádár was left talking exclusively with 
minor Hungarian officials. Although the initiative to open a con-
versation was mine, Kádár did his full share to continue it. […] 
Probably the most interesting result of the conversation was 
Kádár’s unsolicited admission that he was trying to find ways to 
overcome certain institutional rigidities of the communist system 
which inhibited economic development. He made it clear that his 
principal preoccupation was with economic advancement of Hun-
gary. 
A Memorandum of Conversation attached to the report gave 
Kádár’s message even more clearly: 67 
I have been thinking while I was waiting for your arrival what I 
should say to you. It seems to me that we did not elect each other 
to office but we will have to accept each other’s existence and put 
up with each other. We may disagree on many subjects but we 
have important common responsibilities. The task of diplomats is 
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to find ways to get along in difficult circumstances. We should, 
therefore, enjoy normal relations so that we can solve our prob-
lems. […] It seems much better that we take our discussions out of 
the hands of soldiers and put them in the hands of diplomats. He 
then said that the disputes in the world were between regimes and 
not between people. He did not like to use the word enemy but he 
would say his opponent was the government of the United States. 
In one way he would be sorry to divert that opponent from preoc-
cupation with armaments because he knew that America was a 
very powerful country with a very powerful system which in fact 
had some advantages over the rigidity of the Hungarian system 
and if we devoted ourselves entirely to economic development we 
would get ahead very fast and it would be that much harder for 
Hungary to catch up. 
In February 1962 Torbert admitted, that even if the party had 
not gained popular support, Kádár had with his ‘folksy’ 
speeches and manners.68 
The actively hostile enemy image was fading away, although 
there naturally was no cordiality. But it was evident that 
Kádár’s slow tactics and messages of pragmatism were paying 
dividends. In fact, he was giving the same messages throughout 
the 1960’s in various newspaper interviews, which were also 
noted in many Embassy records. Since the American general 
line towards the Satellite countries was anyhow slowly chang-
ing, it became easier and easier for Hungary to fit in a policy 
which would no longer stick to the memories of 1956. 
This standard American line, which can clearly be seen in the 
document ‘Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe’ in 1964, was 
now that the communist regimes would stay in Eastern Europe. 
But, now they were seen as representatives of national Com-
munism, and they would consciously and methodically attempt 
to free themselves as much from the Moscow dominance as 
possible. In this way the communist bloc would lose its mono-
lithic nature. 
It was assumed that this political evolution was not likely to pro-
ceed at a speed which would threaten the communist regimes 
themselves, but the logic of this development would make the dif-
ference – against Moscow anyhow. The national communist re-
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gimes were now the main force which could oppose Moscow in 
Eastern Europe, so it was not practical any more to treat them as 
oppressive and undemocratic quisling governments, but to try to 
develop relations with them. It was also assumed that the Soviets 
would consider direct military intervention in Eastern Europe only 
in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital Soviet inter-
ests to be threatened. Even the fall of Khrushchev did not change 
this analysis.69 
In any case the principle was that the United States should 
improve its relations with Eastern European countries – even to 
strengthen their communist regimes.70 
All this was a far cry from the old moralist view which sepa-
rated the cause of the free, democratic world and the evil commu-
nist bloc from each other completely. No immediate victory was in 
sight; probably there was even some thought of the convergence 
of the two systems in the long run. Mainly the improving image 
was due to the fact that a new phase in the Cold War had changed 
the tactics. 
 
3.2 Finland – Slippery Slope to the East? – or Better Omens 
The same trend that was slowly changing the image of Kádár, 
was influencing the Western image of Kekkonen as well, al-
though a bit slower – because his dramatic crisis had also taken 
place later than Kádár’s. This was perhaps inevitable, if the 
view is accepted that it was the Grand Strategy in the Cold War 
which was strongly influencing the policy. A case like Finland 
would always in such a case partly retain its continuity, partly 
follow the general trend. 
The American and British views on Kekkonen’s personality 
during these crucial years can also be traced from various re-
ports in one form or the other. They are presented in a most il-
luminating way in two documents: a British ‘Personalities’ list 
of influential Finns, consisting of 217 names, written in 1959, 
and an over 60-page ‘biography’ on Kekkonen, ”A Study of the 
Career and Policies of Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland”, 
which was written in the American Embassy in 1963. The latter 
one even included notes. 
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Neither of these documents favours any such interpretation 
that Kekkonen would have been a sinister demon, a traitorous 
power-hungry satellite or an agent of the KGB. Neither was, in 
fact, based on only anti-Kekkonen circles’ information – as has 
always been suggested by Kekkonen’s supporters when the 
question of Kekkonen’s strained Western relations came to the 
debate. Both documents were reasonably neutral and attempted 
to give an unbiased view. 
The key sections of the American ‘biography’ were in the in-
troduction and in the conclusion. Since they sum up the analy-
sis made before in this study, they are cited here quite exten-
sively: 
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen is the unchallenged ruler of Finland and he 
is likely to remain so for many years to come. At 62 he has just be-
gun his second six-year term as President of Finland. A third term 
seems probable and a fourth term is within the realm of possibility. 
[…] He likes the Presidency which he actively sought and for 
which he evidently considers himself well qualified. No individual 
even remotely threatens his political preeminence. There is no cur-
rent prospect of a coalition of domestic opponents capable of re-
ducing Kekkonen´s authority and eventually turning him out of of-
fice. In the unlikely event that Kekkonen at some point proves un-
able to protect his own position, the Soviet Union can be expected 
to take steps to preserve his authority. 
Kekkonen had effectively monopolised Finnish foreign pol-
icy and also made use of it like no predecessor had done before. 
And no one had made domestic developments serve foreign 
policy or used foreign policy for domestic political purposes 
like him before. His domination of Finland was primarily the 
product of the application of political skill and purposeful ex-
ploitation of fear of Russia, and he had also remained in parti-
san politics. Contrary to the idealised view of the Finnish Presi-
dent as a unifying force, he had continued to be the real leader 
of his Agrarian Union and had controlled the actions of the 
cabinet during most of his presidential term. And no one dared 
to challenge him – it was known that it would be useless to try 
to convert him, and he would retaliate by discrediting his op-
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ponents in the Russians’ eyes. To make the President’s task 
even easier, he often had the support of the large communist 
party and factions of the other parties; his opponents were dis-
organised and lacking in skilful leadership. 
The report described a very autocratic leader and personal-
ity: 
Kekkonen is not a popular President. Confident, tough, often re-
sentful of advice, and markedly sensitive to criticism, he seems to 
have few close friends or confidants. He neither seeks nor received 
the adulation or affection of his people. His relationship to them is 
cold, distant. The public seldom sees the congeniality of which 
Kekkonen is capable. He is offensively pedagogical in his attitude 
toward the Finnish people. Kekkonen asks for their confidence 
while often demonstrating that he has little confidence in them. He 
does not appeal for understanding and cooperation; he demands it. 
Despite his unassailable political position Kekkonen is seldom if 
ever magnanimous or conciliatory, even in moments of national 
crisis. He tolerates corruption in high places and deals harshly 
with opponents. Even among some of those who would not con-
sider denying him their support, Kekkonen has incurred an intense 
dislike. 
But even so, Kekkonen’s views had a popular following: it 
was taken for a fact that Finland could not rely on the support 
of Western nations despite their sympathies. And Kekkonen 
had concluded, that the greater confidence the Soviets had in 
Finland, the freer Finland would be to develop its western asso-
ciations. Within the limits he had set for himself, Kekkonen in-
deed desired considerable contact with the West, which was 
demonstrated by his visits to the West in the past two years. 
Outwardly Kekkonen appears confident that he has been success-
ful, even remarkably successful, in protecting Finland´s independ-
ence. This is an attitude he must adopt, however, and it is at least 
questionable that he really believes Finland’s position is as secure 
as he pretends. Nevertheless, despite the doubt he may have, the 
trying moments in relations with the Soviets, and the irritation and 
possible serious concern caused to him by those who suggest he 
may have undermined Finnish independence, Kekkonen has a 
taste for the burden he has assumed and seeks to retain. He seems 
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to be stimulated by his encounters with the Russians and he has 
had the satisfaction of seeing his domestic political position rein-
forced as a consequence of these encounters. In 1961 he told an 
American audience that he found it fascinating to conduct 
Finland’s foreign affairs. Even shortly after what must have been a 
harrowing journey to Novosibirsk later that same year Kekkonen 
said privately that it was thrilling and stimulating to be President 
of Finland.71 
It can easily be seen that the tone was critical, and if there 
was certain respect for the abilities of Kekkonen, it was reluc-
tant. But the tone was not hopeless either; and Kekkonen was 
certainly not considered to be a mere stooge or a mediocrity. 
The main worry was still that he would overdo his policy in his 
zealousness to appease the Soviets at almost any price. It is 
rather a picture of a ruthless nationalist, who was too convinced 
that he and only he could save Finland, and nothing could 
change his grand plan to do this. 
The British Personalities-list made the same kind of remarks: 
One of the ablest men in Finland. His sardonic humour and cyni-
cism are unusual in a Finn; his colleagues do not entirely like him, 
perhaps partly because they do not understand him, and he is eas-
ily criticised. Although a die-hard Finnish patriot during the early 
part of the war, he is now prepared to follow the ’Paasikivi line’ of 
ostensible friendliness towards the Soviet Union. The apparent 
change of Soviet foreign policy in a more moderate direction has 
probably increased the support for such a policy and most Finns feel 
that it is the only realistic line for their country to pursue. But this pol-
icy has, in the past, been deeply distrusted in Finland, where it has 
been held to be a dangerous substitute for a tougher reaction to Soviet 
pressure. The prolonged Government crisis of the autumn of 1958 and 
early 1959 showed the President in a poor light. In the first place he 
was clearly not playing an impartial role, but favouring his old party, 
the Agrarians; in the second he allowed himself to be alarmed by Rus-
sian coldness and showed subservience to the Russians which much 
decreased his popularity.”72 
This is not the place to argue whether these analyses were 
actually valid. However, they represent the attitude which set 
the suspicious mood on Kekkonen’s person. 
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During the 1960’s, after the Night Frosts crisis and Note cri-
sis, these suspicions gradually diminished, but at intervals it 
sometimes seemed a new cause for suspicion of Kekkonen’s 
uncritically pro-Soviet views and dictatorial leanings. For ex-
ample, in 1965 Kekkonen stated in Moscow that Finland could 
only be neutral during peace. In West this was seen as a devia-
tion from official neutrality and as yet another concession to the 
Soviets, and the Americans State Department Assistant Secre-
tary expressed American surprise to the Finnish Ambassador 
and inquired whether there had been a change in Finnish for-
eign policy.73 The Finns assured that this was not the case. 
In domestic policy, Kekkonen’s role in defeating the agrari-
ans’ Chairman [V.J. Sukselainen], whom the Soviets had criti-
cised, was regarded as ‘another successful foray into Finnish 
domestic affairs’ by the Soviets in an American analysis. It was 
not the Soviet interference that was the worst; it was the fact 
that Kekkonen had made extensive use of it.74 The British called 
the spectacle ‘unedifying’.75 
But what was there to do? Kekkonen was there to stay, but 
he seemed unapproachable. If you compare the Western view 
on him, it might even seem to be going towards a worse direc-
tion than in Kádár’s case – because Kádár was gaining more 
freedom from the Soviets and allowing more freedom domesti-
cally himself. However, it must also be borne in mind, that even 
given these two trends it was still evident that Kekkonen and 
Finland enjoyed more freedom than Kádár and Hungary and 
looked likely to do so also in the future. 
The only option to control Kekkonen seemed to be to 
strengthen Finnish civil society and to let the eulogy of Finnish-
Soviet friendship go past unnoticed, as lip-service, or, as it came to 
be called in Finland, liturgy. As a British Foreign Office official put 
it in 1965: ‘while leaving President Kekkonen free to flirt with the 
Russians as much as he likes’ connections between Finnish and 
Western individuals and organisations would be built. ‘What we 
need, I think, is strong pro-Western public opinion in Finland ca-
pable of preventing President Kekkonen from going too far with 
the Russians.’76 
VESA VARES 
 178 
However, as the years went by in the 1960’s, the Western im-
age of Kekkonen improved significantly, for very much the 
same reasons as in Kádár’s case. The Cold War came to a new 
phase or gave way to détente, the old diplomats with the old 
personal stereotypes on Kekkonen moved away, and most im-
portant of all: the worst fears had not materialised. Finland had 
not become a satellite or lost its democracy, and no new crisis 
such as the night frosts or the note crisis emerged. Finland did not 
even make noise about Vietnam. Quite the contrary, it seemed to 
gain more breathing space as it carefully, step by step, joined the 
economic integration of the West. So Kekkonen’s cautious policy 
now seemed to give dividends and not to lead Finland finally to 
the ‘slippery slope’. True, the communists entered the government 
in 1966, which originally caused some worry in the USA and in 
Britain; in 1965, the British had even expressed to the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry that a communist participation in the gov-
ernment would be looked upon with ‘active dislike’.77 Since the 
general line was to avoid anything which the Finns and the 
Russians could claim to be ‘Western interference’, this was an 
exceptionally strong expression. 
But very soon the reports from Helsinki to London and 
Washington became very soothing: the communists had not 
advocated any radical policy. In fact, they seemed to have been 
tamed.78 And Kekkonen seemed to have been the successful 
lion tamer – the one who had managed to fool those who 
thought they had tamed him. 
 
4 The Good Governors 
 
4.1 Hungary 
 
4.1.1 The End of the 1960ss – Stability and Expectations 
At the end of the 1960’s the image of Hungary and Kádár had 
become relatively stable and even positive – if one bore in mind 
the starting points and the obvious differences. Hungary and 
Kádár were becoming not only tolerable, but they also looked 
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better and better compared to other bloc nations – maybe even 
an example for them to follow. 
As the British Ambassador in Budapest, Alexander Morley, 
stated in his Annual Report in January 1967: 79 
Hungarian leadership abjured old-fashioned dogmatist Commu-
nism and became committed to the search for a new brand of 
Communism, aimed at giving the people of this country material 
benefits similar to those enjoyed by their neighbours to the West. 
[…] I have the impression that if it is possible to combine a worka-
ble economic liberalism with full public ownership of production 
and strict central political control, which to us are the essence of 
communism, it is as likely to be seen in Hungary as anywhere. […] 
Contrary to the then usual stereotype of how Hungarians behave 
(which is not always wrong) the Hungarian party and governmen-
tal apparatus has been moving slowly and methodically. 
Also the American Envoy emphasized, how ‘Hungary’s 
pragmatic communist regime, though closely dependent on 
Moscow, is being drawn by geography and economic necessity 
into closer relations with the West’. However, there was also a 
drawback: the Hungarians were still very restrictive in cultural 
and commercial exchange with the Americans.80 But the mood 
of the American reports says that this was a nuisance, not the 
main issue, let alone a reason to stick to the old animosity. 
The Hungarians had noticed that the change in the US policy 
had become final and seemed to sense that they did not need to 
be the beggar who wanted to get parole from the boycott – it 
was in the interests of the USA to dismantle old animosity and 
thus Hungary could wait and set its own terms. The chargé 
d’affaires in Washington, János Radványi, could afford even a 
slightly sarcastic tone in his negotiations with the Americans:81 
As to RFE [=Radio Free Europe, VV], Radványi said that Premier 
Kádár had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some 
humor into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so 
ridiculous they could not be taken seriously. […] Radványi next 
adverted to Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put 
pressure on the Vatican to find a solution to the case. It was unfor-
tunate that there was no provision in the Catholic Church for the 
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pensioning of Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a 
solution of the issue. 
True, the Vietnam issue was still stressed by the Hungarians, 
but even here the Americans now seemed apt to interpret it in a 
new light. It was now considered to be mostly lip-service and 
political currency with which more internal independence was 
bought from the Soviets. The issue was not in reality important 
to Hungary, so the West could afford this propagandist price. 
Hungary was considered to be much more moderate than the 
Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic, and it was 
also understood to take a benevolent view on the reforms in 
Czechoslovakia in 1967-68. It was thought that Kádár would 
not allow himself to be forced either to follow the Czech model 
or to actively attack it.82 
In May 1968 the British Ambassador Millard had a long talk 
with Kádár and naturally sent a long report to London. Kádár’s 
words resembled the ones in 1960 (which were probably ad-
dressed to the Americans): he thought the quarrels were mostly 
due to misconceptions, and as he had assured the Americans 
that he foresaw no socialist revolution in America, he now as-
sured that he did not want to destroy the British Empire. But 
there was even more confidence in his tone now: he was firmly 
in the saddle and would remain so. And he pointed out that 
even though political relations with the West Germans were 
bad, the Germans had made an effort to develop economic rela-
tions; the British should do the same. 
Reverting to this theme of the need for our two countries to under-
stand each other, Kádár said that we would be aware of what had 
happened in Hungary during and since the war. They had suffered 
much, and for the events of 1956 they had paid a very high price. 
They were not now going to sell cheaply what had been won. If I 
knew the Hungarians, I would know that this was how most of 
them felt. 
Concerning the Czechs, Kádár took an almost patronising 
tone: the Czech reforms were not a threat to Socialism, and in 
many ways the Czechs were now catching up with the Hungar-
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ian reforms. ‘They were dealing with their problems in their 
own way, and he was confident of their ability to succeed.’ The 
Ambassador’s analysis to London ended in a somewhat re-
specting, somewhat calculating manner: 83 
To some extent the strength of Kádár’s position is the lack of credi-
ble alternatives. Hungarians are cynical about their leadership and 
of course they have no means of changing it, but he is the best First 
Secretary they have. More positively his prestige is due to his 
strong personality and the relatively humane quality of his rule. 
Although there is little communication between Government and 
people, the Hungarians sense that under the pressures of office he 
has revealed statesmanlike qualities. Many are disposed to give 
him credit for this, although there is much else about the regime 
which they would condemn. The policy of reconciliation has pro-
duced results and to a limited extent Kádár has capitalised national 
feeling. From this brief contact he appears confidently in control. 
The desk officers in London agreed – and were especially inter-
ested in Kádár’s views on the Czech reforms and their future.84 
Kádár had a roughly equivalent meeting with the American 
representative. This was all the more important because this 
marked the final normalisation of US-Hungarian relations. And 
also in this meeting he played the part of the good-humoured 
father of the nation – and of a statesman who was big enough to 
forgive his counterparts’ blunders. In a sense, he had a valid 
opportunity to pose as the winner in the US-Hungarian contro-
versy, since this was the first time an American Ambassador 
met him after the long boycott. ‘There was no false modesty, 
and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not only 
party boss but the real power in this country.’ 
According to the Ambassador, Kádár emphasised the need 
for peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach between 
countries, whose systems were based on differing theories of 
society. It might not have been possible to say as much 20 years 
before, when the force of ideologies was much more intense, 
but the basic problem now was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear 
war between the two superpowers. And once again, referring to 
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the previous bad relations between the USA and Hungary, 
Kádár made a practical analogy: 85 
He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two boxers 
who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 1956 to 
1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither was pre-
pared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to gain very 
much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to come on its 
knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared to assume this 
posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the UN problem had 
now been solved in an acceptable way. If we approached current 
problems in the same spirit which had finally led to a solution of the 
Hungarian question in the UN, based upon realistic acceptance of the 
facts of life, then there was a good possibility of advancing towards 
agreement in other areas. --- Both sides would, of course, indulge in 
propaganda against each other, but firm and realistic acceptance of 
this truth would not let the possibilities of improving our relations be 
submerged by such propaganda. 
Kádár was in an obviously relaxed, good humoured, sometimes 
semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently care-
fully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He 
seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough 
to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-
American relations though very mindful of present difficulties. 
4.1.2 The Troublesome Invasion – and the Recovery 
Even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia no immediate fears were 
expressed about Hungary’s own reforms. That is the economic free-
dom and the extended self-government of the people – at least as 
long as the Hungarians were let to decide these things themselves. 
Hungary was one of the occupying powers in the Czecho-
slovakian crisis, but this did not destroy Kádár’s record and 
image in Western eyes – rather on the contrary. Of course, it 
was noted that Hungary had participated in the invasion, but 
simultaneously it was taken for granted that this had been 
something which Kádár would have wanted to avoid; he had 
finally had to accept it in order not to endanger Hungary’s posi-
tion towards the Soviets. No enthusiasm was detected on the 
Hungarian side, rather extremely half-hearted efforts to find 
excuses for the invasion, excuses which they did not in fact take 
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seriously themselves but had to perform some obligatory lip-
service. It was evident that the Hungarians had no wish to see 
the Cold War positions return. 
As far as Kádár himself was concerned, there were different in-
terpretations on whether his position had weakened or not, and a 
British report also registered a joke: ‘A current joke here is that 
among the telephones on Kádár’s desk, it is easy to tell which is the 
hot line to Moscow, because it has only a receiver.’ Also the Ameri-
can report included a joke: ‘Why are the five armies still in Czecho-
slovakia? They are trying to find the guy who called them to help.’86  
In 1968, the standard tone seems to have been that Kádár 
had tried to ride on two horses at the same time and had been 
forced to participate in the invasion – and would have, had the 
Czech reform policy succeeded, ‘tried to manoeuvre himself 
into a Dubcek-like posture and tried to ride the whirlwind’. In 
any case it was thought to be essential that the West would do 
nothing to blame Hungary or harm its position. It was in the 
Western interests that contacts with Hungary would increase 
and the Hungarian economic reform survived, because in the 
long run this would strengthen Hungary’s freedom towards the 
Soviet Union.87 The American conclusions were no different.  
There were some hints in 1968 that Kádár’s position might be 
in danger – or his health shaky. At the very least, his authority 
had suffered significantly. But as the American Ambassador 
put it immediately after the invasion: it was doubtful whether 
his actual position as Party First Secretary would be in any sig-
nificant danger at this time from putatively ascendant hard-
liners, and there was no indication that he would be losing con-
trol of the Hungarian Party apparatus. But the Czech develop-
ments were bound to seriously impede efforts which Hungari-
ans had made to improve relations with the West generally, at 
least in the short run. ‘This may come about not so much as a 
result of Hungarian unwillingness to pursue such a course as of 
lack of Western receptivity’, Ambassador Hillenbrand re-
marked dryly.88 
In 1969 the mood was already much more confident: the Hun-
garians were able to manage the situation. ‘All in all, Hungarians 
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have shown considerable flexibility and skill in manoeuvring both 
domestically and in the foreign relations field in the post-Czecho-
slovakia situation to create areas of policy opportunity. A particularly 
interesting aspect is scattered signs they judge the current phase suit-
able for efforts to improve relations with Western countries.’89 
When Brezhnev visited Hungary in 1972, the British noted 
with the true kremlological sense, that his repeated personal ref-
erences to Kádár suggested endorsement of the latter’s position 
towards other elements within the Hungarian leadership. The 
communiqué and the atmosphere of the visit had been a triumph 
to Kádár – and public opinion in Hungary was relieved.90 Even 
the future for Hungarian economic reform now seemed brighter 
again and the concept that ‘Hungarian lip service to the Russians 
[…] is, I feel sure, based solely on their interest in future material 
supplies’.91 All in all, the effects of Czechoslovakia had faded: 
‘The Hungarian regime under János Kádár has had considerable 
popular success with its policy of national reconciliation and the 
promotion of a limited degree of liberalism.’92 
It is also interesting to see that whereas in Leslie Fry’s time the 
Legations had been more critical towards Kádár than the desk 
officers in London, now the tables were turned in this aspect. Yet 
again the occupational hazard of diplomats – identification with 
the local conditions – was at work, but this time it meant a sort of 
identification with Kádár’s policies, not with his opposition or 
his victims, as after 1956. Moralism was now absent. 
At any case, in the late 1960s the image of Kádár had thus 
stabilised. It was more positive than negative, and it was ex-
pected to improve, not deteriorate. Hungary belonged, of 
course, to the opposing bloc, but bearing in mind this starting 
point and Hungary’s conditions and possibilities, the results 
were as good as could be expected. The Hungary of Kádár did 
not seem to be very rigid, orthodox or sincerely convinced 
about its own Socialism as such, it was anything but ideologi-
cally expansive (if it was, it was ideologically expansive to lib-
eralize Communism in the bloc) and it seemed to want to ab-
sorb as much market economy and political breathing space as 
it possibly could without provoking the Soviets too much. This 
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did not mean implementation of capitalism or democracy as 
such, but it was pragmatic policy which produced very little 
trouble to the West. Hungary represented the status quo in a lib-
eral shade and this was the best that was expected of it – espe-
cially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the declaration 
of the Brezhnev doctrine. 
And the riddle of Kádár remained in many sense unsolved. 
As the Superintending Under-Secretary of Northern Depart-
ment in the Foreign Office P. Hayman stated: ‘The enigma 
about Kádár remains: how has he been able to combine a record 
of close association with the Soviet Union (in 1956 and at other 
times) with an appearance of national leadership?’93 The answer 
remained uncertain, but more important was that Kádár had 
indeed succeeded. 
 
4.2 Finland 
 
4.2.1 The late 1960s: The Old Foe as the Guarantor of Stability 
As already noted, Kekkonen, even with all the traditional misgiv-
ings attached to him, was no more looked upon as a spineless dicta-
tor after the mid-60s. He was still not ‘liked’ in any true sense of the 
word, and he was still considered difficult to influence and too pro-
Soviet. But the emotional repugnance against him had disappeared, 
and like Kádár, he seemed to guarantee stability. He now seemed to 
be the old statesman, who guaranteed that Finland would maintain 
the status quo and even move slowly nearer the Western model of 
society – and all that was still the best that could be expected. 
There was also a new reason to have a better opinion of 
Kekkonen. In the 1950s and early 1960s it had seemed that 
Kekkonen’s policy meant more compliance and even possible ‘fel-
low-travelling’ radicalism than that of other Finns (the communists 
were, of course, a case of their own). Especially the social democ-
rats, the conservatives, even the grass-roots agrarians and the civil 
society in general had been considered much more reliable. 
In the late 1960s, however, a new danger seemed to be on the 
way in Finnish foreign policy: young neo-left radicals, the new 
intellectual elite of Finland, which was the counterpart of the 
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radical generation in Western Europe. They were not usually 
communists, but they marked the West as ‘imperialist’ and ‘re-
actionary’, and, even if they did not advocate outright Warsaw 
Pact policy, they very much favoured the Soviet interpretation 
of the détente to the Western interpretation. Especially the So-
cial Democratic Party – previously so reliable – was influenced 
by these young neo-left intellectuals. Seen especially from the 
American point of view, these radicals, some of whom were re-
cruited to the Foreign Ministry of Finland, were very noisy 
about Vietnam, Latin America etc. – issues which were incon-
venient for the Americans and on which official Finnish foreign 
policy had kept quiet. 
Compared to this, Kekkonen might be difficult, obstinate 
and a bit too near to the Soviets, but he was traditional and sta-
ble. He had not made noise about Vietnam, and he advocated 
strict Realpolitik, which meant that no idealist surprises were to 
be expected from him. Since there was a warning example also 
in the Western world next door to Finland – Sweden and espe-
cially Prime Minister Olof Palme who took a very moralist 
stand on the Vietnam issue and was also very anti-American in 
other cases – Kekkonen seemed a much better option than be-
fore. The confidence was strengthened by the fact that also the 
Finnish society – if you did not count the intellectuals on the 
surface – , seemed to be far from breaking, rather on the move 
in the right direction, to Scandinavia and Western Europe.94 
And now Kekkonen was confessed to be the best interpreter 
of Finnish interests and of the Finnish space to manoeuvre. As 
the British Ambassador in Helsinki, David Scott Fox analysed 
already in 1967: ‘President Kekkonen can, I think, probably be 
trusted to understand better than anybody how far Finland can 
safely go. He seems to be moving Finnish neutrality very cau-
tiously into a position where it is less slanted towards the Soviet 
Union, although we should not be surprised if he feels obliged 
to throw an occasional sop to Cerberus in the process.’ And he 
specifically stated that what mattered most to the West was the 
fact that the development in Finland seemed to be tending to 
move gradually the Western way.95 
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After the Czechoslovak crisis a British official reported on 
the moods of Kekkonen and the Finnish people: 96 
[…] virtually nobody denies that in the things that matter, he is 
Finland, and that when he speaks to the outside world he is both 
honest and accurate in his interpretation of the way that Finland 
thinks and feels. If he pretended to us that he was entirely free to 
go his own way in foreign affairs, he would misrepresent both the 
facts and the beliefs of his own people. […] And behind him, and 
identifying with him to an astonishing degree, are a people who 
desperately want to be part of the West, who are afraid for the pre-
sent and the future, and who badly need a boost. 
Kekkonen even afterwards confided to Ambassador Scott Fox 
that he had felt that the whole basis of his policy of promoting close 
Finnish relations with the Soviet Union had been so undermined 
that he had seriously contemplated resigning from the Presidency. 
In these circumstances, the Soviet government had found it neces-
sary to send Kosygin to Finland at the beginning of October, for the 
purpose of giving the President very positive assurances that there 
would be no change in their attitude towards Finland and her neu-
trality.97 However, there had been even rumors that the surprise 
visit of Kosygin might bring demands to Finland. 
In these estimations Kekkonen was by no means a spineless 
man of compliance, nor primarily any more an over-ambitious 
and power-hungry partisan politician. It seems that now he was 
thought to have a cunning plan to not only defend Finland’s 
neutrality but also to gain even more space. And while he 
seemed to be able to achieve this, the official lip-service to the 
Soviet friendship was not of equal importance. It also seems 
that the West was now counting on that Kekkonen himself did 
not take this lip-service seriously either. 
Even the fact that the communists had entered the govern-
ment in 1966 – as a very junior partner compared to the social 
democrats and the Centre Party – was not held against 
Kekkonen now. This had been the test-case before, and when 
the communists joined the government in 1966, there were ini-
tially worries. But as already mentioned, now it seemed rather 
that in integrating the communists into the government 
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Kekkonen had actually managed to tame them. In the begin-
ning of the 1960s the participation of communists in the gov-
ernment would have been regarded as the final taming of 
Kekkonen. There were also phenomena which were always 
seen as a worrisome signs for democracy in the 1950s and early 
1960s, like the so-called ‘self-censorship’ in the press, the isola-
tion of the conservatives, political appointments in the civil ser-
vice etc., and now these were rarely seen as very dramatic. 
One would not have been so optimistic in this, had not also 
the image of the communists and left-wing socialists changed in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The new generation was not con-
sidered to be the same as the old, stalinist monolith which had 
only echoed its Russian masters’ voice. According to the West, 
even the communists and the left-wing socialists had now made 
their choice: it was more important and paid better dividends – 
in fact it was the only way to gain any dividends – to integrate 
into the Finnish society, not to be a crony of the Russians with-
out own will. The stalinist fervour of the young intellectuals in 
the early 1970s caused some concern. But by and large the stabi-
lisation of Finland’s international status and domestic policy 
had given the West what it mainly wanted; the 1970’s seemed 
safe, and at the very latest the CSCE – Finland acting as the host 
– secured Finland’s position. Also the Soviet policy seemed 
more predictable than before. 
 
4.2.2 Negligible ‘Finlandization’: Some Concerns – Mainly Satisfaction 
In the early 1970s, there were some points of concern in US-
Finnish relations for the Americans. These included some de-
viation from the strict neutrality, some surprisingly leftist re-
marks of Kekkonen,98 his growing and ever more impatient 
conviction that he and only he could handle the Soviets,99 some 
alleged anti-US bias of the Finnish media,100 and finally even the 
Vietnam-statements,101 which previously had been such a posi-
tive contrast compared to Sweden. Also the Extraordinary Law, 
which cancelled the 1974 presidential elections and prolonged 
Kekkonen’s term by four years by legislation, was considered a 
peculiar thing in a Western democracy. 
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Even so, these features were in some sense common to all 
Western European countries and to their new generation, the 
noisiest part of which made a point of being radical and anti-
American. The foundations of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line were 
still considered valid, if they were followed. The line tried to 
connect neutrality and friendship with the Soviet Union, which 
was sometimes difficult, but ‘Kekkonen’s leadership has mini-
mized these inherent contradictions, and he has succeeded in 
maintaining a balance between the various elements in the Fin-
nish political scene.’ 
There were few concrete measures to influence the Finns – 
mainly keeping up and even increasing the American contacts 
and the American visibility in Finland in general. As Ambassa-
dor Peterson advised in 1970: 102 
Lacking a formal alliance or program of economic assistance, the 
U.S. has only limited leverage in Finland.[…] What is needed is a 
balance between heavy pressure on the Finns – which would only 
create problems for Finland with Moscow – and too passive a role 
– which could erode Finland’s Western orientation. […] When 
American interests are damaged by Finnish over-eagerness to 
please Moscow, the U.S. can to some degree counter this by point-
ing out to Finnish officials that such actions diminish the image of 
Finnish neutrality. Our most effective weapon is a friendly but 
firm line which stresses the damage which could result to long-
term Finnish interests from too compliant a line towards Moscow. 
This theme was repeated also the following years in slightly 
different words; such as in the 1950s, there was nothing spec-
tacular to offer, and the Soviets were not to be provoked. Trust-
ing Kekkonen and the fact that basically Finnish society re-
mained solid and the Finns nationalistically anti-Russian 
seemed the best – and only – way to silently keep up the status 
quo. ‘The Finns have a particularly warm feeling for the United 
States and Americans’, State Secretary Rogers assured President 
Nixon in a memorandum pointing out the usefulness of a fu-
ture visit to the United States by Kekkonen. According to 
Rogers, Kekkonen wanted to establish with the American 
President the same personal relationship he had with the lead-
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ers of the Soviet Union, to have President Nixon’s assessment of 
the prospects for continued peace and prosperity in Europe 
which were so vital to Finnish independence, and to hear the 
President’s views on other world issues. 
A lengthy citation is also here in order, because it shows that 
the major points of the long biography of 1963 were still valid 
or had now an even more positive light – and the authoritative 
features were not dangerous:103 
Some critics, comparing Kekkonen’s performance with that of 
Paasikivi, consider him too deferential to the views of the Soviet 
Union and too obsequious in his personal relations with the Soviet 
leaders. While Kekkonen may occasionally go beyond what would 
appear to be absolutely necessary to provide the Soviet with assur-
ances that Finnish actions will not threaten vital Soviet interests, 
Kekkonen’s basic motive has been the preservation of Finland’s 
independence and neutrality. And this he has achieved to date. 
President Kekkonen is adroit and determined in the pursuit and 
exercise of political power. He is vindictive and ruthless toward ri-
vals, critics, and opponents. 
In public Kekkonen has a cool, reserved manner, but is capable of 
charm. In private life he is a heavy but capable drinker, and unre-
strained. He has been a superb athlete. As a young man Kekkonen 
was Finnish high-jump champion and, in the 1930’s, led the Fin-
nish Olympic teams at Los Angeles and Berlin. Today, at 69, he 
hunts, fishes and skis cross-country. While he has prided himself 
in particular on his speed and endurance as a cross-country skier, 
recent confidential reports indicate that he is slowing down on the 
advice of his physicians. 
We will also wish to assure the Finns that we accept and value Fin-
nish neutrality, that we understand the Finns’ pragmatic need for par-
ticularly friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and that we would 
become concerned only if concessions to the Soviet Union endangered 
Finland’s independence, neutrality, and free democratic institutions. 
We do not recommend any dramatic initiatives in furthering our ob-
jectives. Rather, we would hope to further them by cultivating 
Kekkonen personally – paying him respect and attention his position 
deserves, welcoming an expression of his views, and demonstrating 
to him our interest in his country’s freedom and independence. 
Kekkonen is likely to respond positively to this approach. He 
undoubtedly considers, and with justification, that he has a unique 
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understanding of the Soviet leaders, their problems and motives. 
We would wish to give careful attention to whatever windows he 
opens onto the Soviet scene. 
Kekkonen would be pleased by evidence of our appreciation of 
Finland’s constructive role in the UN; of the sincerity of its interest in de-
tente in Europe; for the availability of Helsinki as a co-site for the SALT 
talks and the excellent facilities offered; and for a neutrality that does not 
feel called upon to manifest its virility through attacks on the US. 
Not even the fact that a government fell in March 1971 due 
to communist intransigence was a problem, because ‘whatever 
the character of the government that is next formed, President 
Kekkonen will remain in absolute control of Finnish foreign 
policy’. Maybe he would have some difficulties with Moscow, 
‘but he should be able to master them as he has in the past’. 
And if there were no communists in the Finnish government, 
US-Finnish relations would be on even more secure ground, 
and ‘the “European showcase” of communist participation in 
the exercise of government power will be shattered’.104 
It seems that the mood was now that with the wizard 
Kekkonen around, the Americans would all the time be in a 
win-win-situation. 
Contrary to this, the Finnish debate about ‘finlandization’ 
has stressed that the 1970’s were actually more dangerous than 
the 1960s. This was so because the previous unpleasant inevita-
bility – the close relations with the Soviets – had now been 
made a virtue. Self-censorship, discrimination on foreign policy 
grounds and Kekkonen’s dominant position had meant a men-
tal capitulation, a limited democracy and a limited freedom of 
opinion. In the 1960s everyone, except the communists, had still 
thought in terms of necessary compliance, neither in terms of 
collaboration nor in terms of true friendship with the Soviets. In 
Finnish eyes, this transformation was the actual ‘slippery slope’. 
However, this was not equally important to the West. And 
thus the circle was completed in the early 1970s. The West, even 
though it might have some complaints in single issues and 
think that Finnish neutrality had some odd pro-Eastern flavour 
in it, now believed genuinely in Finnish neutrality, the recogni-
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tion of which had been more a tactical matter to it in the 1960s. 
And it now had the belief in Finnish neutrality for the very 
same reason for which it had not had this belief previously: 
President Kekkonen. 
As the British Ambassador Bernard Ledwidge put this: 105 
[…] there is quite a formidable battery of sanctions at the disposal 
of the Russians if the Finns ignore hints of disapproval of any par-
ticular policy. It is true that the Finns are today probably strong 
enough to resist all these pressures and get away with it. They are 
not in danger of the fate of Czechoslovakia. But the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen line of foreign policy, which gives priority to maintain-
ing Soviet confidence, has served Finland very well since 1944. It 
has steered this country out of a position of total dependence upon 
the Russians, when a Communist take over was an hourly possibil-
ity, to one in which the Finns live in a Western-style welfare state 
with much less to fear from their Eastern neighbour. So why 
should they bait the bear when they can do so well out of soothing 
him? I agree with John Killick. If I were President Kekkonen, I 
should handle the Russians the way he does. 
By way of conclusion it can be summed up that the formula 
in both Kádár’s and Kekkonen’s image is astonishingly similar: 
moral dislike – disapproval of erroneous policy – a recognition 
of other, worse alternatives – the improved image of the old foe 
whom you at least knew – a feeling which was not admiration 
but some sort of appreciation of the achievements anyhow – 
satisfaction with the stability and even respect. 
Also this suggests that basically the phases of the Cold War 
and the grand strategies in it decided the image, not Kádár’s 
and Kekkonen’s domestic policy or democratic freedom. This 
was even more so since you could never do much else than 
hope for the best and do nothing concrete, and, of course, be-
cause the worst fears had not come true. But also the persis-
tence and traditionalism of Kádár and Kekkonen was an impor-
tant factor: when you could not expect revolutionary improve-
ments, no news was the best news. 
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1 Introduction 
A high-ranking Finnish foreign policy official, Keijo Korhonen 
wrote in his memoirs about the role of Hungary in Finnish 
foreign policy during the Kekkonen era. To quote Korhonen:1  
The Russians were first in importance, after them there was no-one 
in importance, even after no-one there was no-one, then there were 
the Hungarians and at the tail of the queue there were East Ger-
mans, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rumanians.  
In this article the aim is to discuss the image of the 
Hungarian-Finnish relations during the Kekkonen era from the 
early 1960s to the late 1970s, the period when the relations 
between Finland and Hungary improved at both the 
intergovernmental and non-governmental (civil society) level. 
The main problematic deals with Finnish foreign policy – 
conducted by President Kekkonen – towards Kádár’s Hungary, 
but to make the picture more complete Hungarian points of 
view are illuminated as well. What sort of image did Finland 
and Hungary have of each other at the state, diplomatic and 
political levels, and, on the other hand, how did they rate the 
mutual relations? It is not enough to ask, which were the 
practical questions discussed, but one also has to clarify how 
the representation of the relations was managed: how were 
they defined and by what means were they practised? How 
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were these relations established and what kinds of relations 
were pursued? 
It can be anticipated that there are two contradictory 
elements as starting points for this study: first, the heritage of 
the old cultural relations, which were based on the feeling of 
kinship, and second, the political reality of Cold War Europe 
and détente in the 1960s and 1970s. The Hungarian-Finnish 
relations can be approached from two angles: as the meeting 
point and convergence of two states representing two different 
social and political systems and as the encounter of two states 
which both saw themselves and each other as ‘small states’ in 
the world of Cold War politics. 
Expressions of the Finnish policy towards Hungary can be 
found in the context of the meetings of the countries’ 
leadership. Therefore, focus is on the meetings of President 
Kekkonen with the representatives of the Hungarian party 
(HWSP) and state leadership. The questions are: What sort of 
confidential or open interpretations were made, what was 
discussed and what kind of public statements were made? The 
visits as such and their contents are the mirror of the relations: 
they contain data of the relations, and their forms give indirect 
information of the weight that was attached to them. 
First, two visits Kekkonen paid to Hungary in the 1960s will 
be analyzed: the private visit in May 1963 and the state visit in 
autumn 1969. First, these visits were symbolically significant as 
openings of the relations or as first steps in the history of visits. 
The first visit was made at a time when Hungarian relations 
with the West were problematic after the 1956 uprising. 
Kekkonen’s visit in 1963, although it was officially only a 
detour after the visit to Yugoslavia, was the first visit of a 
Western leader since 1956. The state visit of 1969 was an official 
state visit and a part of a visit to Rumania and Czechoslovakia 
as well. It was made while the CSCE conference was being 
discussed and while the shadow of the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia was creating intense international pressure. 
This period can be named as the opening and developing of the 
Hungarian-Finnish political relations.  
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Second, I will discuss the next period lasting a decade, 
during which relations between Finland and Hungary were 
further developed in terms of actual political goals. Hungarian 
President Pál Losonczi visited Finland in 1971 and Kádár 
followed him in 1973 – both visits were first visits, since no 
Hungarian head of state had previously visited Finland, and, in 
addition to this, Kádár had never visited a non-socialist country 
officially before. In 1976 Kekkonen on his turn paid a state visit 
to Hungary. The series of meetings between Kekkonen and 
Hungarian leadership continued next year when the Hungarian 
Prime Minister visited Finland.  
During the era of Kekkonen the President was unusually 
strong in formulating Finnish foreign policy. Kekkonen’s 
Hungarian relations are of special interest to him because as a 
student politician he was an aitosuomalainen, an ardent Finn 
who respected Finnish-Estonian-Hungarian kinship, and knew 
Hungary and Hungarians personally. Presumably, this mental 
heritage might have influenced his opinions and policy towards 
Hungary.2 Power politics was to him, however, a reality in 
which the relations with the Soviet Union were a primary 
consideration but, at the same time, reputation of Finland as a 
Western and neutral state was cherished. It is worth discussing 
how or if these two frameworks – the idea of kinship and the 
prevailing political conditions – were linked to each other in 
Kekkonen’s policy. As a working hypothesis it is presumed that 
these two dimensions were united in his policy to make the 
mutual relations between Finland and Hungary a unique case 
in the field of Cold War Europe. In the context of satellite 
policy, the mutual interpretations and expressions on 
Hungarian Kádárism and Finnish policy of neutrality were 
obviously key issues. Furthermore, it is important to compare 
the attitudes of the diplomatic corps with the policy of the state 
leadership as well as the expressions of the press and publicity 
with the official rhetoric3. 
In this article it presumed that the two contexts – the 
tradition of kinship relations and the politics of Cold War – 
affected the visits too. In the case of Hungarian-Finnish 
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relations, the visits which Kekkonen paid in the 1960s seemed 
to be symbolically valuable as acts of recognition between two 
states. In the 1970s relations were further developed in the 
context of the state visits and discussions between the head of 
states. Hungarian policy emphasised their importance. There-
fore, programs, symbols and forms of state visits are of special 
value and worth studying in order to illuminate the conduct of 
the Hungarian-Finnish relations. 
 
2 Attitudes towards Kádár’s Policy and Finnish Neutrality 
In the aftermath of 1956, the issue of Hungary was a 
controversial one in Finland. Official Finnish policy towards 
Hungary can be defined as a formal satellite policy and the 
attitude of public opinion was that of a warming cultural co-
operation. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest defined it, there 
were two different dimensions in Hungarian-Finnish relations: 
the correct state level relations, resulting from the moderate 
Finnish policy towards Kádárism. At the same time there were 
the correct relations between Finns and Hungarians, which 
were based on the Finnish sympathetic attitude towards 
Hungarians and on the voluntary help to the Hungarians who 
had suffered in the revolution. There was thus a difference 
between the public opinion and the Finnish official policy. 
Kekkonen was well aware of this difference.4  
In the context of the idea of kinship, Hungarian-Finnish 
relations were normalized soon after the revolution. As the 
Finnish Legation in Budapest stated, thanks to the Finnish 
sympathy for Hungarians, the relations between Hungary and 
Finland were restored to cherishing the idea of kinship as early 
as 1957. For example, the leaders of the Suomi-Unkari Seura 
(Finnish-Hungarian Society, FHS) visited Hungary. The chargé 
d’affaires, T.H. Heikkilä, warned, however, that there was no 
reason for too much optimism yet. According to Heikkilä, it 
was still important to consider the conditions in Hungary 
carefully, even if they seemed to be normalised.5 It can be 
argued that the statement reflected, surprisingly, both the 
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attitude of Finnish public opinion and the official moderate 
policy towards Kádárism.  
In spite of the quick return to kinship relations, state-level 
relations between Hungary and Finland remained cool. The 
relations were correct but reserved. Therefore, the fact that the 
Finnish government opposed all open protests against the Soviet 
occupation in 1956 and the Kádár regime did not imply that the 
official relations between Hungary and Finland were good. 
Heikkilä assumed that the relations were kept cool in order to 
preserve Finland’s position as an independent country.6 
Obviously, at the time of the first visit, the cool attitude 
towards satellite countries did not seem to be essential any 
longer. The relations between Finland and the satellite countries 
were gradually warming as a result of developments in 
international politics. In the case of Hungary, there were some 
new aspects to consider from the Finnish point of view. 
Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary in 1963 was part of a process in 
which Hungary’s diplomatic relations were normalised after the 
events of 1956. The Finnish political and diplomatic circles saw 
signs of liberalisation and de-stalinisation in Hungary as well as 
signs of a new orientation in the relations between Hungary and 
the United Nations.7 
The question of Finland’s reputation as a neutral state was 
also an important indicator in Finnish foreign policy. When 
there were perceptible signs of Western acceptance of Finnish 
neutrality, the Finnish political leadership was ready to 
improve the relations with the Eastern bloc. After the visits to 
Great Britain in 1960 and France in 1962, the West gave official 
signs of recognition that Finland was a neutral state.8 In 
addition to this, cultural and scientific contacts between Finland 
and Hungary had increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s.9 
Kekkonen’s visit was discreetly discussed in Helsinki already in 
1961 on Hungary’s initiative, but the Finnish political 
leadership was not ready to accept Hungary’s proposal.10 
The visit of 1963 can be regarded as a turning point in the 
relations between Finland and Hungary. The policy in the 
aftermath of the 1956 revolution seemed to change. Finnish 
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contradictory attitudes towards Hungary were still apparent. 
‘Finnish sympathetic attitudes towards Hungarians were 
transformed to ‘the policy of kinship’ and the ‘moderate 
attitude of the Finnish political leadership towards Kádár’ was 
transformed into the ‘Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary’.  
Kekkonen himself considered that his visit had an important 
effect on Hungarian-Finnish relations. He stated a year after 
that it was the kinship movement that should form the basis for 
Finnish relations towards both kinship nations, Estonia and 
Hungary. He pointed out in his private speech to the 
representatives of the so-called national sciences – such as 
ethonology and linquistics – in Finland that these relations 
should be based on unofficial civil society circles rather than 
conducted at the state level. As he said:11 
To the generation to which I belong and whose marvelous and good 
representatives are gathered here, the issue concerning Estonia and 
Hungary is an emotional subject. […] Already for a couple of years I 
have had an idea that better relations with Hungary and Estonia 
should be established, not necessarily on a formal, official basis, be-
cause I understood that there would be difficulties with that, but 
merely at informal, cultural and social levels, but very carefully.  
Accordingly, Kekkonen invited scholars to create informal 
networks. This was a way to establish and reinforce contacts 
between Finland and Hungary. One can ask whether this was a 
way to strengthen kinship relations as such or whether it was a 
way to get Finns involved with Hungarians in spite of political 
differences. Were these informal contacts aimed to further 
official political relations? 
 
3 Opening New Relations 
Finnish political leadership emphasized the unofficial nature of 
the 1963 visit. This tentative attitude of the Finnish political élite 
towards Hungary can be sensed in Finnish official reports to the 
press. The Finnish News Agency, STT, pointed out that 
Kekkonen would only ’call at’ or ‘stop in Hungary’ during his 
way home from Yugoslavia.12 And, Kekkonen then ‘stopped in’ 
Hungary on 12 – 15 May 1963, immediately after his visit to 
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Yugoslavia. President Dobi and Mrs Dobi acted as hosts. The 
program consisted of cultural events, sightseeing in Budapest 
and a visit to the countryside and Debrecen. Kekkonen also met 
Finns who lived in Hungary. There was no mention of a 
meeting between Kekkonen and Kádár in the official program – 
a fact that can also be interpreted as a symbol of informality.13 
In the Hungarian draft of the program, however, it was 
mentioned that on 14 May there would be a meeting between 
the two leaders, should Kekkonen request it.14 Also the fact that 
the Hungarian leadership implied the political importance of 
the visit in the official lunch and the festive dinner by inviting 
also the Party leadership, Kádár in particular, to these 
occasions, reveals the symbolic value the Hungarian leadership 
attached to the visit.15 
Kekkonen’s visit attracted some attention in Finnish media: 
in the press there was a slightly critical tone. Already before the 
visit, Kekkonen had been annoyed about the tone of the right-
wing newspaper Uusi Suomi. He interpreted their tone as 
questioning the judgement of the Finnish political leadership – 
i.e. Kekkonen’s judgement. In Uusi Suomi the question was 
asked whether it was reasonable to visit a country in which the 
prevailing conditions were suspect. Kekkonen brought this 
matter up with the Chief Editor, Eero Petäjäniemi, who denied 
that he had indirectly criticised Kekkonen in this way.16  
After the visit, it was claimed in a Finnish magazine Kuva-Posti 
that the state visit to Yugoslavia was successful but insinuated that 
the informal visit to Hungary may have been unnecessary at this 
time.17 The reason for these comments can be found in the post-
1956 context: the press might well have been afraid that Finland 
was being identified with the Eastern bloc.  
Hungarian media also commented on the informal nature of 
Kekkonen’s visit. For example, the Hungarian women’s magazine 
Nők Lapja concentrated on Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen, wrote about Kale-
vala and presented the city of Helsinki in a richly illustrated article. 
In the pictures published in newspapers and magazines, Kekkonen 
was photographed in informal situations: in Hortobágy and visiting 
suburban housing developments,18 both in traditional and modern 
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Hungarian contexts. One can only ask whether these pictures 
reflected symbolically new Hungarian-Finnish relations in which the 
traditional context and the modern one were present concomitantly. 
In the political rhetoric certain value was afterwards given to 
the visit. It was to be interpreted as an opening of relations 
between Kekkonen’s Finland and Kádár’s Hungary. One year 
later, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stated in the 
Hungarian Parliament that the relations between Hungary and 
Finland did not reflect only ‘a romantic ethnographic kinship’ 
but that the relations were at a level of modern progress. Péter 
argued that there were ‘many useful economic and cultural 
achievements’ between Hungary and Finland. The work of the 
joint Culture Committee and the trade treaty gave fresh content 
to these traditional relations. Later, in the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry, Péter’s statement was cited as an example of the 
prevailing image of Hungarian-Finnish relations. Péter had 
referred to the ‘high level vistis’ as a proof of good relations. 
Ambassador Palas presumed that Hungary would in the future 
also continue to develop relations especially by these visits.19  
Kádár himself stated to Palas after Kekkonen’s visit that 
‘Hungary carefully observed Finnish foreign policy’. He 
emphasized the ‘good relations’ between Finland and the Soviet 
Union and used the concept of kinship in a modern sense. 
‘Kinship’ was defined as not only a cliché, but a scientific truth. 
At the same time there was in Kádár’s rhetoric another concept, 
‘peaceful co-existence’. The fusion of ‘old’ with ‘modern’ 
rhetoric produced a modern conclusion: the two kinship 
nations wanted peaceful co-existence.20  
The communist state leadership of Hungary was also 
consulting with the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) on Finnish 
policy but also others, the social democrats and the Agrarian 
Union, exchanged thoughts with the Hungarian Ambassador. 
Also the plan of a visit by a parliamentary delegation pointed 
out the Hungarian interest during this time. Hungary was 
interested also in how the communist and other radical cultural 
circles were functioning in Finland.21 An interesting detail in the 
relations between the two different political systems was a 
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discussion between Kádár and the FCP Chairman, Aimo 
Aaltonen, a year after Kekkonen’s visit. The discussion was 
reported to Kekkonen by the Finnish State Police. Aaltonen 
complained about the various difficulties created by 
Kekkonen’s policy. He explained to Kádár that one of the 
reasons why there could not be a communist revolution in 
Finland was that Kekkonen was taking the wind out of its sails. 
Kádár commented with a smile: ‘So God help you!’22 
At the informal level – as Kekkonen wished – there began to 
appear concrete signs of good relations. For example, the 
Hungarian leadership decided in autumn 1963 to grant Kustaa 
Vilkuna a decoration when he was attending an international 
ethnologists’ conference in Budapest. The Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party (HSWP) mentioned that in addition to scientific 
merits, Vilkuna had had a significant role in developing 
Hungarian-Finnish relations. He had been active in the 
Hungarian-Finnish Society and in the Hungarian Ethnological 
Society since 1939 and in concluding the Cultural Treaty 
between the countries. It was also known that Vilkuna was 
among Kekkonen’s entourage and an adviser in foreign policy 
issues.23 On a more popular level, a sign of ‘understanding’ 
between the two countries was that in 1964 package tours to 
Hungary were for the first time organised in Finland. This told 
of – as the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated – the 
‘popularisation of Hungarian-Finnish relations’.24 Tourism and 
travel as well as increasing student exchange were undoubtedly 
ways to re-establish the contacts between Hungary and 
Finland.25 In the beginning of the year 1970, as a result of 
Kekkonen’s state visit to Hungary in 1969, compulsory visas 
between the two countries were abolished. The agreement was 
important, because for the first time Hungarian citizens were 
allowed to travel to a non-socialist country without visas. 26  
 
4 Two ideas of Brotherhood: Tradition and Progress 
If the visit in 1963 was remarkable because it was understood to 
be the opening of a new era of relations between Finland and 
Hungary, the visit of 1969 also had a similar importance. In the 
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late 1960s, respect for Soviet interests was still paramount in the 
relations across the Iron Curtain. One new element in the 
foreign policy of Hungary was the increasing openness to the 
West. A key motivation behind it was the opportunity which 
the West offered to gain access to the latest technology and to 
participate in economic development. The first contacts in this 
respect were Finland and Austria. The visit paid by the 
Austrian Chancellor, Josef Klaus, in 1967, as well as Kekkonen’s 
visit, were given wide publicity.27 For Kekkonen, the tour in 
Eastern Europe offered an opportunity to formulate the Finnish 
position on post-Prague international politics. In 1969 there 
were signs of normalisation in international relations after the 
events in Prague. This might have encouraged Kekkonen to 
visit Eastern Europe.28 Therefore, the situation in 1969 
resembled the situation in 1963: stabilisation after tension.  
The Hungarian activity and emphasis on visits was evident 
also in the fact that Hungary so often took the initiative in the 
contacts with the Finns. János Péter suggested on the 16 August 
1968 to the Politburo of the HSWP, that President Losonczi 
should invite the Finnish President to an official state visit to 
Hungary. He reminded them that already in 196129 an invitation 
to this effect had been forwarded, but Kekkonen had not been 
able to accept it ‘because of domestic policy reasons’. Péter said 
that Kekkonen was planning a visit to Czechoslovakia, Rumania 
and Italy, and he had been informed that Kekkonen might also 
like to visit Hungary.30 Before the visit, the Finnish Embassy in 
Budapest assumed that the policy of peaceful co-existence had 
given Finland a certain position in Hungary’s policy. In the 
report concerning the political events in Hungary it was again 
estimated that relations with the Soviet Union formed the basis 
of Hungarian policy. This was not, however, contradictory to the 
idea of peaceful co-existence. It was stated that ‘this pleasant side 
of the socialist bloc is more evident in the case of Hungary than 
in other socialist countries’.31  
In addition to political conditions, attention was also drawn 
to cultural relations. Culture and science were seen as central 
aspects of mutual relations. A report which was drawn up by 
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the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated that the reason for the 
good co-operation was that Finland accepted Hungarian 
cultural policy: the policy which was conducted at the higher 
political level.32 It pointed out the importance of the idea of 
kinship to the relations between the countries; the tradition had 
been formed by the philologists had initiated Hungarian-
Finnish relations. They were the starting-point for state level 
relations, which had gained more momentum due to the 
Kekkonen visit in 1963.33 
The speeches provide an interesting insight into the image and 
into the system of the relations between the two countries. 
Kekkonen’s speeches in Budapest in 1969 reflected both the 
concept of kinship and the concept of progress: old concepts were 
again linked to new ones. As Kekkonen expressed it, the relations 
between Hungary and Finland were founded not only on 
historical grounds but also on modern co-operation. For example, 
Kekkonen praised the progress Hungary had made during the 
1960s: the development in Hungary between the years 1963–1969 
had shown ‘the high level of Hungarian civilisation and culture’. 
He emphasized both political and cultural understanding between 
the two countries. In this connection ‘kinship’ was reevaluated as 
a scientific truth, not as a romantic speculation or a myth. In this 
rhetoric, the kinship was not, however, the only aspect of 
brotherhood but it was paired with the willingness to make 
cultural and commercial agreements. The concept of a small 
nation implied this twin brotherhood uniting the two countries 
politically, and its rhetoric was carried out with concepts of 
‘kinship, brotherhood, progress and small nation’.34 
The kinship aspect in the traditional sense was visible also in the 
informal part of the state visit. Such details were the Kalevala-show 
held in Budapest and a new Hungarian-Finnish dictionary. 
According to Kustaa Vilkuna, the dictionary was a ‘neat or, in other 
words, smart and solid expression of the special status of Hungarian-
Finnish relations’. Vilkuna had recommended that the dictionary 
should be presented to some of the Hungarian high-ups.35  
The HSWP had also decided that the reception of Kekkonen 
was to reflect his positive role in international policy and to 
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emphasize the importance of the visit. (The way the points of 
the protocol were organized reflected this, too). Hungary deci-
ded to take a positive view on freedom of visas and to conclude 
a treaty of technology and economy with Finland.36 The dis-
cussions between Kekkonen and Kádár can be linked to the 
idea of mutual understanding between small nations in the 
field of international politics. Discussions of world politics and 
mutual interests dealt with the typical, actual political issues. 
Notes of the discussions show that an exchange of views con-
cerning the NORDEK, European security and commercial and 
economic co-operation were on the agenda.37 The official 
memorandum which the President and the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry gave on the state visit emphasised the correct nature of 
the relations between Finland and Hungary. It is worth noticing 
that there was an expression of ‘the similarity of opinions on 
world politics and of the direction of the mutual relations 
between the two states’.38  
The Finnish press, however, did not adopt such a positive tone: 
their treatment of the visit was not necessarily in accordance with 
the official line. An incident of this latter visit was the case of 
‘muckraking journalism’ of which Kekkonen accused one reporter 
of the Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, Lauri Karén. The 
codes of the official ‘liturgy’ were disturbed by Karén´s critical 
articles on Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary.  
Karén had written that Hungary had shown only little interest 
in Kekkonen during the visit. Karén gave an explanation: the 
Soviet Union disliked the potentially increasing contacts between 
Hungary and neutral countries. Karén noticed that the typical 
symbols of a state visit had been lacking in Budapest: there was 
no red carpet at the airport and Kádár was not there to 
personally welcome Kekkonen. In addition to this ‘lack of 
symbols at the airport’, there were only a few Finnish or 
Hungarian flags in the streets of Budapest. He believed that the 
atmosphere in Czechoslovakia and Rumania had been much 
warmer towards Kekkonen. Karén had discussed with some 
British and French diplomats, who had also considered that the 
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reception was rather cool. Maybe Karén’s tone was coloured by 
French or British opinions. 
The President made his attitude to Karén’s articles clear. He 
would not accept this kind of reporting and accused Lauri 
Karén ‘of taking a waste bin instead of a pen’ with him to 
Hungary. Kekkonen further complained that ‘it was clear that a 
journalist who had equipped himself with these kinds of tools 
could not write a truthful description’.39 
Karén stated later in his memoirs that the Hungarians had 
not paid much attention to his writing.40 Nevertheless, the 
Hungarian appraisals of Kekkonen’s visit in 1969 have pointed 
out the huge publicity which was given to it in Hungary.41 
Accordingly, János Péter had proposed to the HSWP Political 
Committee that before the visit the Hungarian media would 
deal with Finland and the relations between the two countries. 
In practise, this meant that on the day of Kekkonen’s arrival the 
daily newspapers were due to wish him welcome in two lan-
guages and that the editorials were to show respect to the im-
portance of the visit. The speeches were to be made public and 
bulletins in colour were to report the results of the visit. Should 
Kekkonen so wish, a TV interview could also be arranged.42  
 
5 Towards Friendship 
During the 1970s the dualist idea of ‘brotherhood’ was further 
developed: contemporary questions brought ‘modern 
friendship’ to the limelight. The concept of friendship was 
gaining more weight at the expense of the idea of kinship. The 
new image was that Hungary and Finland could become 
members of the international community. It is possible to 
presume that rather contemporary political circumstances and 
goals made an impact on the statements concerning mutual 
relations than the tradition. 
Up to 1969, the 1960s had been the period of establishing and 
consolidation in Hungarian-Finnish relations. In the 1970s, 
however, an increase in sheer volume of interchange at political, 
state and diplomatic, cultural, economic and civil society levels 
took place. Political relations and the visits were more open than 
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in the 1960s, when the images of Hungary and Kádár were still 
undeveloped. In time the relations between Finland and Hungary 
improved on both intergovernmental and civil society level as the 
repercussions of the 1956 faded away. When President Pal 
Losonczi visited Finland from 23rd to 26th of August, 1971, the 
themes of negotiations were essentially the same as during 
Kekkonen’s state visit in 1969, but it is evident that the political 
relations were now discussed more openly and publicly.  
During the visit, the Hungarians were especially keen on 
discussing Finnish views on the CSCE, and the commercial 
relations between the countries, including co-operation in the 
fields of technology, science and economy. The Hungarian expert 
in these questions was Deputy Prime Minister Miklós Ajtai. That 
he was not a member of the politburo was interpreted by the 
Finnish Ambassador Martti Ingman to mean that the Hungarians 
intended to loosen the grip of the party on matters of technology.43 
Ajtai had expressed to Ingman his interest in getting acquainted 
with how the scientific research was organized in Finland, what 
the status of Hungarian-Finnish co-operation was and what the 
plans for the future were. He also wanted to discuss the prospects 
of co-operation on the economy, sounding whether the Finns 
thought that joint projects in industry and agriculture were 
possible.44 The interest in technology, economy and agriculture 
can be seen in the visit plan of Losonczi; the President was to visit, 
for example, the Agricultural Institute in Mustiala and the 
Rosenlew factories in Pori. Education, culture and health care 
were prominent in the program of the Presidential spouse. The 
program included for example a lunch on an ice-breaker and 
visiting Tapiola in Espoo, which shows wish of the Finns to show 
clean nature, construction technology and technical skills – 
tradition and the modern side of Finland.45 
Since the most traditional part of the relations, culture, was 
by now in the eyes of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, 
consolidated and unproblematic, the focus was on modern 
themes during the visit. Therefore, according to Ingman, there 
was hardly anything else to discuss in culture during the visit 
than to ‘note the positive development’.46 Of course, Finno-
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Ugrian philology and ethnology were still the key issues in the 
treaty of cultural exchange but the field of co-operation had 
become wider. As was stated in a preliminary memorandum, 
there was a mutual wish to deepen and widen the contacts in 
different fields of science and arts. The objects of interest were 
not, however, necessarily the same. The Finnish Embassy 
estimated that the Hungarians were more interested in Finnish 
science than art, and especially in gaining benefit from ‘hard 
sciences’, whereas the Finns were interested in Hungarian art. 
Moreover, the Finns thought that the treaty on culture was not 
supposed to cover all cultural exchange, but rather to show the 
way and incite initiative, after which it would be possible to 
create direct contacts.47 The more diversified and ‘natural’ 
cultural exchange would be the better: after the official 
agreements one could proceed to striking direct contacts. 
However, the discourse of the visit also offered a role to 
‘tradition’. The trend of the conversations between the two 
Presidents was that good relations arose from tradition, on 
which the countries now could build ‘more modern’ relations. 
They would answer to the needs of the present day. This ‘need’ 
was now about economy, technology, industry and society, as 
the Finns had prophesied already before the visit. Losonczi 
expressed the Hungarian interest in co-operation in health care 
and to conclude an agreement on co-operation in science and 
technology. He suggested that co-operation should be widened 
and that other sciences would develop the same kind of co-
operation as already existed in ethnology and linguistics. He 
also mentioned the need to further develop the relations on the 
economy. Kekkonen reacted in principle positively to these 
proposals. Losonczi also mentioned that the cultural relations 
rested on the sound base of old tradition. According to 
Kekkonen, these cultural relations had also created the 
circumstances for the development of economic co-operation. 
Thus the cultural relations were seen as the foundation and the 
example for other aspects of the relations, and they were also 
the proof of the long tradition of the relations between the two 
nations. The idea of tradition was linked to the cultural 
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relations and they were also seen as the bridge to modernity. It 
can be maintained that the concept of tradition could be used as 
a reference point to the entirety of the relations, but the ‘new’ 
relations, established from the 1960s onwards, were linked to 
this tradition. Losonczi’s reference to how the high-level visits 
had advanced the positive development of the relations 
reflected the emphasis the Hungarians laid to the visits as a 
means of foreign policy.48 
The view of the roles of Finland and Hungary had in inter-
national context was expressed by the concept of mutual under-
standing. In the talks with Losonczi, Kekkonen defined the 
Finnish line in international politics as ‘an active policy of 
neutrality’ which had been, in co-operation with the Soviet Union, 
consolidated as a part of European political reality. The relations 
with the Soviet Union were extremely important to Finland. The 
prolongation of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance by 20 years had set ‘our consolidated good 
relations with the Soviet Union outside speculations as a process 
of change was starting in Europe’. Kekkonen placed the Finnish 
foreign policy as a part of a ‘more stable and peaceful status quo’. 
This was connected to the aspirations to realize the plans for a 
European Security Meeting. In the conversation references to 
Hungarian-Finnish understanding in international issues were 
made. Losonczi, for his part, stated that the mainstay of 
Hungarian foreign policy was the relations with the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries; close co-operation with them was 
one of the factors which had ‘helped us to the calm situation 
which now prevails in Europe’. Losonczi aligned the Finnish 
active policy of neutrality with the policy of ‘the progress-loving 
forces’ which had stabilized Europe, i.e. brought about the 
situation in which there had been no war in Europe for 26 years 
and the international tension had eased.49  
The key concepts of the joint communiqué on the visit had it that 
the relations were unproblematic: multilateral co-operation, 
mutual understanding and friendship. The visit was considered to 
be ‘a new manifestation on friendship and mutual respect 
between our nations’. The relations were described as stable, 
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traditional and up-to-date. Economy and technology were 
emphasized and relations in them were to be developed. Both 
sides stated with satisfaction that the relations between Hungary 
and Finland were developing favourably in all fields of social, 
economic and cultural life. This was thanks to the high-level visits 
and discussions which ‘have promoted the co-operation and 
traditional friendship between these two kindred people’. In 
recent years ‘many important results have been reached in 
bringing the two kindred peoples closer to each other’. Getting to 
know the other’s traditions and present status, and the new 
scientific contacts represented the progress of the relations.  
The image of the visit of President Losonczi was that it was 
largely a visit of friendship and it offered a forum to declare 
how the relations were unproblematic and advanced positively. 
The Finnish and Hungarian interests were considered to be 
common from the viewpoint of history and the present-day 
international position and role. It was also expressed how the 
policy of the other part was appreciated: Finland ‘appreciated 
the endeavours of the Hungarian government to maintain good 
relations with their neighbours and to develop their co-
operation with all nations contributing to international peace 
and security’. Hungary expressed that the Finnish policy of 
neutrality served as a basis for efforts aiming at strengthening 
of international peace and security and at promoting mutual 
understanding between nations.50  
The ‘kindred’ aspect was not as evident as it had been before. It 
was mainly emphasized in dinner speeches, not in official 
conversations or in the communiqué, and even in the speeches the 
contemporary aspect and the challenges of the modern age were 
stressed. Losonczi highlighted the role of the state in developing the 
relations on the economy, but also the civic society level was 
appreciated: the friendship relations between Hungarian and 
Finnish and the Friendship Week51 were, according to him, new 
useful ways to co-operate through ‘popular diplomacy’. Losonczi 
saw these relations as the foundation for developing political, econo-
mical, technical and cultural relations. As he referred to the different 
social systems, he also found a uniting factor: the policy in 
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international questions and the fact that also Finland was advancing 
the mission of peace. Thus the speech declared ‘mutual under-
standing’ both at a popular level and in international politics.52  
The concept of friendship was central also in the draft of 
Kekkonen’s speech, written by Ambassador Ingman: the good 
Hungarian-Finnish relations were presented through the idea of 
‘romantic friendship’. This kind of friendship was usually very 
difficult to realize in state relations. Friendship was the under-
current of the relations, and both the state-level relations and civil 
society contacts were to be built on it. The Hungarian-Finnish 
relations had originally been created by personal friendships and 
the studies on the origins of kindred nations and their languages in 
the nineteenth century. The hobby of closed circles had now beco-
me an object of interest for masses. This was due not only to the 
situation in Hungary, but also to the feeling of friendship. The 
Finnish interpretation of ‘popular diplomacy’ and the role of the 
state were put in a way that the initiatives of the civic society and 
the official arrangements together apparently guaranteed best results. 
Kekkonen also referred to the economic problems with the 
idea of understanding: ‘It has sometimes been jokingly said 
about the trade between Finland and Hungary that both parties 
are equally dissatisfied with its development’. Thus also trade 
was linked to the idea of friendship: getting actively acquainted 
with the other would help in removing obstacles. 
Simultaneously the development of the economy was linked to 
the idea of being members of the international community and 
having an important mission in it. Both countries had been 
pawns in Great Power policy game – even this had helped to 
understand each other. Thus Finland and Hungary had been on 
the same side in the past and so they were in the present.53 
The Finnish newspapers did not cause any reason for 
uneasiness to Kekkonen this time. They described the relations 
between the two countries mainly with the same discourse as 
the speeches mentioned above and thus also romanticized 
Hungarian-Finnish relations more than the reports of the ‘inner 
circles’ in diplomacy.54 This consensus was transmitted in 
Kekkonen’s words, cited also by the leading conservative 
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paper, Uusi Suomi, according to which ‘despite their different 
social systems, Finland and Hungary have created consolidated 
forms for mutual communication’. Thus both countries had 
advanced ‘the developing tendency of European policy which 
aims at creating more mutual contacts between countries with 
different social systems’. The paper estimated that Hungary 
aimed at becoming an interpreter for East European countries 
in East-West questions, like the Berlin Treaty.55 The Hungarian 
role in the preparation of the European Security Meeting was 
thus made public in Finland already during Losonczi’s visit.56 
Soon afterwards the official discussions between the Finns and 
the Hungarians were started, and yet again the high policy of 
visits and agreements was evident. The need for co-operation in 
issues of technology, science and economy was once more put 
forward, and it was agreed that the number of meetings of the 
officials of the Finnish and Hungarian Foreign Ministries was to 
be increased on a regular basis. Hungary suggested more 
ministerial level visits and proposed that the Finns would get 
acquainted with the Hungarian-Austrian co-operation, about 
which the Hungarians had given a memorandum to the Finns in 
spring 1971 and which could be used as a basis for advancing the 
Hungarian-Finnish co-operation.57 The Finnish connection was, 
seen from the Hungarian point of view, most useful in the same 
context as the Austrian: an avenue to Western technology and 
economy through a neutral and thus ‘easy’ country. 
The image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations was more rhe-
torically defined in a speech given by János Péter on 13 December 
1972 in the Hungarian Parliament. According to him, the tradition 
and kinship laid the foundation for present-day relations. He 
thanked ‘the well-deliberated stand and suggestions of the Finnish 
political leaders which had advanced the mutual understanding’. 
The relations with Finland had got ‘impulses from traditional 
kinship relations, and they can be pursued in the prevailing inter-
national conditions in a manner which is useful to both countries’.58  
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6 Evaluating Hungary in 1973 – Kádár in Finland 
The formal head of state of Hungary was followed to Finland 
by the strong man two years later. When János Kádár visited 
Finland in 25 – 28 September 1973, the leading Finnish 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat noted that this was the first time 
Kádár visited a capitalist country and that he was received like 
a head of state even though he was not the President of his 
country. This was not really a critical remark since – to make a 
comparison – the paper mentioned that also other East 
European party leaders had been received similarly in France 
and the United States.59  
Once again the initiative for the visit had come from the 
Hungarian side. Frigyes Puja, when visiting Helsinki in the 
matters of the European Security Meeting, had invited Kekkonen 
to Hungary. However, Kekkonen interpreted the conversation 
with Puja to the effect that it was in fact more important that he 
invited Kádár to Finland. This he had done even before, but Kádár 
had wanted a confirmation of the suitable time.60 Puja explained to 
Kekkonen that Hungary wanted to develop the mutual relations 
also in future and answered that Kádár would gladly accept the 
invitation.61 In Hungary it was decided that the visit would be an 
official one and take place according to the personal invitation by 
Kekkonen. It was also considered important that Kádár would 
also meet the leadership of the Finnish Communist Party. That the 
political culture of Hungary was dominated by the HSWP was 
evident also from the fact that during the visits one made such 
contacts with the brother parties as well as with the government.62 
Before the visit, Ambassador Paul Jyrkänkallio delineated 
the Hungarian political line: in foreign policy it followed the 
Soviet line and lacked ‘any distinctive features worth men-
tioning’. Unlike Rumania, Hungary followed the Soviet line 
without reservations in order to be able to loosen the strains in 
domestic policy and pursue such economic policy which could 
‘increase the welfare and comfort of the private citizen’. 
According to Jyrkänkallio, it was only the more Western way to 
express things which might give cause to think that Hungary 
would have any independent views of foreign policy. The 
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official line on European détente was identical with other 
socialist countries.63 
In domestic policy a more individual policy was followed: 
Jyrkänkallio stated that Hungary strove to create – without 
keeping noise about it and without articulating the final goal 
because of past experiences – a socialist society with a human 
face. Hungary tried to take into account also of the wishes of 
the new generation and to create a viable environment in which 
the people could feel at home and would not risk rising against 
socialist society. There was some flexibility, but if someone was 
about to overstep permissible borders he/she would get a swift, 
although ‘not lethal’ reminder. The Hungarian leadership had 
‘the reins tightly in its hands’. Kádár’s personal attitude was 
still decisive, although there had been changes which had 
increased freedom in the society. The Hungarians still saw 
Kádár as fighting against both revisionism and dogmatism: ‘the 
one who is not against us is with us’. However, the main 
principle was that the leading positions in the society belonged 
to party members. Also the cultural policy followed this line. 
Seen from the Finnish viewpoint and in the light of the 
information received by the embassy, it seemed that nowhere 
else in the socialist bloc the intellectual life was so free. It 
seemed that Kádár was popular and that positive development 
was connected to his person.64 
Jyrkänkallio found the relations between the neutral Austria and 
Hungary interesting; in trade these relations had developed better 
than the Hungarian-Finnish ones, and they were warm despite the 
memories of the Dual Monarchy. Austria was a rival for Finland as 
a close trading partner with Hungary. In this Jyrkänkallio saw 
similarities with Finnish-Swedish sense of belonging together and 
compared the football matches between Hungary and Austria to 
the athletic competitions between Finland and Sweden. He also 
emphasized how important good Western relations were for 
Hungary because the country was very dependent on foreign trade. 
The share of the Western industrialized countries of Hungarian 
trade was increasing.65 In comparison, the Hungarian-Finnish trade 
was really modest and the 1969 agreement on economy, technology 
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and science had not created much concrete co-operation although 
the delegations and direct contacts in culture and economy were a 
sign of the ‘consolidation and the vitality of the relations’.66  
 
7 Policy of Understanding 
The theme of friendship was outwardly as central as ever 
during Kádár’s visit but also the political lines were now dealt 
with more precision than during Losonczi’s visit. The main 
point was that differences of opinion did not affect friendship 
and understanding of the two countries. Both Kekkonen and 
Kádár emphasized in their conversations their mutual interests 
and the similar roles in the international arena. 
For example, considering the Finnish policy, there were 
differences but also a mutual understanding as both sides had 
an opportunity to make their own interpretations of it. Both 
defined the Finnish policy in principle in the same way, but 
Kádár’s ‘acceptance’ of Finnish neutrality meant essentially a 
soviet interpretation of neutrality. Kádár explained that the 
Finnish policy was also in the Hungarian interest, even though 
the countries disagreed especially on the question of the 
relations with the EEC. Kádár defined the Finnish policy as a 
‘policy of positive neutrality’ and thanked Finland for taking 
the initiative for the CSCE and on the German question. He 
remarked that the Finnish policy had sometimes gone against 
the West but that it had been the right policy. He was also 
thankful for Finland’s correct attitude towards Hungary in 
1956. And later Kádár emphasized: ‘Differences of opinion may 
not endanger mutual co-operation and friendship’. It is hardly 
surprising that he drew a parallel between Finland and 
Hungary in the international field: both were small countries 
which had their roles to play in international policy but the 
mutual relations of which were also of importance. The 
countries operated in the same field and had similar interests 
although ‘the friends also had different opinions’. Also 
Kekkonen pointed out that ‘connecting ties are much more 
important and numerous than the differences of opinion’.67 In 
his speech during the festive lunch Kádár yet again defined the 
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Finnish policy as a ‘policy of positive neutrality’. Thus Finland 
and Hungary did not use peaceful co-existence only to their 
own benefit but were able to advance it also internationally. 
They had similar interests because of the CSCE and a similar 
role in international policy. These opinions were also conveyed 
to the Finnish public.68 
It is remarkable to realize that Hungary accepted the Finnish 
policy of neutrality in these years without conditions although the 
Soviet Union did not.69 According to the communiqué of the visit, the 
Hungarian party confirmed again that the Hungarian government 
appreciated the Finnish policy of neutrality which aimed at 
strengthening international peace and security especially in Europe. 
Finland, for its part, expressed its appreciation of the determined 
effort of the Hungarian government to maintain good relations 
with all European countries and the Hungarian contribution to 
increasing international peace and security. The communiqué 
described the mutual relations as versatile relations of friendship of 
which Kádár’s visit was proof.70 So it can be said that Finland and 
Hungary in a way guaranteed each other and accepted the other 
party’s definitions of itself. The image of the mutual relations was 
thus a kind of mirror of mutual understanding. 
The ideal of this understanding can be questioned and one 
can speculate on it further. The Finnish policy of neutrality may 
well have been accepted in another sense than Finland itself 
did. The Hungarian leadership had a tendency to bring the 
countries verbally nearer by putting Finland into the same 
‘camp of peace’ in which Hungary itself was. Accordingly, 
Hungary expressed its liberal attitude towards the co-operation 
with Western countries. Naturally, the Hungarian foreign 
policy was dependent on membership in the Eastern bloc but 
simultaneously Hungary defined itself also as an active party. It 
was possible to achieve understanding with the other party in a 
context which one oneself defined: the actual meaning of the 
understanding was somewhat different from the articulated 
one. Additionally, it can be speculated that the more Hungary 
‘westernized’ its political image and the more Finland paid 
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attention to Eastern policy, the easier it was for the countries to 
adapt to each other and align with each other’s political line. 
The interpretation of the CSCE by Hungary and its criticism 
of the process itself71 were not prominent in Hungarian-Finnish 
talks, economic relations and trade prevailed. It is easy to see 
that Kádár wanted to concentrate especially on these issues. He 
wanted information especially on Finnish-Comecon relations. 
The cultural relations were ‘excellent and flourishing’, the 
economic ones were lagging behind. Thus economy was the 
sector of friendship which needed improving. To begin with, 
Kádár described the Hungarian motives by defending Socialism 
which was, in his view, becoming more democratic – basically 
in the same way Ambassador Jyrkänkallio had described it. It 
stressed Hungary’s ‘Western’ features: freedom of culture, 
contacts with the outside world through tourism etc. Thus 
Kádár was emphasizing how Hungary was becoming a more 
open society. Also the economic relations with the West were 
improving – especially with Austria but Kádár pointed out also 
the co-operation with France and Germany and added: ‘We do 
not have any prejudices in these matters’. He suggested that 
despite the ‘free economy’ in Finland the Finnish government 
might encourage the Finnish economy in a direction beneficial 
to Hungary. The message was that Hungary was very liberal 
and tolerant in its Western relations.72 Presumably Kádár was 
not seeking political acceptance of ‘Kádárism’ as such but ways 
to strengthen it with economic ties with Finland. And as during 
Losonczi’s visit, the Hungarians wanted to advance direct 
contacts with state support whereas the Finns saw direct 
contacts as such as a positive development. 
Finnish publicity was left with the understanding that 
Kekkonen appreciated the Hungarian role in the CSCE and that 
both countries had the same viewpoint on this issue.73 The 
public image rested again on official speeches and the image 
and history of the relations were represented in and for the 
media as a narrative; from the kindred interests of the scholars 
to present-day state relations. Also Kádár had paid respect to 
the past while talking about the present-day challenges, i.e. the 
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relatives and friends were developing tradition-bound relations 
in a modern context.74 Kekkonen, on the other hand, had 
emphasized the process of building the friendship during 15 
years: this had demanded work and was now bearing fruit. The 
speech also contained the same arguments of traditional 
relations as stepping stones to present-day needs and was 
published as a shortened version in the Helsingin Sanomat. 
However, Kekkonen talked about kinship and tradition more 
than Kádár had done and expected that even more could be 
built on the traditional foundation. The tradition thus 
surpassed, for example, the ideological differences – the Finns 
wanted to be bridge-builders to countries which represented 
another social system.75  
Bridge-builders role was reserved for Finland also in the 
Hungarian foreign political discourse in the report which FM 
Frigyes Puja presented to the Hungarian Parliament in April 25, 
1974. Equally illustrative is his article in The New Hungarian 
Quarterly. On these two occasions he defined the Hungarian 
motives towards the non-socialist countries; they were ‘on a 
correct foundation brought about by mutual interests’. Puja 
stated that ‘taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the 
easing of international tension, we aim to utilize negotiations 
and strengthen co-operation which is beneficial to both parties, 
and to strengthen the ties between our states’. According to 
Puja, it was a success that Hungary had signed treaties with 
‘almost every highly developed country’. In this connection, 
Puja mentioned especially Finland; the Hungarian-Finnish 
relations were ‘in many respects a good example’. They showed 
how countries which had different social systems could 
maintain intensive, high-level contacts. Puja followed the state 
visit rhetoric: tradition and present needs. Besides, Finland had 
the same view on issues like European peace and security. 
According to Puja, Kádár’s visit had played a major role in the 
development of the relations. It can be said that the ‘visits’ were 
an argument with which it was possible to point out the success 
and development of the relations. 
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Puja also compared the relations with Finland to the ones with 
Austria. His conception of traditional friendship and 
contemporary scientific and economic goals suited both cases. In 
the Finnish case, the idea of tradition meant kinship, in the 
Austrian case the friendship was based on sports and culture and 
on being neighbours. 
Also the Finns paid attention to Puja’s interpretation of the 
Finnish neutrality. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio maintained that it 
was essential that Puja had talked about the concept of 
neutrality in his article and had mentioned two neutral 
countries, Finland and Austria, with which Hungary had 
‘especially cordial relations’ – which was shown as an example 
of peaceful co-existence. Even so, the word neutrality did not 
necessarily mean the same in both cases since Austria was 
referred to both in the speech and the article as ‘neutral 
Austria’, and there was no corresponding definition of 
Finland’s policy in the parliamentary speech at all.76  
In November 1973 Puja had repeated the image of Finnish 
neutrality and Hungary’s wish to peaceful existence in his talks 
with the Finnish State Secretary Richard Tötterman. He had 
stressed that this meant that Hungary had no wish to interfere 
in the internal affairs of any country. It wanted to respect 
sovereignty and self-determination. The Hungarian-Soviet 
relations were principal and regulated the Hungarian policy. 
The message seems to have been that Hungary was following 
the Soviet line and did not want to be active itself in world 
policy. Tötterman, in his turn, described the Finnish policy as a 
policy of peaceful co-existence which served Finnish national 
interests and also benefited the international community. When 
he discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy, the topic of 
visits surfaced again. Now Hungary wanted to increase the 
amount of the ministerial contacts. Both Puja and Nagy argued 
against the EEC and the Finnish contacts with it and 
maintained that they were detrimental to Hungarian-Finnish 
economical relations which were not as developed as the 
political and cultural ones. Puja couched the ‘disadvantage’ of 
the EEC also in more political terms: the EEC was anti-Soviet 
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and forestalled the progress towards the CSCE. Political 
integration would have a negative effect on Hungary. 
Tötterman stressed, however, that Finland carried trade with 
both socialist and non-socialist countries, and repeated the old 
Finnish dogma of direct contacts advancing cultural relations.77 
Yet politically the EEC had become an issue which did not fit in 
with the normal friendship rhetoric in which both parties had 
allowed the other to interpret the content of the definitions. 
Even so, the Hungarian publicity defined Finland as a friendly 
country towards Hungary in the beginning of 1976. The 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP, Gynes, 
explained in Népszabadság that according to the principles of 
peaceful co-existence, Hungary strived for mutually beneficial 
relations with the neighbouring Austria and the friendly 
Finland, and also with the Federal Republic of Germany, France 
and Italy. Relations to economically developed capitalist 
countries – also to the United States – belonged to this policy.78 
In view of this, the Finnish Embassy had interpreted in 1975 
that as far as the visits were concerned, Finland and Austria 
had distinguished themselves as a group of their own. Puja had 
even commented to the Austrians on Hungary’s Western 
relations that Hungary cultivated especially warm relations not 
only with Austria and Italy, but also with Finland ‘which was 
not due to the common origins of the Finns and Hungarians’.79 
The existence of the good relations was explained rather by 
contemporary conditions, by the ‘new tradition’ of the relations 
than by the ‘old tradition’. It consisted of such factors political 
like-mindedness, history of the relations and common visions 
concerning the future. 
 
8 Hungarian Policy Towards the Visit in 1976 
The central role of the visits as a means of taking care of the 
foreign relations in the Hungarian political culture became once 
more evident in 1976 as a meeting of the heads of the states was 
arranged. When Ambassador Tivadar Matusek visited the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry and officially invited Kekkonen to 
visit Hungary, he reminded them that one such invitation had 
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already been forwarded in 1971.80 Also the Hungarian PM, Jenő 
Fock, called Kekkonen and renewed the invitations by Losonczi 
and Kádár; he added that he had unofficially heard that 
Kekkonen might accept the invitation.81 Kekkonen responded 
positively by declaring his readiness to a 3–5 day visit in 
November – five days would be possible if the program would 
include, for example, hunting.82 The Finns hoped that the 
program would be sufficiently light.83 According to 
Ambassador Jyrkänkallio the Hungarians understood that the 
program should not be too strenuous and that there would be 
possibilities to rest, even though this wish was considered 
difficult to fulfill.84  
Also the differences in mentality and practical work 
sometimes seemed difficult in the Finnish eyes. To quote 
Jyrkänkallio’s confidential letter to a Finnish colleague: ‘I have 
been told – and I indeed do know that myself – that the 
Hungarians always start to act only at the last minute and then 
they improvise a lot. And in most cases everything then goes 
smoothly. But our preparations are endangered by their 
slackness – that is worse.’85 The practical details of the visit 
were meaningful as symbols and expressions of the relations 
between the two states: simultaneously the Finns felt the needs 
to comply with the hosts and express their own opinions. 
Different customs clashed when the language of the invitation 
cards was chosen and also in choosing suits, meals and 
decorations.86 So did the different ways to act in politics and 
diplomacy, for example, Ambassador Matusek’s wish to have a 
say in the choice of the Finnish participants in the talks was not 
well received in the Finnish Foreign Ministry since it did not fit 
the Finnish political culture.87  
Kekkonen’s visit took place in 17th – 20th November, 1976 and 
was publicly characterized as a friendship visit. Kádár was 
acting as the host. Compared to Kekkonen’s visits in the 
previous decade when, for example, meetings with Kádár had 
been slightly ‘back-stage’, the state level and official features 
were now clearly visible. As the relations were now more 
stabilized and the meetings of the heads of states did not create 
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any sensations, substance become more important than sheer 
symbolism of the meetings. Kekkonen’s visit in 1976 seems to 
have followed the pattern of state visits.88  
In 1976, it seems to have been important for the Finns that 
the Hungarians would understand correctly the international 
status of both Finland and of the Hungarian-Finnish relations. 
For Hungary, on the other hand, the main point seems to have 
been the image of Kádár’s Hungary and the disappearance of 
the memory of 1956. As the Hungarian preparatory papers 
pointed out, the visit would take place at a time when 20 years 
had elapsed since the 1956 ‘counter-revolution’ and henceforth 
an international propaganda campaign was to be expected from 
the West. Therefore the demonstrative value of Kekkonen’s 
visit became more important. It was suggested to the Central 
Committee of the HSWP that the reception Kekkonen would 
receive in Hungary would show the Hungarian ‘respect 
towards one of the most remarkable statesmen of the time’. The 
memorandum described Kekkonen as a statesman who had 
advanced peace, security and friendship between nations. 
Kekkonen had also created good, friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The Finnish 
relations were a practical example of peaceful coexistence 
between countries which had different social systems. These 
characterizations were very much the same in 1971. Also the 
development of present Hungarian-Finnish relations – which 
had international importance – was seen as Kekkonen’s 
personal merit. 
It was also suggested that it would be useful to declare that 
Hungary approved the Finnish policy concerning the security 
interests of the neutral countries. Hungary approved the Finnish 
concept of neutrality and Hungary would express its positive 
attitude towards Finnish foreign policy in the Hungarian-Finnish 
negotiations. Hungary would also show its appreciation towards 
neutral countries in general – which perhaps implies an effort to 
make them Hungary’s friends. The memorandum used traditional 
rhetoric: it should have been made clear during the visit that 
Hungary believed that the neutral countries advanced more and 
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more readily peace, security, arms reductions and friendship 
between nations. The Hungarians expected the Finns to 
demonstrate their policy of neutrality and their international 
activity with this visit, especially as the visits to the Soviet Union 
and the United States were approaching. It was also expected that 
Kekkonen would be willing to negotiate about questions of 
economy and trade and thus to advance the Hungarian-Finnish 
relations even further. The political questions were without 
problems, and it was expected that the CSCE would be the basis 
for negotiations for the Finns (the conference had finally taken 
place in 1975 in Helsinki). It was also expected that the Hungarian 
and Finnish policy in international questions would be the same, 
and Hungary would seek co-operation with Finland in this. The 
goal was to ‘act‘ in common with Finland for the next conference 
which was to take place in Belgrade. So it was hoped that in 
addition to the normal references to the mutual friendly relations 
and traditions also principles of co-operation and the Final Act of 
the CSCE would be mentioned in the communiqué. 
It is hardly surprising that yet again it was mentioned that 
the economic relations would have to be raised to the same 
level as the cultural ones. But even the wishes concerning the 
cultural and scientific relations were now more extensive and 
detailed: it was hoped for more and faster progress in co-
operation in natural and social sciences. The present goal was to 
realize the working plan for cultural co-operation for the years 
1976–77: a common television series, co-operation in transla-
tions and a general widening of the field of co-operation. The 
Finnish-Hungarian Society was expected to have an important 
role in this.89 Some issues might be delicate from the Hungarian 
point of view: purchasing of the real estates of the Finnish 
Embassy by the Finns, foundation of the Hungarian-Finnish 
Society (the Hungarians had only one friendship society, 
namely with the Soviet Union) and the joint film project Fenyő 
és gránit (Fir-tree and granite).90 The Hungarian expectations 
were not necessarily dramatically far-reaching but nevertheless 
relatively high. 
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9 Good Relations and Successful Policy with Exceptions 
The Finnish delegation in 1976 was mainly the traditional one, 
and during the visit Hungarian initiatives did not cause 
particular surprises. However, the lack of a partner to Finnish-
Hungarian Society was a slight because the Finns of the FHS 
were receiving, organizing and arranging exhibitions and other 
cultural visits far more often than the Hungarians.91 In 1974 the 
Finns had tried to found a Kalevala-club under the auspices of 
the Patriotic People‘s Front but in the last moment the meetings 
had been forbidden. The Embassy had tried to support the local 
people who were interested in Finland and Finnish culture by 
presenting them samples of Finnish literature. According to 
Jyrkänkallio, it was not sure whether the difficulties were 
caused by local authorities who ‘still lived in the Rákosi times’, 
or by higher authorities. However, the system of friendship 
towns compensated for the lack of a friendly society to some 
extent. But even here there were difficulties: PM Fock had 
informed without giving any reason PM Kallevi Sorsa already 
in 1974 that there would be no new friendship towns from 
Hungary. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio considered all this con-
fusing but it was probably not something directed against 
Finland, rather it was a consequence of the separation of the 
ideological worlds; ‘… even though there are so many warm 
friends of Finland in Hungary, Finland still represents the 
world against which an ideological battle is fought’. There had 
been clear limits for Hungarian-Finnish contacts although 
Jyrkänkallio admitted that it was possible to do much more 
even within these boundaries. It was mainly a question of 
resources and personnel. 
Cultural relations had anyhow been stabilized but there was 
still ground for widening and improving them. The problem 
was that the Hungarian ‘free cultural life’ could not be 
separated from the society and party. According to 
Jyrkänkallio, free cultural exchange in a socialist system simply 
was not possible. A centralized government kept control. 
However, Jyrkänkallio criticized also the Finnish policy and 
dared to write that contrary to official courtesies in Presidential 
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speeches, citizens of the two nations actually knew only little of 
each other. As he put it: ‘The image of Finland is quite dim to 
the Hungarians, even to the educated ones’. This was due to the 
fact that the Finns still concentrated on exhibiting the 
traditional culture, although the urban public of Budapest 
might be more interested in more contemporary themes which 
would have changed the image of the old-fashioned Finland. 
Hungary always exhibited the modern Hungary and ‘its 
achievements’. To quote Jyrkänkallio: 92  
The achievements of the semi-unknown kindred people, for exam-
ple, the modern schools and library buildings or the masterpieces 
of the great Finnish Jugend-period or the exhibition of the excel-
lently organized Finnish health care, would improve the image of a 
poorly developed country and nation which Hungary still seems to 
have of the Finns. The image has hardly been improved by films of 
the dreary life of a smallholder wife or the lethal bullets etc., which 
were offered to the public of Budapest during the culture week in 
May 1973. A large flock of the audience made their exit midway 
from these occasions of Finnish exhibitionism.  
In other words, the cultural differences between the urban 
Hungary and the ‘natural’ Finland as well as the concepts of 
civil society activity and organizing collided. Jyrkänkallio’s 
wish to modernize the Finnish image is a sort of equivalent to 
the emphasis on modernity in political speeches. Since it 
seemed important to the Hungarians to exhibit the modern 
Hungary of Kádár, Finland should follow the example. It seems 
that Jyrkänkallio’s recommendations indeed did affect the later 
Finnish policy in cultural relations. 
Despite practical difficulties, even the Finns estimated that the 
Hungarian-Finnish relations were unproblematic. The survey of the 
Finnish Embassy considered that the crucial year had been 1959 
when the cultural agreement had been renewed. In those days 
Hungary had been in difficulties and isolated. The Finnish action 
had been ‘exceptional and demonstrative’ since Finland had 
concluded very few cultural treaties, until 1959 none. After 1959, 
Hungary had begun to establish ties with the rest of the world, and 
Kekkonen’s unofficial visit in 1963 helped the process considerably. 
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Now that the relations between it and Finland were good, it 
was difficult to remember the problematic days. Finland and 
Austria were mentioned after the socialist countries ‘always first 
and in a cordial tone’. The socialist countries measured their 
political relations with high-level visits and agreements, and seen 
even in this light Finland was a country that had drawn the 
attention of Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s. Kekkonen’s state 
visit had been – according to the Embassy which hardly could 
belittle the event – ‘exceptionally festive and visible’. Also the 
Finnish Ministers put Budapest first in their visit lists, a fact the 
Finnish newspapers did not fail to notice. Exchange of visits had 
been extensive and several invitations were still valid. The net of 
treaties and agreements between the countries was extensive and 
created possibilities for wide co-operation. In addition to the 
Finnish Communist Party, also the Social Democratic Party, led by 
Sorsa, had contacts with the HSWP. 
Jyrkänkallio acknowledged the difficulties in trade and 
explained them by the fact that as industrialized countries 
Finland and Hungary were unknown to each other. Both had 
traditional import countries of their own, especially the FRG, 
and the neighbouring countries were the most important 
trading partners. The geographical factors also had created 
prejudices and practical obstacles on both sides. Normal trade 
would not take things much further, and consequently the 
countries should look for possibilities in scientific and 
industrial co-operation. However, Jyrkänkallio was not very 
optimistic about that either. It had been extremely difficult to 
reach agreements. In this sector, Finland was not the first option 
for Hungary; not only Germans and Austrians, but also the 
Swedes and the Swiss outdid the Finns.93 
The deciding factors had not changed. As the embassy 
estimated, the definition which FM Puja had given in the 30th 
anniversary of the liberation of Hungary on Hungarian foreign 
policy, was still valid. Hungary stood by the Soviet Union in 
foreign policy. Its goal was to create favourable circumstances to 
build Socialism, unity of the socialist countries and solidarity with 
those people who were advancing the same goals in capitalist 
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countries. Furthermore, Hungary wanted to support the 
developing countries and the national liberation movements, and 
to advance peaceful co-existence between countries with different 
social systems. In the last context, Finland, Austria and lately also 
Italy were the first ones to be mentioned. In relations with the non-
socialist countries, commercial interests were the essential ones. 
Hungary’s line towards the EEC and the EFTA was decided by 
the Soviet Union, and also the policy towards the CSCE was 
identical with the other socialist countries. It was even possible 
that Hungary had been given a mission to be active in this, 
because it enjoyed a better reputation in the West than some other 
socialist countries. There were also reasons connected with foreign 
trade for this activism.94  
As far as the Hungarian domestic scene was concerned, 
Jyrkänkallio maintained that the situation was stable, as it had 
been moulded after 1956. The Hungarian rhetoric had treated 
Kekkonen as the supporting pillar of the relations and also of 
Finland, and likewise the Finns saw Kádár as the man behind 
the developments in Hungary. The stability was seen as 
Kádár’s, ‘the great stateman’s’, and the people’s merit. Accor-
ding to Jyrkänkallio, the Hungarians had ‘wisely’ decided to 
tolerate even dissidents in certain limits, even though a 
common belief in Socialism of the whole people was the goal. 
The question of ideology created some breaches in the society. 
Jyrkänkallio recalled that there were many signs in Hungary 
which indicated that there was some sort of disciplinary action 
going on in order to make the people immune to Western 
influence. Even in culture ideology was now emphasized. How-
ever, it was hard for the outsider to see beneath the surface of 
the lively cultural life. The most visible problems in the society 
concerned the differences between interest groups. An outside 
observer could detect increasing differences in wealth, although 
Jyrkänkallio considered that they meant only normal conflicts 
in a stable society.95 
The overall picture of the mutual relations and the 
Hungarian society were thus favourably evaluated by Finnish 
diplomacy. To a keen eye, the image of the relations was more 
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than understanding: it meant that two different cultures were 
adapting to each other.  
 
10 Discussing the Relations and the Policy Line 
To explain neutrality and to explain kádárism are parallel: it 
was just these topics that Kekkonen and Kádár wanted to clari-
fy. In spite of ‘windy’ domestic policy and conflicts, Kekkonen 
defined the Finnish policy as if consensus had prevailed in 
Finnish foreign policy: it had risen above domestic conflicts in 
the beginning of the 1960s. Kekkonen suggested that Finland 
and Hungary should co-operate in Belgrade, because ‘our 
interests are strikingly similar’. Kekkonen wanted to see the 
guidelines of the Finnish foreign policy in international context: 
the definition of Finnish policy was not the main question but 
the fact that Finland aimed at having friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union and every other country. To quote Kekkonen: 96  
By pursuing the policy of neutrality and by defining our own policy 
as a policy of neutrality we can create a lot of contacts in various direc-
tions as bridge-builders, and also the CSCE is based on such activity. 
The content of foreign policy was not endangered and will not 
change, be the title of it what it may. Our position demands that we 
have mutual confidence with the Soviet Union which is very impor-
tant to the will to act for world peace I just mentioned.  
While Kekkonen was explaining Finnish foreign policy 
Kádár concentrated more on Hungarian domestic conditions. 
On foreign policy he gave very much the same picture 
Jyrkänkallio had given; on domestic policy he naturally had to 
play down the problems and present the Hungarian model as a 
success. According to Kádár, Hungary was a non-homogenous 
state in which a single party held the power but also other 
voices were tolerated and there existed different classes, albeit 
not capitalists. The main principle in domestic policy was to 
follow common policy between various classes, the religious 
circles included. The main program was to build a socialist 
society and to develop socialist democratic direction so that still 
wider masses would participate in the decision-making. 
Referring to the year 1956 he expressed the hope that the Finns 
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would trust that there was at present a socially balanced 
situation in Hungary.  
Kádár also dealt with travel and tourism in the political 
context reminding that after 1956 the West had boycotted 
Hungary. However, Hungary had started to pursue a more 
open policy in travel, and tourism had indeed increased. ‘In 
view of Hungary’s relations with the West’, Kádár remarked, 
‘this policy has proved to be the right one’. He admitted that 
travel had been economically beneficial. Also the Western 
attitude towards Hungary had changed. 
It is evident that the year 1956 was reflected in the way Kádár 
presented the Hungarian conditions and political line; he wanted 
to explain the Western image on Hungary, still influenced by the 
uprising. He also reminded Kekkonen that the Hungarian 
leadership takes care of the people who had suffered and did not 
want them suffer still more – and the people appreciated and 
supported this. According to Kádár in November 1976, the 
Hungarian policy was based on the principle that ‘you will not 
give cause for joy to the enemy and you will not let friends down’. 
Kádár commented also on the international reputation of Finland 
and stated that, ‘as everyone knew’, Finland was a neutral country 
but Hungary belonged to the Warsaw Pact and was a People’s 
Republic. Hungary aimed at having beneficial relations with the 
Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the Third World 
countries, but also with the Western countries. The relations with 
Austria had improved, and there were good trade relations with 
West Germany. According to the consolidated rhetoric, Kádár 
praised the Hungarian-Finnish relations and Kekkonen’s role in 
the CSCE and repeated the Hungarian line of how the relations 
were to be continued by high-level meetings. As always, he also 
advocated the state-controlled direct contacts between enterprises 
and assured that the foreign companies had good possibilities to 
function independently in Hungary. This – although controlled 
and encouraged by the state – was largely in congruence with the 
Finnish aspirations.97 The emphases of Kádár and Kekkonen were 
not naturally quite identical, but understanding was reached by 
letting both parties interpret the idea in their own way. 
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The same formula to reach understanding can also be found 
in the talks on neutrality which were stressed in the communiqué 
negotiations. The communiqué is especially noted for its being 
the official public image of the 1976 meeting – at the very least 
to the historian it is the best documented part of the visit. These 
talks are also the most notable proof that politics defined the 
image of the relations more strongly than the idea of kinship. 
Kádár demanded that the communiqué should be formulated in 
a way that ‘even an outsider would […] get the idea that there 
are extensive relations between our countries’.98  
The preparatory negotiations for the visit proved to be quite 
difficult. When a Hungarian delegation of preparing officials 
visited Finland in 27th – 30th October, 1976, it could be seen that 
the drafts contained same elements but their order and some 
details differed from each other. Hungary, for example, wanted 
to describe the cultural relations much more widely.99 But the 
most difficult part was to find a suitable definition to Finnish 
foreign policy since the Hungarians would have liked to define 
the foreign policy of both countries in a later passage of the 
communiqué than Finland. Seen from the Finnish viewpoint this 
suggestion was ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘misleading’. Furthermore, 
the Hungarians suggested that the Finnish line should be 
connected with the CSCE. The Finnish Foreign Ministry, 
however, interpreted that this would give an erroneous picture 
of the basic Finnish attitude. 
The Finns assumed that the Hungarians aimed at a ‘political 
action’ in order to avoid a situation in which the Finnish policy 
of neutrality would be emphasized in the joint communiqué. The 
Finns, on the other hand, wanted to stress peaceful coexistence 
and the CSCE as such. Besides, the negotiations revealed basic 
differences in political culture, especially in concepts of state 
control. The Finns felt no need to include detailed chapters on 
various forms of co-operation in the communiqué; this should, 
after all, be mainly a high-level communication. Difference of 
concepts can also be seen in the fact that Kádár had also put 
travel in a political context and connected it with the goals of 
the Hungarian state. The Finns, however, did not regard travel 
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as belonging to immediate state control. Thus it did not require 
a specific chapter in the communiqué either.100  
The first Finnish suggestion emphasized the image of neutrality 
and aimed at getting Hungarian recognition of it. Finland also 
expressed its support for ‘Hungary’s successful policy of peace’. 
The relations between Finland and Hungary were a concrete 
example of peaceful co-existence between two countries with 
different social systems. The Final Act of the CSCE formed the 
basis for the relations and for other international activity. The 
Hungarian suggestion, for its part, defined both countries as 
pursuing international peace and security. They would 
influence together the détente. The references to the Conference 
and to the peaceful co-existence were mainly the same as in the 
Finnish suggestion.101 
Nevertheless, in the communiqué it was pointed out with 
satisfaction that ‘the traditionally good, friendly relations and 
the multilateral co-operation between Finland and Hungary 
were developing in all fields and equally served the interests of 
two countries and peoples as well as the cause of international 
peace and security. The parties reaffirmed that they both would 
develop their bilateral relations and international activities in 
full accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of CSCE in 
Europe.’ In this context it was deemed appropriate to refer to 
the ideal of peaceful co-existence. The relations between the two 
states were a good example for peaceful coexistence of states 
with different social systems. In the context of the CSCE Kádár 
and Losonczi ‘appreciated the peace-loving, active policy of 
neutrality of Finland as well as the valuable contribution of the 
government of Finland and President Kekkonen personally to 
the stabilization of international peace and détente and to the 
cause of security and co-operation in Europe’. It was pointedly 
added that: ‘President Kekkonen has expressed his high esteem 
towards the effective peace policy of Hungary.’102 
Thus the political publicity was sent a message of how the 
parties had given their approval to each other’s policies: policy 
of peace was the link – although more loosely in the 
communiqué than in the speeches.  
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11 Speeches and Public Statements of Up-To-Date 
The same problems and differences as in the communiqué 
negotiations and the talks can be found also in the speeches 
given during the visit. Mainly: What did Finnish neutrality 
imply? In what context should it be expressed and whose 
interests did it represent?  
In the speeches of Kekkonen and Kádár tradition and the 
present day were connected. According to Kekkonen’s and Kádár’s 
rhetoric, the tradition was not only a story, it was genuine reality 
and it had created the basis for modern friendship. Especially the 
draft of Kekkonen’s speech linked Kekkonen’s personality strongly 
to Hungarian-Finnish relations: he had been to Hungary already as 
a young student and visited the country already as a head of the 
state. His relations with Hungary thus had historical perspective 
which obviously increased the value of the relations. Not only tradi-
tion but also modern Hungary was central; Kekkonen had arrived 
to see progress in Hungary – which was actually the same rhetoric 
as in 1969. Thus he had not become solely one to live up his me-
mories – the present day was more important. But simultaneously 
he paid homage to the tradition of the visits and to their role in 
cultivating the relations between the two countries. The modern 
tradition of the new relations proved the stability of the relations. 
Even this could be expressed positively as a part of modernity and 
the liveliness and versatility of the relations. Kekkonen expressed 
his appreciation towards the progress and building process in the 
Hungary of Kádár – his approval of Kádár’s policy. 
It might have been on the Embassy’s advice that Kekkonen’s 
supper speech was drafted so that one should distance oneself 
from the old, ‘wrong’ Finland-image painted by folklore-
clichés. The friendship was presented as ‘more correct’ and 
more up-to-date than the old images; both parties wanted to 
leave the romantic and ethnological ‘shepherd in the folk 
costume’ -image behind and replace it with an image of an 
interesting modern partner. The Hungarian-Finnish friendship 
was supposed to be unique in the world, and this lay the 
foundation for the relations. The speech did not make an issue 
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of the problems in trade either; these did not harm the complete 
image of friendship. According to the speech, there were 
economical, political and educational reasons for paying special 
attention to the ‘multilateral and balanced’ development of the 
co-operation. Part of the message was that the Hungarian and 
Finnish peoples had given their support to the chosen policy 
and to the Hungarian-Finnish relations; thus the civil society 
level was connected to the interests of the state leadership – as a 
sort of Finnish counterpart of the role the Hungarians had 
wanted for the government. The micro and macro levels were 
thus intertwined. In this context, Finland and Hungary actively 
took part in international life and the co-operation between 
nations. This could not be done without bilateral relations; the 
countries could not live isolated, they could live only relation to 
the others. This meant that Finland and Hungary were a part of 
the international politics and active agents within it.103 
Kádár’s speech emphasized broad political lines and espe-
cially the CSCE; these were issues on which Finland and 
Hungary agreed. The fact that he also stressed the importance 
of Kekkonen’s visit and state visits as such was also in congru-
ence with the traditional Hungarian line. According to Kádár, 
Hungary followed the policy of peaceful co-existence; the 
supporters of peace aimed at defeating the obstacles built by re-
actionary forces. Kádár once again placed Finland in the camp 
of the pro-peace nations: Finnish peace-loving foreign policy 
had proven its vitality. Kádár thus wanted to point out the 
similar interests and mutual understanding; he placed both 
countries in the peace-loving camp, but of course, this could be 
understood in many ways. However, in this sense Finland was 
a ‘brother nation’ (veljeskansa).104  
It is evident that Hungary wanted broad and open publicity. 
The newspaper propaganda was restrained, but one could not 
avoid the message that Finland and Kekkonen were very much 
appreciated. The Hungarian newspapers had a task: they had to 
highlight the importance of the visit and write about Finland, 
Finnish foreign policy and Kekkonen. Similarly, the Hungarian 
television was to run a joint Hungarian-Finnish film ‘Suomi’.105 
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President Kekkonen was also interviewed on Hungarian tele-
vision before the visit.106 
The Finnish publicity continued with the thematic of friendship 
by repeating that the relations were unproblematic. Hungary was 
presented as a socialist country which permitted also the Western 
culture to have living space: cultural life was controlled from above 
but in fact both countries were small countries with rare languages 
and thus had troubles with balancing domestic and external 
culture. The Finnish press cited the statements of FM Puja who had 
also maintained that the common policy line with other socialist 
countries did not limit Hungary’s possibilities; on the contrary, it 
offered more of them.107 Following Kekkonen’s speech the Helsingin 
Sanomat actually transmitted the same image as the state leadership: 
two small countries operating in the international field, since even a 
small country could not live in isolation.108 FM Keijo Korhonen 
offered basically the identical view in the Hungarian Népszabadság 
in addition to which he also gave a bright picture of the future of 
the economical relations, the promotion of which needed a political 
decision. Relations relying on old traditions were good and they 
were not to be forgotten in the future either.109  
Thus the public image in the media followed flawlessly the 
official political discourse. The difference in emphasis between 
the countries was that Hungary stressed the economic relations, 
Finland getting to know the modern features of the ‘friend’. 
Thus the argumentations reflected those of each other. The 
Finnish Ambassador’s view that the image of Finland in 
Hungary was too old-fashioned had also made its way to the 
official discourse and to the media. One could say that the 
mission of the visit had been to ‘update’ the friendship, and this 
was the also dominant trend later in the 1970s. 
 
12 New Aspects in Hungarian Foreign Policy – Lázár in Finland 
Significant interpretations of Finnish foreign policy and of 
Hungarian policy towards Finland were received as the new 
Finnish Ambassador in Budapest, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen, was 
invited to have a discussion with Kádár. 
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It was not Kádár’s habit to receive diplomats from non-socialist 
countries on other occasions than during the state visits. The 
Ambassador interpreted this special treatment to be a recognition of 
the special status Finland had in Hungary’s policy. As such nothing 
essentially new seems to have been said in the discussion: the 
arguments were based rather on present-day politics, not on the 
tradition of kinship. According to Kádár, the relations were of 
special nature, the development of which had largely been decided 
by Finland’s foreign policy and its ‘basic line, increasing security 
and co-operation in Europe’. Naturally Kádár confessed that being 
linguistic relatives helped but at the end of the day it was of 
secondary importance. It was Kekkonen’s personal contribution 
which had been essential in building the relations.  
If there was any new substance in Kádár’s statements, it was 
the fact that he remarked how Hungary’s policy did not consist 
only of loyalty towards the Soviet Union. According to him, 
Hungary took care of its own foreign political and economical 
interests while taking the Soviet co-operation into account. Kádár 
praised the Finnish foreign policy: Finland had achieved ‘a far 
more important status than the size and specific country of 
Finland would have merited’. He pointed out that neutral 
Finland would have a chance to do services to ‘strengthening 
peace and security’ also in the future.110 Behind this rhetoric one 
can see the political motives of Hungary concerning Finland: co-
operation within the CSCE was probably the foremost as a goal. 
The Hungarian PM György Lázár had made similar references 
earlier the same year (15 – 17 June 1977). The Hungarians had 
wished to have talks on general international questions, the 
preparations for the Belgrade Conference and economic relations. 
They also looked towards having an opportunity to meet 
representatives of Finnish trade and industry.111 Ambassador 
Jyrkänkallio had interpreted that replacing Fock with the 
‘economist’ Lázár was a sign that economic questions were 
essential to Hungary and that the direction of policy was becoming 
more orthodox marxist – there were also other indications of this 
trend.112 On the other hand, the embassy pointed out that Lázár 
was said to enjoy a good name in the West.113  
POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP 
 243
The notion that there were also independent and specific 
features in Hungarian foreign policy which differed from the 
general policy socialist bloc was new for the Finns. Especially 
activity and initiatives concerning the CSCE were new; Hungary 
had, for example, made initiatives to the Western CSCE-countries 
for co-operation in order to carry out the Final Act at a bilateral 
level. According to the Hungarian view, a peaceful Europe would 
be built together with the progressive elements of Western Europe 
at the Belgrade meeting. Yrjö-Koskinen estimated that even though 
the Soviet Union had naturally approved of the Hungarian 
initiative, first and foremost it served the Hungarian national 
interests. The interpretations and emphasis of the Final Act were 
typical and used as political means, for example, in trade disputes. 
The new direction was due to the détente which had given 
Hungary as well as the other socialist countries a good opportunity 
to pursue its own and the bloc interests. Ambitious goal to develop 
the country and economic contacts with the West were possible to 
achieve only in the atmosphere of international détente. So the 
Hungarians wanted the Belgrade Conference to be constructive. 
The Finnish Embassy also thought that Hungary was better off in 
human rights issues than most socialist countries and had thus 
better chances to influence the Western countries in Belgrade. 
The survey was largely based on an article by FM Puja, 
published in the review Külpolitika in April 1977. Puja had 
argued the Hungarian foreign policy line partly in keeping with 
national traditions and historical ties, as was the case in the 
relations with Austria, the Western social democrats and the 
German labour movement – but he had not mentioned Finland 
in this context. Nevertheless, the embassy still had it that 
Austria and Finland were always the first ones to be mentioned 
after the non-socialist countries. With these countries Hungary 
had ‘really good relations without problems due to reasons 
easy to understand’. An essential factor in the relations with 
non-socialist countries was the commercial interests.114  
The Hungarian line concerning the CSCE and Finland 
became more concrete when Puja visited Finland in June 1976 
and suggested that the decisions of the Final Act would be 
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carried out in bilateral Hungarian-Finnish relations.115 The issue 
was also dealt with in official negotiations in October 1976 
before Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary. Finland had given a 
written answer to Budapest in November in which it had not 
been against the idea in principle but was of the opinion that 
neither new institutions nor new channels were needed; the 
existing ones were sufficient. Furthermore, some of the 
Hungarian suggestions needed to be clarified. The Foreign 
Ministry emphasized that Hungary had made similar 
suggestions to various other Western countries and that none of 
them, perhaps suspecting that Hungary had tactical motives, 
had been more positive than Finland. Most of them had not 
given an answer at all. So the Finnish attitude can be 
characterized as relatively careful. The Political Department of 
the Foreign Ministry suggested that if the question of 
developing the relations on the basis of the CSCE came up and 
if the Hungarian suggestions emerged again, Finland could say 
that the development had been positive in many different levels 
since the signing of the CSCE Final Act, and these achievements 
were compatible with the co-operation and the resources of the 
countries.116 This answer was at its best evasive. 
 
13 Common Policy Line? 
The image which the Embassies painted of the history of the 
relations remained largely unchanged; traditional scientific 
relations and the Kekkonen visit of 1963 were the most 
important milestones. A new feature was that during Lázár’s 
visit the relations of the Finnish political parties to Hungary 
had come to the forefront. The economic relations were 
troublesome as ever because of a lack of traditions, 
geographical distance and inability to reform. Cultural relations 
were without problems but the Ambassadors were still worried 
about the old fashioned image of Finland; the problem was how 
to offer the ‘right’ one to the urban Hungarians. The planned 
exhibitions of Timo Sarpaneva and Marimekko in Budapest were 
seen as a step in the right direction.117 
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Even during Lázár’s visit the Hungarians tried to attach a more 
‘political’ meaning to the concept of friendship through the 
arguments of co-existence, peace and détente. Lázár placed 
Finland in his toasting speech on the same side as Hungary in 
international questions – ‘the side of peace’. Policy which had 
achieved ‘the positive support of both the Hungarian and Finnish 
societies’ served the national interest of both countries and 
advanced the causes of friendship between nations and détente. 
The embassy’s draft for the Prime Minister’s speech, on the other 
hand, made a point of the different levels of friendships and visits 
and the cultural agreements and relations which were presented 
as internationally significant. And when Hungary emphasized 
trade policy, the Finns pondered how export might be promoted. 
Even the international aspect was milder in PM Sorsa’s speech: the 
fact that Finland and Hungary were together in the international 
politics was put in the context of exchange of information.118 So yet 
again the Hungarians wanted to ‘politicize’ the rhetoric whereas 
the Finns played down this tune as much as possible – without 
changing the essentials of the liturgy. 
The Finnish Embassy noted Hungarian aspirations also in 
the fact that the Hungarian press regarded the Lázár visit as a 
‘top meeting’ in the same way Kádár’s visit to Rumania and 
meeting with Ceausescu were rated. The newspaper Magyar 
Hírlap titled its article ‘Relations without shadows’ and 
considered them both official and human: they were 
multilateral relations, relations between good friends, and in 
keeping with the Helsinki Final Act. This time also the 
linguistic kinship was presented as a cause. Mostly, however, 
the Hungarian media emphasized strongly the economic 
aspects of Lázár’s visit. Finland was presented as depending on 
foreign trade, and it was maintained that co-operation with 
socialist countries had been beneficial to Finland. 
The organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 
Népszabadság, interpreted that the Hungarian-Finnish relations 
were even deeper than what was recommended in the CSCE Final 
Act – a definition of the relations which the Hungarians had 
usually used to describe the relations between socialist countries. 
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It seems that ‘friendship’ was now used to verbally incorporate 
Finland in the same camp as Hungary and make it an example of 
co-existence. According to Népszabadság, the Hungarian-Finnish 
relations were based on ‘sincere interest and political realism 
trying to find possibilities to deepen the relations to mutual 
benefit, while the Hungarian government and the Finnish 
leadership were carrying out the peaceful active policy of 
neutrality’. The question of the image of Finnish neutrality came 
to the forefront when the Finnish Embassy mentioned that 
Western diplomats had noticed how there was no mention of the 
Finnish neutrality in the Hungarian-Finnish communiqué.119 It is 
worth speculating whether the interpretation of Finnish policy 
became more ‘orthodox’ at the same time when Hungary was 
assuring to the West how it had become more open.  
As the end of the 1970s was approaching the key elements of 
the Finnish role in Hungarian foreign policy had thus become 
clearer. They can also be found in Kádár’s speech in the plenum of 
the Central Committee of the HSWP in April 1978. Kádár stated 
that Hungary had intensified its relations also with its most 
important trading partner, FRG as well as with Austria, Finland, 
Italy, France and ‘many other capitalist countries’. Hungary was 
maintaining good relations with capitalist countries, although 
some people were doubting and fearing that this would only 
bring ‘inflation and the negative effects of the crisis of capitalism’. 
However, active policy in this direction was necessary for 
Hungary because of economical reasons. The goal of the policy 
was peaceful co-existence between states with different social 
systems. It was the only alternative to a world war, and to carry 
out this policy economical, cultural and social connections and 
visits were needed. Peaceful co-existence between socialist and 
capitalist countries could not consist only of formal meetings and 
statements. It meant also negotiations on questions of 
international policy and efforts to understanding. In addition to 
this, it meant extensive economical relations. According to Kádár’s 
rhetoric, there would not be a war between states which had 
beneficial mutual economic ties.120  
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To sum up: the Hungarians connected Finland with an 
interpretation which suited their own needs. Both in bilateral talks 
and in wider contexts Finland was regarded as a political friend. 
This friendship was obviously linked to the international politics 
in terms of co-existence, and it was supposed that economic 
advantages could be achieved by this policy. It can perhaps be 
said that in the Finnish case these economical benefits remained 
lacking but it was possible to express the idea of political 
friendship relatively freely. 
One example of the special status of Finland and, above all, of 
making politics with the visits, was also the Hungarian idea of 
Kekkonen’s ‘holiday’ in Hungary in 1978. Kádár and Losonczi 
invited Kekkonen to a holiday and recreation trip to mark the 50th 
anniversary of Kekkonen’s first trip to Hungary.121 The Protocol 
Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not consider the 
idea very realistic. There were already enough travelling to 
Hungary at various levels – they had to be rather restricted, 
especially as Hungary seemed to be so keen on them.122  
 
14 Conclusion 
In the 1960s the tradition of cultural co-operation and the tradition 
of cherishing the idea of kinship was linked to the Finnish satellite 
policy towards Hungary. The concept of kinship was un-
doubtedly a way to establish Hungarian-Finnish relations. There 
was, however, a trend to modernise the concept of kinship in 
order to strengthen its value. This myth offered common dis-
course and it was a way to assure the structure of good relations at 
the time when the relations were reopened. As Kekkonen put it, 
these relations were meant to be primarily unofficial: academic 
contacts, cultural co-operation and increasing tourism.  
Kinship activities offered a basis not only for popular, 
unofficial contacts between the Finns and Hungarians but for 
the political rhetoric as well. The only limitation on the use of 
the old tradition was, according to Korhonen, that the players 
of the game knew the rules of it. In other words, the rhetoric of 
tradition was to be used in the context of the limitations of the 
international policy.123 Accordingly, the efforts to establish 
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unofficial contacts founded on the idea of kinship could be 
articulated as arguments in political relations. The liturgy of the 
first visits in 1960s reflected this policy. In addition, the 
concepts of a small nation and progress were used in the 
political liturgy, too. Similarly, just as with the concept of 
kinship, these arguments referred to the ties between the two 
countries. The role of science, both in terms of the kinship 
aspect and technical-scientific co-operation was essential. In 
conclusion, in the 1960s two ideas of brotherhood were 
developed: the traditional and the modern one.  
In the 1970s, the key concepts of the image of the Hungarian-
Finnish relations were the versatility of the relations, friendship, 
understanding and modernity. When the relations were stabili-
zing, the central idea was simply to develop them. The definition 
János Péter had given of the basis of the Hungarian-Finnish rela-
tions in 1964 – not only a romantic, ethnographic kinship, but also 
accomplishments in the fields of economy and education124 – can 
be seen as the constant feature in the development of the state-
level relations from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s. 
For Finland, relations with Hungary were – in terms of state 
level politics – an integral part of Finnish policy towards the 
satellite countries, even though a special one, because the civil 
society activity and tradition were exceptional. The Hungarian 
direction was sometimes even a bit crowded with visits. In the 
1970s the visits of the heads of state received no such criticism in 
Finland as it had in the 1960s and they were not seen as 
demonstrations: the Hungary of Kádár had consolidated its place 
as a part of the foreign relations of Finland, and both the Foreign 
Ministry and the public had a positive attitude towards Hungary. 
The visits as such were no longer an ‘issue’ for Finland, only a 
way to conduct relations. For Hungary, on the other hand, they 
were a way to measure and develop the relations with non-
socialist countries. The trend of the Hungarian political culture 
was to take care of the bilateral relations with visits and treaties.  
The economic relations were very central in the Finnish rela-
tions with the socialist bloc in the 1970s because they were usually 
the most troublesome aspect of the relations. The Finns inter-
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preted that the Hungarian motives in Finland concerned trade 
policy which served the needs of domestic policy. For Hungary, 
the correct state level relations with Finland were important in or-
der to create and develop technical-scientific contacts with the 
West. The Hungarian focus on economy, trade and the CSCE as a 
theme already began in the 1960s but was lifted even to a higher 
plane during the visits of the 1970s. Even though the trade did not 
develop as was hoped, the relations were maintained well in all 
contexts: it was a friendship with a tradition, and the Finns argued 
that it was born among the ‘people’ because of the idea of kinship. 
Finland was a part of Hungary’s international Western rela-
tions concerning both the economy and the CSCE. It is clear that 
Finland was not the only window to the West. Seen from the 
Hungarian point of view, it was marginal compared to Austria. 
However, Finland was more ready than the other Western 
countries to conclude agreements and make joint communiqués 
which were important tools for Hungarian foreign policy. The 
Finnish foreign policy of good relations with the Soviet Union 
made it an easy partner, and since it was geographically far away, 
it was also ‘safer’ than Austria, for example, in the question of the 
freedom of the visa. On the other hand, the geographical distance 
was naturally also a drawback when one tried to add trade or 
other substance to the relations and fight the old clichés which the 
Hungarian people attached to Finland. 
The concept of kinship was in time succeeded by the concept of 
friendship in the political argument. Friendship was contextual-
lized to modern times and politics, not only to tradition, language 
and culture. The Finns used more often the traditional definitions 
which rose from kinship and friendship than the Hungarians. This 
tradition was the sound basis, and the early relations between the 
countries were seen in the work of the scientists and in their 
interest towards the kinship nation. However, it was important to 
step to also modernity in cultural relations, and even more impor-
tant was that this concerned economy and trade. The aspect of 
kinship was the central argument for the close relations only in the 
beginning; after that it was duly mentioned in festive and comme-
morative speeches but the concept of friendship became more 
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important as a proof of understanding between nations and states. 
The mutual understanding in various fields could all be put under 
the umbrella of ‘friendship’. Even the economy was mentioned as 
a part of ‘understanding although, paradoxically, a bit negatively: 
both parties acknowledged the problems in this sector. It was also 
maintained that the friendship was working even despite differen-
ces of opinion and different social systems and, for example, des-
pite the disagreement about the EEC.  
The respect for the head of state also seems to have been an 
important part of the image of good relations and friendship. 
The image that was given of Kádár in Finland was undoubtedly 
positive, as was the image of Kekkonen in Hungary. As the 
Finnish press noted, Kádár was received as a head of state 
although he actually was the Party First Secretary. It is also 
clear that personal opinions about Kádár influenced the 
opinions on conditions in Hungary.125 In the discourse of the 
visits, the central role of the party in the Hungarian society and 
politics faded, and even though the Hungarian leadership 
openly declared its allegiance towards the Soviet Union, it also 
managed to emphasize its own line and freedom of action 
Hungary enjoyed. Likewise, respect for Kekkonen as a person 
was a part of Hungarian policy towards Finland and evidently 
also a way to demonstrate the good relations. The organ of the 
party, Népszabadság published in 11 September 1975 an article 
by Péter Dunai, called ‘The Road of the Finnish Foreign Policy’ 
which was a kind of book review on the selected speeches and 
articles of Urho Kekkonen translated into Hungary. Dunai 
wrote also about the visits and the mutual relations and 
explained that they and the peaceful co-existence they repre-
sented were due to Kekkonen’s policy – thus the success of the 
policy was connected to the person of the head of state. 
Naturally, also Kekkonen’s relations with the Soviet Union and 
his peace policy were emphasized.126 Actually it can be maintai-
ned that the personal interests of Kekkonen concerning Hun-
gary had been more visible and important when the relations 
and the images had been established in the 1960s rather than 
during the time of consolidated satellite policy in the 1970s. 
POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP 
 251
In spite of all modernity it was continuously the traditional 
cultural sector and non-state-level contacts such as travel and 
friendship activities that were seen as the most useful and most 
developed part of the relations. It seemed that Kekkonen’s urge 
for the scholars of ‘national sciences’ he had expressed in 1964 
had reached its aim. However, even here there were problems 
when the images were to be modernized and the old kinship 
images to be set aside. Modernity was connected to culture as 
well, such as to economy. Two cultures and societies met each 
other in the Hungarian-Finnish relations: for example the urban 
Budapest and the rules of the socialist society met the Finnish 
nature and civil society. 
Friendship was also political friendship – especially from the 
Hungarian perspective. The idea that the countries had the same 
role in the international arena belonged to the discourse of the visits 
as well. The countries expressed their acceptance and appreciation 
for each other’s foreign policy, although in practise they linked this 
acceptance to their own political framework. For Finland, the 
question of neutrality was essential; for Hungary, it was the social 
progress, Kádárism. These had to be explained to the other party 
during the visits. There were also comparisons with relations bet-
ween Austria and Hungary.127 The dilemma of neutrality can also 
be seen in the way the Finnish Embassy paid attention to others: 
how did the other neutral countries see Finnish neutrality?128  
In the 1970s, the relations between the Finland of Kekkonen 
and the Hungary of Kádár were politically unproblematic. It 
was also usual to note the understanding in international 
questions. In the CSCE questions Hungary was especially keen 
on seeking understanding with Finland; it was stated that the 
countries had the same position in the international field. The 
Hungarian-Finnish friendship, based on the idea of kinship and 
political understanding, was given as an example which served 
the whole international community well– both in the sense of 
peaceful co-existence and in the sense of exemplary cultural 
relations. The image of two countries in the international field 
can thus be seen as a continuing trend from the opening of the 
relations until their consolidation phase. 
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1 Introduction 
The scientific relations of small capitalist and socialist countries 
during the Cold War era are largely a neglected area of study. 
Either it is deemed quite insignificant in comparison to wider 
issues of transfer of technology and know-how between greater 
countries or it has simply been overlooked as a peripheral sub-
ject. This holds true also of the scientific relations between 
Hungary and Finland. In spite of the fact that since the end of 
the 1960s Kádár’s regime was ready to acknowledge that al-
though the ideological warfare against the West had to be ac-
celerated, Finland was in the category of the capitalist countries 
with which extensive agreements concerning scientific co-
operation could be struck. Finland, like Sweden, was not an 
imperialist country but a capitalist one, and ‘pink’1 at that. In 
the beginning of the 1970s Finland was not regarded only as a 
highly attractive field for scientific and cultural propaganda by 
the Hungarian authorities but also a country where to send jun-
ior experts in increasing numbers to learn Western techniques 
and innovations.2 The rapprochement of Hungary and Finland 
was preconditioned by the way Finland promoted the ‘good 
                                                 
* This article is a revised version of the second chapter of the author’s study 
Co-operation across the Iron Curtain. Hungarian-Finnish Scientific Relations 
of the Academies from the 1960s to the 1990s. Studies in General History, 
vol. 12. Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2005. 
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neighborhood policy’ towards the Soviet Union. ‘Finlandiza-
tion’ could become to mean something positive for the Hun-
garians since it was – paradoxically enough – Finland, not 
Hungary that gained favours (Porkkala, the lease of the Saimaa 
Canal) and advantageous trade agreements from the Soviets. 
In the favourable foreign political situation of the early 
1970s, and as the science policy of the Academy of Finland (AF) 
was radically reformed (1970) and became impregnated by left-
ist concept of science (‘science for the people’), an opportunity 
for widening scientific co-operation opened. After lengthy ne-
gotiations a bilateral agreement between it and the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (MTA) was signed in 1976. The tradition-
ally dominant finno-ugric studies had to give room to the 
breakthrough of up-to-date natural and technical sciences 
within the framework of scientific exchange activities. In the 
following years, they received the lion-share of funding, a fact 
reflected also in the composition of the symposia of the first 
Days of Finnish Science held in Budapest in May, 1979. Under 
the pressure from social reformers the priorities of the AF were, 
however, soon to be reshuffled.3 The shift towards social sci-
ences can be read in the programme for the Days of Hungarian 
Science held in Finland (27 August – 3 September 1981); among 
others, one symposium of psychology was organized at the Jy-
väskylä University, Central Finland.  
Regarding the rise of the societal role of social sciences in 
general, it may not be amiss to reassess the significance of psy-
chology among them and as a field of Hungarian-Finnish scien-
tific co-operation and exchange. Psychologists in both countries 
were convinced that psychology was the basic study of human 
behaviour and as such of immense value for social reform. Re-
forms were based on planning and ‘social engineering’ which, 
for their part, craved for psychological data and generalizations 
to back up their projects. The subject-matter of psychology was 
more critical than, for instance, that of medicine or agricultural 
sciences in shaping the understanding of society. Since the 
same kind of social problems and deviant behavior were found 
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to be on the increase in Hungary and in Finland, it was foresee-
able that both could learn and benefit from each others’ meth-
ods and research results. The debates and arguments of the ex-
perts would also reveal some fundamental differences between 
the Finnish, more individualist approach and the Hungarian, col-
lectivist approach to psychology, and possibly lead to a point 
were touchy philosophical questions of values and norms were 
encountered. Pivotal questions in this article are: how and why 
was it possible for psychologists from two juxtaposed social and 
science systems come to terms with each other and find common 
ground for scientific discussion and joint projects? One must also 
reconstruct what results the co-operation was able to show and 
how and in what forms it was carried on after the change of the 
system in Hungary (1989). 
At the outset, one has to keep in mind how ‘psychology’ was 
understood in the West when it reached its heyday in the 1970s. 
It was not principally a study of ‘psyche’ as in psychoanalysis 
or deep-psychology but simply ‘the study of human behav-
iour’. The human being was seen as a mechanism of stimulus 
and response governed by the laws of causation. Mental proc-
esses were measured according to neurological theories rather 
than by interpretative analysis. This behavioralism also became 
quite popular in educational psychology. For a contemporary 
observer, it was possible to state that in Hungarian, ‘socialist’ 
psychology, the value of psychological devices of control and 
education of man was exaggerated and in Finland the possibili-
ties to change human environs in order to ‘improve’ behaviour 
were underestimated.4 However, the behaviouralist definition 
of psychology implied a fair dose of psychologism, meaning 
that all social problems could be reduced to the analysis of in-
dividual human behaviour. In Finland, this was softened by 
functionalism: as in sociology, conflicts in a society were inter-
preted as improving its efficiency and cohesion, also in psy-
chology the development of an individual was seen in the con-
text of contestation of prevailing values and norms. Hungarian 
psychology was not equally permissive.  
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In Marxist psychology leanings towards behaviouralism 
were overridden by more holistic approaches emanating from 
the theories of man’s social development expounded by Lev 
Vygotsky (1896–1934)5 and Anton Makarenko (1888–1939)6 
which took root in Hungary in the early 1960s. In the 1950s 
Hungarian psychology had been rather vulgarly collectivistic, 
and it was established by administrative measures. It did not 
rise through patient scientific discussion and emphasized sta-
bility at the expense of creativity. At the time Hungarian psy-
chologists had very few contacts with the West, simple Pav-
lovism with naturalist reductionism dominated. Vygotsky’s 
teaching became more known in the 1960s, and studies in psy-
chology of work, educational psychology and psychology of 
children’s development were launched. Also studies in propa-
ganda, public education, traffic, criminal, and sports psychol-
ogy became popular7, and they were already infiltrated by 
ideas from the West. However, psychology was given a pecu-
liarly collectivistic task: by studying the laws of behaviour find-
ing regularities on the basis of which authorities could optimize 
people’s adaptation to social life. Social psychology in socialism 
set out to manage people’s everyday problems.  
Marxism tended to preformulate the phenomenon under 
study and omit the phenomenon itself. Consequently, expecta-
tions concerning psychology were very high: it should have 
been able to find knowledge and means to eradicate fluctua-
tions in work-force, traffic and shop-floor accidents or quickly 
to reduce the number of neuroses, suicides and antisocial be-
haviour in general.8 Authorities suspected that building social-
ism after all breeded all sorts of crime.9 These fears reflected the 
dark side of the social reality; alcoholism, suicides, and mental 
depression were disquietingly widespread.10 Psychology was 
burdened with an enormous responsibility to heal society.  
Marxist psychology took root in Finland in the early 1970s, 
and in the reforms of teaching of psychology in the highest edu-
cational and pedagogical institutions such as Jyväskylä Univer-
sity, the new reference material included a Soviet handbook of 
SEARCHING FOR THE SOCIAL MAN  
 
 
265
psychology along with works of Halperin, Leontjev11 and others 
which had been translated into Finnish. They were being adver-
tised as ‘opening a new scientific-materialist phase in Finnish 
psychological literature’12. The leading psychological review re-
garded ‘friendly’ relations with the Soviet Union as very impor-
tant also for the development of psychology in Finland. The edi-
tor was convinced of the ‘bridge-building’ role of Finnish psy-
chologists which was to allow discussion between American and 
Soviet traditions of psychology to flow freely in Finland.13 Yet, 
the same paper occasionally took a critical stand against the 
pseudo-philosophical bias in Marxist psychology itself. It was 
argued that the ‘mentalistic’ language of Halperin and Leontjev 
remained aloof of empirical processes and the connection of psy-
che to material conditions was obscure. Behavioralism was to 
overrule such philosophizing: consciousness was to be translated 
into language which described behaviour.14 It seems that Vygot-
sky’s collectivist theories were not taken as seriously in Finland 
as his more applicable studies in schizophrenia15 which shows 
the eclectic character of Finnish psychology.  
Psychology had already experienced a revival in the early 
1960s in both ideological blocs. Hungarian psychologists would 
not refer to their domestic predecessors but to foreign sources. 
They tried to follow international trends, and in the end of the 
1960s the latest development was the institutionalization of 
educational psychology which dealt with retarded populations 
and human selection in the name of social hygiene and educa-
tional reform. At the time when political intervention still hin-
dered rivalry within science in Hungary,16 in Finland the state 
began to demand ‘socially valuable’ results from all social sci-
ences, psychology included.  
Both in Hungary and Finland it was widely expected that 
psychology would become one of the social sciences – yet an-
other efficient means of planning and control. What was com-
mon to Socialism and Capitalism in the 1960s–1970s was the be-
lief in the secular religion called ‘progress’, be it evolutionary or 
Marxist. In that they rivalled: human reason was promiscu-
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ously applied in regulating human affairs and cultural and 
natural environment. The control of populations was rational-
ized and conscious planning of social policy was to be based on 
sociological and psychological knowledge. Modern ways of 
persuasion and indoctrination were invented and further de-
veloped in party headquarters and research institutions espe-
cially for use in education and mass recruitment. Educational 
psychology developed into an effective means to create suitable 
tastes, opinions and values. These remained ideologically dif-
ferent in socialist Hungary and capitalist Finland – at times the 
Hungarians complained of the expansion of American values 
and culture in Finland. Propaganda-makers exploited modern 
mass-media. Psychologists who would not study social struc-
tures and milieu as deeply as individual behaviour became re-
dundant. In Finland canvassing and ‘policy of satisfying’ di-
rected at the consumer appealed to irrational traits of the man, 
in Hungary irrationalism was to be rooted and a ‘new, really 
social man’ was to be created. Both systems were wary of stag-
nation and in the progressive atmosphere social engineering 
was not only a matter of adjusting this or that minor problem of 
social adaptation, it had to cater for overall social development. 
In its name, in Hungary during the whole period under scru-
tiny and in the late 1960s and 1970s also in Finland17, ‘reaction-
ary’ ideologies were deemed futile in this respect.  
The ensuing co-operation between Hungarian and Finnish 
psychologists was to lead to concrete, and in the eyes of the au-
thorities, also socially applicable results. It was optimistically as-
sumed that psychology could reveal peoples’ dispositions and 
give lessons to direct their behaviour into socially acceptable 
channels. In Hungary this became a question of viability of socia-
lism, in Finland it was to be the recipe for ‘peaceful social pro-
gress and economic growth’. The role of psychology was deemed 
critical: for instance, recently detected forms of deviancy among 
adolescents, students and some marginal(ized) social groups 
were to be studied in order to make their rehabilitation possible. 
This served the more final goal to encounter the ‘threatening’ 
SEARCHING FOR THE SOCIAL MAN  
 
 
267
erosion of the moral backbone of social order in both countries.  
A sociologically oriented intellectual who described the 
grievances of society had formerly been potentially dangerous 
to the Communist Party in Hungary but in the 1970s it was 
possible to raise such issues. The tone was changed: apologies 
to ideology and covering up ‘mistakes’ in planning and their 
execution were gradually given up.18 Towards the 1980s soci-
ologists and psychologists were no longer the masters of the 
ideological warfare, and every now and then an interesting ar-
ticle or documentary was made public.19 Marxism-Leninism be-
came so flexible in definition that a variety of interpretations of 
it could live side by side. Many a well-educated communist 
could transform himself/herself from a ‘Red to an expert’.20 
Also the transfer of know-how and technologies from the West 
was emptied of ‘class-content’ in the 1970s which amounted to 
the rise of technical intelligentsia also in Hungarian society.21  
One intriguing question is how the ‘psychological mission’ 
could be jointly accomplished. Notwithstanding the apparent 
compatibility or complementarity of theories, study tasks and 
methods, the contradictory value-systems behind the two ‘psy-
chologies’ – individualist versus collectivist – could cause hiatus 
in planning joint research. In such a basic ‘science of man’ as psy-
chology was, one could expect that in principle antagonistic 
world-views of Marxism-Leninism and Liberalism – the latter 
being the pronounced principle of science in Finland – would 
cause insurmountable obstacles. Disagreement over ethical and 
epistemological aspects of study would arise. It has to be speci-
fied here how and why deep-lying philosophical problems were 
being evaded or avoided in a pragmatic manner which satisfied 
both sides. This involves further questions: was it that in the 
name of ‘neutral co-operation’ examination of premises of study 
was glossed over? Or was it that, for the sake of ‘maintenance of 
the social order’, the results of joint activities were exchanged 
and utilized happily without further ado? Although theories 
could clash, the study methods might be the same and lead to 
similarly applicable results. Or did any form of co-operation end 
ANSSI HALMESVIRTA 
 
 
268 
up in a cul-de-sac which could not be bypassed?  
Although Finns were usually more ignorant of the condition of 
psychology in Hungary than the Hungarians of the one of the 
West, both knew of the principles, development of methods and of 
some of the innovative results of psychological studies over the 
Iron Curtain. Radical students of psychology in Jyväskylä Uni-
versity naively believed in the 1970s that the ‘really social, virtuous 
man’ had already been born in socialism whereas the staff of the 
Department took a much more moderate view of the achieve-
ments of socialism.22 Idealism vanished as the drawbacks of ‘mod-
ernization’ were recognized on both sides, and reassessment was 
demanded along similar policy lines. Knowledge of modern soci-
ety and mind was expected from psychologists in both ideological 
camps, and their co-operation presupposed a ‘depoliticized’ 
agreement on what were the common problematics. 
The records of the MTA and the AF archives preserve re-
ports of Hungarian and Finnish exchange researchers telling 
their superiors about the urgency of reforms and further re-
search co-operation to investigate mental and social grievances 
and deviant behaviour. The most alarmist messages issued 
forth from the contributions of criminologists and experts of 
child and adolescent psychology. The worry of losing a whole 
generation due to immorality, anti-social behaviour and juve-
nile delinquency increased during the 1970s, and for instance, 
the conference report of the psychologists taking part in the 
Days of Hungarian Science (Jyväskylä, 1981) carried with it a 
certain mood of common, albeit hidden despair. Partly in re-
sponse, respective authorities put forward plans of ‘rescue op-
erations’, tailored to specific circumstances in Hungarian and 
Finnish societies. Official publications and correspondence of 
the MTA and the AF from the same period show a considerable 
and continuous increase of funding in social sciences, psychol-
ogy included. The ‘painful’ areas of society received more at-
tention, and research of the neglected areas of social reality was 
started. Suggestions for reforms in mental care and changes in 
criminal law were forwarded to the Ministries, and law experts 
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and officials referred to psychological investigation to back 
their proposals. 
It seems that in these programmes both the Marxist-oriented 
and the evolutionary, developmental psychology were reaching 
a point in which their credibility was challenged. They were 
now seeking support from state authorities and, to a certain ex-
tent, from each other. In Finland this led to a situation in which 
behavioralism had to give space to rivalling, systemic theories 
in which the human being was recognized as an organized, ac-
tive and goal-oriented whole.23 Under the impact of theories of 
cognition and mental development of Vygotsky Hungarian 
psychologists also leaned towards the idea that human beings 
should be studied in concrete contexts, not only in laboratory 
conditions. In this way, ‘psyche’ was making a come-back in 
psychology, and during the 1980s it was becoming a more dy-
namic faculty than it had ever been.24 
In its due course, as the coercive nature of total social plan-
ning and control became transparent, rude progressivism was 
exhausted. The uncontrollability of huge social processes – 
forced industrialization and urban development in Hungary, 
the plight of the countryside and migration waves to south and 
Sweden in Finland – was gradually understood. Corrective 
measures took their place, for instance, when such phenomena 
as unemployment, crime and booming traffic with its terrific 
accident numbers started to worry the social engineer and the 
decision-maker in both countries. In scientific and technical co-
operation between Hungary and Finland quite a few common 
problems were found and up-to-date techniques were applied 
to the advantage of both sides. Psychology tackled the psychic 
problems caused by dislocation and alienation of certain sec-
tions of the populations in the two countries resembled each 
other greatly. They could be studied by the same methods even 
though basic social values and goals remained different. The 
future of the youth and the development of its potential to so-
cialization was a one of the most pressing common concerns. 
One common consequence of the theoretical shift can be 
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found in the plans for educational reform in both countries. 
More stress was now laid on new forms of education which 
would not be as authoritarian as had been customary both in 
Hungary and Finland. It was as if it had been realized that co-
ercion was the wrong method, and a more sympathetic ap-
proach, enlightened campaigning and teaching by competition 
and example the right one. One comes across with variations 
on this theme in the records and it remains to be studied how 
social political questions were tackled in bilateral relations be-
fore the collapse of Marxist psychology in Hungary. 
At first, the impact of social psychology was felt in re-
evaluations of the state of social and political order in Hungary 
and Finland. The Hungarians were more eager than the Finns to 
draw lessons from the collaborator’s social and political life – it 
was their mission to transfer information on the workings of Fin-
nish society to Hungary. The initial assumption of the Hungari-
ans studying in Finland was that Finland was on a lower, less 
developed stage of social ‘progress’ than socialist Hungary. From 
the Hungarian vantage point ‘underdeveloped’ Finnish democ-
racy was to be compared with the ‘maturing’ Hungarian peo-
ple’s one. To Hungarian exchange researchers the ‘new Finnish 
social policy’ based on reformist social psychology of the 1970s 
somehow resembled socialist social policy, and was thus wel-
comed as a step in the ‘right’ direction. However, the outcome of 
studies pointed also to another, unexpected direction; for in-
stance, when Finnish institutions of local democracy were care-
fully studied by a few younger Hungarian political and social 
scientists in the 1970s-1980s, they were found almost exemplary. 
It must have been a shock for a young communist to realize that 
in the final analysis it was the Finnish ‘rational freedom’ that 
bore such fruits to society and economy that made Finns them-
selves mentally and physically satisfied and relatively happy, 
and Finland a stream-lined and modern industrial country, 
ahead of Hungary in many respects.25 As Finland turned out to 
be less ‘reactionary’ than Hungary, a mood of disillusion re-
sounded in the reports of Hungarian researchers.  
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Parallel astonishment can be detected in some articles of 
Hungarian historical and literary reviews of the 1970s on Fin-
nish social and scientific affairs. The realization of the fact that 
Hungarians had not been able to follow the Finns on ‘the way 
to the truth’ caused tangible anger in the authorities at home.26 
An alarming conclusion was: something was wrong with the 
socialist morality if it was losing the battle over souls to basi-
cally Lutheran, bourgeois mentality.  
It is hard to say how widely this message from Finland was 
spreading in Hungary but it certainly contradicted the image the 
official, diplomatic representatives of Hungary delivered from 
Helsinki to Budapest. The Finnish political culture of ‘excessive 
pluralism’ (too many parties, extreme Right-wing propaganda, 
remnants of fascism and chauvinism, electioneering in local and 
general elections, decentralized power structures etc.) was, in 
their view symptomatic to a chaotic system, and eventually over-
come by some form of leftist ‘Finnish Popular Front’. In contrast, 
what came to realities in Finland was, at the same time, sadly re-
alized by some experts that it was not Kádár’s Hungary but 
Kekkonen’s Finland that benefited politically and economically 
from relations with the Soviets Union.27 Under the foreign politi-
cal umbrella, it was equally painstaking for a visiting Hungarian 
scholar or scientist to gather that the Finnish economic-political 
system – science policy as a part of it – which should have been 
‘backward’ was definitely more efficient than the one of Hun-
gary. The causes for it were not found only in the usual rich 
natural resources and pragmatic foreign policy but also in the en-
terprising psycho-social build-up of the Finnish people. The 
‘Finnish dilemma’ motivated many a Hungarian social scientist 
and psychologist to apply for research grants in the 1970s and 
the 1980s to Finland. And, in answering the question ‘what did 
psychology have to do with changes in political culture?’, it may 
be tentatively argued that the results and impressions they re-
ported at home, even if not making any direct impact on the de-
cision-makers, nevertheless could mould the way scientists 
looked at Hungarian science and society more critically. 
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2 The Jyväskylä Symposium 
It was the general agreement of the Academies from the year 
1976 that regulated the official scientific relations of Hungary 
and Finland. Although its outspoken purpose was to open co-
operation in new sciences, psychology was not among them at 
the beginning. It did not feature in the agreement (1977) con-
cerning the organization of the Days of Science either. Neither 
did the programme of the first Days of Finnish Science in Bu-
dapest in 1979 include a psychology symposium. However, in 
1979 out of the MTA’s and AF’s 44 joint research projects seven 
were in social sciences, two of them being conducted in psy-
chology; 1) a project on ‘event-related potential correlates of 
psychological processes’ carried out as experimental studies in 
electro-physiology (Helsinki University), 2) examination of the 
bullying and the behaviour of victims in primary and secon-
dary schools (Turku University).28 The first purported quite 
ambitiously to establish a link between electro-physiological 
processes of the brain and the processes of the mind, and the 
second focussed on a common problem at schools in line with 
studies in deviancy. 
In the background, the floor for more extensive co-operation 
had been long prepared by Professor of Psychology and the Di-
rector of the Department of Psychology in Jyväskylä University, 
Martti Takala. During his pioneering career there (1954–88) 
psychological studies orientated towards developmental stud-
ies. The Department of Psychology was the oldest in Finland 
(est. in 1936) and developmental and educational psychology 
there had already acquired international fame, for instance, in 
family studies and in the pioneering studies in aggression by 
Professor Lea Pulkkinen. As the Department was growing fast 
in the beginning of the 1970s, the studies branched out into 
several directions such as social development and control of 
children and youth, studies in ways of life, and more specifi-
cally, studies of student attitudes (Isto Ruoppila) and social 
drifting and deviancy (Pulkkinen).29 Although psychology be-
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came a legitimate university branch of higher education of its 
own only in 1980 in Finland, research in the field had been 
conducted in Jyväskylä since the 1950s. The number of staff 
grew from eleven to seventeen from 1971 to 1981, and in 1980 it 
had got its own building on campus, the biggest of its kind in 
Finland. Facilities in Jyväskylä were excellent although the 
studies were at the beginning quite diverse, and often theoreti-
cally and methodically rather weak.30  
In times when Hungarian psychology lived through interna-
tional networks and informal cross-talk over the borders31, psy-
chology in Jyväskylä also drew the attention of the Hungarians. 
Common interests were soon found and Takala made personal 
contacts with Hungarian colleagues in international congresses 
in early 1970s, and it was he who gave them access to the De-
partment in Jyväskylä.32 These initiatives were to grow into 
quite intensive and manifaceted collaboration. One of the most 
conspicuous results was that the Hungarian and Finnish psy-
chologists were able to have a psychology symposium on youth 
education with the timely topic ‘Psychological and Pedagogical 
Aspects of Youth Education’ (from the 31st of August to the 1st 
of September) included in the first Days of Hungarian Science 
held in Finland (27th of August – 3rd of September, 1981).33 Jy-
väskylä was a provincial centre but it was honoured to be the 
venue of the symposium, the others being held in the more eas-
ily approachable capital. It was the first official scientific meet-
ing-point of Hungarian and Finnish psychologists under the 
auspices of the Academy allowing relatively free and extensive 
exchange of ideas and research results. Special impetus was 
given to its proceedings by common understanding of psychol-
ogy as a social science with distinctive value as signs of social 
disintegration were recorded in both countries. Finnish devel-
opmental and social psychologists were well aware of anti-
social tendencies and of the defiance of ‘traditional’ values and 
norms among the younger, radical generation. These were the 
areas of study from which the Hungarians were very keen to 
learn when in Finland. 
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From the Finnish side the symposium was co-ordinated by 
Professor Isto Ruoppila34 from Jyväskylä, and from the Hungar-
ian side by Dr Ferenc Pataki, the Director of the Institute for 
Psychology at the MTA since 1977. Pataki’s career was having 
an upward swing and at the end of the 1980s he belonged to 
the closest circle of György Aczél’s advisors in science policy.35 
Thanks to Aczél’s pragmatism, psychology was also to benefit 
from the reform of the Academy of the 1970s. Pataki clung to 
the Marxist-Leninist world-view, but he agreed with reform-
minded colleagues that the socialist educational philosophy in 
Hungary painted an altogether too rosy, ‘idyllic’ picture of the 
socialist society without tensions and contradictions while the 
educational institutions themselves were ‘conservative’. Sche-
matism, unquestioned stereotypes and psychological atomism 
misled not only educational psychologists but also teachers in 
the field. It was high time that education were brought to the 
level with the needs of the times by up-to-date socio-
psychological data.36 It was psychology’s function to become 
self-critical against prevailing hyperempiricism and ‘thirst for 
facts’ (tényszomjúság).37 What was missing from Hungary, but 
well-advanced in Finland, was studies in educational psychol-
ogy, which would help teachers to harmonize their work with 
the phases of development of children. For Pataki, Makarenko’s 
and Vygotsky’s dynamic theories of development had already 
helped in refuting the belief in ‘natural development’.38 He was 
also inspired by Western developmental psychology, which re-
garded pedagogy as a branch of social psychology. If applied in 
Hungary, it would have meant a decisive turn away from ‘old’ 
mental hygiene towards school and youth studies. In spite of 
his reformist leanings, Pataki held on to the basic Marxist tenet 
which emphasized man’s nature as a social being (társas lény) – 
the ‘primitive man’ had already been disposed to live in com-
pany (társulási késztetés), a presupposition providing the credo 
for collective psychology. However, Pataki launched studies of 
school life and youth group/community studies by Western 
methods.39 He applied them in studies of performance and con-
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flict, in studies of youth culture, ethos and values, and special-
ized in studying conflict situations between university students 
and authorities. These were delicate issues, because it had been 
realized both in Hungary and in Finland that certain groups of 
young people rejected the values and norms used in socializa-
tion in higher educational institutions.40 In Finland the studies 
in problems of integration of society, in reception of norms, 
values and in acquisition and performance of roles, were up-to-
date. The head of the AF, Erik Allardt, following in the foot-
steps of T. Parsons, witnessed the heroic climax of critical soci-
ology when Kekkonen accepted communists in the government 
(1966)41 – the danger of upheaval from that quarter was thus 
eliminated.  
It is remarkable that psychology found room among other 
Science Days’ symposia representing the new generation of 
harder sciences, namely computer-aided cardiological research, 
laser physics, biology, pharmacology, neurochemistry and geo-
physics.42 However, it was not to be the least of newcomers: 
developmental psychology with its studies in childhood and 
adolescent development became one of the most exhaustively 
analyzed fields of social studies within the co-operation of the 
Academies. Since the 1981 symposium in Jyväskylä, develop-
mental and educational psychologists met regularly and aimed 
at generalizing their topics, for instance, to cover the wider 
problematic of socialization and child-rearing practices (a sym-
posium in Jyväskylä, 4 – 6 October 1995).43 Although the high-
light of the co-operation occurred in early 1980s, and has 
somewhat abated, the contacts have so far lasted at least until 
the year 2000 when the latest joint conference was held in 
Szeged, in Hungary.  
As a member of AF’s Committee for Social Sciences, Ruoppila 
advanced the cause of psychology, took care of international 
relations and organized congresses in Finland. He had wanted to 
find concrete and high-level themes of study from the very 
beginning, and he also saw to it that only internationally 
renowned psychologists arrived from Hungary. He was positively 
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surprised to find out that they were not ‘censured’ people 
followed by ‘shadow-minders’ whom the Russian colleagues had 
to endure while in Finland.44 Of course, Ruoppila could not 
intervene in the way the MTA chose delegates from among its 
own members of institutes, not from the Universities which were 
kept at bay in international relations. 
The opening speech of the Days of Science given by Kai-Otto 
Donner, the Director of the AF, reflected recent, ‘progressive’ 
changes in Finnish science policy. He honoured his predecessor 
and the ‘grand old man’, Kustaa Vilkuna (d. in 1980), and 
remembered the ‘old AF’ as the cradle of natural and national 
sciences. However, as he emphasized, bygones were bygones, 
new sciences, among them the upstart psychology which 
produced humane applications for the common good of 
society, ruled the day.45 Undoubtedly, they were more 
‘progressive’ than the ‘old ones’, since they accrued benefits for 
wider society, not only for the industrial and scientific élite.  
The honorary guest lecturer of the Days, the President of the 
MTA, Lénárd Pál, responded to Donner’s speech and agreed 
with him to a certain point. In his opinion the wider public had 
also been disappointed at the ‘old sciences’, a condition which 
had brought with it deprecation of the social value of science in 
general. Pál defended ‘new sciences’ more potently than Don-
ner: although – even in socialism – they were not omnipotent, 
they were of ‘inestimable value’ in building the socialist soci-
ety. However, there remained the ‘pitiful’ discrepancy between 
natural and social sciences: the knowledge of nature had be-
come overwhelming in the last 50 years while the knowledge of 
society and its laws lagged strangely behind. The reliability of 
social knowledge was certainly more questionable than that of 
nature if seen from the perspective of the forces of production 
and the socialist economy. During the processes of forceful in-
dustrialization, especially in building heavy industry, society 
and environment had suffered from harmful side-effects. 
Alarmed, Pál demanded a reevaluation of the role of science in 
socialism. In serving the needs of modern technology and pro-
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duction, science had ‘unfortunately’ pushed the needs of the 
people aside. Planning and production should recognize the 
‘human factor’ – people’s needs and expectations should have 
enticed production to create new products. Production should 
not have created ‘unwanted’ needs in population. It was sociol-
ogy’s task to find out what people really wanted. Reflecting on 
the growing concern for ‘social production’, Pál specifically 
pointed to the responsibility of psychology to heal modern 
mental ailments caused by uncontrolled technological progress. 
Advanced and quickened communication, in particular, 
strained the ‘nervous system’ (stimuli moved faster than they 
could be processed) of the urban population. The challenge 
was: scientists and researchers should find innovations that 
could satisfy the modern demand for smoother services and 
comfortable infrastructure. Some key spheres of life which 
needed urgent, socially acceptable safety solutions were the 
rapidly expanding traffic and technically complicated shop-
floor conditions.46 In this way, both in Hungary and Finland, 
psychology was coined the social science which should find 
and dispense alleviation to maladjustment. The consequences 
of industrialization and urbanization were considered similar 
enough in capitalism and socialism that lessons of psychology 
were complementarily applicable to both. Psychology was be-
coming openly, and in the eyes of science authorities and plan-
ning officers, legitimately interventionist. If sociology was to 
deal with the general problems of adaptation of youth into so-
ciety, the education of skilled workers and students, guiding 
them in their choices of career and in family planning was to 
remain the domain of social psychology. 
In the papers presented at the Jyväskylä symposium, case studies 
of aggression, ways of life, and the formation and inculcation of 
values gained prominence. By way of introduction, Professor 
Ruoppila updated the situation in modern societies with which the 
psychologists had to come to terms. Changes in the structures of 
societies had caused ‘problems’ to be grappled with: urbanization, 
service-orientation in economy, internal waves of emigration and 
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unemployment (7–8% in Finland/assumed ‘non-existent’ in 
Hungary). This state of affairs had brought with it a radical change 
in the role of psychologists from control and treatment of children 
and teen-agers with psychic problems and learning difficulties to 
the care of their ‘sound psychic development’.47 Recent research in 
Jyväskylä and Helsinki concentrated on determinants of youth’s 
social behaviour, skills and systems of value. The latest orientation 
was to study problems in adolescent socialization caused by 
unemployment, as yet an unexplored subject for the Hungarians 
present. They were more interested in the work done at Tampere 
University by T. Nummenmaa (1979) on the development of 
sequential structures of children’s thought. Children had been 
shown a series of events on a film which they had to describe. 
Afterwards a stage model had been laid out and tested.48 Quite 
remarkably, this procedure found mutual applications when 
designing TV-programmes for traffic education of school-children. 
At this point it should be noticed that the underlying antagonism 
between Marxist collectivism and Western individualism in 
psychology had not been brought forward, let alone resolved at the 
Jyväskylä symposium. There was no point in causing friction in 
budding collaboration by ideological skirmishes. The socialist ideas 
of man’s educability put forward by Marxist educational 
philosophy had not made so profound an impact in Hungarian 
psychology that it could have caused friction in Jyväskylä. In fact, it 
had been agreed by the participants to stay silent on philosophical 
questions and avoid a situation of competition between capitalist 
and socialist science. Even comparisons of experimental methods 
were put aside because of insurmountable cultural differences in 
criteria. The success of the Jyväskylä symposium was ensured by 
limiting the topics into social application of psychology. The Finns 
were quite well aware that in Hungary science was ‘collectivistic’, 
hierarchical, and controlled by the Party, but it was also clear that 
Hungarians were as independent as the ‘Georgians’, and compared 
favourably with hard-line colleagues coming from the GDR. A 
symposium was not a venue to talk about politics49: it could be left 
to a more informal place such as the sauna.50 To stress: the reason to 
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call the symposium together at all was its scientific interest. The 
Finnish psychologists had learned through their reading that their 
Hungarian colleagues published in English and in German studies 
on the same subjects as they themselves did, namely on youth 
development from the educational point of view which was also 
one of the special fields in Jyväskylä. 
It was only Dr Pataki whom the Finns suspected of being a 
hard-line Marxist psychologist or ideologue overseeing the 
other Hungarian visitors. This suspicion proved false, since 
Pataki was at the time of the symposium conducting studies 
the results of which inescapably led to the criticism of the 
existing educational and social system: he studied the 
maladjusted, their deviant behaviour, and people living in 
disadvantageous situations in socialism. He demanded studies 
in alcoholism, for instance, among university teachers. He had 
already also spotted many signs of social disintegration in 
Hungary where there was found an alarming number of 
families in which the father was an alcoholic who needed 
frequent detoxification, in which the mother was in a mental 
hospital, and in which the children were kept in custody.51 
Nevertheless, Pataki made only minor concessions to anti-
authoritarianism in youth education. His paper on the results 
of the MTA’s and the AF’s joint project on ‘Juvenile Health 
Habits’, awarded by the IEA (International Association for the 
Evaluation of Education), dealt with the consequences of the 
relaxation of discipline of adolescents at school. It had been in 
the common interest of school authorities in Hungary and 
Finland to support ‘healthy’ socialization, for example, 
eradication of smoking and drinking habits and reorienting the 
young to sports. It was also a common concern at the 
symposium that symbols of discipline and strict forms of 
communication between the pupils and the teacher at school 
were undermined. Pataki had to confess that ‘soft’ values 
appealed to youth and that they were more interested in 
matters of mode and taste than learning proper behaviour in 
class. He rejected functionalism and neo-behaviouralism by 
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pointing to social conflicts, irrationality and complexity of 
normative behaviour. He had uncovered that a youngster could 
be a member of many groups and share many norms and 
values, which indicated that also in Hungary the authorities 
should anticipate differences in socialization in order to 
preserve social dynamics. He declared that an individual’s 
autonomy should not be sacrificed and lamented the 
prevailing, ‘severe, autocratic and indifferent teaching 
atmosphere’ in which young people had to learn under a heavy 
homework-load, pressure of competition and mental tension.52 
Pataki’s lessons were applauded by his Finnish colleagues. 
Pataki did not, however, favour the ‘liberal’ education, prac-
tised in Finland, either. The maladjustment of youth in capital-
ism could be put down to it. Surveys implied that ‘liberal’ 
teaching methods had been deemed ‘weak’ by both pupils and 
teachers in Hungary and in Finland. One thought-provoking 
result he picked out was that the teachers who had slackened 
discipline had failed to achieve the objectives of education. 
Leaning on this, Pataki ventured to giving a political lesson. In 
his view, before the socialist educational system could become 
‘perfect’, centralism was paramount but not in the prevalent 
form of mechanical uniformity and over-regulation. He harked 
back to Makarenko’s image of the model teacher who should 
have been ‘independent, responsible and willing to take initia-
tive’, an image resembling his ‘magnetic comrades’ who ignited 
the spirit for collective building of socialism in the masses.53 
Thus Pataki had not given up the basic teachings of socialist 
psychology, which opposed the ‘bourgeois’ idea that man 
could not be transformed from a selfish, competitive, individu-
alist ‘animal’ to an altruistic social being seeking the collective 
good (cf. Makarenko’s young communists in Dzerhinsky La-
bour Commune). In Hungary the ideal was the ‘actively serv-
ing and sacrificing’ New Man, a hero pursuing chivalrous mo-
rality.54 The ideal of socialist communal life cropped up in 
Pataki’s presentation; teaching should have taken place in a 
‘perfect school-community’ where teachers and pupils formed 
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a co-operative partnership in equality. Pupils and students 
should not have been treated as subjects because such ‘autoc-
racy’ created dangerous anti-values in them (indifference, hos-
tility, passivity). However, Pataki emphasized that schools 
should have been prepared to fight against ‘stupid fashions’ 
and ‘negative’ behaviour patterns (e.g. adult-aping drinking). 
Approaching the core of the matter, Pataki put his finger on a 
very tense topic in Hungarian education: the failures of the 
teachers to impede antisocial phenomena. Concurring with 
more open modes of critical discussion spreading at the time in 
Hungary, he dared to state that ‘socialist democracy’ would in-
crease only if critical situations in schools were not made pub-
lic. The system should not protect an ill-advised teacher from 
critical examination.55 
In spite of his ‘openness’, Pataki in principle held to the basic 
moral propensities idealized in socialist rhetoric56, and hoped 
that they could still be cherished under a less authoritarian 
order. He admitted that the speeded-up economic development 
in Hungary under Kádárism had brought problems for the 
population in adaptation with it. Values espoused by Socialism 
had not consolidated after eradication of the traditional 
(religious) ones, a mentally distressing condition confirmed by 
later historians.57 On the basis of comparison, the main 
difference between Finland and Hungary was that the 
Hungarian economy had not met the ‘consumerist’ demands of 
the people. For instance, production could not heal the ‘car-
fever’ of the younger generation. Expectations of universal 
attainability of goods had been aroused but not satisfied, 
whereas in Finland the situation was far better. Everything was 
to be had. Hungary suffered also from something that seemed 
to be missing from Finland in the early 1980s: tolerated 
parasitism of the old élite and its privileged clientele. These 
modern dilemmas of ‘individualization’ – incomplete within 
the higher echelons but expanding in wider society – had 
caused ‘severe incertitudes’ for human sciences, psychology in 
particular. For Pataki, however, it was the students that caused 
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the problem, not the hierarchical, bureaucratic nature of the 
educational system. He blamed them for sticking to one-sided 
life-styles (e.g. reading addiction). The worst of their kin were 
the ‘failed ones’ who ‘formed control-evading territorial groups 
of anti-social subcultures’. Pataki’s judgement was 
straightforward: it was self-interest, the antinomy of socialist 
morality that had overwhelmed them. Alarmingly, young 
people with decent educational opportunities tried to dodge all 
physical labour – greatly idealized in socialist heroism – and 
nourished the illusion of finding an easy but well-paid job.58 
Problems of maladjustment and conscious evasion of socially 
‘respectable’ habits made it difficult for the authorities to plan 
social development and adjust it with ‘reality’. Pataki’s concern 
was that reality was apparently slipping away from psycholo-
gists’ purview. According to another research report presented at 
the symposium, student life-styles were not as erratic and dis-
quieting in Finland as in Hungary. Finnish students’ mental 
development was by large more positive and they were usually 
successful in their studies if they were allowed to study 
according to a ‘free’ program. If not, the research results showed 
opposite tendencies. What seemed worrying from a 
psychologist’s point of view was that students considered 
university study in Finland very ‘stressful’.59 At the time of the 
symposium both school and university education systems in 
Finland were fundamentally reformed, and the students’ 
reaction was mostly critical. Nevertheless, the dialogue with 
Finnish colleagues confirmed for the Hungarian psychologists 
that young people fared better in capitalism than in socialism 
which could not but be disquieting news for them. Had they not 
in the 1970s already realized what ‘prejudices’ the youth – like 
during the uprising of 1956 – had against Socialism in general.60 
Before the 1970s aggression was studied in Hungary in 
pathology and criminology. Studies of aggression from the angle 
of developmental psychology were launched in the MTA in the 
late 1970s, when patterns of anti-social behaviour were spotted 
and classified. This had ushered in a change of paradigm, so much 
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so that children’s and adolescent’s aggression was studied with 
psychoanalytical methods developed by Erik Erikson, the German 
psychoanalyst of identity crises, and other well-known Western 
authors.61 The findings of Hungarians could now be compared 
with empirical results of studies in violent behavior in Finland. It 
especially seemed to be corroborated that violence shown on TV to 
children incited violence in play. More tentative was the 
conclusion that boys ‘liked’ violence in cartoons but were 
frightened by realistic violence.62 
The impact of psychoanalysis on Hungarian psychology 
could also be heard from another paper dealing with psycho-
diagnostics of marginalized young people, this time married 
young couples facing difficult living conditions. The Hungarian 
speaker complained that science could not really ‘catch’ a 
deviant phenomenon: it appeared powerless against ‘unfavo-
rable effects’ (illiteracy, deviancy of parents, parents’ failures 
and mistakes in education at home, living in some isolated 
ethnic group). Stimulus/response -tests and multi-factor ana-
lyses did not explain the development of deviancy in such com-
plicated situations. Socialist psychology which presupposed 
patience with adaptation into realities of Socialism did not 
seem capable of providing sufficient incentives to it. ‘Indivi-
dualization’ begot individuals who either remained or chose to 
remain outsiders, a phenomenon not recognized by the science 
politicians. Blatant discrepancy prevailed between what 
families regarded as socially relevant according to their values 
and what really was significant to society as a whole. For a 
psychologist it was a moot point to realize that families did not 
prepare their children for school properly although they ‘must’ 
have done it. One explanation was, however, at hand; although 
promised in planning and propaganda, the Hungarian system 
had not been able to create and maintain equal educational 
opportunities for everybody.63 
Deviating from Pataki’s interpretation, the younger school of 
Hungarian psychologists courageously criticized the prevailing 
system itself rather than, for instance, teachers, parents and 
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students. They pointed to paternalism and conservatism which 
allowed too little room for ‘free play’ of talent. They recommended 
that in order to root out inequality of opportunity – seen also in 
regional differences – the general cultural level of the unprivileged 
people, formerly non-existent in statistics, should have been 
elevated. Only thus could parents be induced to improve home 
education and better prepare their children for school. Another 
discomfiting message issued forth: a civilizing mission of such a 
magnitude was possibly too much for Hungarian socialism to 
accomplish in times of serious economic distress and ideological 
inflexibility. 
Another example of unequal opportunities in Hungarian so-
ciety was the disadvantageous position of the gypsies, a pheno-
menon which was acute at the time also in Finland. They 
seemed to have no motivation for adaptation, and their illi-
teracy was a lot higher than that of the average population, 25% 
in Finland and 39% in Hungary. Referring to recent develop-
mental studies in the field the symposium cautiously 
concluded: gypsies could be integrated into ‘normal’ society 
only very slowly (!). How this could be done was to be discove-
red in a joint follow-up research.64 The results of the research 
remain unknown but the problem itself has become marginal in 
Finnish psychology. In Hungary it is a constantly recurring 
public issue. 
The most delicate theme of the Jyväskylä symposium was 
the one of juxtaposed value systems prevalent in Hungary and 
in Finland. Their comparative evaluation concerned the issue 
which system, socialist or capitalist, had better succeeded in so-
cialization. Leaving the question of the use of symbolic violence 
aside, it was, according to one Finnish expert, ‘obvious’ that 
young people in Finland were generally more satisfied with the 
prevailing political system than youngsters in Hungary. This 
result of a questionnaire study was interpreted to prove that 
young Finns satisfactorily adopted the values of their parents. 
Finns congratulated themselves: ‘We are progressing in the 
right direction’. The Hungarians could not believe their ears 
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when they heard that Finnish children, predisposed to indivi-
dualism, were more ready to socialize than the Hungarian kids 
who were supposed to grow community-oriented. Some re-
searchers referred to studies of Hungarian and Finnish ABC-
books as evidence. In Hungarian books the character-building 
of a child proceeded with examples of punishment and of vir-
tues of diligence, unselfishness, punctuality and honesty in ac-
tion. In Finnish ABC-books such moralizing was not conspicu-
ous, and pictures of punishment were missing. Instead, they 
were more neutral in showing scenes of physical and hygienic 
practices, gave lessons in traffic safety and ordinary manual 
skills. One Finnish psychologist considered the poems, songs 
and fairytales in Hungarian books to be good nourishment for 
emotional development which the Finnish children very rarely 
enjoyed. Surprisingly enough, it was the Finnish books that 
seemed to provide for ‘internationalism’ so eagerly promoted 
by socialist proselytizing. They taught the ‘everyday knowl-
edge of man’ so that children could learn to understand others 
(dissimilarity, alterity) and become peace-loving and tolerant 
persons.65 Thus the psychologists working in Jyväskylä laid 
emphasis on the so called ‘moral education’ – not disciplining – 
which supported the ethical development of the youth.66 Here 
lay the obstacle to further co-operation in studying of values: 
because the value-systems were so different in Hungary and 
Finland, it was quite impossible to find any common criteria for 
the ‘measurement’ or evaluation of the values, which could be 
applicable in both countries. The problem was essentially a phi-
losophical one, falling outside psychologists’ competence. It 
could not be discussed on a platform, the speakers of which did 
not pretend to be able to dictate common normative aspects of 
science. More pertaining to the topic would have been to reassess 
the evidently contradictory achievements of the symposium. 
As preconceivable, the AF’s report on the Days of Science 
contained the recommendation that the controversial study of 
value-systems should be dropped from the future agenda of co-
operation. It was suggested that most of the traditional 
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disciplines, such as linguistics, ethnography, folklore and 
musicology should be returned to the lists of the Academies, 
and that a comparative study should be written on science 
policies in Hungary and Finland under the supervision of the 
Hungarian Academician, Péter Vas-Zoltán. Obviously, there 
was a deeper learning-process going on in Hungarian-Finnish 
scientific relations, for it was planned that not only the science 
systems should be compared but also ‘the cases of frustration 
and occasional lack of results’.67 For psychology it was deemed 
advisable to concentrate on the most up-to-date studies. First, 
experimental psychology, i.e. physiological psychology, with 
its methods of modern computerized data processing, was to 
be rated highly on the agenda. Secondly, and in line with 
developmental psychology, studies in early childhood and 
personality development, acquisition of language skills and the 
way of life of youth deserved to be continued.68 In this way, 
despite intermittent ambiguity and stumbling-blocks, an 
agreement between the Hungarian and Finnish participants 
was reached, which paved the way towards revision and 
expansion of co-operation in psychological studies. 
It must be pointed out that the Hungarian side was to gain 
more from the co-operation than the Finnish one. As it dawned 
on the Hungarians that the equipment and resources at Finns’ 
disposal were far better than their own at home, they became 
eager to intensify research exchange by increasing the quota of 
visitors.69 While in Finland, Hungarian psychologists had an 
easy access to well-equipped laboratories and to most 
important international journals of their science, dearly needed 
in Hungary. It also could be sensed that Hungarian visiting 
researchers envied the great choice of research themes available 
for the Finns in Jyväskylä, especially in experimental psycho-
logy. It was not merely out of politeness that the Hungarians 
wrote highly of Finnish psychology. Not that the co-operation 
was quite imbalanced or unequal. Valuable for the Finns was 
that they learned from their Hungarian experiences how high-
quality research could be done with meagre resources. They 
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had to admit that the papers Hungarians had read in the 
Jyväskylä symposium had been very good. The Hungarian 
visiting professors distinguished themselves as valuable 
supervisors for Finnish post-graduates who prepared their 
theses. About the exchange of publications there is not much 
record, usually Jyväskylä-based psychologists sent quite a few 
of the 200 copies of their serial to Hungary but it was not 
known how their colleagues utilized them. The material 
arriving from Hungary was dealt out at the Department to the 
researchers interested in it.70 
The satisfaction Hungarian psychologists continuously ex-
pressed of their research conditions and experiences in Finland 
issued forth from one follow-up visit report written a year after 
the Jyväskylä symposium. Having visited all psychology de-
partments of Finnish Universities, Dr Sándor Veres from the 
MTA praised them for the ‘maximal help’ and ‘deep cordiality’ 
with which he had been able to complete his research with ‘total 
and faultless solutions’. Without hesitation Veres could recom-
mend Finnish institutions as exemplary research bases to his su-
periors. The realization of the fact that both Hungary and 
Finland had after World War II gone through a period of acceler-
ated industrialization had encouraged him to wider compari-
sons, for instance, of social mobility using socio-psychological 
methods well-developed in Finland but neglected in Hungary.71 
He proudly listed the institutions from which he had collected 
contacts, information and impressions. In the Department of So-
cial Psychology of the University of Helsinki he had met col-
leagues who worked closest to his own field, minority studies 
(mobility, identity, migration). Besides, he became acquainted 
with family studies and discussed this with some leading repre-
sentatives of Finnish sociology and psychology, E. Haavio-
Mannila, V. Stolte-Heiskanen, E. Allardt, M. Alestalo, R. 
Alapuro, J. Simpura and J.-P. Roos among others. Most enlight-
ening to him were studies in Finnish alcoholism and the declin-
ing birth-rate, serious concerns in both countries. In Turku he 
gathered information on aggression studies (K. Lagerspetz) and 
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in Tampere he became involved in ‘an extraordinarily interesting 
exchange of ideas’ concerning incarceration and rehabilitation 
(lunatic asylums, workers’ homes, AA-centres). In his expert 
opinion, modern Finnish rehabilitation measures were some-
thing very suitable for reforms in Hungary.72 
In Jyväskylä Veres took part in the conference of the 
Association of Finnish Psychologists and visited the venue of 
the 1981 symposium to renew contacts there. He was welcomed 
by Professors Takala, Pulkkinen and Ruoppila and some junior 
members of the staff. On the basis of negotiations a joint 
research theme was hit upon: family life-modes and life-styles 
after 1945. This could be combined with studies in social 
mobility and socialization more popular in Hungary but 
familiar also to the Finns. Summarizing the utility of Finnish 
psychological institutions for Hungarian visitors, Veres stated 
that they ‘are very flexible, centralized and ready to adapt’, the 
very qualities the MTA had been looking for. Without eulogy 
he enumerated the ‘progessivism’ of Finnish psychologists: 
they kept pace with international developments, co-operated 
with Scandinavian colleagues in particular, reacted smoothly to 
changes in their own society and had founded new institutions 
to study the impact of those changes. All this was recom-
mendable for the Hungarians, and it was, in Veres’s opinion, a 
shame that Hungarians had established relations with Finnish 
psychologists much later than, for instance, colleagues from the 
GDR and the Soviets Union. It was high time to make official 
contact with the Finnish Psychological Society.73 Veres’s report 
was very well received by his superiors, and their remarks in 
its margins suggest that they took heed of his ‘advice’ and 
urged to enter selectively into private discussions with the 
leading partners in Finland. In Veres’s report one could not 
detect the usual self-censure and reassuring rhetoric towards 
superiors, and it may well be that its frankness made an 
impression in the decision-makers of the MTA, although it was 
not particularly pleasing to them. Instead, it pointed to the 
weaknesses of their science policy and prompted to self-
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criticism. Egged on by the Jyväskylä symposium, psychology 
proved to be a viable science among the ‘harder’ sciences in 
Hungarian-Finnish scientific relations. As a respectable social 
science on the rise since the late 1960s, it was very much in 
demand because modern societies developed so fast that some 
groups of people were dropping out, suffering unforeseen 
psychic discontents and maladies. Together with law studies 
and economics it was one of the sciences the function of which 
was to provide useful comparative and differential results to 
base decision-making for social planning. In the context of 
Hungarian-Finnish relations Hungarian psychologists were con-
tinuously interested in the economic and social problems con-
nected to relatively fast economic growth in Finland.74 Studies in 
social structure, social relations and social policy carried out also 
in Jyväskylä were duly reported back to the MTA.75 
It has already been suggested that the orientation of joint 
psychological studies was steered away from studies in value-
systems towards subjects regarded as more neutral. The ‘old’ 
approach became less esteemed also because in Finland 
teachers were allowed to teach different values to their pupils. 
The tendency to ‘pure empiricism’ was reinforced in the 1980s. 
During the Days of Finnish Science held in Budapest in 15–22 
April 1985 the delegation of Jyväskylä University’s Department 
of Psychology, led by Professor Heikki Lyytinen, took part in a 
symposium of psychophysiology. Lyytinen’s own paper on 
‘Psychophysiological preparation for sensory, cognitive and 
motor events’ was quite in line with the innovative metho-
dology of experimental neuropsychology. Later psychologists 
from Jyväskylä and the MTA developed a common registration 
system for neuro-psychological testing which is actually still in 
use. It was the measurement of nerve activity with sensory 
electrophysiology as a branch of cognitive psychology which 
succeeded best in this respect and was to feature prominently 
from the late 1980s on. Hungarians particularly were enthusia-
stic of these new methods which suited their interests in experi-
mentation. This was one of the permanent achievements of 
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Hungarian-Finnish collaboration. To point to disappointments, 
the harmonization of methodology failed because the science 
cultures were basically too different. To cite only one typical 
case, harmonization was tried in studying violence shown on 
TV but the coding of filmed sequences turned out to be 
impossible because the TV programmes in Finland were largely 
international. This did not match with Hungarian TV which 
was national.76 
Bilateral relations of psychologists were kept alive by regular 
meetings, seminars and conferences organized by turns in 
Hungary and in Finland. Developmental psychology struggled 
to maintain its central role and managed yet another conference 
in Helsinki in 1989 on child-psychology and studies in parent-
infant interaction in modern families. New trends also made 
their way to Jyväskylä where developmental psychology was 
traditionally at its strongest. To illustrate, one Hungarian 
visitor presented there in 1989 a poster on ‘Rhythm in 
preverbal communication’ which aroused great attention and 
was filed for later publication. Again Jyväskylä showed its 
know-how value as a useful partner in ‘cross-cultural 
analysis’77 which included also comparative studies in the de-
velopment of intellectual skills.78 Jyväskylä was picked up as 
the venue where one could meet the best experts of the field. 
 
3 Conclusion 
In all, the contacts and co-operation of Hungarian and Finnish 
psychologists were from the very beginning quite unforced, and 
at least according to representatives of Jyväskylä University, it 
was easy to work with Hungarians. Surely, the contacts were few 
in comparison to the relations with the West, especially the 
Nordic countries, but they were quite continuous, flexible and 
easy-going. 
In general, Jyväskylä’s relations with Hungarian science were 
many-sided and diverse; for instance, its doctoral school in 
musicology (Kodály-studies), the project of multidisciplinary 
Hungarian Studies, contrastive studies in linguistic, and the 
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traditional finno-ugric studies fare well even today. Among 
others, this has come about in the bilateral relations with 
Debrecen University. Sometimes psychological studies 
approached general sociology, in which the research co-opera-
tion branched out in many directions ranging from family-
studies to studies in alcoholism and deviancy. Not surprisingly, 
this thematic had strong implications for social policy, one 
representative example being the restructuring of social services 
for the elderly pensioners pioneered by Professor Marjatta Marin 
from Jyväskylä. That the Finns preferred to take care of them at 
home till the end (one 94 year-old woman lived alone in a distant 
homestead in Sumiainen near Jyväskylä) and did not send them 
to institutional care was very much a service worth 
implementing in far-away small farms in Hungary.79 
In the 1970–1980s, the message of both Hungarian and 
Finnish psychologists was that the societies of their countries 
were going through a critical period, the Hungarians facing 
impending socio-economic crisis, Finns suffering from 
incessant fluctuations of the capitalist world economy. By way 
of conclusion, it may be suggested that the research co-
operation was, on one hand, motivated by analyses of social 
statistics showing ‘negative trends’, and on the other, by the 
need to find ‘progressive’ measures to provide prophylactics or 
heal the ‘diseases’ of society such as increasing juvenile 
delinquency, deviancy, alcoholism, rising suicide-rates, rapid 
increase of deaths in traffic, and discontents of rapid 
urbanization in general common in both countries.80 While in 
Finland the reform policy was rather utilitarian, Hungarian 
Socialism hated criminals and aimed at uniformity, common 
rules and behaviour patterns to enforce loyalty and discipline.81 
Against the expectations of Hungarian socialist leaders, the 
expected eradication of crime under Socialism did not come 
true. For their part, the Finnish psychologists were not as 
pessimistic of the future of society as the Hungarians, but their 
studies also revealed symptoms of misadaptation, especially 
among the young living in the peripheries. 
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Relations in psychology brought in tangible but at times 
contradictory achievements and opened unexpected vistas of co-
operation and dialogue. They also show some of the tensions 
between the two systems, conspicuously in the use of 
‘propaganda’ and ‘know-how’. But as usual in Hungarian-
Finnish relations, the co-operation also of cultural and scientific 
elites was not seriously disturbed by the contradictions between 
the values of the capitalist and the socialist system. This is 
typically ‘liberal’ attitude which largely ignored or found its way 
around Marxist criticism thus avoiding open confrontation.82 The 
Marxists, for their part, did not want to force the issue and make 
the kind of politics of science that would upset or estrange their 
partners. Thus co-operation went surprisingly smoothly. 
Psychology and its applications to control human behaviour in 
society’s sore points were equally useful in both countries. 
As for the repercussions of the co-operation in psychology for 
science policies and political culture it may be suggested that re-
search results awakened the decision-makers to the under-
standing that society needed the services of psychology in order 
to define social grievances and plan their alleviation. In common 
venues this became quite evident. For instance, when the MTKK 
(the Hungarian Centre for Culture and Science, Helsinki) opened 
a Centre for Hungarian Studies in 1988, contrastive linguistics, 
history, literature, ethnology, sociology, fine arts and architec-
ture, musicology, education, film and theatre studies, geography, 
and also psychology were called in to make up the programme.83 
It led to founding of a permanent psychology work-group in 
1988–1989 which organized seminars and conferences, the the-
matics of which were problems of maladjustment in Hungary 
and Finland.84 At about the same time the Universities of Jy-
väskylä and Lapland (Rovaniemi) started to organize continuing 
education for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists in psycho-
dynamic individual psychotherapy, the latest seminar of which, 
eleventh in a series, was held in Budapest in 9–16 May 2004. 
Guided by their Hungarian colleagues, Finnish psychologists 
had returned to the roots of psychoanalysis – the theme of the 
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seminar was Sándor Ferenczi and his heritage.85 
In Finland the Nordic type of welfare society has been main-
tained, although the Popular Front government had to step 
down in 1987. In Hungary the belief in the reformist role of social 
sciences collapsed in the end of the 1970s as it became evident 
that society cannot be made socialist by social reforms. The op-
timistic and activist ethos connected to Socialism was fading 
away. Although Hungary could list the CSCE process as a dip-
lomatic achievement, relations with capitalism developed omi-
nously. As György Földes has concluded: in the end of the 1970s 
the Kádár regime was already facing grave problems in keeping 
the Hungarian public satisfied with the way Hungary was co-
operating with the capitalist countries.86 The planned economy 
turned out to be too expensive but for the sake of social integra-
tion it had to be carried on. Later on, as the internal opposition 
gathered strength, the discontent with the political leadership 
developed into a more general criticism of the high politics of 
statesmen and diplomats, of the so called ‘détente culture of Hel-
sinki kitsch’87, advocated by Finland and supported by Hungary. 
In these circumstances the status of Hungarian, socialist science 
was undermined whereas in Finland science was able to main-
tain its financing on a relatively satisfactory level. In these cir-
cumstances the demand for psychology has not diminished. 
New grave problems like children’s depression preoccupy the 
experts. It is not only the science authorities who are alarmed, 
also the Finnish politics of interest groups (the relations and 
agreements between employees, the Trade Unions and the 
state) encourages studies into dislocation, social inequality, and 
entertain wider reforms of social policy. 
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On the Borders of Propaganda and What Can Be Said: 
Hungarian-Finnish Cultural Relations during the    
Kádár-Kekkonen Era 
 
Raija OIKARI 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In this article the focus is on what kind of political aims were 
set to cultural exchange and in what way it was manifested in 
practice in the cultural relations between Kádar’s Hungary and 
Kekkonen’s Finland. There is no doubt that cultural relations 
after the Second World War were a scene of the use of power. 
During the Cold War cultural relations became highly politi-
cized both in the East and in the West and cultural relations be-
came the so called fourth dimension of foreign politics together 
with political, military and economic relations – cultural ex-
change was now in the service of foreign policy.  
In Hungary – as well as in every socialist country – culture 
and international cultural relations were openly a part of for-
eign politics and they were given political and ideological tasks. 
It is also a question of language, or rather of discourse, particu-
larly of the ideologies and use of power which are concealed in 
language. This discourse deals with the constituting of ideolo-
gies of languages. Furthermore, the questions of language us-
age have led to wider political actions; language serves as a ma-
jor means of manipulating, and even of transforming power re-
lations. In addition, it is a major factor influencing, affecting, 
and transforming social relationships. Yet, once selected, the 
very form of language used also affects by defining and concre-
tizing the conceptions that may not have yet been spelled out. 
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Further, language can be used as a means of control across the 
range of social relationships.1 
I examine the cultural relations between Finland and Hun-
gary first of all as a forum of discursive power and – it can be 
stated – as state socialist Hungary’s way of making propaganda 
in Finland. The focus is, thus, on discursive actions, that some-
times turned into propaganda, and the purpose of which was to 
influence the intellectual maps, attitudes and actions of the sub-
jects who were the objects of those actions. When discourses of 
two social orders meet, the consequence is clashes, misunder-
standings, resistance of the other’s discourse, or efforts to adapt 
at least to some extent to the other’s discourse. It is also a ques-
tion of a power relationship, where the situation constantly 
changes and where the actions of both sides affect the power 
relationship, which is consequently constantly in motion and 
under change.  
 
2 Propaganda or Information? 
The word ‘propaganda’ is of a relatively recent origin; the first 
documented use of the term occurred in 1622. Originally 
propaganda was the Catholic Church’s means of coordinating 
efforts to bring people to the ‘voluntary’ acceptance of church 
doctrines. The term thus took on a negative meaning in Protes-
tant countries but a positive connotation in Catholic areas. 
However, the term propaganda was widespread only in the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, when it was used to describe 
the persuasion tactics employed during the First World War 
and those later used by totalitarian regimes. Propaganda be-
came to be defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and 
opinions, often through the use of lies and deception. The term 
has since evolved to mean mass ‘suggestion’ or influence 
through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the 
individual.2 
It is, of course, difficult to write about propaganda, since the 
term itself is questionable and has been understood in different 
ways depending on the period of time and society in question. 
In this context it is relevant to ask in which ways the conception 
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of propaganda differed in Hungary and in Finland, and for 
what (historical, political, traditions of thinking) reasons.  
From the strong faith in the communist elite having the right 
consciousness and the right knowledge in its possession follows 
that in socialist rhetoric ‘propaganda’ does not appear as nega-
tive as in the West. Rather than implanting an organized lie in 
peoples’ minds it seems to have been the purpose to get reality 
onto the right track, so to speak. Propaganda was a necessary 
part of building the right kind of world, and thus it was not 
needed to make any value judgements of it. It was about, as it 
was often said by Hungarian authorities, ‘informational work’ 
(tájékoztató munka). Propaganda made in the West, however, 
demanded a different approach than the one made inside the 
socialist camp, since in the West the attitude towards propa-
ganda aspirations was very suspicious. ‘Informational work’ 
was to be handled with consideration and as unnoticed as pos-
sible, which required sometimes the most complicated round-
about methods.3 
Nevertheless, defining ‘propaganda’ has long been based on 
not making value judgments about its contents. ‘Propaganda’, 
however, has a very negative connotation in peoples’ minds 
even today in the West, while in Eastern Europe – it seems to be 
– it has been accepted as a much more neutral notion. This 
causes problems also in examining the official documents – 
which is my main source – of socialist Hungary: when is it 
about propaganda as we understand it, and when is it about 
something which can be called ‘marketing’ or ‘information’? 
And when is ‘information’ a euphemism for propaganda? 
This is also a question of reception of the target polity of propa-
ganda aspirations, which is influenced by history, tradition, politi-
cal culture etc. The inner circle of Hungarian officials responsible 
for dealing with information delivered to foreign (Western) coun-
tries seem to have been aware of the differences in understanding 
propaganda, as they speak about ‘propaganda’ in their classified 
memorandums, letters and so forth, but categorically use euphe-
misms when dealing with Western officials or citizens. This leads 
to the idea of borders for what can be said: there clearly were bor-
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ders which could not be overstepped without encountering resis-
tance and unwillingness to take the given information seriously or 
as truth. This seem to have been the case both in the attitude of the 
Finns toward the Eastern propaganda, and in the reactions caused 
by self-censorship when there was a doubt of having stepped over 
this border.4  
When we examine the cultural relations between a socialist 
regime and a West-oriented democracy, the idea of alliance bet-
ween knowledge and power is obvious. The aim of the state so-
cialist Hungary was to spread ‘correct knowledge’ or ‘correct in-
formation’, and in this case the power relation can be localized in 
who has the power to define the contents of the ‘correct knowl-
edge’. Thus, one of the crucial themes of the relations, especially 
cultural ones, between the regimes is controlling contents and 
meanings. The idea of the Great Narratives by Lyotard is also 
close to this pattern of thought: socialist rhetoric has strived to 
create great, whole narratives about the heroic nature of Social-
ism, and about the epoch-making effect of the endeavour to 
build up Socialism on the quality and happiness of the lives of 
the subjects. This is also linked with a kind of mission-thinking. 
It is thought to be a responsibility of the bearers of the ‘correct 
knowledge’ to make dissident individuals, polities and societies 
to change their way of thinking, and as a consequence of that, 
their sense of reality corresponding with the socialist thought.  
The final aim of action in Marxist thought, namely, is eman-
cipation through correct knowledge. Freedom, however, re-
quires first the subjects (the citizens) being brought up into the 
right consciousness, in other words, into the suitable subjects 
for the politics in question. The entire propaganda and its le-
gitimization in the Soviet bloc were based on this thought, and, 
on faith in the liberation which was to be a result of the right 
consciousness produced by scientific Socialism. Of course there 
is a strong paternalistic tone in this thinking: the starting point 
is that there are agents in the society who know better than or-
dinary citizens, what kind of society is best for them. Western 
thought and perhaps also certain Finnish omnipotence was by 
no means compatible with this kind of way of thinking.  
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In the case of cultural relations between Finland and Hun-
gary I will examine the mechanism, its principles as well as the 
way in which propaganda aspirations were manifested in prac-
tice. We can often find attempts to spread ‘correct information’, 
which can be found in numerous reports written by the Hun-
garian Embassy in Finland. This way of thinking is linked both 
in the element of power that labelled modern society and the 
problem of knowledge it brought about. Faith in knowledge is 
one of the basic principles of modernity, and it is based on ab-
solute faith in Reason as the carrying force of modernity. The 
problem of knowledge is crucial if we consider discursive use 
of power as a principal power producing element in the cul-
tural relations between Finland and Hungary, which is mani-
fested in practice as endeavours to spread ‘correct information’, 
often simply propaganda, through cultural relations.  
Compared to the way of thinking in the East, it is interesting 
to consider how the concept of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ were 
understood in the West: the same faith in Reason guided also 
the Westerns thinking, but it included also the faith in authen-
ticity. In other words, Western thinking assumes a stable, 
monolithic, authentic and ‘right’ state of affairs, which can be 
manipulated and distorted by discursive actions. In the Eastern 
Europe, on the other hand, the ‘reality’ was seen in another 
way: the ‘right’ and ‘correct’ reality was something that was 
reachable in the future after active endeavours. Thus, in both 
cases ‘the reality’ was seen as a construction and the conception 
of the constructive nature of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ seems to have 
been even stronger in the Eastern thinking.5 
Communist ideology in theory has always been oriented to-
ward ‘the world revolution of Socialism’. After Communism 
came to power in major countries, however, notably in the So-
viet Union and China, it predictably became increasingly ori-
ented toward the growth of the international power and influ-
ence of these countries. Communist international propaganda 
has been extensively developed through the press, radio, televi-
sion, tourism, and the use of economic and military aid for 
propaganda purposes. The Soviet foreign propaganda was di-
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rected toward both communist and non-communist sectors of 
the population, as well as, notably in terms of economic and 
military aid and commerce, toward rightist groups, which had 
reasons of Realpolitik for sympathy toward or alliance with the 
Soviet Union. The themes of communist propaganda toward 
capitalist countries were primarily anti-American, and it par-
ticularly concentrated on the issue of peace, through various 
front organizations and through constant propaganda stress on 
the theme that communist countries were for peace while capi-
talist opponents were for war.6 According to the plan by HWSP 
(1971) the main purposes of the development of propaganda 
were to affect the masses, to update the propaganda and to de-
velop the material used in propaganda. According to the basic 
line of the propaganda defined in the report the fundamental 
principle of the activity was a wider understanding of propa-
ganda: there was room for spreading socialist ideology through 
cultural and scientific activity, endeavours to bring socialist so-
cial order to a relevant alternative also for other than Eastern 
European regimes, and promoting Hungarian culture and 
works of art abroad. This definition, as a matter of fact, brings 
out the essence of the whole cultural exchange of the socialist 
countries: cultural relations were without any doubt an instru-
mental activity, the purpose of which was to propagate the so-
cialist ideology in the first place, and only in the second place 
the promotion of the own culture abroad.  
Hungarians, thus, strived to convey information, the pur-
pose of which was to change the Finns’ attitude towards (‘new’) 
Hungary and also towards the socialist ideology - ultimately 
the whole socialist block - through the agency of various insti-
tutional cultural formations. Among these was the agreement of 
cultural exchange – which was the basis of the cultural ex-
change – Finnish-Hungarian Society as well as the lecturers of 
Hungarian language at the University of Helsinki, who also had 
a role in this respect. We can point out discursive use of power 
in all cultural exchange, such as literature, theatre and even 
music, but they will be left aside in this article. Instead the focus 
will be in clearly institutional formations, most of all in the 
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agreement of cultural exchange and in friendship activities. At 
the end of the article I will analyze some special cases that illu-
minate the borders of the ‘sayable’ during the Kádár era. 
The principal material used in this study is the official 
documents produced by the officials of Hungarian political re-
gime, such as Foreign Ministry and, the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party. It is relevant to take into consideration the often 
tactical nature of those documents: rather than an image of the 
‘reality’ of that time, they reflect the political culture, relations 
between the agents of officials and those who had the power, 
political hierarchy, and especially the paranoid and controlling 
atmosphere of everyday socialism. The purpose is not to state 
anything about how things ‘really’ were, but how reality was 
chosen and striven to be outlined. 
 
3 Hungarian Propaganda in Finland 
The basis of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary 
changed dramatically after the Second World War. Before the 
war it was based on the kinship ideology and the project of na-
tional identity, which was not possible in the new situation. On 
the grounds of the documents it seems to be that now Hungary’s 
attempt to spread ‘correct information’, often pure propaganda, 
became the crucial issue of the cultural exchange. It was not an 
easy situation, since the former generation of the agents of cul-
tural exchange represented the ‘wrong’ ideology. The basis of the 
kinship ideology was seen as nationalist, as well as fascist, and at 
least historically also Finno-Ugristics leaned on nationalist ideas. 
Kinship ideology was banned in the peace treaty, so that it was 
not a part of the cultural exchange anymore, but Hungarians 
could not get rid of Finno-Ugristics despite their desire. Propa-
ganda, which was directed to Finland, was, nevertheless, taken 
seriously by the Hungarians since historical background made 
contacts between the two countries possible despite the fact that 
the political and social position of these countries had radically 
changed. Finland for Hungary was on the one hand a bridge-
head towards the West, on the other hand a textbook example of 
the functioning peaceful co-existence. 
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In a thorough memorandum from the archives of the Hun-
garian Socialist Workers’ Party (HWSP) from 19717 we can find 
a report on the situation and possibilities as well as a plan for 
cultural and scientific propaganda directed abroad. This memo-
randum is quite straightforward in using the term ‘propa-
ganda’, which is usually not the case: also in Hungarian classi-
fied documents it is typical to use euphemisms, most often the 
expression ‘informational work’. The constructive way to see 
how things are is revealed in the chapter in which the writer 
states that imperialism is in serious crisis in general, whereas 
socialist ideology is ‘in itself stronger and our culture, which 
serves society, more democratic.’ The conclusion of this com-
plete superiority of Socialism is that there is greater and greater 
interest towards Hungary abroad, which is seen as a conse-
quence expressly of the invincibility in the field of the intellec-
tual life. According to the memorandum, propaganda had been 
successful not only in socialist and ‘progressive’ countries, but 
in capitalist countries as well. In addition, the period of transi-
tion followed by the war was over and new groups of people 
were now in the sphere of influence of Hungarian propaganda, 
and they had already overcome the biggest obstacles to get 
propaganda through. There were still important goals to reach: 
broadening the sphere of influence of propaganda and organis-
ing effective information services. Furthermore, an efficient fil-
ing system was required, by means of which would be possible 
to make thorough analyses of the experiences gained from 
propaganda activity. Thus, it would be possible to further in-
crease the efficiency of the planning of propaganda. 
The matter to be criticised, according to the memorandum, 
was that propaganda had been too limited: now it was impor-
tant to widen the scope of propaganda to the masses and the 
youth of the capitalist countries, as the key agents – such as 
politicians and leading agents of cultural and scientific fields – 
of the societies were already reached. It was to be done by 
planning propaganda which would be richer in nuances and 
carefully targeted to the different layers of these societies. In 
practice, Hungarians had continuous problems in their endeav-
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ours to spread propaganda in Finland, since it was not possible 
to assume a single social subject: different layers of society 
would have demanded different kinds of propaganda.  
The other major problem was that Hungarians soon under-
stood that the majority of the Finns were non-socialist or not 
interested in politics, especially those who were in hegemonic 
positions. It had to be taken into consideration also in the 
propaganda- and information activity in the way that it was not 
worthwhile e.g. to spread too political material. Instead, it was 
still valuable to rest on an old thought of the kinship – for the 
time being, until the correct knowledge would disprove the old 
mistaken conceptions. The Hungarians realized this already in 
the 1950's.8 In a long report by Ambassador Sándor Kurtán 
(1964) about the tendencies in Finnish cultural and mental life 
especially concerning Hungary, it is stated that there is no seri-
ous opposition towards Hungarian propaganda. As a conclu-
sion the Ambassador states that public opinion is positive. Un-
fortunately it was primarily due to the long Finno-Ugric tradi-
tions. The good thing for Finland was that she was not involved 
in the Cold War and hardly accepted any Hungarian immi-
grants after the 1956 uprising. Thus the counterrevolutionary 
ideas did not spread in Finland through immigration. 
One of the problems in the propaganda work was that 
Finland was non-socialist and agrarian, where people prefera-
bly let go unnoticed the fact that Hungary had turned into a so-
cialist country. However, this does not correspond to the opti-
mistic view of the propaganda plan made for Finland. Accord-
ing to Kurtán’s report there was clear resistance against socialist 
realism in arts. In addition, since the publishing in Finland was 
occupied by non-socialist forces, it was not easy to get new 
Hungarian literature published in Finnish. On the whole, mak-
ing propaganda was rather problematic in Finland, although 
there was no opposition against Hungary itself. Rather it was 
because of the mental undertone, the ethos, which was pre-
dominant in Finland. The right tactics were to avoid hard tones, 
to make contacts with the key figures of the society, thus to in-
fluence through individuals, and to further utilize the idea of 
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kinship, although it was politically negative. The idea was this 
way to infiltrate information for Finns about the ‘real’ Hungary, 
the kin nation that was now building up Socialism. The Hun-
garians counted on the power of the right knowledge to the ex-
tent that they estimated the most effective method of making 
propaganda being to invite individual authors or journalists to 
Hungary. After the visit they would write about their experi-
ences in Hungary ‘... in a realistic manner and from a Finnish 
point of view.’ The writer of the report predicts that eventually 
the correct information would work, in other words: ‘... the 
economical and international achievements of the socialist sys-
tem slowly start to have influence on the conservative and so-
cial democratic public opinion.’ It is thus a question to realize 
and accept the reality.  
In the already mentioned memorandum of the HWSP (1971) 
we can read that in Hungary propaganda was steered through 
a carefully organized system, which was based on the doctrine 
of Lenin. Lenin was a voluntarist, far more so than Marx: he be-
lieved that the consciousness of the masses could be and must 
be manipulated. Thus, propaganda, according to Lenin, must 
be exhaustive, differentiated, and entirely controlled by a cen-
tralized propaganda apparatus.9 In Hungary, the organisation 
of foreign propaganda consisted of domestic institutions and 
foreign ‘bases’, the structure and mutual relations of which 
were complicated. The steering and practical actions among 
these different sectors differed considerably, and foreign 
propaganda was only one of them. To reach a desirable pur-
pose it was important to centralize the forces of propaganda, 
and to operate unanimously. The institutional basis of the for-
eign propaganda was built in a hierarchical way. On the highest 
level the steering and executing of propaganda was the respon-
sibility of several high level organs, whereas among the expert 
bodies were scientific institutions, universities, scientific re-
search institutes, as well as cultural enterprises and official in-
stances, such as publishing houses, and art, film, music and art 
agencies. The bases of propaganda abroad were, according to 
the memorandum, the embassies, cultural and scientific atta-
ON THE BORDERS OF PROPAGANDA AND WHAT CAN BE SAID  
 309
chés abroad, Hungarian representatives in the central office of 
UNESCO in Paris, Hungarian institutes and cultural centrals 
(Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, Rome, Paris), as well as 
commercial sections and offices abroad. Funds for this activity 
came from different sources: the state, companies, royalties of 
the artists, copyrights, other sources (government funds 
pointed for cultural and public relations activity etc.). 
This highly organized propaganda machinery states the totali-
tarian nature of Leninist propaganda. It was intended to domi-
nate and control not only all means of elite and mass communi-
cation, but also all history, social science, literature, art, and mu-
sic. This led to the instrumentalist view of education, too. In So-
viet type socialism, all the fields of society, especially art and lit-
erature, were harnessed to propaganda. As pointed out above, 
the institutional basis of the propaganda and the organs which 
were controlling the practical level of the propaganda work 
formed a complicated and intertwined network, which corres-
ponds to the organization of power in socialist Hungary on the 
whole. The mutual hierarchical and other relations between the 
instances were obscure to the extent that they seem to have func-
tioned to conceal the use of power. It is nearly impossible to un-
derstand where the decisions were actually made and who the 
actual agents who made the decisions were.  
For instance, the position of the Institute of Cultural Rela-
tions (KKI) in the organization of the use of power is difficult to 
outline. After the uprising of 1956 there were some rearrange-
ments made in Hungary. A new Ministry of Culture was 
founded, and it was a unification of the former two ministries 
that were responsible for educational and cultural affaires (Mű-
velődésügyi Minisztérium, Népművelésügyi Minisztérium). Among 
the departments of the new ministry there were also independ-
ent offices, yet steered by the ministry and ultimately by the 
Party, such as the KKI. Along with the organisational reform 
the Department of International Relations by the Ministry of 
Education was unified with the KKI.10From that on the KKI, 
which was originally established in 1949, was the central insti-
tution of the coordination and development of the solid cultural 
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propaganda of Kádár’s Hungary. After 1956 it concentrated 
more than before on the practical level of administration. Con-
sequently, on the one hand the KKI was a separate body in the 
Ministry of Culture, but on the other hand, in practice, the KKI 
was directly responsible for the Party and its departments, de-
pending on the particular case in question. Naturally, György 
Aczél as the highest controller of the cultural policy was the ac-
tual head of the KKI as well, but we can hardly find his name in 
the documents concerning the operations of the KKI. This is 
again an indication of the opaque, concealing power exercised 
in socialist Hungary. 
The larger campaigns, fundamental questions such as the 
way propaganda should be spread, how to disturb the immi-
gration etc., were carried out by the Political Committee of the 
HWSP, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Depart-
ment of Agitation and Propaganda and the Department of For-
eign Affairs of the HWSP. Although the KKI was the central co-
ordinating institution of the foreign relations, there were other 
bodies as well that operated in the same sector. The Committee 
for Culture and Information was established in 1960. It fell di-
rectly within the authority of the government, and it was the 
main organization organizing foreign propaganda at ideologi-
cal level, while the KKI was a practical organizer. There were 
representatives of KKI in the Committee for Culture and Infor-
mation, and it is likely that the KKI got instructions mainly 
from there, but also from the bodies mentioned above.11 
In the memorandum of the HWSP (1971) the writer espe-
cially stresses the point that cultural, scientific and educational 
foreign propaganda is an organic part of propaganda in gen-
eral, and propaganda of different fields shares the same aim, 
which is to promote political and economical connections and 
that way to open new possibilities for increasing the efficiency 
of foreign propaganda. According to the memorandum cultural 
and scientific propaganda had, however, some special features 
because of the special character of these fields, and it caused 
special requirements for the propaganda. Ideological commit-
ment was considered to be especially important for the propa-
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ganda made in the fields of culture and science, as these fields 
were seen as door openers in foreign relations. That is because 
culture and science opened doors to those groups and sections of 
people which were impossible to reach in any other forms of 
propaganda. Thereby it was possible to avoid the so called politi-
cal discrimination, which means in the case of Finland that the 
right-wing groups did not accept direct political propaganda.  
According to the memorandum referred to above, the Hun-
garian authorities presupposed that all the cultural activity be-
tween Finland and Hungary was harnessed to propaganda. For 
example, the writer of a memorandum from 196412 outlines the 
possibilities of propaganda in Finland. He emphasizes the im-
portance of individuals and personal relationships, and as an 
example he refers to the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian So-
ciety, Väinö Kaukonen, whose attitude and influence is praised. 
According to the memorandum, Kaukonen had realized that 
the task of the society was not only to cherish the relations be-
tween the two countries, but also to make ‘the gallant people of 
the new Hungary, who bravely and successfully build the new 
socialist life’, known to the Finnish people. The society had also 
managed to fulfil one of its basic duties, which was to 
strengthen its influence by increasing the number of members 
among new groups of Finnish people. The FHS was important 
propaganda machinery for the Hungarians in many ways. On 
the whole, all the bigger cultural and scientific happenings 
were seen as mutually supporting propaganda occasions. 
In the above memorandum, it is especially recommended to 
promote cultural products, making scientific and personal con-
tacts as well as ‘constantly being in public and influencing’. The 
basic idea was to convince the masses through smaller groups. 
The key figures of these groups were, according to the memoran-
dum, those influential persons who had the opportunity to influ-
ence public opinion. All the practical actions were to be harnessed 
to the main aim, which was to spread socialist ideology: film festi-
vals, art biennials and competitions, literature and theatre happen-
ings and matinées, scientific conferences and so on. From this 
point of view music and folk art were especially favourable art 
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forms, as there was no language barrier to hinder the reception of 
the message. Nevertheless, the Hungarians had to face the fact 
that they could not get socialist realism through in Finland.13  
 
4 Clashes 
In the cultural relations between the countries representing two 
different social systems the question was also about the politics 
of truth and a language game: which words were suitable to 
use, in what way were the patterns of thought forced onto the 
right track, who had the power to define the rules of the game 
and to say what was regarded as truth? In this case there were 
two language games, the socialist one of Hungary and the 
Western non-socialist one of Finland. At times there were great 
difficulties encountered in the two language games. The Hun-
garians had to think carefully about what issues were possible 
to bring up in Finland, or rather about those borders which 
were not to be overstepped without encountering resistance. It 
was a question of a certain vocabulary that defined the space 
where the accepted discourse could operate. If the borders were 
crossed, the group that played according to the other language 
game (the Finns) reacted negatively and propaganda thereby 
turned ineffective. On the other hand, borders were indistinct 
and changing. For example, the phrase ‘peaceful co-existence’ 
was very doubtful to the Finns at first, but soon it became a cru-
cial part of the accepted discourse of foreign policy of Finland.  
The chargé d’affaires of the Finnish Embassy in Budapest, 
Toivo Heikkilä, stated in his report from 1959 that there are a 
lot of doubts about the possibility of mutual understanding and 
‘real’ cultural exchange with peoples’ republics of Eastern 
Europe. There were doubts about the possibility of getting in 
contact with the ‘real’ people, instead of the party cadres. Ac-
cording to the chargé d’affairs, ‘Cultural relations with the East-
ern regimes are encumbered with several mortgages. We have 
every reason to be cautious when it comes to the plotting for 
peaceful co-existence by the Eastern regimes.’ Furthermore, 
Heikkilä stated that due to the differences between the social 
systems cultural exchange ‘[…] does not seem to be completely 
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genuine. There is some kind of unfamiliar and strange tone. Po-
litical appropriateness shows itself all too clearly. Tactical calcu-
lations produced by the idea of peaceful co-existence disturb 
the atmosphere.’ Heikkilä believed, however, that the purpose 
of the cultural exchange was not to infiltrate Communism into 
Finland, and the situation could thus be taken calmly. In addi-
tion, Heikkilä surmised, it would be unwise not to make con-
tacts with the communist world, because ‘Besides, it may be 
that in the course of time, artificiality that is hindering this co-
operation will disappear and it will turn open and natural. 
Right now the course seems to be in that direction, but all kinds 
of turns are possible.’14  
In the beginning of the 1960s great changes took place in the 
cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. The uprising 
in 1956 and the suppression of it aroused interest in Finns to-
ward Hungary and, furthermore, it increased the interest to-
ward Hungarian culture and literature, too. Since the official 
Finland refrained from commentating on the uprising, it did 
not cause any troubles for the relations between the two coun-
tries – on the contrary. In any case, the Hungarians were con-
vinced that Finland was not likely to act ‘unexpectedly’ in its 
politics. Furthermore, Finland was an important bridge builder 
between East and West, and through the good relations be-
tween Finland and Hungary the latter could make contacts with 
the really important Western countries. Furthermore, peaceful 
co-existence between the Soviet Union and Finland seemed to 
be possible and even successful, and in that sense Finland was 
important for the whole socialist camp.  
Still, little by little it became clear that the differences be-
tween the two different social systems needed to be taken into 
consideration. In all the socialist countries, also in Hungary, 
cultural life was centrally steered and controlled, and, accord-
ingly, the cultural relations were also organized by the official 
instances of the state administration without exception, 
whereas most of the cultural import in capitalist Finland took 
place within the framework of the rules of market economy.15 
Nevertheless, there have always been interests of (foreign) poli-
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tics in Finnish cultural politics, too, in addition to the laws of 
the market economy. 
 Although the suspicions of the Finns were reduced as the 
years went by, Hungarians still understood that they had to 
change their strategies fairly often, and that they had to make 
subtle and discrete propaganda. In a memorandum from 196616 
it is stated that the opportunities for propaganda in Finland 
were, first, as wide as possible in personal relations and, second, 
in ‘indirect information’. For example, it was important to make 
contacts with the right-wing press (Uusi Suomi, Helsingin Sano-
mat), when it would be possible to publish material supplied by 
the embassy in those newspapers. Furthermore, it was crucial to 
make contacts with radio, television and the news agencies. It 
was emphasized in the report that building networks for propa-
ganda purposes served not only the propaganda interests of 
Hungary, but also of the whole socialist camp.  
Accordingly, cultural exchange between Finland and Hun-
gary seems to have been permeated with propaganda endeav-
ours. For example the Friendship Weeks in 1967 was, according 
to a report written about it17, an occasion were the Hungarians 
utilized ‘every single opportunity to make propaganda’. Never-
theless, the Finns were uninterested. The writer complained, for 
instance, that the participants of the Finnish delegation were 
seemingly completely apolitical, and thereby ‘political informa-
tion’ did not reach them at all, except for an opportunity to an-
swer the often provoking questions posed by the Finns. At the 
end of the visit the hosts offered the Finns an opportunity for 
discussion about the people’s front movement, the NEM, for-
eign politics of Hungary, foreign cultural relations etc. Accord-
ing to the report, the guests did not pay any attention at all to 
the offer, even though it was made several times, so that the 
Hungarians had to give it up. Nonetheless, the Hungarians 
counted on the positive experiences the Finns had in Hungary, 
the consequence of which was likely to bear fruit later on. 
Again faith was exposed to the ‘right knowledge’; when the 
Finns had seen with their own eyes the success of the socialist 
Hungary, they would slowly but surely change their attitude 
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not only toward Hungary but toward the whole socialist camp. 
The Hungarians were even hoping for new propagandists to be 
found among the Finnish delegation, which once again empha-
sized the importance of personal contacts in propaganda.  
Around the mid-1960s the Hungarians were concerned about 
the tendency in the cultural relations between the two countries, 
which they even called ‘an age of stagnation’. In a report dated in 
October 196418 Ambassador Kurtán was worried about the 
changing emphasis of activity in cultural relations between 
Finland and Hungary. He saw the relations being at stake for 
two reasons: it was rumoured that money was tight, and that the 
emphasis in general was moving away from the Finno-Ugrian 
relations in Finland. The impression of the Ambassador was that 
there were also some kinds of political intrigues involved, and 
that some individuals were acting in their own institution’s or 
orientation’s interest. The Ambassador thought that the stagna-
tion was caused deliberately, and despite the difficult funding 
situation, it was rather a political-diplomatic problem.  
Taken as a whole, the situation was not especially critical, al-
though there actually was some kind of change in the emphasis 
of activity in Finnish cultural politics and general approach to-
wards the cultural relations. One of the consequences of that 
was an administrative reform of the Ministry of Education car-
ried out in 1966, the result of which was the change of the role 
of the Finnish sub-committee. Among the other new depart-
ments was a Department of International Relations, the task of 
which was to coordinate the relations in the fields of culture 
and science. Also the relations between Finland and Hungary 
fell within the authority of this new department. The reform 
was made on the one hand because of the revival of interna-
tional relations both with the West and with the East, and on 
the other hand because of the strong institutionalization of Fin-
nish cultural and scientific policy, which was completed at the 
end of the 1960s. 
The cooling down of the so far privileged relations with 
Hungary seems to have been confusing for the Hungarians, and 
they tried hard to find out what was going on. According to the 
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reports, Ambassador Kurtán made inquiries about who had 
said what to whom and why the Finns had acted the way they 
had. One of the reasons for the change of attitude was, accord-
ing to Kurtán, the approach of the head of the Department of 
International Relations, Kalervo Siikala, who was also the direc-
tor of the Finnish office of UNESCO. During his visit to Buda-
pest in summer 1964, he stated that as the work of the Finnish 
sub-committee was so weak, it would be worthwhile to 
strengthen cultural co-operation based on UNESCO, instead.19 
Suspicion toward Siikala was probably one of the reasons the 
Hungarians were so doubtful towards the reform in the Minis-
try of Education a couple of years later. 
According to the report by Ambassador Kurtán in 196420, he 
had found out that Academician Kustaa Vilkuna had some-
thing to do with the tightening of money and slackening of the 
Finnish-Hungarian relations. To quote Kurtán: ‘The fact that 
Vilkuna lies behind everything does not mean that he has 
turned into our enemy, but that he secures the interests of 
Finland by his political and diplomatic means. Presumably, in 
the future he will also give support to all kinds of relations be-
tween Finland and Hungary, but, naturally, he will do this 
bearing in mind the interests of Finland. Of course he has been 
acting this way all the time, even though we were not aware of 
it. Still, we must give our support to him in the future, too, but 
in the way that enables us to utilize him.’ During a conversation 
with Vilkuna later that year21 Kurtán inquired about the effects 
of a funding problem for the cultural relations between Finland 
and Hungary. According to Kurtán, Vilkuna was evasive and 
‘changed the subject’, which gave Kurtán a reason to adopt a 
sceptical attitude towards him. Kurtán seems to have thought 
that Vilkuna was in line with those who wanted to widen the 
relations both toward West and East, which would endanger 
Hungary’s previous privileged position. Hungarians were espe-
cially concerned about Finland’s plans to sign a cultural agree-
ment with France. 
In the reports mentioned above, one of the obstacles for the 
steps called for by the new cultural agreement is also seen to be 
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the factors of world politics. According to the analysis by the 
Ambassador Kurtán, in the new situation in world politics it 
devolved upon Finland to act ‘in a spirit of disruption and agi-
tation’, which did not offer favourable possibilities for recipro-
cal cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary. The Hun-
garians interpreted Finland’s plans to widen its cultural rela-
tions with other people’s republics than Hungary (in the first 
place with Poland and Estonia) as disruption and agitation as 
well. All this is connected to the point that only now it started 
to be completely clear that Finland was a part of the Western 
camp, and that culturally and mentally it was independent 
from the Soviet Union, despite good relations with it. In fact, as 
Kurtán stated in his report, even President Kekkonen had un-
ambiguously stated that ideologically Finland was certainly not 
a neutral country.22  
The Hungarians took up a doubtful attitude towards the new 
department of the Ministry of Education, although in the be-
ginning they thought that it would not reduce the influence of 
the joint committee.23 Nevertheless, in connection with the Fin-
nish reform the sub-committee became less important, as its 
role was seen rather as advisory. Also in Hungary the execution 
of the work plan was moved from the sub-committee for the 
Institute of Cultural Relations (KKI). From Hungary’s point of 
view, the centralization of cultural and scientific co-operation 
was solely a negative turn. Even in the working plans for the 
years 1968 and 1969 it was written that the changed attitude 
towards cultural relations by the Finns is ‘unambiguously nega-
tive’, since the Finns had come to the conclusion that the cul-
tural relations should be as equal as possible with all the for-
eign countries, and that such a privileged position as that of 
Hungary’s should not exist. The Hungarians also estimated that 
Finnish non-socialist hegemony had become suspicious to-
wards Hungary, because she had been so active in the cultural 
relations. For that reason, according to the analysis by the Am-
bassador, the Finns wanted to turn to the West in their cultural 
relations.24 According to a memorandum by the Ambassador 
Rudolf Rónai (196925) the purpose of the reform was besides to 
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centralize the state control as well as the funding of the interna-
tional cultural activity, also to weaken the special position of 
the Finnish-Hungarian relations among the cultural relations of 
Finland. He referred to Kalervo Siikala’s statement, according 
to which Hungary’s position had aroused wonder both in the 
West and the East. Accordingly, because of Finland’s new ar-
rangements the Hungarians started to intensify the activity out-
side the agreement. Many of the memoranda and reports from 
the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasize it. In practice, this 
trend meant intensification of the role of the FHS.26 
The emphasis of the idea of kindred languages and Finno-
Ugristics was one of the major problems for socialist Hungary 
in its relations with Finland. From the point of view of the 
Hungarians it brought the wrong kind of contents to the cul-
tural exchange, which they had difficulties to control. The Hun-
garians accepted Finno-Ugrian traditions as a starting point as 
useful and viable, but their purpose was to have the idea of kin-
ship effaced in the course of time. There was a lot of discussion 
on the topic around the mid-1960s between the Hungarian Em-
bassy in Helsinki and the Foreign Ministry of Hungary.27 They 
saw Finno-Ugristics and kinship thinking as nationalistic ways 
of thinking, which they wanted to purge from the cultural con-
tacts. On the other hand, the Hungarians thought that even 
though there were a lot of politically negative features in that 
thinking, it could still be utilized. The starting point would in 
that case be the fact that Hungary is a kindred nation of the 
Finns, which is successfully building up Socialism. In addition, 
most of the Finno-Ugrian peoples lived in the area of the USSR. 
Finland was the only one, which had a capitalist system, but, 
nevertheless, a well functioning Eastern policy. From this point 
of view it was possible to see Finno-Ugrian contacts as interna-
tionalism and peaceful co-existence.28 The Hungarians also con-
sidered writing a new history of Finno-Ugristics, ‘from a critical 
point of view’. Here we can see one example of how truth poli-
tics was functioning and in what ways the discourses being 
used were striving to be influential. In practice Finno-Ugristics 
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based on long traditions could never be properly eliminated 
from the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. 
 
5 The Cultural Agreement of 1959 
The 1958 American-Soviet cultural agreement was a landmark 
achievement and arguably one of the most successful initiatives 
in the Cold War. Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 
1956 posed a temporary setback to the cultural rapprochement 
between the superpowers. The agreement was so important for 
the USA that its reaction to the uprising was seemingly strong 
but at the same time the superpowers were negotiating about 
the agreement behind the scenes. On the 28th of February, only 
four months after the Soviet repression in Budapest, a survey of 
editorials revealed that the American and allied publics would 
look favourably upon a resumption of contacts with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.29 One cannot avoid thinking that it 
may have been significant for the cultural agreement between 
Finland and Hungary, that the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion signed an agreement of cultural exchange 27th of January, 
1958. However, it is not mentioned in the files. 
The practical political activity in cultural relations was based 
on the official cultural agreement and the executive role of the 
joint committee. The joint committee was divided into the sub-
committees of Finland and Hungary. After the war there was a 
temporary state of no cultural agreement between Finland and 
Hungary, as the new regime of Hungary did not take the old 
agreement as valid. Due to the administrative organization of 
the socialist countries the cultural co-operation with them re-
quired official arrangements, and the Western countries usually 
organized the cultural relations with them based on the agree-
ments. The accomplishing of a new – or renewed, according to 
the point of view – agreement was crucially important to get 
cultural exchange started after the war. After a fairly compli-
cated process the agreement was signed officially June 6, 1959. 
Typical of socialist regimes was an aim for official agreements 
at the state level with the foreign (especially with the Western) 
countries, the purpose of which was to prevent any material con-
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tradictory to the aims of the society to enter the country. On the 
background there was also a desire to strengthen the national 
cultural identity in the eyes of the rest of the world, and to prove 
that the change-over to the socialist system did not make culture 
become shallow and uniform. There were several converging 
features in the cultural exchange and the execution of the agree-
ments with the socialist countries resulting from the similarity of 
their administrative organization. First, it was typical to require 
a reciprocal approach, second the authority of the state authori-
ties and the sovereignty of the countries in deciding the con-
tents of the cultural exchange, and third the principle of the ex-
change without using currencies. That way the exchange did 
not encumber the balance of currency account. The requirement 
for reciprocal cultural exchange was carefully controlled, so 
that always precisely the same number of scholarship students, 
visitors, exhibitions and materials were exchanged between the 
countries involved.30 
Consequently, one of the preconditions for the recovery of the 
cultural relations between Finland and Hungary was the accom-
plishment of an official cultural agreement. On the other hand, 
Finland’s good relations with the Soviet Union were the most 
important premise for reviving Finnish-Hungarian relations. The 
matter of the agreement was taken up already in the late 1940s 
by both the Hungarians and the Finns (The Commission for 
Finno-Ugristics, the leaders of which were actually agents of the 
previous era). In a memorandum by the Hungarian Embassy in 
Helsinki from the year 1948 it is written about how the agree-
ment should be up-dated. The basic problem seems to have been 
the reciprocity, as Hungary was mainly responsible for assuming 
the expenses of the cultural exchange. The purpose of the new 
agreement was, obviously, to solve this problem.31 
After the Second World War the new socialist countries were 
very willing to make cultural agreements because of the ques-
tions of prestige and image. Nevertheless, there were many fac-
tors that affected the conclusion of the agreements. As sug-
gested above, the agreement between the USA and the USSR, 
signed in 1958, was likely to have been one of the most impor-
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tant preconditions for the agreements between socialist and 
non-socialist countries. The turning points in the relations be-
tween Finland and Hungary, however, were the FCMA Treaty 
between Finland and the Soviet Union (1948), and the Hungar-
ian uprising of 1956. Furthermore, an agreement with Finland 
was important for Hungary also because it was to be the first 
agreement concluded with a capitalist country. The aims im-
posed for the agreement were to get cultural relations under the 
control of the state, to broaden the impact of them to all areas of 
society, and to lay a political foundation for the cultural work in 
Finland.32 Finland, however, was for a long time reserved to-
wards new cultural agreements, and until the beginning of the 
1970s only the agreements with Hungary and Poland signed 
before the war were revived, and a new one was consummated 
with the Soviet Union (1959). The agreement was necessary first 
of all for the literary exchange. After the war there was a rather 
tense period, which started to ease off in the mid-1950s. The 
crucial turn was, however, the signing of the cultural agree-
ment, and after that the number of translations in both coun-
tries started to increase.33 
The Finns were aware of the political nature of the cultural 
relations and the agreement, and they strived to prevent propa-
ganda from entering the country through it. The Hungarians, 
however, found the agreement important, but they did not 
want to look too eager in the matter. In a letter from the year 
195434 the Foreign Ministry of Hungary tells the Hungarian 
Embassy in Helsinki to keep a low profile and to act only in the 
case that the Finns brought the matter up first, which happened 
the very same year. Academician Kustaa Vilkuna had an official 
discussion about the agreement question with the representa-
tives of Hungary, and on that occasion promised to bring the 
question up among the governmental circles, to be more pre-
cise, with the then Prime Minister Kekkonen35. Vilkuna was 
very active in the question of the cultural agreement, together 
with Counsellor Väinö Kaukonen and Professor Erkki Itkonen. 
That time the Hungarians found the agreement important from 
the political point of view. In a report by the embassy it is stated 
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that the reviving cultural relations with Finland will not only be 
an improvement of the relations with Finland, but will also help 
to normalize Western relations of Hungary. The final aim was, 
however, the peaceful co-existence between the two social sys-
tems36, which disturbed the Finns, as noted above. In the mid-
1950s the Hungarians were quite cautious with the matter, yet 
they scrutinized it, looked into the contents of the old agree-
ment, and sounded out the views of the Finns, but so that the 
Hungarians did not look too eager in the matter.37 
In the cases of Poland and Hungary, the old agreements 
were used as a basis of the new agreements. It is noteworthy 
that Finland concluded a new bilateral cultural agreement with 
Hungary even before the agreement between Finland and the 
Soviet Union, which was signed later in the same year. Conse-
quently, Hungary was both in 1937 and in 1959 Finland’s first 
contracting party. It must be pointed out that in comparison 
with the other cultural agreements of Finland the agreements 
with Hungary and the Soviet Union differ quite remarkably 
from the other agreements. In the case of Hungary the explana-
tion is the idea of the kindred languages and that the agreement 
originates in earlier times. The bilateral cultural agreement was 
concluded with France in 1970, which caused anxiety among 
the Hungarians. Usually the agreements with the Western 
countries were wider than those signed with the socialist coun-
tries, and, thereby, the agreements with Hungary and also with 
Estonia were more like the agreements concluded with the 
Western countries than with the socialist countries.38 
One of the key questions was how to name the upcoming 
agreement: whether it was a renewal of the old agreement, or a 
completely new one. A document from the year 195639 refers to 
the earlier agreement as a possible basis for a new cultural 
agreement. The matter was deliberated from various points of 
view, but the crucial view was that the earlier agreement was 
signed by ‘the fascist and chauvinist states of Finland and Hun-
gary’. According to the Hungarians, the earlier agreement was 
not valid, as it was concluded between the governments, and 
not between the countries. Nevertheless, for the Hungarians it 
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was also ‘politically appropriate’ to conclude a new, functional 
agreement with Finland, in consideration of the fact that the 
earlier agreement could not be a basis for ‘co-operation between 
the People’s Republic of Hungary, which was now building So-
cialism, and the Republic of Finland, which was in a process of 
democratization’40. The naming of the agreement was a bone of 
contention until the very signing of it, and finally the Hungari-
ans had to face the fact that if the new Finnish government 
would not accept the idea of a totally new agreement, the only 
possible starting point would be to negotiate an agreement, 
which was based on the earlier one. At the turn of the year 
1958–59 the Hungarians agreed on this arrangement, since it 
was still politically appropriate.41 
The polishing of the contents of the agreement required a lot 
of negotiation, as the nature and naming of the agreement was 
so complicated. Eventually, the new agreement was based on 
the earlier agreement. It was a little shorter, and the emphasis 
of the kindred ideology was lessened; for example there was no 
mention of the kinship day, which was celebrated in schools in 
the 1930s. It was accepted in the agreement that the anniversary 
of the liberation of Hungary on 4th of April was given attention 
in schools, whereas the earlier agreement mentioned the Hun-
garian national day of the 15th of March. In socialist Hungary 
both the 15th of March and the 20th of August were rather doubt-
ful, even dangerous, anniversaries42. Nevertheless, it was im-
possible to prevent citizens from celebrating those days in one 
way or another, and therefore the authorities strived to take 
away the true contents of the anniversaries by creating new 
traditions: socialist parades, flag-raising, literary matinées and 
so on.43 In the agreement there is a stipulation about the school 
books, and in 1937 it was still important for the contracting par-
ties that ‘in school books there must be attention to the culture, 
life and circumstances of the kin nation, and the books have to 
be written not only truthfully, but also in a friendly spirit’, 
whereas in 1959 the demand is to ‘give a clear picture about the 
other country’.44 The introductory chapter of the agreement had 
to be changed, because the name of the state of Hungary had 
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officially changed, but also because now the cultural relations 
ought to be developed ‘according to the best democratic tradi-
tions, for peace and progress.’ Nevertheless, there is still one 
crucial sentence left in the introduction: ‘[…] in consideration of 
the kin relations that join together these nations […]’. It can be 
stated that this was very exceptional in an agreement text of the 
countries representing the two social orders in the situation 
subsequent to the war. 
There was agreement on the possibility of appointing joint 
committees in different fields in addition to the executive joint 
committee, which is an indication of striving to have extensive 
general agreements, and a change-over of the focus of the activ-
ity towards the co-operation programs and plans by the joint 
committee. In the light of the documents we can see a radical 
change in the practice of the cultural exchange after the agree-
ment became effective, the most important change being con-
nected to the role of the joint committee. At the beginning the 
meetings of the committee were arranged every year, and from 
the mid-1960s every two years, which was a desire of the Finns. 
Interestingly enough, the participants of the committee had a 
rather different view of the working methods of the committee, 
depending on the country they came from. While the Finns 
strived for lessening the bureaucracy and lightening the execu-
tion process, the Hungarians, on the contrary, demanded more 
and more precise and binding work plans, and more detailed 
planning of the activity on the whole. For instance, the Finns 
refused to form working committees, but wanted to negotiate 
about the matters in full scale meetings instead, but it was not 
official enough for the Hungarians. Ambassador Kurtán stated 
in his report, however, that the Hungarians can expect good 
results from the Finns, if they did not make too categorical de-
mands on them. It was, for instance, unwise to use expressions 
like ‘it has to be done’, or ‘it needs to be done’, because the 
Finns did not like that kind of purpose and easily become reluc-
tant.45 Here we can see the differences between the two political 
cultures, which urged the participants to search for the com-
promises at the official level of the cultural relations. 
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The Finnish and Hungarian members of the joint committee 
seem to have had quite different ideas of the openness of the 
work of the committee, since the Hungarians found it clear that 
there were things that ought to be discussed off the record. One 
such case was for instance Kaukonen’s inquiry about the possi-
ble change of the lecturer of Hungarian language (István Nyirkos). 
According to the report about the meeting by Ambassador 
Kurtán, the Hungarians were quite annoyed about the incident, 
first because of the inquiry itself, and second, that it had been 
done during the meeting and not off the record. Later on the 
Ambassador discussed with Kaukonen the forms and proce-
dure of meetings. In the report Kurtán said that they had 
reached mutual understanding: in the future all the unpleasant 
or minor matters would be discussed off the record. According 
to the report, Kurtán and Kaukonen had agreed not to bring up 
such matters at the meeting, so that they would not ‘divert the 
members’ attention from the truly important matters’. Among 
the matters of no importance was, for example, the incapability 
of Endre Gombár to organize properly visits agreed in the 
agreement and organized by the consent of the joint committee. 
Gombár was responsible for the cultural exchange between 
Finland and Hungary in the KKI.46  
To all appearances doubts about the unwillingness of the 
Finns for co-operation with the Hungarians were dispelled in 
the mid-1970s, and the Hungarians could again count on the 
traditional willingness of the Finns to have cultural contacts 
with them. As the final aim of the Hungarians was to make 
propaganda in Finland, it did not matter that Hungarians had 
more activity in Finland than vice versa; in other words that the 
principle of reciprocity was not realized. Although scientific re-
lations were slowly reaching a satisfactory level, they were still 
far from the volume that cultural co-operation had reached long 
before. In the 1970s, however, the cultural and scientific co-
operation agreed on in the agreement continued to expand. 
Furthermore, the cultural exchange was still realized on the ba-
sis of the work plans by the joint committee. Accordingly, the 
endeavours of the Hungarians to expand also the scientific co-
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operation had been successful, as in the working plans for the 
years 1974–75 the forms of scientific co-operation, such as the 
expert visits between the universities and the student- and 
trainee exchange were emphasized. Moreover, also in the field 
of culture the stress seems to have been on the expert exchange 
at the cost of artist exchange and art happenings.47 
Along with the agreement there was a new level in the activ-
ity, which seemingly made the planning and practice of the cul-
tural exchange open and translucent. Nevertheless, in practice 
this was not the case, because although the decisions were 
made in the meetings of the joint committee and there were re-
cords and documents about everything, a second, secret level 
still remained. The Hungarian way to deal with some matters 
unofficially and off the record was one of the clearest indica-
tions of it. As a matter of fact, also the huge amount of paper 
increases the opacity of the activity. It even feels that this moun-
tain of paper conceals the way decisions were made in reality, 
as well as what was decisive in decision-making in the end. 
 
6 The Finnish-Hungarian Society as Propaganda Machinery 
Some of the institutions were originally founded and harnessed 
for propaganda. For example, the Finnish-Hungarian Society 
was established, because the Hungarians realized that they 
needed an organization through which they were able to reach 
the masses of the Finnish society.48 The idea of re-establishment 
of the FHS was already put up in the late 1940s. The first docu-
ment I have found is from the year 1948, when the Hungarian 
Ambassador in Helsinki had as his opinion that the matter was 
not possible to handle before the re-establishment of the diplo-
matic relations between Finland and Hungary. In addition, 
broadening the relations between the two countries became pos-
sible due to the FCMA Treaty concluded between Finland and 
the Soviet Union the same year. Furthermore, after the war there 
were even boycotts hindering the revival of the cultural relations 
between Finland and Hungary.49 
Usually the activity of the Finns in the agreement issue is em-
phasized in the sources, but the documents show clearly that the 
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Hungarians were at least as active, behind the scenes. For in-
stance, in a report by the Ambassador Ferenc Münnich (1950) he 
mentions that information about Hungary should be organized 
more efficiently, for example through the planned FHS. Accord-
ing to the report, the matter had proceeded to the point that the 
Ambassador had some persons, who could establish the society, 
and he presumed that the society would be established by Octo-
ber or November of the same year. The main purpose was not, in 
the beginning, to create a mass organization, but to get ‘informa-
tion’ better organized and to avoid the publicity of the embassy 
in ceremonies or cultural occasions.50 A friendship society be-
tween Finland and Hungary already existed, but in a new situa-
tion, and with the new ruling powers it was ideologically prob-
lematic, in the same way as the old cultural agreement. Quoting 
the first chairman of the FHS, Ele Alenius: ‘The old friendship 
society was very suspicious about new Hungary, and visa 
versa’51. According to Väinö Kaukonen, the tone of the new soci-
ety was different from that of the old one: now the leading role 
was played by the workers’ delegations.52  
There was also a Club for the Friends of Hungary, which 
started before the war (1937), but it was never in favour of the 
establishment, like the ‘official’ Finnish-Hungarian Societies be-
fore and after the war. The club kept quite a low profile in its ac-
tivity, so that it did not attract the attention of the Hungarian 
Embassy, at least not until 1956, when the members of the club 
became active due to the uprising in Hungary by e.g. organizing 
collections and writing in newspapers about the matter. In 1957 
it was written in a report by the Ambassador53 that the club is 
illegal and that it sympathizes with Horthy’s Hungary. On the 
other hand, the club seems to have been harmless for the FHS. In 
1960, when FHS celebrated its 10th anniversary, the Club for the 
Friends of Hungary was at hand again. The Secretary of the FHS 
stated in his main speech of the celebration that the club was not 
interested in making contacts with new Hungary, and that it was 
operating on a very narrow basis. Interestingly enough, the old 
Finnish-Hungarian Society was not mentioned at all as a fore-
runner of the new FHS.54 
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The problem with these old friendship societies was, natu-
rally, that they were labelled as the organizations of the kinship 
work, which was prohibited in the peace contract. Nevertheless, 
the Club for the Friends of Hungary was not suppressed, as it 
was apparently not officially registered. That was obviously 
one of the reasons the Hungarians regarded it as illegal. In any 
case, all the activity that could be seen as kinship work was ab-
solutely prohibited, especially when the Allied Control Com-
mission was still in Finland. The old kinship activists continued 
their work within the framework of the club, although accord-
ing to different principles than before the war. They for exam-
ple kept in contact with the Hungarians who stayed in Finland 
and organized programme connected to Hungary and espe-
cially to its culture. Vicar Martti Voipio was a key figure in the 
club. Viljo Tervonen, who was active in the club, says that it 
functioned until its members grew old and the club died ‘a 
natural death’.55 
The special features of the various friendship societies, 
among them the Club for the Friends of Hungary, were ana-
lyzed in a document from the mid-1960s56. There is a general 
view of the history of cultural relations between Finland and 
Hungary and of the role the kinship ideology played in those 
relations. This ideology is labelled as nationalist and politically 
right-wing. According to Tervonen, the authorities of Hungary 
did not have a negative attitude towards the club, but the 
documents tell another story. In 1964 Ambassador Kurtán ana-
lyzed the candidates for the board of the FHS, e.g. professor 
Antti Sovijärvi, who was one of the active members of the club, 
which was considered as a problem and led to the long lasting 
negotiations about his joining the board. The club was accused 
of hesitation with respect to Sovijärvi. The reason for the en-
deavours to get Sovijärvi into the FHS was the aim to isolate the 
club from all the activity concerning Hungary. The plan seems 
to have been successful, because Sovijärvi agreed in giving a 
speech (both in Finnish and in Hungarian) to President 
Kekkonen, when a folk music group from Debrecen was per-
forming in Helsinki. The occasion was organized by the FHS, 
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and thus, according to the interpretation of the embassy, it 
came to engage Sovijärvi into the society in the eyes of both the 
audience and the membership of the society. 
The majority of the key members of the FHS were close to 
the FPDL or the FCP, in other words communists, but there 
were also politically independent members – the founders of 
the society from the very beginning wanted to get together a 
membership of the representatives of different aspects of Fin-
nish society, with different views. It strived to be an organiza-
tion for the whole nation, to quote Alenius. Nevertheless, the 
society had to take into consideration the foreign policy of 
countries representing different social orders, and the activity 
of the society had to be in harmony with it.57 According to 
Hungarian documents, however, the task of the FHS was to 
propagate achievements of the socialist Hungary in the fields of 
politics, culture and economy, as well as the life of the Hungar-
ian working class, farmers and intelligentsia. One of the crucial 
tasks was also to give a contribution to the masses who fought 
against the Western, decadent culture, and that the society was 
‘fighting for the international solidarity, and had a role to play 
in the fight for peace, as well as the building a society and a 
world that respected the equality of all human beings.’58 Official 
foreign policy was indeed taken into consideration, when the 
number 4/1953 of the Suomi Unkari -lehti (the Finland Hungary 
Magazine) was dedicated to Stalin. 
In any case FHS was dependent on the Hungarian Embassy, 
and every action had to be accepted by it. For example, the soci-
ety had to send bulletins to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 
which checked them, made comments on them and gave further 
instructions for the information spread by the society. The em-
bassy sometimes also complained to FHS of not informing the 
embassy about the plans precisely enough in advance59, whereas 
the embassy drew up monthly reports for the Foreign Ministry 
about the activities of the FHS. In a letter from the year 1953 the 
ministry reproaches the embassy for not keeping a firm hand on 
the society, so that the embassy should pull itself together and 
give the society a push. One of the most important tasks was to 
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recruit new members from new sectors of Finnish society, the 
main task of the society being ‘to search for […] a way to those 
public circles that have until now bore distrust of our peoples’ 
democracy, or had even adopted a harmful attitude towards it.’ 
The task of the leaders of the society was to make contacts with as 
many public circles as possible, among which efficient propa-
ganda could produce good results. Thereby, the FHS would not 
only help the Hungarians, but also the international peace move-
ment.60 The openness of the role of the embassy behind the FHS 
was deliberated about as well, and it was decided to keep it ‘in 
certain matters at a general level and concealed’.61 
The activity of the FHS grew rapidly, the purpose of which 
was to enlarge the basis of the FHS. Among the new activities 
there was a magazine, Suomi Unkari -lehti which was estab-
lished in 1952. At first the majority of the editorial material 
came from Hungary, and thus only a tiny minority of the arti-
cles was contributed by Finns. Also the twin town movement 
and Friendship Week organized every third year, were the re-
sponsibility of the society. In time the twin town movement be-
came a remarkable factor in the relations between Finland and 
Hungary, also because it furthered the co-operation between 
the society and the Hungarian Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias 
Népfront).62 The twin city activity was seen as important in 
bringing Finland closer together to the socialist camp: it was 
supposed to be a manifestation of a peaceful co-existence doc-
trine in practise.63 Later on the Hungarians noticed that the twin 
city relations also had other political advantages. In 1969 the 
Ambassador wrote in his report that it had been possible to 
make contacts with the social democrats through the twin city 
relations during the time when they were still enemies: the twin 
city relations were a natural way of co-operation with them, as 
it was not yet possible at an official level.64 
In 1956 the Embassy wanted to find a new chairman for the 
Society to replace Alenius. According to Alenius himself, the 
reason was that the new Ambassador, József Szipka, distrusted 
Alenius. Szipka went to the office of FCP to announce that 
Alenius was no longer suitable as a chairman of the society, be-
ON THE BORDERS OF PROPAGANDA AND WHAT CAN BE SAID  
 331
cause he suspected Alenius of having connections with the CIA. 
Alenius mentions this incident as an example of the stalinist 
manner of proceeding.65 On the other hand, according to a later 
memorandum by the Ambassador Kurtán, the reason for the 
resignation of Alenius was unknown, although Kurtán wrote 
that according to his sources of information Alenius was in-
volved in an argument, as a consequence of which he was of-
fended and resigned. Nevertheless, Alenius was a key figure for 
the Hungarians, and they wanted him to stay in the society. Ac-
cording to Alenius himself, in 1963 Ambassador Kurtán pre-
sented an official apology to him because of the incident.66 
The chairman designate, Professor Erkki Itkonen, then, 
joined the board of the FHS at the beginning of 1954 together 
with Väinö Kaukonen and Erkki Ala-Könni among others. He 
paid a visit to Hungary the same year, and when applying for 
the visa, he was evaluated by the embassy. According to the 
report, Itkonen was estimated to be ‘just a linguist’, and, fur-
thermore, so completely apolitical, that he had for instance 
never been a member of any organization. From the point of 
view of the Hungarians, thus, it was a victory for them to have 
him as member of the FHS. Hungarians calculated that through 
Itkonen they could reach the traditional, conservative academic 
circles, that had until then been beyond reach. Itkonen himself 
had a different impression about his task, as he said in a speech 
after his nomination: ‘Let the kinship spirit encourage us, and 
let us strive to build such an organization, which all the friends 
of our sister nation could join’.67 It is worth noting that Itkonen 
mentioned the kinship ideology, which was forbidden even as a 
word, and in that kind of connection. 
The planned visit of Itkonen was an important starting point 
for Hungarians to get these cultural-scientific circles inside the 
sphere of their influence. To achieve this goal, it was important 
to handle Itkonen in the right way, considering his character. Ac-
cording to a memorandum, in a discussion with him, the method 
to be used was to keep subtle, patient and not too aggressive. 
According to the instructions, Itkonen should first be supplied 
appropriate and thorough information, and only after making 
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good and lasting relations with him, would it be time to ‘work 
further on him’.68 The next year Itkonen was one of the candi-
dates for a new member of honour of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. The purpose of taking a new member of honour was – 
officially – to advance cultural and scientific relations between 
Finland and Hungary. Academician Vilkuna became the new 
member of honour, in the end, and in reality the most important 
qualifications for him were his good relations with PM 
Kekkonen and his strong political influence on the whole.69 
In May 1956 professor Itkonen was invited for a supper by 
the Ambassador Szipka to discuss the change of the chairman 
of the FHS. During the evening Kurtán suggested Itkonen to 
become a new chairman, but Itkonen hesitated on grounds that 
he did not want his name to be used for political purposes. The 
Ambassador, nevertheless, affirmed that the society was a 
completely apolitical, cultural organization, and that the claim 
that it would be a political weapon of the embassy, was nothing 
but wicked slander of the right wingers. Itkonen was convinced 
and agreed. He did not, however, wonder about how the Am-
bassador could decide or even negotiate regarding the chair-
man of the society, which should have been independent from 
the embassy.70 Itkonen’s period as chairman remained short 
and he resigned on the 26th of October. The reason for the sud-
den resignation was the uprising, more precisely the demand 
for Itkonen to express a public condemnation of it which he 
could not do. The following day the society decided to join the 
appeal of the Finnish Red Cross for helping the distressed peo-
ple of Hungary by organizing a collection of funds. After the 
suppression of the uprising the operations of the FHS went on, 
and contacts were made with the new ruling powers of Hun-
gary under a leadership of the new chairman, Erkki Ala-Könni. 
In the annual report of the society the uprising is characterized 
as ‘a disorder of the previous year’.71  
After the suppression the FHS had direct contact with the 
KKI during the whole socialist era. Formerly the connections 
between the society and Hungary went through the embassy. 
This new arrangement gave the FHS an official role in the rela-
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tions between Finland and Hungary, given the position of KKI 
in the hierarchy of Hungarian foreign policy. According to a 
memorandum by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary (1973) the 
political steering of the FHS was a duty of the Foreign Ministry, 
and at a practical level a duty of the Hungarian Embassy in 
Helsinki. The KKI was, however, the base of the practical cul-
tural and propaganda work of FHS. The Patriotic People’s front 
was only involved in the organization of the so called Friend-
ship Week every third year.72 
The rules of the FHS were changed in 1957: now the only 
purpose of the society was to ‘work to develop and promote the 
cultural relations between Finland and Hungary, and to con-
solidate the friendship between the two countries’73. The rather 
strong contention of Itkonen of the uprising did not, in the end, 
hinder the co-operation between him and the Hungarians. In a 
report from the year 1963 it is written that it was extremely im-
portant to get Itkonen back to the management of the FHS. The 
embassy had an interesting hypothesis about the reasons for the 
resignation of Itkonen: it was said to have happened because 
Itkonen had an argument with the previous chairman Alenius. 
Thus, Itkonen’s resignation seemed to be a matter that con-
cerned only the Finns – as the resignation of Alenius as well. At 
the same time the uncomfortable ‘problem of the 1956’ could be 
avoided. It seems to be that the Hungarians could close their 
eyes to a ‘wrong’ attitude to the uprising, when a useful repre-
sentative of bourgeois Finland was in question, as it was not 
realistic to expect orthodox thinking, whereas the leftists were 
objects of a careful ideological investigation in the context of the 
uprising. It was a question of political appropriateness which in 
certain manoeuvres passed ideological matters. 
It seems to be that being a member of the FHS tended to in-
crease political credibility, although it was not as big credit as 
being a member of the Finnish-Soviet Society. Already in 1960 
the society had five deputy chairmen and actually 20 board 
members. As noted above, the Hungarian Embassy was active in 
choosing the chairman and the board members. One could think 
that some of the board members were there only because of po-
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litical reasons, especially those who in fact did not take part in 
the meetings.74 Being a member of the FHS was also favourable 
for those who wanted to visit Hungary and were examined by 
the embassy: the leaders of the society could also guarantee 
them.75 The board members of the society took part in the visits 
of the Hungarian delegations to Finland, and they also reported 
on conduct unbecoming to them to the embassy, such as during 
the visit of László Kovács in 1960. According to the report by the 
secretary Sulo Muuri to the Hungarian Embassy, Kovács men-
tioned that he was ‘on a free soil again’, and that it would be dif-
ficult to vote in the coming elections in Hungary, because ‘there 
are only oranges similar in appearance on the plate’.76 
The role of the FHS changed after the signing of the cultural 
agreement in 1959. Until then it had partly been a substitute of 
the official bodies of cultural relations, in the post-war situa-
tion.77Due to the agreement, part of the duties that were earlier 
the responsibility of the society, were now moved to the state or-
gans, but especially the financial preconditions of the society im-
proved remarkably at the same time.78 The FHS and some of its 
central figures were fairly influential in completing the new cul-
tural agreement between Finland and Hungary, as concretely as 
negotiating the details of the agreement in Budapest in 1957. 
Despite the agreement, the society’s role was from then on 
the propaganda and information activity outside the agree-
ment. It was an important sector, as the official cultural ex-
change was based on the traditional co-operation between the 
finno-ugrists and ethnologists, which was based on the idea of 
kinship. Thus, it was necessary to have an organ to take care of 
the tasks that were not mentioned in the agreement, such as 
advancing Socialism in Finland.79 Broadening of the role of the 
FHS was also connected to the rearrangements made in the 
Finnish cultural politics in the 1960s, which changed the role of 
the joint committee. 
Thus, the influence of the FHS both in cultural relations and as 
propaganda machinery remained great despite the agreement. 
And the striving to expand the sphere of influence of the society 
especially to the right-wing circles of Finland was still on the 
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agenda in the mid-1960s. The Secretary of Legation, Mr Vincze 
wrote in his report in 1964 that the basis of the society should be 
further broadened to get new members from such public circles 
which could increase its influence in Finnish society. He also 
stated that ‘we must create such an impression that FHS is 
autonomous in a way a truly Finnish organization should be’. The 
embassy was still strictly steering the operations of the society, as 
becomes apparent in a mention that the embassy had considered 
closely and from different points of views the composition of the 
board of the society. They had come to the conclusion that they 
should also take right-wingers, but not to the extent that they 
would have real influence on the line of the FHS. Comrade Poiko-
lainen from the FCP, who was present at the meeting, assured that 
the management of the society would be kept in the hands of 
communists, and if some troubles appeared, they would immedi-
ately ask for instructions from the embassy.80  
The basic line of policy was that the embassy indirectly sup-
ported the policy of the FCP, and accordingly, the communist 
members of the FHS were to support the aims of the Hungari-
ans inside the society. The interests of the embassy and the do-
mestic political interests of the FCP were consistent with each 
other: they wanted to establish relations with the radical wing 
of the bourgeoisie in order to be able to disseminate socialist 
propaganda there. The aim behind the establishment of rela-
tions with the right-wingers was to advance the people’s front 
policy in Finland. The establishment of the front was the main 
goal of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary in 
the 1960s, when the Hungarians rested their hope on the rise of 
a leftist radicalism especially among the youth and cultural cir-
cles. This ideological battle could, such were the expectations of 
the Hungarians, open new prospects for Hungary to advance 
the victory of Socialism in Finland, which was the final aim. 
Consequently, cultural diplomacy was considered a central area 
of operations, and its sectors to be the cultural agreement, the 
planned culture and science centre of Hungary, and the FHS. In a 
report from the year 1963 cultural relations are mentioned as the 
most important manifestation of Finnish-Hungarian relations.81 
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The leaders of the society seem to have been willing to par-
ticipate in the accomplishment of the mission the embassy had 
set to the FHS as well, at least still in the 1960s. In 1964 the 
chairman Väinö Kaukonen said in his speech he gave at a meet-
ing between the representatives of the society and the embassy 
that the duty of the society was, besides cherishing the tradi-
tional friendship between Finland and Hungary, also to make 
the Finns ‘like’ the new Hungary, whose people were bravely 
and successfully building up new life. This statement even sur-
prised the Hungarians, although there had been signs of a 
change of the line earlier already. The Ambassador Kurtán sur-
mised that the change of the line happened because of the influ-
ence of Kaukonen, who is characterized in the memorandum as 
one of the leading figures of the radical professors. The FHS was 
openly political and communist until Kaarina Virolainen started 
as chairman in 1964. The new chairman was important for the 
Hungarians especially as Mrs. Johannes Virolainen (Johannes 
Virolainen, one of the leaders of the Agrarian Party, since 1965 
Centre Party, PM in 1964–66), and as a close friend to Mrs. Sylvi 
Kekkonen. In addition, she was a central figure in Finnish social 
life and in the circles of the Centre Party.82 
The endeavours to increase the importance and to broaden the 
sphere of influence of the FHS seem to have been successful, since 
in 1964 President Kekkonen himself was present at a gala evening 
organized by the society. According to a memorandum by the 
embassy, the presence of Kekkonen attracted attention in political 
and diplomatic circles, because he had not been present on occa-
sions of any of the friendship societies, except the Finnish-Soviet 
Society. Ambassador Kurtán assumed that there were several rea-
sons for Kekkonen being there. The main speech was given by the 
writer Väinö Linna, who ‘belonged to Kekkonen’s immediate cir-
cle’, and, according to Ambassador, the FHS had ‘managed to 
achieve a role as a Finnish institution’. There were also higher po-
litical reasons: Khrushchev visited Hungary about that time, and 
the communiqués given by him and Kádár were in line with 
Kekkonen’s foreign policy: they stressed the importance of peace-
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ful co-existence. Naturally the Ambassador referred also to 
Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary the previous year.83 
In the mid-1960s the Hungarians found new ways of making 
propaganda, especially among the university students. The New 
Friendship Circle (Új baráti kör) was established under the guid-
ance of lecturer István Nyirkos. It was an organization for the 
students, and the sole purpose of it was to strengthen propa-
ganda among them. Later it was planned to be merged with the 
Petőfi Circle (Petőfi kör) of the FHS. The embassy wanted its role 
to remain a secret, as well as the fact that lecturer Nyirkos acted 
as guided by the embassy.84 Another Petőfi Society was estab-
lished as well, but it was independent from the embassy. Conse-
quently, the embassy attacked it and its leader, Sulo Ikonen. In a 
report by the embassy there is a claim that Ikonen himself is a 
homosexual, and that he has established the society to be a meet-
ing place for his kind. According to the report, the aim of this 
new society was to cause damage to the FHS and its Petőfi Circle. 
Ikonen had to resign from the FHS ‘obviously because of his 
unhealthy inclinations’. The embassy even went to the point 
that when the members of the Petőfi Society planned a trip to 
Hungary, the embassy advised the KKI not to receive them.85 
According to Outi Karanko-Pap, some of the friends of Hun-
gary avoided the FHS because of its political nature, and they 
wanted to establish a new society as a non-political association 
of those who were interested in Hungarian culture. Karanko-
Pap says that the embassy put hard pressure on the Petőfi Soci-
ety, and even expelled it from the premises of the FHS, where 
they had their meetings at the beginning.86 
The FHS went on actively when the political life became sta-
ble both in Hungary and in Finland. The FHS was the second 
largest friendship society in Finland after the Finnish-Soviet So-
ciety, even though the difference between the number of mem-
bers was considerable: the FHS had 1200 members, while the 
Finnish-Soviet Society had 220,000. Although there was the cul-
tural agreement and the executive joint committee, the position 
of the society remained fairly official. In the programme of 
every official, political guest and delegation from Hungary 
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there was included also negotiation or meeting with the man-
agement of the society. The FHS was a kind of model example 
of a well functioning friendship society as well. As the position 
and importance of the society was remarkable, there were 
sometimes also political tensions connected with Finnish do-
mestic politics, power relations and the inner power struggle of 
the FCP, where the dogmatic and moderate wings were strug-
gling for the hegemony of the party. In the party, as well as in 
the society, the moderate wing was in the majority. The em-
bassy paid attention to this power struggle between the Finns in 
the mid-1970s, when the boards of most of the local sections of 
the society and the central office in Helsinki were occupied by 
the representatives of the three major parties of Finland (Centre 
Party, SDP and FPDL). The embassy had also noticed that the 
parties had a power struggle for the positions inside the FHS. An 
example of how hot a question the power relations could be is 
that, to be quite sure, there was exactly the same number of repre-
sentatives from different parties on the board of Espoo’s FHS as 
on Espoo’s municipal government. Obviously as a consequence of 
mandate thinking, there were as many as 40 members in the man-
agement of the society at the beginning of the 1970s.87 
In the 1970s, the basis of the society remained the same: its 
duty was to operate under the guidance of the Hungarians in 
disseminating Hungarian propaganda in Finland, which the 
Hungarians saw as having succeeded during the 1960s. In a 
memorandum from the year 1971 it is written that during the 
three or four previous years informing the Finns about the 
Hungarian culture and ‘present-day life of Hungary’ had pro-
duced remarkable results. A special emphasis was laid upon 
the importance of the society as a basis of Hungarian propa-
ganda work in Finland. The continuous controlling and steering 
of the activities of the society were among the duties concerning 
Finland that were considered as the most important by the 
HWSP.88 The efficiency of the society as propaganda machinery 
was considered so important that according to a memorandum 
by the embassy (1974), the whole cultural work of Hungarians 
in Finland was based on the work of the society.89 
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In the mid-1970s the Finnish Ministry of Education wanted 
to move as many duties as possible hitherto belonging to the 
joint committees and ministries, to the friendship societies. In 
fact, the diminishing of the role of the joint committee suited 
the Hungarians well, because the joint committee was occupied 
by the ‘old school’ agents, who were ideologically problematic: 
they had connections with the ‘old Hungary’ and were politi-
cally too conservative. In the mid-1970s there were already 
many friendship societies (46 altogether) in Finland, among 
which the FHS was middle-sized, but, according to a memo-
randum by the embassy, among the most active.90  
In the course of the 1980s it started to seem that Kádár’s 
power was beginning to totter. The political nature of the cul-
tural exchange was lessening, as Hungary was liberating, and 
as the interests of Hungary towards Finland were changing. 
Now it was indeed more a question about the real cultural and 
scientific contacts and economic co-operation. According to 
Heikki Koski, who was the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian 
Society in the 1980s, the society started to have the reputation of 
a non-political organization of citizens, also from the outside. 
There was a further broadening of the political basis of the soci-
ety, as also the National Coalition Party (NCP) was brought 
closer to the society, which also happened on the party’s own 
initiative. In the 1980s the society was fairly active and influen-
tial, since it was the fourth largest of the friendship societies in 
Finland, after the Finnish-Soviet Society, Finnish-American So-
ciety and Pohjola-Norden (Nordic) Society. The Hungarian Em-
bassy was still active in controlling the operations of the society, 
but it is not at all relevant to compare the relation between the 
society and the embassy with the relations between other East-
ern European countries and their friendship societies, especially 
not from the point of view of politics or propaganda.  
The founding of the Centre for Hungarian Culture and Sci-
ence in 1980 caused another change in the role of the society, be-
cause now there was another strong institution that introduced 
Hungarian culture and science for the Finns. They did not, how-
ever, compete with each other, because in the 1980s the Finns 
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were more and more interested in Hungary, its culture, society 
and science. According to Koski, founding the centre as a matter 
of fact supported the society, and they also had close co-
operation with each other.91 Nevertheless, there was a conflict of 
political nature, which affected the political balance in the soci-
ety. That was in the mid-1980s, when the board of the society 
chose a new executive director, and the people’s democrats, the 
FPDL saw the post as belonging to their mandate. The board, 
however, gave its support to a candidate other than FPDL’s, and it 
seems to have been a lot of discussion on the matter, both in the 
society and in the circles of the FPDL.92 
 
7 The Limits of What Can be Said – Two Case Studies 
The limits of what can be said were not the same for the Finns 
and for the Hungarians, and it caused also clashes. Next I deal 
with two cases, that illuminate these different limits, first with 
the reactions that Academician Vilkuna’s actions caused in 
Hungarians, and second the limits that some of the Finnish 
public circles had set for themselves. At first there is Kustaa 
Vilkuna, who played various roles in the post- war political life: 
he belonged to President Kekkonen’s immediate circles, and, 
furthermore, he was a kind of messenger to him as well. 
Vilkuna also delivered information about Kekkonen’s opinions 
to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, which drew the attention of 
the Hungarians, too.93 Vilkuna’s relations with Kekkonen were 
important for the Hungarians, and in addition to that he acted 
as a Minister of Education for a shorter time. Although Vilkuna 
had an important role in reviving and developing the cultural 
relations after the war, the co-operation between him and the 
Hungarians became difficult before long. It seems to be that 
Vilkuna no longer accepted the role the Hungarians had chosen 
for him, and, moreover, he did not keep to the limits of the al-
lowed discourse, which is often reported with resentment.94  
One example is a report by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary 
about Mr. and Mrs. Vilkuna’s visit to Budapest in 1964. Accord-
ing to the report, they had posed provoking questions several 
times and behaved in a provocative manner, in other words, they 
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had not obeyed the unwritten rules about the allowed topics of 
conversation. Vilkuna had for example asked if lecturer Nyirkos 
was in the service of the Foreign Ministry of Hungary or if some 
individuals were Jews or not. ‘To crown everything’, Vilkuna 
was reported to have told jokes about the secret police of Hun-
gary, the ÁVH. Mrs. Vilkuna, on the other hand, had distin-
guished herself by asking about the situation of cardinal 
Mindszenty. The writer of the report, Rezső Mikola, proposed 
that in the future the Hungarians should be careful not to ‘frater-
nize’ with Vilkuna anymore. Mikola assumed that Vilkuna was 
withdrawing from scientific life, and entered into a less influen-
tial position in the foreign politics of Finland than before. Fur-
thermore, he referred to the coming presidential elections (1968), 
after which Kekkonen might not be a President anymore. Such 
being the case, Vilkuna would remarkably lose his influence.95 
The reactions of the Hungarians reveal, above all, the unwrit-
ten rules of what was possible to say and was not, within the 
framework of the cultural relations. Vilkuna constantly broke 
these rules, thus refusing to play a language game according to 
the Hungarian rules. As Vilkuna broke the rules, the confusion 
and reactions of the Hungarians were interesting: usually it 
seems that the hosts did not at all enter into conversation about 
the denied topics, but changed the subject or kept completely si-
lent. For example, there is a description in the report mentioned 
above about an episode, during which Vilkuna without any 
warning asked, how the Soviet Union paid for the uranium it got 
from Hungary. He added that the matter had been discussed in a 
‘propaganda occasion’ earlier that day. Since there officially was 
no propaganda in Hungary, but only ‘informational work’, the 
hosts obviously got so confused that the only answer Vilkuna got 
was, according to the report: ‘We will travel to Tihany tomor-
row’. In another occasion the answer to an inappropriate ques-
tion posed by Vilkuna was silence. The Hungarian official re-
called: ‘I did not react’. 
There were fairly strictly defined borders of the allowed and 
denied discourses in Finland, too, especially in the 1970s. The 
political atmosphere was inflammatory, which becomes appar-
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ent in a denunciation case that happened in the mid-1970s and 
almost developed into a scandal. In 1975 a Hungarian writer, 
Dénes Kiss, visited Helsinki as a reporter of the newspaper 
Népszava to report about the Hungarian Weeks in Helsinki to-
gether with the reporter of the newspaper Magyar Hírlap, Pál 
Belley. The Finnish Writers’ Union organized a meeting for 
them to have an opportunity to speak with Finnish writers. An 
unofficial conversation was organized in 11 March, and the par-
ticipants were supposed to discuss on the position and situation 
of the Finnish working-class writers. The Finnish participants 
were the interpreter and a writer Anna-Maija Raittila, writers 
Matti Rossi, Veijo Meri, among others. 
The topic of the conversation did not inspire the participants, 
not until the discussion turned into writer Väinö Linna, and the 
Finnish wars. Kiss was interested to know if there was a re-
markable novel about the Winter War, too, in Finland. As the 
Finns stated that there was not, the company started to search 
for the reasons for that. According to a current article of Suomen 
Kuvalehti96 Veijo Meri, who was analyzed to be a right-winger, 
saw as his responsibility to explain to the guests the reasons for 
the breaking up of the Winter War, after which he entered into 
an altercation with Matti Rossi (who represented the radical 
wing of Finnish communists, and it is worth pointing out that 
Rossi also had connections to Finnish Maoism in the 1970s). The 
argument became so excited that it started to be unbearable for 
the others. When Rossi declared as his standpoint that ‘Finnish 
Winter War has to be understood as an attack by international 
Fascism against Socialism’, Kiss tried ‘in a typical Eastern 
European manner’, as it is written in the article, to liven up the 
atmosphere by asking: ‘Which Fascism?’ (Melyik fasizmus?). 
Much later (1997) Kiss returned to the matter in an article he 
wrote for the Suomen Kuvalehti97, in which he states that he 
really was uncertain of which Fascism the excited writers were 
talking about. Moreover, he writes that he only wanted to point 
out that there was not only German Fascism, but also a Soviet 
one. This short and seemingly innocent utterance was to be the 
core point of the prolonged dispute. Raittila, who acted as an 
ON THE BORDERS OF PROPAGANDA AND WHAT CAN BE SAID  
 343
interpreter, asked Kiss if he was sure he wanted the question to 
be translated, and after receiving a positive answer, translated, 
trying to clarify: ‘Which Fascism, Eastern or Western?’. Kiss 
also tried to ease the situation by saying: ’We should not argue. 
We are both small nations. We are poets. We are not diplomats. 
Let us discuss on these matters as poets.’  
Later Raittila realized that she had made a crucial mistake. In 
the article in Suomen Kuvalehti later that year98 she says: ‘I could 
as well have not translated that sentence. Or I could have 
stayed in the literal translation: “Which Fascism?”’ The writer 
of the article stated that Raittila had misjudged the situation, as 
she had not realized that the argument between Rossi and Meri 
had provoked Rossi, ‘a man of absoluteness’, the way it had. 
Rossi indeed was so infuriated after the conversation that he 
threatened Meri that he would write about it. Meri thought that 
Rossi meant a newspaper article about the Winter War, but in 
reality Rossi wrote a letter to the Writers’ Union of Hungary the 
very same day. In the letter, written in English, Rossi accused 
Kiss of anti-Soviet propaganda. Rossi wrote, for example: ‘After 
I had given my view of the so-called “Winter War”, linking it 
with what followed and pointing out that the two wars should 
be regarded as one and that the deep reasons of the tragedy lie 
in the rise of Fascism in Europe, Mr. Kiss asked me whether by 
Fascism I meant also “Eastern Fascism”. As the term was un-
known to me, I asked Mr. Kiss to be more precise. Mr. Kiss ex-
plained to us that “Eastern Fascism” means the fascist and im-
perialist Soviet Union. I was obliged to point out that to me, as 
to the majority of my fellow-countrymen Fascism has an en-
tirely different meaning.’99 
Rossi added as his opinion that a statement such as that is not 
merely an opinion, but ‘everywhere a lie’, and, furthermore, can 
be seen as provocation in Finland. He stated that fortunately 
there were no ‘reactionary powers’ present, when the provoca-
tion would have succeeded, as it would have entered into the 
front page of every reactionary newspaper. Rossi judges Kiss’s 
behaviour as ‘irresponsible and stupid’. In the end of his letter 
Rossi threatens that ‘Mr. Kiss may rest assured, that should he 
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feel again inspired to travel this way, I shall not be present at 
those press conferences or meetings in which he expounds the 
particularities of Eastern Fascism.’ It was probably this sentence 
that lead to the misconception that Kiss would have expressed 
his opinion in a press conference, and not in a closed, unofficial 
conversation. For instance Suomen Kuvalehti100 writes about the 
incident: ‘[…] a letter, in which [Rossi] claims […] that Kiss made 
anti-Soviet propaganda in press conferences in Finland.’ 
The Hungarians’ actions caused by those two words reveal 
above all, that Finnish political atmosphere was indeed inflamma-
tory in the 1970s. Some public circles were very sensitive about the 
use of correct discourse, and accusations about anti-Soviet propa-
ganda were in some circles a striking weapon. On the other hand, 
this procedure illuminates how the Hungarian political machinery 
worked in a situation in which someone was suspected to have 
crossed the line of what can be said in public. Rossi’s letter was ad-
dressed to the Writers’ Union of Hungary, and he delivered a copy 
of it also to the Ambassador Rudolf Rónai, which, according to the 
interpretation of the Finnish Writers’ Union, made it a letter of de-
nunciation. Rossi did not inform the members of the Writers’ Union 
about the letter, so that they could hear only hazy rumours of it 
during the spring. Accordingly, they did not know what was in the 
letter, to whom was it addressed, and what was likely to be its con-
sequences for Kiss.  
Those two crucial words ‘Which Fascism?’ seem to have 
been so important that Hungarian authorities tried to find out 
precisely, first, what Kiss really said, and second, how the 
words could be interpreted. The case was examined and han-
dled in fairly many instances in Hungarian political system, it 
was commented in Finnish media, opinions, defensive letters 
and statements were made both for Kiss and for Rossi. In the 
following I present some citations from the documents, because 
in that way it is possible to illuminate the importance of the 
right discourse and the definitions of the accepted borders of 
what could be said. 
Kiss was questioned by Editor in Chief of his newspaper, to-
gether with the eye witness and a colleague of Kiss’s, Pál Belley. 
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Belley assured in his report101 that during the discussion about 
the Winter War, by ‘Eastern Fascism’ Kiss referred to stalinism, 
and that he did not notice that Kiss had said anything that 
could have been interpreted as anti-Soviet propaganda. Rather 
it was, according to Belley, a mistake made by the interpreter: ‘ 
[ … ] in my opinion, in his badly formulated question, by ‘left-
wing Fascism’ Dénes Kiss meant stalinism [ … ] I think in Kiss’s 
question there was not any hidden criticism against Soviet Un-
ion, rather it was an unfortunate formulation and an addition 
made by the interpreter which may have distorted the mean-
ing.102’ Also Népszava’s Gerő wrote a report103 in which he stated 
that the political view of Kiss is unambiguous: ‘He is a man, 
who loves his socialist country, and works for it.’ He assumed 
that the interpreter had made a mistake in the conversation in 
Helsinki, which had caused a misunderstanding. 
Kiss, on the other hand, had to write over and over again 
what had happened, ‘as in prison’104. Two of Kiss’s reports 
available in the MOL105 are long and thorough, and it is possible 
to get a clear picture about the conversation from the point of 
view of Kiss. The discussion seems to have waved from the 
original topic (position of the working-class writers in Finland) 
to TV’s influence on Hungarian films, from the relation be-
tween form and content to the Winter War. According to his 
own words, Kiss was considering the possibility that maybe the 
Winter War, which had not yet been analyzed in Finland, was a 
consequence of stalinism, in other words, Soviet Fascism: ‘Is it 
possible to think that a section of the Finnish public opinion 
could see the Winter War really as a consequence of – searching 
for a word – a Soviet Fascism?’106  
In the second report Kiss clarifies the core point of the con-
versation as follows: ‘I asked, if the Winter War was interpreted 
at least by some Finns, as stalinist – we tried to find the correct 
word together with the interpreter – imperialism. It is possible 
that also the word ‘Fascism’ came up. We were also discussing 
about the danger of Fascism in Europe, and its destructive in-
fluence, mainly concerning the past.’107 Kiss emphasized that 
this was only one of the many topics handled in the conversa-
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tion, and that he could not get an exhaustive answer to it, be-
cause the Finns entered into a controversy over the matter. Kiss 
reported that he had asked about the ‘Eastern Fascism’, because 
he had been wondering about the many pictures of Brezhnev 
and Mao in the streets of Helsinki. He had posed the question 
thinking about Maoism. ‘[…] later on, when the present-day 
danger of Fascism came up, I asked again, that was it not possi-
ble that also Eastern Fascism existed, or something similar, 
which means an extreme left phenomenon.’108  
Veijo Meri reacted as well, and wrote his own letter, which is 
dated 16 May 1975 and addressed to Népszava (editor in chief 
Siklós). This letter developed into some sort of a scandal as 
well, as it was thought to be even more dangerous than Rossi’s. 
Suomen Kuvalehti wrote on 11 July 1975 that Meri’s ‘[…] excited 
counter letter, which aimed to declare false all the imagined ac-
cusations against Kiss, was addressed to the wrong place.’ 
There were only rumours about the contents of Meri’s letter, 
and still in 1997 Kiss claimed that he had never seen the letter in 
question. The letter was, however, published in Suomen Kuvale-
hti as a Finnish translation already on 1 August 1975. In his let-
ter, written in English, Meri assures that ‘In discussion Mr. Kiss 
did not say anything, which could offend the Soviet Union.’ He 
refers to Rossi’s ‘original interpretation about the Winter War, 
which is not in line either with the Finnish one, or with the So-
viet one.’ To calm down the turmoil caused by his letter, Meri 
wrote also a letter to Suomen Kuvalehti109, in which he explained 
the background of his letter, and the reason why he sent it to 
Népszava. Meri wrote that he viewed it sensible to address the 
letter to the superior of Kiss in order to get the problem solved 
at the original source, so to speak. He added that in Finland 
there was no knowledge about in which instances the case was 
handled in Hungary. Meri also included the translation of his 
letter, which was published, too. Kiss himself had the concep-
tion that it was Meri’s letter that put him in a real danger, as 
appears in the article written by Kiss in 1997. Kiss said that he 
only got obscure threats, and that neither of the fateful letters 
was ever shown to him. At the end of his article Kiss labels both 
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Meri and Rossi as denouncers. In the light of the documents the 
situation was, however, completely different, as several Hun-
garian officials suggested the case to be closed already. 
In Finland, however, there were still many rumours going 
around about what would happen to Kiss. The rumours were 
about his dismissal from the Writers’ Union, losing his job, 
withdrawing his books from circulation, cancelling the Attila 
József Prize, sending him to physical labour, and so on. There 
were so many rumours that, according to Suomen Kuvalehti, 
‘There were times when it was the only topic people were talk-
ing about in the corridors of Finnish radio’. The last drop was 
the writers’ conference of Mukkula, where the Kiss-case was a 
hot topic, and where the management of the Writers’ Union 
constantly heard demands for concrete actions to help Kiss. The 
union felt that it was partly responsible for what had happened, 
because the conversation took place on the premises of the un-
ion, although Rossi sent his letter as a private person.  
In a letter dated 8 July 1975110 János Nagy from the Foreign 
Ministry informed the HWSP about the actions by the Finnish 
Writers’ Union. A delegation of the Union had approached 
Ambassador Rónai in 27 June 1975 that means, immediately af-
ter the Mukkula conference. The delegation gave the Ambassa-
dor a copy of a letter they had sent to the Writers’ Union of 
Hungary, which, together with Meri’s letter, had a great influ-
ence on the attitude of the Hungarian authorities towards Kiss. 
In the letter in question they rectified the misunderstanding 
that Kiss had been present at a press conference, defined Rossi’s 
actions as provocation, claimed that Kiss never used the expres-
sion ‘fascist and imperialistic Soviet Union’, and confirmed that 
Kiss referred to stalinism. In the end they referred to the good 
relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and appealed 
to Hungarian authorities to close the case.111 
In Nagy’s report referred above, it appeared that Rossi him-
self had also been examined. The result was that he was found 
politically ‘wavering’. He was also found to represent the minor-
ity of the FCP (the stalinists), and to have expressed negative 
opinions about what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and 
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so on. Thereby, during the thrashing out of the case, Rossi him-
self entered onto the dock, in a way: he himself as a writer and as 
a communist was carefully examined. Furthermore, his actions in 
the Kiss-case did not evoke a positive response even in Hungar-
ian official circles in any stage. In addition, Rossi’s friends inter-
viewed by Suomen Kuvalehti 112 stated that ‘There is enough pun-
ishment for Matti that the case has been published’, and: ‘It is not 
easy to be labelled as a denouncer.’ There were also some de-
mands for expelling Rossi from the Writers’ Union in the public. 
It seems to be that in July 1975 the Hungarians were willing 
to bury the case whereas in Finland, because of the electoral 
campaign and an excited political atmosphere, the case was still 
discussed in turmoil. The Kiss-case is even mentioned among 
the most known cases of the year 1975113. Meanwhile, despite 
the uncertainty and even fear that Kiss was experiencing114 the 
Hungarian authorities started to reach a decision. Kiss was 
given an admonition, and his exit permit had been denied until 
the end of the same year.115 Accordingly, when it comes to the 
Hungarians, the case was closed. After July 1975 the Hungarian 
documents only deal with the articles published in the Finnish 
press about the case. The Hungarians were surprised about the 
turmoil in an interview by Suomen Kuvalehti, in which they state 
that nothing at all had happened to Kiss. According to Kiss 
himself the Finns had been constantly asking him about the 
case, also in Hungary116.  
 
8 Changing Boundaries 
As a conclusion we can state that the Finns were sometimes 
even more sensitive than the Hungarians, when it came to al-
lowed discourse, because of both domestic and foreign political 
reasons. Second, it is clear that the crucial boundary line in this 
case was not the remark about the ‘Eastern Fascism’, but if Kiss 
meant stalinism or ‘the fascist Soviet Union’ in general, by that. 
From the point of view of the Hungarians, it was correct and 
orthodox to criticize Stalin, but in the opinion of Finnish radical 
communists, including Rossi, that was among the denied 
themes as well. It is also clear that as the limits of what can be 
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said were obscure and changing people could not know what 
was allowed and what was denied at a certain moment117. In 
this case, both Dénes Kiss and the Finns presumed that the 
room to move was far smaller than it was in reality. 
The aims of Hungarian foreign politics and propaganda fol-
lowed the policy of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the propa-
ganda made by Hungary in Finland was aimed first at the peo-
ple’s front policy, and second, at the victory of Socialism in 
Finland. This aim clashed in the course of time – in the 1960s – 
with the fact that it was possible to realize the policy of peaceful 
co-existence, but otherwise the reality was that as her ethos, ori-
entation and aims Finland was undoubtedly right wing and 
orientated to the West, even though she was seemingly a neu-
tral country. As the liberalization went on in Hungary, and as 
the Kádár regime was coming to an end, also the aims and con-
tents of cultural exchange were changing. At the same time, the 
space of discourse was widening, and eventually the change of 
system in Hungary changed the framework and practice of cul-
tural exchange in a drastic way.  
Nevertheless, as Foucault says, power is everywhere and 
ever-present. However, we should bear in mind his insistence 
on the positive, productive characteristics of modern appara-
tuses of power. Thus, power constantly constructs in constitut-
ing discourse and knowledge. ‘Power does not weigh on us as 
“a force that says no” instead it “induces pleasure”. […] It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression. […]. If power is strong 
this is because […] it produces effects at the level of desire – and 
also at the level of knowledge.’118 There are power relations in 
all societies and in all human interaction, at all times, also in the 
cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. However, to-
day the limits of discourse are set from different positions than 
in the era of Kádár and Kekkonen. 
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Hungarian and Finnish Family Farming in Village 
Community from the 1950s to the 1980s 
 
Péter PORKOLÁB 
 
 
1 Introduction 
This article purports to present the village family life both in Hun-
gary and in Finland from the 1940s to the middle of the 1980s. The 
method of study was the one of participating observation and the 
concrete data is preserved on magnetic tapes in the possession of 
the author. Such a method, aiming to introduce the life of one 
farmer family from both countries within the above mentioned 
period, has not been applied before. Another explanation is rele-
vant at the outset: because everyday language usage often con-
fuses the concepts of ‘country’, ‘rural’ and ‘village’, in this article 
the term ‘village’ has been adopted as it refers to a distinct com-
munity whereas the other ones are more indefinite. 
Significant political and economic changes took place in both 
countries after the Second World War, thus my research harks 
back to the 1940s. These changes should be taken into consid-
eration; otherwise understanding later events would be impos-
sible. Furthermore, in the middle of the 1980s remarkable 
changes took place in the village life both in Hungary and 
Finland, as well as in the life of the studied families. These 
changes introduced a new era in the life of village people. 
The main role in this article is played by active villagers who 
lead their lives, work and earn their living in a village. They are 
the ‘full value’ members of the village community; therefore 
their whole life connects them to their village. This article does 
not deal with those village inhabitants, who commute or lead a 
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double life and have a home in another settlement as well. It 
also means that the situation of the whole rural society is not 
discussed but a rather determinative stratum of it. 
The two families did not become the subject of research by 
chance. As a result of a wider survey, they both seemed suitable 
for a comparison from the point of view of the present study. It 
was important that both families should represent a determina-
tive stratum of families and family farms in their own countries. 
From Hungary the village of Tiszadob (in the north-eastern 
Szabolcs-Szatmár County) and family Porkoláb, while from 
Finland the village of Lankamaa (in Central-Finnish Laukaa 
parish) and family Hienonen were chosen. The following as-
pects were considered in choosing the particular families: 
 The families had lived in the same settlement at least for a period 
of three generations 
 The families have had a connection to agriculture and farming at 
least for a period of three generations 
 Within the time period of the research the family members led 
their lives as active villagers in the given village. 
Participant observation had a great significance in the research. 
The life of the Hungarian family on the farm has been personally 
observed since the 1970s, while it was possible to collect data on the 
Finnish family for a three-year period from 2000. The Finnish family 
had been visited and observed for a number of occasions to make a 
deeper study possible. One may remark that neither of the families 
had any significant interest in politics, although, for instance, it was 
customary for the Finnish family to support the politics that pro-
moted agrarian interests. 
This study is structured as follows: first, the results of the re-
search carried out in Hungary, the history of countryside, the 
village and the family are described. While analyzing the situa-
tion in Hungarian village community, more examples about the 
given village are cited than in the case of the Finnish country-
side. It is due to the fact, that the events that took place in Hun-
garian villages as a result of collectivization require deeper in-
troduction to the whole community. In Finland private farms 
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could function continuously and communal activities were 
formulated solely through contacts between friends or 
neighbors. The analysis of Finnish village community and the 
Finnish family follows the part discussing Hungarian settings. 
 
2 Hungarian Villages from 1945 to the middle of the 1980s 
In Hungary the political turn after 1945 changed the social 
structure of the village to a great extent. After the system of 
large estates came to an end, those without landed property, as 
well as small-holders were provided land or landed property 
according to the Land Redistribution Act enacted on 17 March 
1945.1 Already in spring 1945 villagers started to carry away be-
longings from the estates of Counts; they were encouraged both 
by sheer aversion and anger, but also by the post-war political 
upheaval. On 15th April 1945 the first land distribution cere-
mony took place also in Tiszadob. The Land Redistribution 
Committee invited priests and all the villagers to the event. 
In 1945 the plans of the communist and Smallholders’ Party 
were executed throughout the country in the process of land redis-
tribution. Accordingly, agricultural workers, manorial servants, as 
well as dwarf and small-holders owning land less than 10 cadastral 
holds (one hold = 0.5755 hectares) were given new land. In the vil-
lages land claiming committees were formed from claimants for 
land. They distributed the land following the principles and wishes 
of the above-mentioned two political lines. In Tiszadob the land 
claims committee was called together from those agricultural work-
ers who had not found work on large estates before 1945 owing to 
their leftist political views and also because the quality of their work 
was not sufficient enough for the demands of the landowners. Con-
sequently, they represented the poorest stratum of the rural society. 
Land distribution was completed at a great speed throughout 
the whole country, affecting 34.6% of the territory of the country,2 
namely 5.6 million cadastral holds.3 60% of this territory was given 
to agricultural workers, manor servants and dwarf holders. As a 
result Hungary became the land of smallholders.4 
However, these newly formed small estates lacked the neces-
sary means of production and cattle – draught power or sowing-
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seeds for cultivation. Also the adequate knowledge and agricul-
tural competence were missing in many cases. Landless people 
and those owning only a small plot were not earlier forced to 
plan and think comprehensively of all small details in organizing 
agricultural production. For many who faced these tasks for the 
first time, it was very difficult to start. Obviously those owning 
bigger farms or estates already before 1945 were in a more ad-
vantageous position, mainly in respect of agricultural organiza-
tion and planning. Experience and knowledge accumulated and 
handed over through generations is more valuable in many a 
cases than larger landed property and bigger stock, or a larger 
variety of equipment. The very farming itself requires a holistic 
approach and knowledge gained through instruction and ex-
perience, and it cannot be replaced by anything else. 
The speeded-up execution of land distribution was not only 
due to the general land-hunger in the country, but also to Soviet 
political influence. Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Allied Con-
trol Commission, made it clear to the Hungarian leaders that 
the early accomplishment of land redistribution also serves So-
viet military interests, i.e. that of the Red Army. The argument 
behind this was: if people realize the quick accomplishment of 
land redistribution, they will jettison the Fascist Arrow-Cross 
Government and the nation may become united.5 Thus the So-
viet leadership exercised influence on Hungarian policy as well 
as Hungarian people and public life as soon as they appeared in 
the country. The Soviet authority ended only with the change of 
the regime in 1989–1990. 
In spite of land redistribution, many people remained without 
land, or gained only a small landed property, which was not 
enough to provide living for a family. Many of these families left 
the villages and started a new life in a city, where as a result of na-
tional industrialization program factories were built attracting 
masses of village dwellers.6 In Hungary the flow of migration from 
the countryside to the cities, from agriculture to industry was con-
tinuous from the 1940s until the collapse of heavy industry. 
Those leaving Tiszadob did not choose commuting as so 
many did in other parts of the country, but they looked for new 
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livelihood in cities. They settled in the industrial area of Borsod. 
As the distance between Tiszadob and the main industrial cities 
of the area is not very long, those leaving Tiszadob moved to 
the following cities in the neighborhood: Leninváros, (today 
Tiszaújváros), Miskolc and Kazincbarcika. Mainly young peo-
ple left the countryside. For them it was important to reach the 
village where their families stayed7 – it was easier to leave if the 
city where they settled and started a new life was close to the 
onetime home village. 
Those staying at home and intending to earn a living from 
agriculture were to face difficulties. In the years of scarcity after 
the war, delivery obligations and progressive tax afflicted the 
villagers, especially the old8 and bigger landowners. Those har-
vesting form a plot smaller than 2 holds were to deliver 25 kg 
wheat, while those harvesting from 15 holds had to deliver 120 
kg bread crops. The principle ‘the more you have, the more you 
can stand’ was complied with.9 
In Tiszadob local committees, the Executive Committee and 
the Permanent Delivery Committee controlled different areas 
within the village, and taxed mostly old landowners, who had 
cultivated their own land already before 1945. The new land-
owners10 were in most cases the followers of the new regime, 
and since it was them who distributed the land, they were also 
provided bigger landed property, and it often happened that 
the new landholders owned far bigger landed property than the 
old landowners. The old landowners were regarded as men of 
the Count, men of the old regime. They suffered from the high-
est taxes and they were controlled most strictly in time of deliv-
ery. New local authorities aimed at making life difficult for the 
families they did not like. 
The idea of establishing co-operatives was present in Hungarian 
politics already in 1947, and later the idea of collectivization became 
popular in certain circles of rural population. At Tiszadob the one-
time agricultural workers – becoming new landowners – stood for 
the idea of collectivization and considered the co-operative form a 
good solution. Collectivization and the prospects of agriculture in 
general caused strong debates and conflicts among political leaders. 
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Rákosi and Gerő argued against the line represented by Imre Nagy, 
who was for a gradual change. Rákosi intended to fulfill Soviet de-
mands. The Soviets demanded the foundation of co-operatives in 
Hungary following the model of kolkhozes, even by radical means.11 
Opposed to this Nagy supported a long-term gradual change: co-ope-
ratives would have worked parallel to family farms, supporting them 
and this way gradually persuading the landowners to their side.12 
In the studies of Péter Veres the ideal image of the smallholder 
from the end of the 1940s appears, alongside with the ideal of the 
small family farms. He does not consider the foundation of co-
operatives effective in the whole territory of Hungary but imag-
ined them as supporting institutions of individual family farms.13 
Three years after the land distribution, in 1948, new landhold-
ers of Tiszadob founded the fifth farmers’ co-operative group of 
the country, which was at the same time the first one in the 
county. Landowners, who took hold of the greater part of the 
dismantled manorial estates, together with their buildings and 
equipment, joined the co-operative Local authority in the village 
also supported the foundation of co-operatives following the po-
litical line of Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, 
MDP). Thus the livelihood of the old landowners and especially of 
those, who were considered kulaks, was made very difficult. 
In 1950 Rákosi announced that peasants had to be compelled 
to join co-operatives to build socialism.14 Parallel to the institu-
tion of collectivization, the MDP aimed at abolishing agricul-
tural activity of wealthy landowners, demonstrating that pri-
vate farms had no future in Hungary. The MDP aimed at elimi-
nating peasant farms on the basis of the first five-year plan. It 
was planned that in a very short time 60% of the land would be 
cultivated by co-operatives, and 6% of the land by state farms.15 
The stratum of wealthy landowners (kulaks) was regarded as 
the main obstacle of rural development in Hungary, and in 1948 
their persecution campaign started. All those who owned 25 cadas-
tral holds were regarded as kulaks, as well as those, whose land 
was worth more than 350 gold crowns. Kulaks were put on the so 
called kulak lists. The people recorded on the list were to pay ‘kulak 
tax’, officially called ‘agricultural development contribution’.16 
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Who was to pay this tax (contribution)? 
1) Those who owned forest and landed property (hereafter: es-
tate), the area of which reached 25 cadastral holds or those whose 
cadastral net income reached or exceeded 350 gold crowns,  
2) Those who owned an estate of 15 cadastral holds or less 
did not have to pay even if its cadastral net income exceeded 
350 crowns. No contribution should be paid either, if the terri-
tory of the estate exceeded 25 cadastral holds, but its cadastral 
net income did not exceed 150 crowns. 
3) Those whose estate reached or exceeded 15 cadastral holds 
and its cadastral net income reached or exceeded 150 crowns, 
and if the landholder, besides forest and agricultural income 
had other income liable to general income taxation (over 5,000 
forint annually). 
Horticultural and wine growing estates were bound to pay 
threefold the size of the cultivated area would have counter for.17 
However, not only the wealthier farmers were constantly con-
trolled and taxed, but also those with smaller estates had to fulfill 
delivery obligations. Those who neglected any of their duties were 
punished by different ways. Propagandists were sent out to the 
threshing to estimate the quantity of the crop, as well as to urge the 
landowner to deliver the crops directly from the threshing machine. 
They also controlled and executed delivery obligations.18 
In spite of obligations, old landowners at first hold onto their 
private lands and stayed out of co-operatives but in 1952 the 
wealthiest landowners finally lost their lands as the process of 
persecution of the kulaks was successfully completed. In 1951–
52 the opposition of the peasantry against collectivism declined. It 
was mainly due to the process of consolidation of holdings, which 
was executed several times a year in order to integrate dispersed 
land-strips. As a consequence the farmers never knew whether 
they cultivated the land for themselves or for somebody else. Thus 
the Hungarian peasantry was crushed. In the second half of 1952 
agricultural co-operatives were formed one after the other. In-
creasing number of smallholders offered their lands to the co-
operative, giving up their private landed property. Until the end 
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of 1950 2,185 co-operatives had been established, by the end of 
1952 their number had increased to 5,110.19 
The policy of collectivization seemed to be successful. In Hun-
gary in 1948 the Soviet (artyel) type of co-operatives of 1935 was 
regarded as the basic model. Three types of co-operatives were 
distinguished in Hungary: co-operatives of type I, II and III. In co-
operative type I fertilizing, cultivation and sowing were done col-
lectively, all other tasks were completed individually. In co-
operative type II after collective fertilizing, cultivation and sowing 
the land was not distributed to individual farmers. Everybody had 
to work on the piece of land measured according to the landed 
property given by him to the co-operative, or the land was again 
divided to individual cultivation. In both cases the gathering of 
crops was accomplished collectively. In co-operative type III each 
work phase was completed collectively according to the directions 
of the co-operative, and the share after work was counted by work 
units. In the case of co-operatives type III the members had to give 
up all their landed property except 1.5 holds. This remnant consti-
tuted the household plot which the families cultivated individu-
ally. In Hungary farmers’ co-operatives of the type III became 
dominant and developed into co-operatives of the Kádár era.20 
Following the decision made in Moscow after the death of 
Stalin, on 4 July 1953, Nagy was nominated Hungarian Prime 
Minister replacing Rákosi, who kept his position as First Party 
Secretary.21 The provisions of the government led by Nagy were 
the following: 
 agricultural taxes and delivery obligations were decreased 
 formerly accumulated arrears of taxes and delivery obligations 
were remitted 
 kulak lists were abolished 
 for co-operatives and their members, in case they had paid their 
taxes 100% for year 1953, the complete tax arrears for year 1952 
were refunded by the state 
 for private smallholders, in case they had paid 50% of their taxes 
for 1953, the other 50% was cancelled by the state 
 in addition to tax and delivery allowances, the state compensated 
for damages caused by hail or fire, also in cases, when the victim 
did not have insurance 
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Also leaving the co-operatives was made possible. The 
measure, which prohibited members from leaving the co-
operative for three years after joining it, was repealed. Also the 
process of consolidation of holdings was stopped for 5 years.22 
Due to these provisions people left co-operatives in great 
numbers, especially the ones who had given up their private, 
landed properties because of the strict regulation of previous 
years. The foundation of a great number of co-operatives, the 
radical increase in the number of new members, and the quick 
decrease in the number of members followed one another very 
rapidly. In Hungary at the beginning of the year 1953 5,224 co-
operatives functioned. In the second half of 1953 their number 
fell by 688, then in 1954 by 225. By the end of 1953 out of the 
total 376,000 members 126,000, and in 1954 20,000 left the co-
operatives. At the beginning of 1953 the area of co-operatively 
owned or cultivated land decreased from 1.620,000 holds by 
477,000 holds, and by a further 61,000 holds in 1954.23 However, 
delivery obligations remained unchanged and were continu-
ously in effect, although compared to previous years to a lot 
smaller extent. 
In village life we also can see other changes than the con-
tinuous changing of agriculture which determined to a great 
extent the life of Hungarian villages in the 1940s–1950s. 
The process of electrification with the development of elec-
tric network in Hungarian villages started in the 1950s. In 1954 
local administration in Tiszadob applied to the County Council 
for developing an electric network of 5 km and for establishing 
a driven well in Újtelep. They claimed that in the Legújabb 
Telep part of the village the electrical network was not yet es-
tablished. In the area of Újtelep only one well functioned, which 
could not supply enough water for the population of the whole 
area, and the water of the well was not healthy either. People in 
Újtelep fell sick with goitre, which was due to the inadequate 
quality of water. 
In 1954 the Local Council of Tiszadob obliged local inhabi-
tants to build permanent wooden closets on their yards. This 
measure was also due to the typhoid epidemic that swept the 
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village before 1954, which was a consequence of the unsuitable 
handling of human excreta. 
Among the aims of village development in 1955 we find the 
following: establishing new roads, pavements and wells and 
renovation of the old ones. In April 1955 all districts of the vil-
lage applied for extension of the local electric networks, as well 
as for establishing completely new ones. Even the biggest farm-
stead, called Reje, belonging to the village, joined this applica-
tion. The farmstead in Reje asked for a new access road, to-
gether with telephone connection and a new well. In order to 
complete all these duties, the Local Council obliged the inhabi-
tants to do community service and pay Village Development 
Contribution.24 Recreation was also coming into the village: a 
tractor drivers’ Sports Club was founded with 200 members in 
September 1954. In 1955 a football-, a table tennis-, a ski-, a 
chess-, a volleyball- and a swimming-club functioned in the vil-
lage, as minutes of the local council tell us.25 
By 1955 a great number of smaller farmsteads had ceased to 
exist in the neighborhood of the village, and a diminishing 
number of people stayed there. There were only very few chil-
dren so that schools were closed down. Afterwards many fami-
lies finally left their farmsteads. The school of Kocsordos-
Katahalma closed down in 1949 due to depopulation in 
Katahalma farmstead. Only in Kocsordos a school operated un-
til 1952. In 1955 also the farmstead school of Farkashát closed 
down, when the teacher, Tibor C. Jankovich died. 
The years 1954–55 marked again a turning point in Hungar-
ian villages. After the Federal Republic of Germany joined 
NATO, the economic policy of the Soviet Union changed. The 
development of heavy and military industry became a priority, 
and Hungarian policy was criticized for neglecting the im-
provement of these industrial branches.26 In spring 1955 the po-
litical line of Rákosi gained power again, and old delivery obli-
gations and taxes of agricultural producers increased, and in 
autumn 1955 Rákosi started another campaign for collectiviza-
tion.27 People’s hatred against the regime culminated and led to 
an uprising in October 1956. In the countryside the revolution 
HUNGARIAN AND FINNISH FAMILY FARMING  
 
367 
of 1956 went on rather calmly, compared to what upheaval was 
going on particularly in Budapest. 
Party Executive Committees were closed in the whole coun-
try from October 1956 to March 1957, also at Tiszadob. From 
there it was reported: a teacher from local school encouraged 
his pupils into ‘revolutionary’ activity, i.e. did not stop them 
from burning their Russian course-books. A group was formed 
to hunt down the leaders of the village in the name of the revo-
lution, and a list for the purpose was written. Some of the 
members of this group were later arrested and put into prison. 
According to both the report of the Executive Committee and 
the witnesses, all this happened rapidly and in haste.28 
In late 1956 the Hungarian government was led by János 
Kádár. He allowed people to leave the co-operatives; and he 
also made their dissolution possible. Two thirds of the agricul-
tural co-operatives broke up and several hundreds of small and 
middle-sized peasant farms resumed their work all over the 
country. The Kádár government did not rescind the cancella-
tion of the compulsory delivery system, thus Hungary was the 
first among socialist countries to abolish the delivery system.29 
During the meeting of communist parties in Moscow in No-
vember 1957 the socialist reorganization of agriculture was dis-
cussed again. As a result in 1958 the Central Committee of the 
HWSP decided on the development of co-operatives and the re-
commencement of collectivization.30 In the process there was no 
longer a chance for private landholders to hold on. The most 
prominent stratum of farmers was compelled to join the co-
operatives, contrary to the earlier practice. Moreover, in many 
cases these big landholders became the leaders of co-operatives. 
The co-operatives founded in course of the third wave of collec-
tivization were established on the model of co-operative type III. 
Thus everything was made common in the co-operative, only a 
piece of land of one cadastral hold was allotted to the members 
of co-operatives on which they could cultivate whatever they 
pleased. In many places the cultivation of household plots the 
land was prepared and sowed by the co-operative, while cultiva-
tion as well as harvesting was done by the members themselves. 
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By 1962 collectivization had been completed all over Hun-
gary. In the following years the number of landholdings, whose 
owners no longer worked in co-operatives, increased.31 Many 
people left the villages and agriculture. At the end of the 1950s 
and at the beginning of the 1960s another wave of emigration 
took place from villages to cities. In this period the number of 
industrial workers, together with that of commuters rapidly in-
creased. Many of them were employed in building industry. It 
was not only the emigration that increased the area of unoccu-
pied land left in co-operatives. The same happened with the 
property of the members who died. These lands could have 
been separated from the co-operatives according to the Hungar-
ian constitution. However, this never happened, as the appara-
tus of the state, the interest of which was to keep the co-
operatives intact, supported the leaders of the co-operatives. 
Kádár claimed in 1966 that although it was unconstitutional to 
do so, i.e. not to give the land back to the family, according to 
various laws which circumvented the constitution the owner 
could not decide about his land anyway.32 Those who were not 
members of the co-operatives could not inherit the land taken 
by the co-operative. The land was bought from these people for 
a rather symbolic sum of money. Thus the co-operatives gained 
more and more landholdings. 
On 1 January 1968 a New Economic Mechanism was intro-
duced in Hungary. As a consequence agricultural co-operatives 
received far more support and could get rid of several legal and 
organizational problems.33 In the 1960s household plots became 
supplementary farms for village population. These were legal 
and even supported by the state. Half of the products produced 
on household plots served livelihood of the family, what was 
left was marketed. Household plots played a significant role in 
supplying the country with vegetables, fruit and poultry.34 
At Tiszadob it was cattle- and pig-breeding that dominated 
in household farming. On the plots mostly crop was grown. It 
helped the raising of pigs and cattle, but there was a lack of 
market which could buy other products of agriculture from the 
village. The farmsteads and settlements around Nyíregyháza, 
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e.g. Nagycserkesz, could more easily and quickly reach markets 
where it was possible to sell early fruit and vegetables grown in 
greenhouses. Similarly, in the villages around Budapest the in-
habitants earned their living from producing for the markets of 
the capital. This phenomenon was traditional: villages situated 
closer to bigger towns had a better chance to make profit in 
production and marketing than the ones far from them and 
with worse infrastructure – not to mention the dead-end vil-
lages, like Tiszadob. There the local railway station is 3 km 
away from the village which makes it rather difficult for local 
people to use railway connections. Thus they do not use rail-
way for traveling or transport as often as it is usual in villages 
with better railway connections. In addition, local bus traffic 
was in this period rather poor. There was one line going to the 
direction of the nearest town, to the county centre, Nyíregy-
háza. In this period one could leave the settlement either by 
train or on the only road leading to Tiszadada-Tiszalök. Over 
the river Tisza, and on the asphalted road between Polgár and 
Tiszadob one could leave the village towards Miskolc and Len-
inváros. However, to these directions there was no local bus 
connection or any other means of public transport. The only di-
rection that most of the inhabitants of Tiszadob could go was 
the road leading to Nyíregyháza. 
The inhabitants of Tiszadob bred cattle both for meat and 
milk. They took the milk into the dairy of the co-operatives, and 
the co-operatives paid them monthly milk-money. Co-
operatives helped members also marketing meat cattle. As for 
pig-breeding the locals sold both porkers and piglets. The co-
operatives helped also marketing porkers, while people sold 
their piglets directly from the house or in livestock markets. The 
inhabitants of Tiszadob went to sell and buy livestock in the 
markets of Nyíregyháza and Ónod. Owing to household farm-
ing and the stabilization of co-operatives’ salaries, the living 
standard of village population started to rise. 
Collectivization slowed down the development of Hungar-
ian villages and the growth of peasantry for a few years. How-
ever, a general development can be observed from the middle 
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of the 1960s, and the trend intensified from the year 1968. The 
development was gradual; people following a different model 
than that of the 1950s. Earlier landed property meant every-
thing. Each family aimed at increasing the amount of land 
claiming that it was basically land that they lived on. They 
needed landed property to bring up and marry off their chil-
dren. The aim was to improve financial situation. That is why 
besides striving after new landed property village population 
often followed the custom of having only one child in the fam-
ily.35 If there was only one child in the family, the estate did not 
have to be divided but it provided a living for the only heir. 
However, the children could not get hold of the land before 
their parents died. This meant that young couples were to face 
difficulties. Often they had to live according to the wishes of 
their parents until they inherited the land, and the same order 
of things continued in their own life as well. 
After collectivization this tradition completely changed. 
Families lost their landed properties and they were forced to 
find other ways of living. This was hard since the Hungarian 
peasant did not know how to accommodate to the new situa-
tion. Urban manners did not suit him.36 He was used to relax 
while working. The occasions of common spinning, corn 
husking and feather plucking were his ‘free-time’ occupa-
tions. To these occasions the villagers gathered in the eve-
nings and listened to a good storyteller or played games.37 It 
was only sleeping that meant a real rest. All this was about to 
change, too. Instead of expanding their landed property, they 
enlarged their houses and acquired new equipment. They 
educated their children and they strove to provide their chil-
dren everything that the modern world demanded: motorcy-
cles, cars, and in many a cases, a flat for the married couple.  
The forms of entertainment changed, too. Old customs dis-
appeared; sometimes dancing or a feast on the pay-day were 
organized at the co-operative but mainly work consumed the 
day. After finishing their tasks at the co-operative everybody 
went home to work on their household plots. They tried to 
work as hard as possible in order to pay for the growing de-
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mands. The customary collective forms of entertainment and 
work disappeared from the villages. 
In the second half of the 1960s the appearance of television 
sets in villages brought about a revolutionary change in the 
way of entertainment and relaxation. Watching television be-
came the main form of spending free time.38 This changed hu-
man relations, consequently also certain customs. For instance, 
long meetings and discussions in the evenings with neighbor-
hood families started to recede. People spent now their free 
time in their homes watching TV and nobody was longing for 
the long discussions at neighboring houses. 
The change in the life of villages was visible also from the 
outside. The old, long rectangle-shaped houses were replaced 
by the cube-shaped house type. In many cases mainly young 
families did not build farm buildings behind the houses, which 
previously used to be indispensable for village homes. 
Electrification was completed in Tiszadob in 1964. Washing 
machines, refrigerators and televisions appeared in the house-
holds. More people started to buy bicycles and motorcycles. 
After the collectivization was completed in 1962, farmsteads 
were gradually disappearing in Hungary. As a first step smaller 
schools were closed down. In 1966 in the vicinity of Tiszadob 
the school of Kisliget, educating children from seven farm-
steads, was closed down. 
By the end of the 1960s villages had a new look. From the 
1970s the financial support of villages decreased and an urbani-
zation project was launched aiming at developing the towns 
intensively. The rate of agricultural settlements decreased from 
51% to 31% from the 1960s to the 1970s.39 During this period, 
co-operatives even villages and schools were united. As a con-
sequence of the centralization process 40% of the schools were 
closed down in Hungary between 1974 and 1977. The number 
of General Consumer and Marketing Co-operatives (Általános 
Fogyasztási és Értékesítési Szövetkezet, ÁFÉSZ) also dropped 
by 80% between 1960 and 1980 due to integration.40 The cen-
tralization process was promoted with the idea ‘the bigger, the 
better and the more socialist’.41 
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The leaders of co-operatives were displaced on central deci-
sion. With the new leadership a new stratum of agricultural in-
telligentsia appeared in the villages. They completely reorgan-
ized the structure of existing co-operatives. Also the social 
structure of villages remarkably changed.42 Beside profession-
als, increasing number of skilled workers started to work in co-
operatives. A group of young professionals, technicians and 
skilled workers replaced the former non-skilled workers and 
low unqualified leaders of co-operatives. 
As a result of mechanization and professional production in 
agricultural co-operatives, great part of the former worker’s 
brigades and teams was dissolved, and the village people 
started to get alienated from each other, due to lack of contact. 
Despite urbanization and due to the reorganization of the co-
operatives the living standard of village population continu-
ously grew. Cars – Lada, Skoda, Trabant, and Wartburg – ap-
peared in the villages in the 1970s. The growth of families was 
supported also by centralized development projects; pipe water 
supply reached the villages. In Tiszadob the building of the wa-
ter system started in 1976 and the work was almost completed 
in the next few years. During the 1970s another wave of devel-
opment and expansion reached the villages. In this period vil-
lagers started to build stables, cowsheds and storage units on 
the yards behind the cube-shaped houses. Villagers realized 
how great a financial help the household plot could provide 
raw materials. Moreover, it could produce extra income for the 
family. This was followed by another building boom all over 
the country. It was possible to take loans on 3% interest rate 
and many people started to build houses also in the country-
side. Hungarian villages now took on the outlook also visible 
nowadays. Since then this has been changed or extended only 
in regions close to cities, or in villages with good infrastructure 
or in resort places. 
Development was visible not only in the life of the inhabitants 
but also in a village settlement as a whole. In Tiszadob the follow-
ing institutions were being built: new kindergarten in 1976, a su-
permarket and a restaurant in 1978, a bank and a pharmacy in 
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1979, a new school in 1982. At the beginning of the 1980s citizens 
could already feel and in the middle of the 1980s it was already 
obvious that the political system was shaking in Hungary. This 
led at great speed to the change of the regime and the leadership 
in the country. 
 
3 Village Life in Finland from 1945 to the middle of the 1980s 
In Finland, agriculture and forestry played decisive roles in 
livelihood of the people until the middle of the 1950s.43 Previ-
ously agriculture had meant subsistence farming. Self-
supplying farms characterized Finnish agriculture and the Fin-
nish countryside in the 1940s and until the end of the 1950s. 
Owing to the process of settling inhabitants from the ceded ter-
ritories of Karelia as well as to the national agricultural and 
economic policy, small farms with arable land not bigger than 
2-10 hectares became common. The number of dwarf holdings 
increased between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s as a result 
of population settlement, and until the beginning of the 1970s 
dwarf holdings constituted 2/3 of the farms in the country. In 
this period the second most common type of farm in Finnish 
agriculture were family farms with an area of 10-25 hectares. 
The number of farms with a territory smaller than 2 hectares 
was around 100,000 but the agricultural income they produced 
can be considered as insignificant from point of view of na-
tional economy. The number of farms bigger than 50 hectares 
was still small even at the end of the 1970s. In the 1950s farms 
with an area of 8-10 hectares arable land were considered ideal. 
Later by the end of the 1970s the size had grown to 25-35 hec-
tares, depending on the agricultural branch and location of the 
farm. During the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s self-
subsistence in foodstuffs was aimed in Finland. However, agri-
cultural production increased so rapidly that at the end of the 
1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s agriculture required 
strict control due to overproduction. By the turn of the 1950s 
and the 1960s a part of the farms broke up into so little pieces 
on account of inheritance that they became unviable.44  
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The act of leasehold in 1958 aimed at blocking this process. It 
encouraged farmers to buy land by providing cheap loans and 
by making the redemption easier in case of inheritance. New 
area could be bought mainly from state wooded land property 
until the middle of the 1960s. This was supported by the state 
with advantageous loans with low interest rates. According to 
the acts of 1969, agricultural income was regulated. Compensa-
tion was paid to the farmer, who left his land uncultivated for a 
while, also in the case when he gave up stockbreeding. In order 
to restrict pork and egg production penalties had to be paid. 
Acts regulated the production in all branches of agriculture. 
From 1968 income tax was introduced instead of the previous 
tax paid on basis of area. In the agricultural agreement made in 
1973 a pension system was established for those working in ag-
riculture. This could be used in case somebody gave up agricul-
ture or a generational change took place within the family. Be-
sides the new pension system an institution granting leave was 
also founded. In consequence, those making their living from 
agriculture could go on holiday in any time of the year, simi-
larly to those working in other fields of economy. Owing to the 
agricultural income law, the salary system of those working in 
agriculture followed the changes taking place in the wage sys-
tem of employees living on regular wages or salaries. However, 
also very small farms producing minimal income ‘died away’ in 
large numbers during the 1970s. The rise of agricultural income 
was also due to the fact that the quality improved and the quan-
tity of production increased significantly. Afterwards, due to 
different reasons, mainly to agricultural policy, agricultural 
production in Finland began to stabilize. 
From the 1940s average crop production per hectare gradually 
increased due to compulsory fertilization, more intensive cultiva-
tion and also to the better quality of crops. By the 1970s the aver-
age production had doubled. The production of barley increased 
so fast that it soon surpassed the cultivation of the traditional oat. 
By the end of the 1970s the production of hay decreased by 50%, 
and its place was soon taken by ensilage. The area of cultivated 
land grew significantly although vast areas were left uncultivated. 
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The area of arable land dropped to the level of 1945 during the 
1970s. Nevertheless, land was cultivated more intensively than in 
the 1940s. The productivity of agriculture increased also as a result 
of improvement works. While in the 1960 only 8% of the fields 
were pipe-drained, by 1980 the rate increased to 34%. The expan-
sion of oil plants and vegetable plants was also remarkable. 
In stockbreeding raising cattle, pig and poultry remained sig-
nificant branches. The structural changes in agriculture affected 
firstly the breeding of sheep which started to lose ground in the 
1950s. Only before complete extinction, in the middle of the 1970s, 
it was realized that it was necessary to save Finnish sheep stock. 
The decrease in horse stock was due to the appearance of tractors 
in Finland. This process started already in the 1950s and by the 
1960s Finnish horse keeping had collapsed. Later the state paid for 
colts, and owing to the popularity of horse riding, the drastic de-
crease of horse stock in Finland stopped. Nonetheless, horses have 
never restored their onetime position in agriculture. The number 
of cows also fell, but due to cattle breeding and better feeding 
conditions the milk production continuously grew. In conse-
quence the overproduction of milk has caused problems in Fin-
nish agriculture and economy since the 1960s. From the beginning 
of the 1960s breeding pigs and poultry spread due to the introduc-
tion of mechanized feeding system. 
Hunting and fishing seemed to be significant branches but in 
fact they constituted only 0.3% of the gross output. More impor-
tant was sea fishing. Herring fishing was important but came to 
an end in the 1970s and was replaced by salmon breeding 
which became a significant branch. Reindeer breeding in Lap-
land has not developed since the 1960s as the area of pasture 
has decreased. Today reindeer breeding plays a significant role 
in tourism. 
In Finland the area of forest decreased by 12-13% due to parcel-
ing. Nonetheless, also the amount of growing forest decreased sig-
nificantly due to intensive cutting. In the 1940s–50s 65% of Finnish 
wooded land was in private ownership. This represented 80% of 
the growing wood. In the 1950s 90% of the owners of private for-
ests were farmers. By the 1970s this rate had changed; only 70% of 
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the forest owners lived in villages and earned their living from 
intensive cultivation. It happened in the 1970s that the amount of 
growing stock started to increase. Forestry preferred conifers, but 
between the 1950s and 1970s the composition of forests regarding 
the species of tree changed only slightly: in Finnish growing stock 
scotch fir constituted 45%, spruce 37%, deciduous species of tree – 
mainly birch – represented 20%. 
In the 1950s in order to stop the drastic decrease of growing 
stock, forestry initiated fertilizing, accelerated drainage and sup-
ported forestation of the arable land. The state supported the 
planting of saplings. The laws of forest improvement of 1967–69 
strongly supported the expansion and stabilization of forestry. Be-
tween 1959 and the middle of the 1970s wooded land of private 
estates increased by an average of 4%, and at the end of the 1970s 
cutting plans demanded 60 million m3 of crustaceous trees com-
pared to the 50 million m3 of the 1950s. During the 1950s forestry 
work was done with hand tools and horses dragged the wood. 
Tractors not only in agriculture, but also in forestry displaced 
horses until the 1970s. In 1975 no horses were used in forestry and 
logging tasks. From the 1950s on forestry work became specialized 
to such an extent that it required more special skills and knowl-
edge. Due to mechanization forestry could employ less people –
mainly winter seasonal laborers. 
Motor saws appeared first, but their first types were rather 
heavy and huge, thus they were used mainly in falling tasks and 
cutting bigger pieces of logs. Other tasks, for instance lopping 
were still carried out with hand tools. Lighter motor saws ap-
peared rather quickly, which could be used by one person which 
made logging significantly easier and quicker. At the beginning of 
the 1970s multifunctional machines appeared which accelerated 
the displacement of human workforce from forestry and logging. 
In logging the amount of cutting was yearly 300 m3 per logger 
during the 1950s, which grew to 1400 m3 by the end of the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s. Due to production increase as well as 
to the development of techniques, quality and quantity of mecha-
nization, during the 1970s more and more forestry workers be-
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came unemployed. Not finding jobs in the countryside they 
moved to urban centers to earn their living. 
It was the rapid spreading of mechanization that had the 
greatest effect on Finnish agriculture and forestry, as well as on 
family farms and Finnish village life. It meant modernization 
which the people largely accepted. This led to remarkable 
changes in village life after the 1960s.45 In the first place, electri-
fication contributed to the quick spreading of machines in agri-
culture. Machines powered by combustion engine or steam did 
not spread on Finnish farms, their place was at an early stage 
taken by machines run by electricity, which could be also han-
dled more easily. Parallel to electrification different types of 
tractors appeared, which in the 1960s completely displaced 
horse-carriages from agriculture and later in the 1970s also from 
forestry as already pointed out. First field tractors were used 
also in forests, but at the beginning of the 1970s four-wheel 
driven machines appeared and replaced field tractors in for-
estry. In the beginning the size and the capacity of these ma-
chines were growing, later at the end of the 1970s more special-
ized machines and equipment appeared. These made work eas-
ier and quicker both on cultivated lands and in forests. Com-
bines (harvesters) became widespread in agriculture very early, 
while milking machines were introduced in the 1950s. Intensive 
milking technology appeared in the 1970s which gradually re-
placed the system of transporting and storing milk in cans. The 
quick development in mechanization was one of the reasons 
that soon made farmers specialized.  
Mechanization made an impact on all fields of village life.46 
Old farm buildings such as barns disappeared or began to col-
lapse, and huge, modern silos replaced them. Hay-cocks and 
hay-tacks were rarely seen. The size of stalls and barns became 
bigger so that machines could move and work in them unhin-
dered. Mechanization and modernization led to the specializa-
tion of farms on one product only. In the 1940s self-sufficiency 
was regarded as the most important factor in family farming. 
However, by the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s 
specialized farms purchased all they needed in the household 
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from the income they earned from one main product. Around 
60% of agricultural products were sold in the 1940s. This rate 
had grown to 90% by the beginning of the 1970s. 
Considering all this we may conclude that the share of agricul-
ture in gross output was 16% in the 1950s, which then dropped to 
11% in the 1960s and to 5% by the end of the 1970s. Living from 
agriculture was a life-style in Finland until the 1960s, but soon it 
became gradually one way of living among many others. Finnish 
agriculture had aimed at self-sufficiency but this led to enormous 
overproduction47 which characterized even the 1980s.48 
The viability of the countryside depends to a great extent on 
working opportunities, although the presence of a rising gen-
eration is also important. They together determine how viable a 
certain village is. Again, in a village the most crucial institution 
for children is school. A operating school also shows the viabil-
ity of a village. For children the village school is not only the 
place of education, but it also hosts community feasts and other 
important gatherings. Village schools flourished in Finland un-
til the 1960s. Due to emptying of the villages during the 1960s, 
in Finland a large number of village schools closed down, be-
tween 1954 and 1975 altogether 2,280. After the 1940s the num-
ber of schools in the countryside continuously increased. The 
1960s was the period of maintaining schools, while during the 
1970s schools were united. As a result many old school build-
ings were left empty in the thinly populated regions of Finland. 
Many of them started to decay. At the end of the 1980s most 
schools had only two teachers, while more than half of the ele-
mentary schools employed 1-3 teachers. The School Act of 1984 
made it possible for schools to operate also as meeting places 
for the local community. They became so called ‘village houses’ 
(kyläntalo). In school buildings different clubs were organized, 
and not only for school children. For instance, for smaller chil-
dren day care was arranged, for elderly people pensioners’ 
clubs or handicraft clubs were initiated in a way which did not 
disturb normal education. This opened a new period in the life 
of village schools.49 
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For Finnish village population getting to work, school and 
other institutions is a crucial question, since they live very far 
from each other and from centers. It concerns mainly elderly 
people, young mothers with small children and the young. 
Traditional bus transport is not a rewarding solution for them. 
Since the houses are scattered, it is difficult to find a suitable 
place for the bus stops so that it would be close to everybody. 
Thus the number of travelers is very few. Villagers in Finland 
must use alternative means of transport. For example, they use 
cars, taxis or order buses and other services as well as multi-
functional transport. In the middle of the 1970s in Finland 66% 
of the households had a car, 48% of women had a driving li-
cense, while 65% of men had one. In the 1980s more than 70% of 
village households used a car. Thus the car became the alterna-
tive for public transport for those who owned one. It is still stu-
dents, mothers and the young who face difficulties in public 
transport. Since the 1980s school buses and school taxis have 
been allowed to transport also others than schoolchildren, if 
there are free seats. The habit of ordering special buses or taxis 
has become popular. This makes traveling for village inhabi-
tants remarkably easier. 
Transport services do not aim at taking village dwellers to 
different services but the services are brought to the inhabitants. 
For instance, besides carrying and delivering the post, the post 
vans can run other errands based on agreements made with lo-
cal inhabitants: they could take people shopping, transport 
other things, etc. In order to strengthen and preserve this prac-
tice, Finnish Post made the multifunctional tasks of post vans 
official at the end of the 1970s. They have proved to be popular 
and are still used in the countryside. 
Building countryside road network speeded up when cooled 
milk-tanks were introduced for storing milk for transport to the 
dairy. Milk trucks required a road of better quality in order to 
reach each individual farm. State and local communities to-
gether maintained local roads while the owners and others us-
ers maintained private roads. Most of the small roads are peb-
ble-paved and cannot stand very heavy traffic. In spring these 
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roads in most places become impassable due to water and mud 
issuing from melting frost. 
Alongside the permanent villagers there is a seasonal stra-
tum of village inhabitants. Namely people who own or hire a 
summer cottage (kesämökki) and literally occupy the countryside 
in the summer holiday season. From the 1950s the number of 
summer cottages doubled in every ten years until the beginning 
of the 1970s, and at the beginning of the 1980s their number was 
over 265,000. Most of the cottages were built at the end of the 
1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. In this period the inner 
and northern parts of the country became more popular for 
building cottages. People who had left their home villages and 
moved to towns started to use their old homestead as a summer 
cottage or built a new one close to it. 
Most popular resorts for summer holidays are lakeshores. 
Consequently, cottage plots close to a lake were the most popu-
lar and became quite expensive. The cottage building boom 
brought with it one negative consequence: the quality of water 
and natural life of small lakes suffered. As a result, the building 
of summer cottages was later strictly seriously restricted. 
The appearance of temporary summer population in certain 
villages where the number of permanent inhabitants had de-
creased remarkably caused also positive changes. The increasing 
consumption of foodstuffs, petrol and building material could en-
sure the very survival of a particular village. It has to be under-
lined that the owners of the mökki still pay their taxes to local par-
ish. Consequently, villages with a great number of summer cot-
tages received a significant income from holiday-makers’ taxes. 
Farms with their red houses and household buildings, graz-
ing lands for cows, roads to the fields, huge school buildings 
and summer cottages hidden here and there in the middle of 
wooded and watery landscape represent the Finnish country-
side for the outside observer. But inside many tensions can be 
sensed: generational problems, lack of jobs and income, the im-
pact of urbanized society caused many leave their home vil-
lages during the 1960–70s. This tendency has been continuing 
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ever since and only few people can realize their dreams to 
move back. 
 
4 The Porkoláb Family in Tiszadob 
The Porkoláb family has lived in Tiszadob at least since the 
eighteenth century. The settlement of Tiszadob was mentioned 
already in 1220 in the Regestrum of Várad. The village be-
longed to the Andrássy family until 1945. It has a radial and 
agglomerated settlement structure. New parts of the village 
were built in the 1920s and after 1945. Tiszadob is a dead-end 
village, as it borders in the west on the river Tisza, which can be 
crossed only on a temporary floating bridge. The village had an 
asphalted road until the end of the 1980s which led to Nyíregy-
háza, the center of the county of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg. Its 
railway station is two kilometers away from the village on the 
railway line Nyíregyháza-Ohat-Pusztakócs. In the period under 
scrutiny the co-operative employed most of the inhabitants in 
Tiszadob. The service of local shops has been satisfactory and 
the local school has always fulfilled the needs of the village. 
The grand-grandparents of the author, Béni Siető and Erzsébet 
Sóron settled in Tiszadob after getting married. At first Béni Siető 
worked as a farm worker, then as a forester on the estate of Sán-
dor Andrássy. Since his parents were wealthy farmers, he was not 
used to obeying orders and he intended to earn his living inde-
pendently as soon as possible. The couple moved from the mano-
rial farmstead into the village. They built a house on a plot pro-
vided by the Count. It was 14 meters long based on stone and 
roofed with tiles. It consisted of a big house, a small house, a 
kitchen and a larder at the far end. On the yard there was a 
thatched pigsty, which later was also roofed with tiles. There was 
also a cowshed attached to the cart-shed. The couple cultivated a 
land of 13 holds on a family agreement, since the parents of Erzsé-
bet Sóron owned it. The young couple itself owned a land of 4 
holds. On the 13 holds they could sow anything, but after harvest 
they were to pass half of the product to Erzsébet’s parents, who on 
this occasion served them fine meal. They rarely hired helpers, 
only in times of hay-making, gathering the forage, reaping, carry-
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ing and harvesting. During harvest they hired a worker who was 
given one third of the yield. For seasonal other hard work they 
hired a day worker, usually the same person.  
The family kept cows, pigs, poultry and pigeons. Pigeons 
were popular, as they were productive and required very little 
care. On the land wheat, corn, barley, rye, as well as forage, 
such as alfalfa was grown. Besides they owned hayfield and 
grazing land, and a patch of forest. Dairy products, eggs and 
hens sold to the market-women accrued remarkable profit for 
the family. Pork was cooked twice a week. The family ate a lot 
of pigeon meat, stirred food, dumplings, potatoes and rice. 
They ate a lot of beans, which they also marketed. There were 
years when they sold 300 kg beans. They bought 130 liters of 
wine every year, for which they paid with products. Béni Siető 
bought the wine usually form one of his fellow soldiers, and 
later he went with others to purchase wine from a village in the 
district of Hegyalja. They took 4-5 sacks of crops for the wine. 
They distilled 15-20 liters of pálinka each year, and they bought 
beer and rum in time of harvest. 
Their three sons of the family died very young, only one 
daughter stayed alive, called Erzsébet Siető. Every member of 
the family worked; also the growing child had to start working 
at a very young age. In harvest time the daughter had to collect 
the forage left on the field. She also milked the cows, killed and 
cleaned the poultry. The young girl was told very clearly and 
directly that her work was needed. So much so that despite her 
outstanding school results and the teacher’s request, the parents 
did not let their daughter to continue her studies at day school. 
Parents considered most important to own larger landed prop-
erty in order to survive in future saying: ‘If we have 8-10 holds 
of land, our child can make a living’. Actually at the time, even 
a land of 5 holds could provide living for a small family. 
The family was not remarkably well-to-do but lived rela-
tively well. They were satisfied with their life compared to the 
prevailing conditions in general. There were not many possi-
bilities for improvement; and, for instance, the medical inspec-
tion of the three dead children cost three holds of land. Their 
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living standard slightly improved or rather stagnated until the 
beginning of World War II. Before the war they managed to 
buy two oxen, which made transport and certain agricultural 
tasks easier. 
In 1949 Erzsébet Siető got married with Károly Porkoláb who 
also lived in Tiszadob. His parents were R. Porkoláb Károly and 
Porkoláb Borbála, who lived in the other end of the village. 
Their home was a house built on the ground without basement, 
with two rooms and tiled roof. On the yard there was a stable, a 
cart shed – later a store – stores for chaff, carrots and potatoes, 
and a pigsty. Hens spent the night on the attic of the pigsty. The 
family had two horses, 4-5 cows, and 6 porkers for market each 
year as well as poultry, ducks and chickens. 
In the garden there were haymows and straw-stacks. The 
family had different fruit trees in the garden: 5 apple trees, 
sweet apples, summer apples, plum trees, a mulberry-tree, a 
cherry tree and a gage tree. Hazelnut or grapes were not grown. 
The family cultivated 8 holds of land of their own, and besides 
they rented arable land. They grew wheat, barley and rye. Each 
year they planted half a hold of potatoes, half a hold of melons, 
which they took to Miskolc to sell. It also happened that they 
sold the melons directly from the field. On half of the rented 
land they could sow everything, while on the other half the 
owner decided what he wanted to grow. 
The family earned extra income from selling dairy products 
to market-women, especially butter. They had also income from 
horse carriage transport Károly R. Porkoláb occasionally took 
on, including transport of ashlars from Bekecs, the bringing of 
different crops and pork to the market of Miskolc. In winter he 
worked as a second forester on the estate of the Count. Al-
though he was offered this job for the whole year, he did not 
accept it. He did not want to give up the independence of a 
smallholder who had a fixed yearly income and some other 
benefits. 
In time of harvest they hired a worker, who picked the 
swathes and the wife herself bound them. They hired a day-
worker for various tasks as well, who was paid for a three-day 
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job with a carriage. The day-worker was served food and drink 
at the house. The day-worker always ate at the same table with 
the host. 
The family slaughtered a pig of 180-200 kg once a year. They 
tried to preserve it so that it could last until the following au-
tumn, since the season of ducks arrived then. The housekeeper 
fed the ducks with corn, so that they and their liver fattened. 
Ducks kept in this way were called fattened ducks, whose liver 
was big enough for breakfast for the whole family. Duck meat 
was also excellent to roast. They cooked soups, such as sweet 
bean soup, sour bean soup, semolina soup, rice soup, thickened 
gooseberry soup with meat, and lebbencs50 -soup. For breakfast 
they had milk, tea, barley coffee, bread and lard. They also ate a 
lot of millet mush, but millet was also thickened, or popped, or 
used for baking strudel. They often ate dumplings, jam pockets, 
scones and gúnárnyak (gander’s neck).51 On Sundays the family 
ate chicken-soup, mush, potatoes or dumplings with stew. If 
father and son went to work on the field, the child took half a 
liter, the father 0.7 liters of milk, which they drank after having 
bacon and bread for breakfast. The housekeeper took the lunch 
out to the field, which usually included two courses. 
They drank beer, wine and pálinka in the family. They dis-
tilled pálinka themselves at home; they purchased beer in bot-
tles of half a liter from the local pub, but mainly during the 
summer, in time of harvest. They bought wine at the bodega of 
the Count for 35-40 fillérs a liter.52 
Clothing was much simpler and poorer than today. In a 
Porkoláb family which lived well, the child had a pair of walk-
ing shoes, a pair of winter shoes and a pair of boots. In summer, 
as a matter of course, the child ran barefoot in order to save the 
shoes. Clothing included three shirts, three pairs of underwear, 
summer clothing, a winter and feast clothing. Adolescent man 
got a long and a short winter coat. 
Until 1938 they were three members in the family. One child 
died early, but in 1938 the third child was born, a girl. So they 
were four at that time in the family. The children started to help 
in work at a rather early age, especially the son. When he left 
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school at the age of thirteen, he went regularly to plough, and 
in winter he fetched trunks with a sleigh for days alone. His 
work became remarkably important – in that he was treated as 
an adult. 
Károly Porkoláb took a heifer with him to his father-in-law’s 
house, as landed property could be inherited only after the par-
ents died. Thus Károly Porkoláb and Erzsébet Siető started their 
common life at the house of Béni Siető and Erzsébet Sóron. 
From now on we follow the life of the young family there. 
During World War II, when the front reached their village, the 
Siető family fled together with other families to a farmstead far 
away from the village. Their farm was damaged rather seriously, 
the pigsty and their straw-cutter was bombed, and German sol-
diers took away their pig, among other things. Before the family 
fled, they hid their belongings and food. They were away only for 
a short time, but it was enough for the villagers left in the village 
to spoil the houses left behind. In consequence, the family had 
hardly anything to eat and start life anew after the war. Moreover, 
delivery obligations introduced after 1945 made their life difficult. 
The leaders of the village forced the family to deliver such an 
amount of milk, eggs, and later of crops that was impossible to 
fulfill. On top of all that they had to carry milk twice a day to the 
other end of the village.53 
In 1945 it was already possible to claim for landed property, but 
Béni Siető did not do it. He thought that the ‘old time of the Count’ 
would come back soon.54 Others – servants, agricultural workers – 
immediately claimed for land, sometimes even for 20 holds, and 
they got it. They also claimed for cattle, equipment, and buildings 
from the estate of the Count, which they also received. It was only 
in 1948 that the Siető family claimed for landed property. They 
claimed for not more than 5 holds, from the land that was still left 
and of not good quality.55 In 1948 the families who had received 
landed property, equipment, cattle and buildings already in 1945 
established the first co-operative in the village. They claimed that 
because before the war they had not owned landed property, they 
lacked agricultural experience and sufficient knowledge. The first 
wave of collectivization did not touch the Siető family. From 1949 
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both on the newly received land and on the fields so far cultivated it 
worked together with the young couple. Common work started. In 
spite of political difficulties and family quarrels the family holding 
improved. In 1949 Károly Porkoláb junior was born; he was the 
only child of Erzsébet Siető and Károly Porkoláb. In 1951 they 
bought a vine-yard which was registered in the name of the young 
husband, Károly Porkoláb. Vine-yards had always been expensive, 
before 1945 only richer landholders and farmers and owners of lo-
cal domains could own them. The family bought a vineyard of 278 
négyszögöls (one négyszögöl = c. 3.6 square-meters) for 4,000 forints. 
They sold a cow for 2,500 forints and adding it up they managed to 
buy a vine-yard in a garden-plot where they grew grapes, pears, 
apples and currants and planted tomatoes and pepper. Their hap-
piness was reflected thus: ‘The grapes were so beautiful that al-
ready on the way home people bought them from our basket, and 
also the tomatoes and pepper grew nicely.’ 
In 1952 the family moved from the Újtelep part of the village 
to the center. They sold their house for 26,000 forints in Újtelep 
and bought a house for 32,000 which was not newly-built. It 
was an old, thatched house in a rather weak condition. The 
farm buildings were even worse, left uncared for. Nevertheless, 
the farm was large enough to maintain two families and very 
suitable for cultivation. First, new farm buildings had to be 
built for the farm had to provide a living for the big family. In 
1953 a new cowshed was ready. During the previous the diffi-
culties started when in March Károly Porkoláb was enrolled in 
military service for three months, exactly at the time when 
summer work should have begun.  
In autumn 1952 after gathering and trashing was completed, 
Béni Siető joined one of the co-operatives in Tiszadob, called 
Táncsis. He took with him the landed property, and the family 
was left without land and work. In the autumn of the same year 
Károly Porkoláb went to work at the local forestry office as a 
forestry worker. The following one and half years were spent in 
mixed feelings, when in autumn 1953 due to the political 
changes Béni Siető left the co-operative. His son-in-law, Károly 
Porkoláb, left the forestry office in spring 1954. Together they 
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resumed independent cultivation, but this time not on their ‘old 
land’ but on the exchange land they got through reallocation of 
fields situated dispersedly around the village. From 1954 they 
worked again as private farmers. They cultivated a land of 16 
holds. They grew wheat, corn, potatoes, sugar beet, which they 
could sell quite profitably. Instead of the previous forms of co-
operatives called Hangya (Production, Trade and Consumer 
Co-operatives) this time producers’ co-operatives were founded 
in increasing numbers. Similarly to their predecessors they 
dealt with buying up and selling products, supplying the needs 
of the villagers, and marketing. However, they followed the 
line of new politics. The agricultural co-operative bought up 
potatoes, and in order to market sugar beet it contracted with 
the sugar-mills of Szerencs.  
Porkoláb and Siető also managed to sell other products, such 
as cereals and corn. 
Their family kept 5-6 store-pigs and a sow, which were let 
out to the pasture with the herd every day. They also bred 2-3 
cows. During the whole summer the cattle stayed on the pas-
ture with the herd, while the 2-3 milking cows stayed with the 
village herd. They had two young bullocks, which were yoked. 
Besides cattle they kept poultry, which was not a source of in-
come, but provided meat for the family of 5 members. They 
kept chickens, ducks and pigeons, even rabbits for a long time. 
Despite delivery obligations and high taxes the farm was im-
proving and the financial situation of the family started to get bet-
ter. In 1957 they bought in Károly Porkoláb’s name two weaned 
colts, which they started to harness. At the end of the 1950s they 
rented a Hoffer tractor with rubber wheels from the machine sta-
tion of Tiszavasvári to haul the manure to the end of the plough-
land, from where they spread the manure on the field by horse car-
riage. In the 1950s the family started to build a new house on the 
place of the old rectangular-shaped house. Although the building 
work itself was finished only in 1961, the needed financial sources 
were found in the second half of the 1950s. 
It is an important fact that the 1950s was the last period in Hun-
garian agricultural history when the village peasant, the private 
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farmer, could meet his own needs himself, especially regarding 
food-supply. Only very rarely did they have to resort to buying: 
‘We produced the sowing-seed ourselves, we did not buy food in 
the shop, we received sugar for the sugar beet we sold, and it was 
only salt that we bought.’ Self-sufficiency ended at the end of the 
1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. Land was finally taken 
away from the Hungarian peasantry, by general collectivization 
completed by 1962. Consequently, also Hungarian village popula-
tion tried to adjust their tastes to the goods sold in the shops. 
The agitation for joining the co-operative started in autumn of 
1959 also in Tiszadob. The agitators came from Tiszavasvári. 
There were particular agitators sent to certain houses, who sat in 
the house from morning to night. They did not let anybody work 
but disturbed the people and did not stop talking. Even the well-
to-do peasants, who were regarded as kulaks and were persecuted 
from 1952 and who stayed in the village but did not give their 
lands to the state, had to praise co-operative agriculture. These 
peasants were not earlier come close to the co-operatives but in 
collectivization of the 1960s they were also forced to join them. 
They were approached by saying ‘even wealthy peasants realize 
that the only prospect for agriculture in the future is the co-
operative’. The agitators intended to make those family members 
join the co-operative, who officially owned the landed property in 
the family. Béni Siető owned the family land and in autumn 1959 
only he joined the co-operative as a foot-worker. In spring 1960, 
because of the lack of other opportunities, Károly Porkoláb also 
joined the co-operative as a coachman because he had brought 
horses with him. Erzsébet Siető became member of the co-
operative only later, while Erzsébet Sóron never joined it. The 
family joined the co-operative called Táncsis, which had been 
working from 1948, and where Béni Siető already had been a 
member for a short period. 
Almost all villagers became members of the co-operative, 
only a few people could retain their lands. They were farmers 
with 1-2 holds of land, who got their plots in one piece very far 
from the village on fields of poor quality. Those who stayed out 
of the co-operative cultivated their small plots, and also dealt 
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with carriages. Most of them later became weir-keepers. Those 
farmers, who remained private farmers, did not have a better 
livelihood than those, who joined the co-operative. 
In co-operatives friends, acquaintances and relatives formed 
working teams, brigades. Thus the old system of connections 
and relations could survive also in the world of the co-
operatives The Siető and Porkoláb family acquiesced with it. 
Although they did not like it, they had to put up with it, since 
everybody did the same around them. There was no real choice. 
After joining the co-operative in 1961 they started to build their 
new house. It had 3 rooms, a kitchen, a huge corridor and a 
pantry; its structure was different from the old rectangular 
type. It was based on ashlars with doubled cob-walls, it had 
tiled roof, and large twin windows gave it light. The ashlars 
were brought from Bodrogkeresztúr on train, the adobes were 
made in Tiszadob, and the tiles were brought from Polgár on 
carriage from where also other needed materials which the local 
building master could not produce were to be had. The wooden 
material of the house was cut and sawn in the village, but the 
builders also used a great deal of the wooden structure of the 
old house while making the roof for the new one. The house 
was ready to move in already in 1961 but many things were still 
needed. The money to continue building work came from sell-
ing meat cattle and bulls. When they managed to sell 1-2 bulls, 
they had something completed in the house. Thus the comple-
tion of the building lasted for several years. 
At the beginning of the 1960s the salaries were very low at 
the co-operative. In the first period members received 40% of 
their salaries as the co-operative could not afford to pay more. 
A member doing physical work earned 200-300 forints a month. 
For the families, which had cattle and animals at home less was 
paid, and they did not receive bonus at the final account either. 
The Siető and Porkoláb family continued breeding milk and 
meat cattle, also store-pigs. They could earn considerable in-
come by selling milk and meat cattle. As Károly Porkoláb had 
it: ‘The salary paid by the co-operative was equivalent to zero’. 
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The co-operative provided each member a household farm of 
one hold, where they planted corn and potatoes. They could 
decide how much corn and potato they could cultivate. The 
family had 300-300 square-fathoms for potato, the rest for corn. 
They would have like to have more potato grown as it was 
proper feed for store-pigs, which still provided good profit for 
the family. At first the area of household farms provided was 
reduced if it had a vineyard or garden-plot. Thus Károly 
Porkoláb got a household farm, the area of which was reduced 
by the area of his own vineyard. The women in the family cul-
tivated the household farm, the vine-yard and kept the garden 
around the house. They looked after the animals as well. Men 
mowed the fodder grass and hay-making, but they could do it 
only on Sunday, since they had to work at the co-operative 
from Monday till Saturday. However, after mowing the fodder 
grass in many cases the two women and the growing son com-
pleted the hay-making. Men carried the hay home, but it was 
not a hard job, as Károly Porkoláb could do it with his two 
horses, since he was a coachman. 
At the beginning of the 1960s the family gave up intensive reli-
gious life. So far they had celebrated all feasts, gone to church, but 
since men could work on the household farm only on Sunday, they 
gradually gave it up. This happened to every family in the village. 
Even those who were not members were forcefully called to 
work for the co-operative in order to prevent the formation of 
prosperous household farms. Called or not, everybody worked 
on co-operative lands. Men could not manage to work on two 
lands besides their everyday work. Consequently, the house-
hold farm was left to the women to run. The growing child in 
the family also worked a lot at home during the summers. 
He/she usually fed, cared for and gave water to the animals. 
Fulfilling these tasks together with the children of the same age 
from the neighborhood was not so difficult for them. 
However, children worked not only at home. Károly 
Porkoláb junior already as a primary school pupil took part in 
summer agricultural work at the co-operative together with 
several of his fellows. Sometimes 30 children worked in a team. 
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The children knew each other well from school, and their par-
ents also worked at the co-operative together. Thus it was a 
matter of course that if one child went to work, the others also 
wanted to go. They worked mainly during fruit and vegetable 
harvest, or did other jobs that children could do led by 2-3 
adults. The adults earned 3 forints per hour at the co-operative; 
children received 1 or 1.5 forints per hour. Károly Porkoláb re-
called: ‘We children wanted to go to the co-operative, since at 
noon we had a two-hour long lunch break when we could play. 
I had very good, positive memories from my childhood regard-
ing the co-operative.’ Junior worked every summer. As a 
grammar school pupil he guarded sunflowers, his task was to 
frighten crows away. Later he worked at grain clearing. Com-
bined harvesters could not clear the grain completely, and it 
had to be cleared again. The grains cleared in this way were 
stored in sacks, and pupils helped in putting the sacks where 
they belonged. They worked in pairs, one week at night, next 
week daytime. This was a real adult job which paid well.  
After finishing grammar school Károly Porkoláb Jr. applied 
to college, but he had already missed the first year. Until the 
next academic year he worked in the co-operative, this time as a 
young man. He worked as a wage accountant at the co-
operative, which meant regular work with regular and fixed 
salary. When he went to college56 he made a contract with the 
co-operative for his college years. He received a scholarship 
from the Táncsis co-operative of Tiszadob and did his summer 
practices there – he spent the whole summer working. After 
graduating from college he continued working at the co-
operative. The salary from the co-operative was enough for him 
to live independently from his parents during the college years. 
It has been seen that every member of the family worked in a 
one way or another at the co-operative, one as an active mem-
ber, one as a child, one as a young worker or as student, others 
on the household farm, or on the land cultivated by shares. In 
the family Béni Siető and Károly Porkoláb were members, 
Erzsébet Sóron and Erzsébet Siető worked on the household 
farm and on the lands cultivated by shares. Erzsébet Siető also 
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became an active member in the 1970s, while Károly Porkoláb 
Jr. worked at the co-operative as a child, as a student and as an 
active member. In all, local families and the entire village com-
munity were bound to co-operatives very tightly. 
In 1968 the New Economic Mechanism was introduced in 
Hungary which supported the co-operatives. They strength-
ened and the situation of villagers stabilized. Those cultivating 
their household farms were given more possibilities. Also 
household farming as a source of income was supported if the 
farmer was a member of a co-operative. That the people consid-
ered co-operative to be common property – this was also the 
policy of the party and local leaders – started a new custom in 
the late 1960s in Hungarian villages which people regarded as 
moral and legal within the limits of local unwritten regulations. 
This was that every worker in proportion to the area he worked 
on in the co-operative regularly took home a part of the product 
he produced there. It has to be emphasized that this was not 
considered illegal, as everybody followed the custom, both the 
leaders and the workers. During the years even a silent regula-
tion developed in the community on how much one could take 
home from the common products according to his position at 
the co-operative. The impact of this kind of extra income could 
be seen also in the outlook of the settlements and whole village. 
Nonetheless, it was considered as normal and nobody was rep-
rehended. The intensive cultivation of household farms led to 
considerable improvements in Hungarian villages. 
In our case the family furnished a room in the new house with 
new furniture. After finishing grammar school successfully, 
Károly Porkoláb Jr. got a Jawa motorcycle with an engine of 250 
cm3. Other improvements were also made in the family. In the 
middle of the 1960s they bought a new bicycle for Erzsébet Siető, 
since before they had only one men’s bicycle in the family. They 
bought a television set in 1965 and at the end of the 1960s a wash-
ing machine and a refrigerator. On the yard they built a new pig-
sty, farm buildings and a corn-crib – the latter for storing house-
hold corn. Such significant changes could be seen in the life of the 
family between 1959 and the end of the 1960s. 
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From the 1970s there were three families. Károly Porkoláb Jr. 
graduating from college got married in 1972. He married Kata-
lin Kalydy, whom he got to know at college, and who also 
graduated as a horticulturist. They had two children. The new 
family introduced a lot of new into their lifestyle. Most impor-
tantly, they moved into a separate house. Both being young ag-
riculturists, the co-operative provided them a managerial 
house, which was situated 1 km from the village in an old vine-
yard. With the help of their parents the young couple managed 
to buy a Trabant in 1974. In 1976 they moved into the village, to 
another managerial house of the co-operative. In Tiszadob wa-
ter system was established in the very same year but was in-
stalled in the house which already had a bathroom and a water 
closet only in the following year. Till then a pump in a well in 
the yard lifted water for washing and bathing. Since the water 
was not suitable for drinking, the family carried drinking water 
in cans from further away. The young couple lived considera-
bly comfortably; in 1979 they bought a Lada, traveled in Italy 
and Bulgaria on trips organized by the co-operative, and in 
Romania and Czechoslovakia by their own car. 
The young family continued to cultivate the land of their 
parents and grandparents. Károly Porkoláb Jr. tried bee-
keeping and having sheep. However, he was promoted in the 
co-operative and did not have enough time to continue that. 
Consequently, he and his wife did not take part in running the 
family farm between the beginning of the 1970s and 1984. 
In the following both households are dealt with because that 
shows continuous changing within the family  
At the beginning of the 1970s in Károly Porkoláb’s Sr.’s fam-
ily the cattle stock was decreased because of alterations in farm 
buildings. One part of the cowshed was turned into a tool-store; 
the forage shed was turned into a garage. Higher salaries at the 
co-operative made it possible to pay these improvements. The 
family worked on the household farm, but its significance de-
creased remarkably in the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s water 
system was installed in the house, and a bathroom and a 
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kitchen sink were built inside. In 1976 Béni Siető died. His son-
in-law took over the running of the household farm. 
At the beginning of the 1980s a wave of house building 
spread all over Hungary. If somebody could buy a plot, he 
started to build a house. People were provided loans with very 
low interest (3%), which made building a new house together 
with all the necessary farm buildings possible. People used 
building loans also for purchasing cars and furniture, since 
building itself was completed with help of the community. 
Brothers and sisters, friends and colleagues helped. They were 
not paid for their work, but provided with food and drink.  
Károly Porkoláb Jr. and his wife also started building a new 
house in 1982. At that time they had been married for 10 years. 
They received financial support from their parents, and they 
also contracted a loan. A local builder led the building work, 
and brothers and sisters, relatives, friends and colleagues came 
to help. The couple kept a record of some aspects of building 
work. It shows how many people took part in the building of 
the basement and the walls, and also for how long they worked 
there. Recorded also was how much and what kinds of food 
and drinks they bought for the helpers. Basement building 
lasted for 7 days. Number of helpers during these days was as 
follows: first day 5 people, second day 14 people, third day 14 
people, fourth day 3 people, fifth day 12 people, sixth day 12 
people, seventh day 7 people. Wall building lasted for 6 days. 
Number of helpers during these days varied from 2 to 10 peo-
ple. During the recorded time – 13 days – altogether 102 people 
took part in the building. For them the following foodstuffs and 
drink were purchased: 
5 kg pork 
10 kg beef 
6 knuckles of ham 
13 kg sausage, lard and salami 
4 smoked trotters 
2.5 kg cottage cheese 
3 cartoons of sour-cream 
8 chickens 
5 ducks 
70 eggs 
5 packets of coffee 
26 l pálinka 
10 l wine 
475 bottles of beer 
3 l refreshments 
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This shows that the family wanted to treat the helpers prop-
erly with food and drink, since paying cash for their work was 
out of the question. During the 1980s the custom of building 
houses in voluntary communities (kaláka; in Finnish: talkoot) 
was still alive. A man went to help in several building sites, and 
those whom he helped all came to help him when he built his 
house. At Tiszadob this practice disappeared at the end of the 
1980s and professional building brigades built the houses. 
Bricks were delivered from Mályi, tiles from Békéscsaba, 
wooden material was cut and sawn in the village. The house 
was modern, for instance, it had central heating. It was com-
pleted in 1983. 
On March 1, 1984 a great change took place in the life of the 
family, since Károly Porkoláb Jr. resigned from the Táncsis Co-
operative for personal reasons. He went to work for the forestry 
property of Tiszadob. His wife also resigned and went to work 
in the children’s home of Tiszadob. From forestry work Károly 
Porkoláb Jr. earned half the salary he had had at the co-
operative. Instead he had much more free time and his job was 
now more peaceful and balanced. At the same time he took 
over the running of the household farm from his father, Károly 
Porkoláb Sr. 
Already before leaving the co-operative Károly Porkoláb Jr. 
had bought a cow, but real improvement took place in the farm 
only after he took the new job. The farm was very suitable for 
cattle-breeding, there was professional knowledge, and the sen-
ior farmer could also help with his experience. They started to 
enlarge the cattle stock rapidly, but not with the old Hungarian 
speckled type, but with the red and black speckled Fries type, 
more suitable for intensive milk production. 
 
5 The Hienonen Family at Niittyharju 
The Hienonen family lives in Central Finland, in Lankamaa. 
Three lakes along the road to Rautalampi surround Lankamaa: 
Kynsivesi on the east, Leivonvesi on the south and Kuusvesi on 
the west. The area of the village was inhabited already in the 
sixteenth century. It belonged to Hankasalmi parish until 1967, 
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when it was connected to Laukaa to which it still belongs. Elec-
tricity was installed in the village in 1949, telephone connection 
was built in 1959, and the road suitable also for car traffic was 
laid in 1960–61. The shop vans of Keskimaa, Mäki-Matti, Tope-
lius, Lukkarinen and Kyläri supplied the population of the vil-
lage until 1992. The trucks of Valio and Mäki-Matti transported 
the milk from Lankamaa. Post is delivered 6 days a week, and a 
library-bus and a passenger bus comes regularly to the village. 
The community has organized regular taxi transport for those, 
who need it.57 
The Hienonen family lived on the central area of the present 
farm as crofters before the national crofters’ emancipation of 1917. 
After 1919 the family started private farming, similarly to many 
Finnish peasant families. The present farmer’s great-grandfather, 
Taavetti Hienonen built the first family house at Niittyharju. To-
day houses (2) and farm-buildings are situated close to each other. 
A pine tree and some remnants of the stone basement show the 
place of the first house on the other side of the brook running 
through the estate. 
The first farmer and his son were both smiths. Nobody con-
tinued their work later on in the family. Iisakki Hienonen, the 
son of Taavetti and Silja Hienonen, married a Helli from Savio, 
near Jyväskylä. Iisakki and Helli – as they were called in the vil-
lage – built a new house in 1922, which is today called as the 
old house. One son was born in the family, Eino Hienonen. 
However, they also had a foster-child, adopted from the wife’s 
family. 
Iisakki Hienonen led the estate, which consisted of forests, 
plough-fields, pastures and hayfields. They also kept cows, 
pigs, sheep, horses and hens. The farm was self-supporting, al-
though they also marketed some products, mainly by barter. 
The farmer, being a smith, earned his living not only from farm-
ing – he was a handyman. He completed everything he once 
imagined. He made everything himself that he considered im-
portant for his family and the farm but also for his own 
amusement. He built boats in his workshop, which he sold. 
This provided remarkable extra income for the family. He also 
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made a kantele and an accordion. He built the first water system 
from wood in the village, and it provided water both to the 
house and the farm buildings. He dammed the water up in the 
brook running through the farm, and this ran the generator he 
himself planned and built. This system provided the farm with 
electricity, until the state electrification reached the village. Us-
ing their own electricity was not easy, as they did not have a 
transformer. The current was either too strong, so all the lamps 
had to be switched on in the house, or too weak so that the 
planing machine could run but the mill could not always be op-
erated. Despite the difficulties it was a great achievement con-
sidering the circumstances of the 1940s. Before the Second 
World War they had already used machines on the farm, which 
were powered by internal engine motors. The electric ones built 
by Iisakki Hienonen modified these machines after the war. 
The farm in this period aimed at complete self-sufficiency 
and developed intensively. Homemade machines and equip-
ments helped the work in the farm and the household. At this 
time the family owned a landed property of 12 hectares and ser-
vants worked on the farm already in this period. 
The Junior Heinonen’s, namely Eino Hienonen’s wife, Eila 
Muurikainen, came first to the farm as a servant in 1947. Hav-
ing been away for a year, she came back to the family as a wife. 
Eila Muurikainen’s family lived close to Lankamaa. On the pa-
ternal side she came from a well-to-do farmer family. Her fa-
ther’s father owned a land of 1000 hectares. However, Eila’s fa-
ther had not been in good terms with his father – he did not in-
herit anything after the father died. The family had to send their 
children, among them Eila, to serve on other family farms as 
usual in Finland at the time. 
Now, when the family became larger with the arrival of the 
new wife, it had 6 milk cows, 2 mares, which had colts in suc-
cession. They kept approximately 20 sheep, 10 pigs and poultry. 
The farm was still led by Iisakki Hienonen but the young cou-
ple did most of the work. The farmer spent his days mainly in 
his workshop, and took part in farming only in time of summer 
season. The family lived on a common budget. They ate at the 
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same table and the farmer arranged all financial affairs. He 
checked everything very carefully both in the family and on the 
farm. 
Until 1953 Iisakki Hienonen led the farm. His son, Eino Hie-
nonen, succeeded him. His parents had only him and so the 
process of inheritance went smoothly. Eino Hienonen inherited 
everything but they made a contract on selling and buying 
property and on pension to the parents. But they still lived to-
gether, ate at the same table, and this remained so until the par-
ents died. When they stroke the contract a couple from 
Tahkokorva arrived as witnesses. The contract regulated every-
thing in detail: it told how much butter, flour, potatoes and 
other food as well as hygiene products constituted the pension, 
even Iisakki Hienonen’s daily cognac portion was listed which 
he drank on medical prescription. The contract ensured a re-
spectable life for the elderly parents. Money was not mentioned 
in the contract, since the young couple had officially bought the 
farm from the parents. They had one year from the signing of 
the contract to pay the whole sum of money, and when the 
payment took place between father and son, nobody knew ex-
actly to what extent it was finally completed. As the parents 
had their own money, the contracted pension was called ‘life-
pension’, i.e. the young couple had to support the elderly par-
ents for the rest of their lives. Had the parents moved away, for 
instance, the points of the contract should have been followed 
very strictly. The family, however, agreed to continue living to-
gether and they stayed on good terms with each other. 
After the farm became Eino Hienonen’s property in 1953, the 
family continued agriculture and developed it. Eino did not 
continue his father’s job as a smith – he did not make boats, say-
ing that if he also started making boats, farming and agriculture 
would come to an end. He began intensive improvements on 
the farm. In the beginning they milked 4-5 cows and had a tank 
of 10 liters to store and transport milk daily. During winter time 
the amount of production of milk was not enough to fill it but 
when production stated to grow, they acquired a 20-liter tank 
which became almost full in summer time. Five years after Eino 
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had become the farmer and the family had with great efforts 
gathered the capital, they started to build a new cowshed.  
Men worked not only on the farm, but took up other jobs as 
well to get some extra income for the family. Iisakki Hienonen 
made boats but his son, Eino took up transport and forestry 
work and also hunted to earn extra money. The family had two 
horses in this time. With one of them Eino delivered wood in 
the forest during the winter. Often the housewife’s brother and 
other neighbors, or often she herself drove the horse on the 
farm when his husband was away from home. He was away 
from home not only due to delivery jobs, but he also went to cut 
and float wood for weeks. The most popularly hunted animal 
was squirrel, since its fur could be sold most profitably. The fur 
was salted and put out to dry on the wall of the house. Then 
they were sold in Jyväskylä where a lady who had a squirrel fur 
coat was considered very rich. 
On the farm there were also sheep, usually around 20. They 
were kept for own consumption, but some of them were also 
sold. Their sheepskin was salted and prepared for making win-
ter blankets, waistcoats and coats. Women spun the wool at 
home. In summertime the family fattened pigs, at times as 
much as eleven, and sold them in Kytönniemi or slaughtered 
them for family consumption. They kept hens, but only for their 
eggs, since they did not eat their meat. Besides mutton and pork 
they also ate beef. They slaughtered one bull each year. 
Women cared for the cows and completed different house-
hold duties. They also earned extra income by selling dairy-
products and bread. Since there were families which did not 
regularly bake bread, women on the Hienonen farm baked 
bread for them as well. 
The family aimed at complete self-sufficiency; they bought very 
few products from shops or tradesmen, mostly sugar and salt as 
well as textiles for clothing, and particular tools and utensils they 
could hardly make at home. They bought them either in a grocery 
or from an itinerant vendor. The nearest grocery was in Laukaa; 
itinerant vendors came with their goods in a certain time of the 
year. 
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The family grew rye and barley, which they took to the mill. 
The nearest mills were situated in Lievestuore and later in 
Lankamaa. The family also had a home mill which almost sup-
plied their complete flour needs. At times the home mill ground 
the rye so white that it could be used for baking yeast bread. 
Saturday was the baking day for women. They baked buns, 
yeast bread and rye bread but they did not need to bake rye 
bread every Saturday for it lasted longer. Baking yeast bread 
and buns on Saturdays was a must for women. They baked 
buns from 4-5 kg flour but they often ran out by the middle of 
the week. So they just waited for the next baking day. 
The family did its duties according to a certain order, kept 
the meals of the day, and divided the duties of the week. The 
annual feasts also had their own place, their accustomed order. 
The family got up every morning at five o’clock, had a cup of 
coffee together and then everybody went to her/his duty: some 
to the cowshed, some outdoors, some stayed indoors depend-
ing on the nature of the task. In the 1940s and 1950s only men 
worked in the forest, on the arable land and hayfield, and with 
the carriages. In those days men did not work do housework, 
not even in the cowsheds. The breakfast was ready by 7 o’clock, 
and it was made of potatoes and some kind of sauce. Then 
around ten or eleven o’clock they again had coffee together. 
They ate lunch between midday and one o’clock, three 3 o’clock 
in the afternoon they had coffee together again. They had din-
ner at seven; by that time everybody had finished working. 
Later this order changed, when Eino and Eila Hienonen became 
the owners. Men took coffee, sandwiches and buns with them 
to the forest. When they arrived from woods a substantial 
warm meal awaited them, usually potatoes and meat. For 
breakfast they often had rye porridge, but the most popular 
food was potato with some kind of meat or sauce or fish. If they 
worked at home, the family usually had a rest after lunch, and 
after that everybody continued working. The family went to 
sauna on every Wednesday and Saturday. On six days of the 
week everybody worked, but Sunday was a day for rest. Simi-
larly to other days of the week they got up at five and looked 
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after the animals but Sunday was a sacred day and they did not 
do any other work. The order of the meals was the same as on 
weekdays.  
Going to church was very important. They went to church in 
Laukaa, which was 15 kms away from their house across the 
lake. In summer they went to church by motorboat, in winter 
by horse sledge. Those who could not go to church listened to 
the service on the radio at home. On Sunday afternoons 
neighbors visited each other. Either somebody came to the fam-
ily, or the family visited somebody in the neighborhood to talk 
and have a cup of coffee. Christmas was the main feast of the 
year. The family was always present at the service in the church 
at six o’clock in the morning together with the others from the 
surroundings. On the first Christmas day they fed the horses 
earlier in the morning. The cows were given so much hay the 
evening before, that they did not have to bother about feeding 
them in the morning, they only milked them. Jingling sledges 
from every direction were heading to the Laukaa church on the 
ice early in the morning. After the service they went home 
competing, who would arrive home first. 
On Sundays on the way home from church men did not drive 
the horses any longer, but sat back in the sledge and the horses 
were left to find the way home. Men always had spirits with them 
in sledges, and some of them got drunk on the way home. 
Self-sufficiency literally meant that everything the family 
needed was to be homemade. For instance, flax was grown and 
women wove linen at home and made underwear from it. 
However, they wore homemade linen clothes only until the 
1940s, later that they bought textiles from the shops and made 
their clothes at home of it. Underwear was made at home for a 
longer time but a tailor from Laukaa made, for instance, men’s 
suits or they bought them in Jyväskylä. From leather they made 
blankets, waistcoats, coats and gloves. Gloves made from dog 
leather were the warmest. Besides clothing it was food that they 
produced and gathered themselves. Main products have al-
ready been mentioned but the family picked up berries in the 
forest, mainly cowberries and bliberries.They also sold cowber-
PÉTER PORKOLÁB 
402 
ries but usually they conserved them for themselves for the 
winter. Bilberries were dried, or they mad jam of them. From 
red bilberries they made jam, or stored them mashed in their 
own juice in which they lasted even without sugar. They picked 
great amount of mushrooms, which they salted and conserved 
in small pots. They salted lot of fish and conserved it in big 
wooden tubs, just like meat. In autumn they salted more fish 
than in spring. They salted pike and bream in springtime. 
Bream was salted, then dried in the sun or in the oven, and 
stored in the pantry or in the attic in large baskets. They cooked 
fish together with potatoes; the salt coming out of the fish salted 
also the potatoes. For salting meat and fish they bought coarse 
salt in sacks of 50 kg, and they bought sugar in 5-10 kilo lumps. 
Of the belly and stomach and other intestines of the animals 
they did not eat, soap with alkali bought in the shop was made. 
They grew carrots, potatoes, beetroots, cabbages, onions, tur-
nip, swede and sugar beets in the fields around the house. They 
drank home made beer and sour milk; home made beer and 
milk were always available at the table. 
The family could start building a new cowshed in 1958. In it 
they installed a milk tank of 40 liters, and also brought in new 
cattle breed which hey produced more and fatter milk. At the 
beginning of the 1960s they completely gave up sheep breeding. 
They increased the number of cows and young cattle instead. 
Already at the end of the 1950s the family joined a tractor soci-
ety and used it together with other four farms. This was always 
driven by the same person in order to avoid quarrel about pos-
sible problems in the work. The Hienonen family bought their 
own tractor, a Nuffield in 1962, which was used in plough-
work and in the forest. Together with the tractor a milking ma-
chine, crucial on a dairy farm, was bought. The farmer and his 
friend used this machine in milking the cows, since the wife did 
not like it and continued to milk by hand. When the new cow-
shed was built, they joined the society of milk testing. They 
started to transport milk to the milk bay around 1954–55, when 
the road suitable for cars was built in the neighborhood. In the 
beginning they took the milk of only three cows to the dairy, 
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churned butter from the milk of four cows at home, and mar-
keted it, like in old times. However, finally all the milk was 
taken to the dairy. At first milk went to Äänekoski dairy, later 
to Jyväskylä. At first farmers collected their milk in a nearby 
house from where in the summer a motorboat, in the winter a 
horse sledge took the milk to a collecting point where a truck 
collected and transported it to the dairy. Although the family 
sold the milk, they still drank their own milk and churned but-
ter from it for domestic use. 
When the family joined the society of milk checking, they 
handed down milk with 6% fat content. The new cows gave so 
high-quality milk that the Hienonens won several prizes with 
them. Hard work, good caring and investment bore fruit. The 
family farm became specialized by conversion to a dairy farm at 
the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s firstly by 
reducing, later by eliminating other activities. They strength-
ened the main profile of the farm buying new machines, 
equipment and investing their capital. They bought a forest of 
19 hectares which also served the improvement of the farm. The 
Hienonen farm was an example for the neighboring farms. 
Many people came to ask for advice and many people saw how 
the farm was run because the post of the 7-8 families was deliv-
ered to the Heinonens. People coming to pick up their post 
stopped for a moment to talk with the members of the family. 
Unexpected deaths divided the family into two and halted 
the tendency of improvement on the farm. In January 1965 
Iisakki Hienonen died, shortly afterwards his wife, Helli passed 
away and the most hitting death was that of Eino’s in May. 
Eino and Eila Hienonen had three sons. Markku was 11, Martti 
9 and Reijo 6 years old, when their father died and Eila was left 
alone with her sons and the farm. Her brother, Antti helped her 
a lot for two years while he also lived on the farm. Often 
women, but also men from the neighboring houses came to 
help. The two elder boys, Markku and Martti, helped the most. 
It was his father who taught Markku how to drive a tractor, and 
the young boy liked this work very much. He often helped her 
mother driving the tractor, since Eila could not handle it al-
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though she tried. Martti helped on the farm in everything; he 
worked in the cowshed, on the hayfield, on the plough field or 
in the forest. Although he was still at elementary school, it 
maybe said that he worked like an adult.  
Eila’s bother, Antti left to Helsinki after two years. Eila had 
to run the farm by herself again. However, with the neighbors’ 
and children’s help he could manage and the farm started to 
improve again. Improvement of the fields already started, 
horses were sold and machines did all the heavy work. Markku 
became an architect; at present he lives in Oulu. Reijo studied a 
trade and lives now with his family on the lakeshore part of the 
farm. Martti stayed at home in the old house with his mother. 
He is the one, who has continued farming. 
After primary school Martti studied at a farmers’ college 
(maamieskoulu) which lasted for a winter. He has been living on 
the farm ever since. At first his mother ran the farm, later Martti 
himself as he bought up the farm in 1982 from his brothers, 
Markku and Reijo. He made a contract with his mother based 
on the same principles as the one his parents made with his 
grandparents 30 years earlier. When Martti Hienonen bought 
the farm, the area was 40 hectares, out of which 10 hectares 
were ploughed. They had 12 cows, five bulls, five growing heif-
ers and some hens. Later Reijo bought from Martti the summer 
house situated on the lakeshore and the land around it. 
Martti gradually enlarged his estate and improved the farm. 
He started to cultivate a part of the wooded land, and also 
bought new arable land which slowly amounted to 23 hectares. 
The plough lands are all situated in the area of Lankamaa, be-
sides there is forest of 40 hectares which is mostly situated in 
the same area. The landed and wooded areas together with the 
house and the land around it now come to a little bit more than 
60 hectares. He not only enlarged the farm but following in the 
footsteps of his parents modernized it. Later he built a new 
cowshed where he installed a new piped milking system with 
milk-cooling tanks. He bought a new machine every year either 
in the cowshed or for the work on cultivated lands and in the 
forest. In 1981 he renovated the main living-house built by his 
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great grandfather. Downstairs there is a sauna, a laundry-room, 
a bathroom, a toilet, a living-room (tupa), a kitchen, and an of-
fice room. Eila Hienonen lives upstairs in a separate apartment; 
and in the other part there are two rooms. The old fireplace re-
mained in the house as a heater; it heated a new central boiler. 
In the new cowshed functions a separate heating center and the 
central boiler of the heating system is there. The building is at 
the same time a store for firewood, also a workshop and a ga-
rage for cars and tractors. 
Martti also continuously improved the cattle stock. He grew oat, 
barley and hay on the fields, he strengthened the profile of the farm 
– milking cows and live stock (lihakarja) at the end of the 1970s. 
However, it was still milk production that made the bigger profit. 
After taking over the farm Martti got married. Solja came to 
the family as a wife in 1985. Since then the structure of the fam-
ily and the method of farming changed. This change was not 
only due to the new housewife’s will but also to the national 
change of economy which deeply affected the life of Finnish 
family farmers. The term ‘family farm’ is fitting because in 
Finland for the families, who started to live on the land and in-
sistently continued to live on agriculture throughout the years, 
farming was not only a source of living, but also a lifestyle. 
Farming determined their everyday life, with its positive and 
negative sides. The family and its source of living, i.e. farming, 
were strictly connected. The private farms specializing only in 
one single product, have managed to continue farming in case 
the whole family was involved in it. Thus ‘family farm’ de-
scribes them most precisely. 
Looking over the 40 years, the following changes took place 
at the Hienonen farm. They already had their own generator 
providing electricity around 1945. The village gained central 
electricity in 1949 and the family has also used this since then. 
Iisakki Hienonen also built a water supply system from wood 
at the end of the 1940s. Eino Hienonen renovated this system 
while rebuilding the cowshed, which since then has been mod-
ernized following the requirements of the age. There is still no 
public water supply system in Lankamaa. Each house has its 
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independent water pipe system and pump for drinking water 
supply. This is a general practice in the Finnish countryside. 
The telephone system was installed in the village in 1959; also 
the Hienonen family received a telephone-line then. However, 
they shared it with the Friman family. The two families could 
use the line by turns. When it rang twice, the call was for the 
Hienonen family; when once, it was for the Frimans. In 1971 the 
manual telephone system was altered to an automatic system in 
the village. The family had a washing machine already in the 
1950s and they bought the first refrigerator at the end of the 
1960s and their first freezer in the 1980s. They heated the house 
by a wood stove until 1981 when heating was modernized with 
the already mentioned central heating system. They installed a 
modern bathroom also at the time. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Since 1945 Hungarian villages and their inhabitants have been 
tested in many ways. In 1945 the abolition of the system of large 
estates marked the end of an era, while the redistribution of 
land opened a new one. The country of servants and landless 
peasantry became the country of smallholders. The new situa-
tion did not last very long either. In 1948, three years after the 
redistribution of the land, family estates were already regarded 
as obstacles of the socialist regime. Family farms strived further 
until 1958 under political pressurizing. Between 1958 and 1962 
yet another far-reaching change took place in the Hungarian 
agriculture: the process of general collectivization was started. 
Co-operative farms were established all over the country. This 
changed the structure of agriculture and the life of farming 
families radically. People tried to get accustomed to the new 
conditions, meaning a struggle for survival for them. Most of 
the people staying in villages worked in co-operatives, and in a 
few years time slow economic growth was reflected also in the 
living standard of the Hungarian village population. However, 
the ‘survival’ of this social stratum has always been crucial for 
those in power, since their very existence depended on the well-
being of the peasantry.  
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Villagers adapted themselves to the new circumstances: they 
aimed at enlarging and improving the small private property 
they were allowed to have, i.e. the household farms. The culti-
vation of household lands was fundamental for both the system 
and the owner of the land. Conditions in Hungarian villages 
improved. New houses were being built, electricity and water 
supply was installed, cars and household machines and equip-
ment appeared in the households during the 1960s and 1970s. 
In Hungarian villages a strong stratum of farmers could not 
develop within the discussed time period. Prominent farmers 
were eliminated from the villages during kulak persecutions. 
The stratum of active farmers disappeared from the Hungarian 
countryside. The called co-operative peasants stayed in the vil-
lages. The expressions ‘farmer’ and ‘landholder’ had disappear-
red from everyday language usage. Instead, Hungarians refer-
red to peasants, often pejoratively, regarding somebody as un-
educated and uninformed. In Hungary villagers were often 
identified with these negative characteristics during the time 
period discussed. 
In Finland after the Second World War agriculture became 
stronger – 94,000 new individual estates started cultivation. 
However, in consequence the average size of a property de-
creased from 10 hectares to 8-9 hectares. After the war the 
number of village inhabitants increased, also the number of 
children grew. Consequently, a lot of schools were founded in 
the Finnish countryside. 
Owing to the fast developing agriculture Finland reached the 
level of national self-sufficiency in the 1950s. Nonetheless, this 
soon led to agricultural overproduction. As a result Finnish 
government aimed at abolishing small and uneconomic farms. 
The state even gave subsidies to those giving up agricultural 
activity. Consequently, at the end of the 1960s great changes 
took place; Finnish society with a majority of village population 
living from agriculture turned into a consumer, primarily urban 
society within a few years period. 
PÉTER PORKOLÁB 
408 
One million people gave up farming. Most of them left the 
countryside and moved either to the big towns of southern 
Finland or to Sweden. 
At the end of the 1970s the state encouraged specialization in 
agriculture in order to sustain village life in Finland. Family 
farm became the basic unit of agriculture. The Finnish country-
side turned into a producer of raw material. During the 1980s 
agricultural overproduction continued and the farmers received 
remarkable subsidies. The following differences can be traced 
between the situations of villagers in the two countries within 
the discussed period: due to political pressure, collectivization 
and its consequences formed the outlook of Hungarian villages. 
They lost a definitive stratum of their population, that of the 
independent, active farmers. The value system changed, the 
land, as a basis of agriculture was no longer a key-concept and 
a reality defining values and making wealth in Hungary. In 
fact, its position in Hungarian society was not taken by any al-
ternative, until land was again privately owned in the 1990s. 
Hungarian village population lost its land in the 1960s and 
looked for other ways of economic activity, often showing off 
and exaggerating. However, we can state that Hungarian vil-
lage dwellers were in a disadvantageous position regarding so-
cial welfare if compared to urban population. 
On the contrary, in Finland a stratum of strong private farm-
ers could develop, also due to political situation. Nonetheless, 
the alteration of this stratum had also dramatic effects on the 
whole country. As working opportunities drastically decreased 
in the countryside, a great deal of the population moved away. 
Consequently, the very survival of several villages was ques-
tionable. Finnish society became urbanized very rapidly which 
caused difficulties both for villagers and for urban population. 
The improvement of the Finnish countryside took place almost 
as speedily as urban modernization. Owing to both moderniza-
tion and traditionalism so characteristic of Finnish village popu-
lation, it faced and experienced modernization in a way that it 
did not lose its inherited customs and methods completely. 
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Co-evolution of People Politics and Production: Finnish 
Agriculture after the Second World War 
 
Jari OJALA 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Finland is one of the northernmost agricultural countries in the 
world. Therefore, the short growing season and disadvantageous 
weather conditions are the basic constraints for Finnish 
agriculture. The growing season in the southernmost parts in 
Finland is around 180 days, whilst in the north only 120 days. 
Despite these drawbacks the Finnish agricultural production 
faced a growth in productivity during the post-war period. This 
was due to the modernisation and commercialisation of the 
agriculture. Also, a number of institutional changes can be seen 
as the reasons behind the growth. Finnish farming was a success 
story in production terms, though at the same time the rural 
areas and the population faced structural change, including 
massive migration from the rural areas. 
As one of the pioneers in the study of structural change in 
agriculture, T. W. Schultz, already stated in the early 1950s, the 
development of Western economies can be characterised by a 
decline of the aggregate input of the community to produce farm 
products1. Also in Finland the growth of productivity enabled the 
feeding of the Finnish people with less labour input into 
agricultural production. Right after the Second World War 
Finland was still a country highly dependent on the agricultural 
sector. By the end of the century the situation changed dramati-
cally: the status of agriculture in Finland declined in terms of 
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both its contribution to the national economy and its role as an 
employer. Primary production in 1950 accounted for 26% of gross 
domestic production (GDP) and 46% of the labour force, whilst 
by 1985 its share has declined to 8% of GDP and 14% of the 
labour force (Table 1). In 2002 the proportion of agriculture2 was 
only 1.5% of GDP and 4% of the labour force, though in the vast 
rural areas agriculture and forestry together formed the most 
important field of activity.3 
The changes in Finnish agriculture are among the basic 
determinants in explaining the economic, social and political 
developments of the country during the latter half of the 20th 
century. The development of agricultural production was a key 
factor in launching the massive emigration from the rural areas to 
the urban centres – thus preparing the ground for urbanisation of 
Finland that occurred during this time period. Furthermore, the 
rise in production and productivity made it possible to lower the 
prices of foodstuffs; together with the growth of wealth people 
spent less on food and drink. For example, in the late 19th century 
over 50% of the private consumption expenditures still went to 
foodstuffs (not including drink), whilst this share decreased to 
one third in the early 1950s, to one fourth by the early 1980s, and 
to c. 14% by the early 21st century.4 
During the post-war period agriculture made a considerable 
impact on the industrial development within the country. The 
food industry emerged to become the fourth largest industrial 
branch in Finland, including meat processing, the dairy industry, 
the bakery industry, and the brewing and soft drink industry. 
The agriculture based cluster of industries evolved, including not 
only food industries but also various other industries, for 
example, the machinery of metal industry production and tools 
(such as tractors) to be used in agricultural production. The most 
important industrial sector during the post-war era, namely the 
forest industry, was also closely linked to the developments of 
the agricultural sector due to the fact that the greatest proportion 
of the forest was owned by farms up to the 1970s. 
One of the main characteristics of Finnish agricultural produc-
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tion throughout history has been the privatively owned, rela-
tively small-sized farms. The role played by the central govern-
ment in providing possibilities for agriculture has been another 
key factor. This paper aims to stress the co-evolutionary progress 
of Finnish agricultural production on the one hand, and the 
changes in society/government as a whole on the other. It is not 
possible to explain the other without taking into consideration the 
changes in the other determinant. Namely, during the period 
Finnish society and the economy in particular faced a number of 
changes. Agricultural production can be seen as pivotal in this 
process. Also, agricultural production was highly dependent on 
the complex socio-economical and macro-level political const-
raints. Following the basic ideas of Nobel laureate Ronald Coase, 
agricultural production in privatively owned farms was basically 
possible only because of property rights provided by the govern-
ment; namely the rights to own farm land.5 
The government also used its rights to govern land ownership 
in several phases in Finnish history, starting with general 
parcelling out of land in the 18th and 19th centuries, land 
acquisition acts in the early 20th century and right after the 
Second World War. In 1950 one third of all Finnish farms, namely 
over 100,000 farms, were established by land acquisition acts.6 All 
these changes were only possible by infringement of private 
ownership, and they all laid the basis for the further develop-
ment not only in agricultural production but for the countryside 
in Finland as a whole. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Employment 1860 – 1999, percent shares 
 Primary 
production
Secondary 
production
Services Total 
1860 79 14 7 100 
1890 74 17 9 100 
1920 60 20 20 100 
1950 46 29 36 100 
1980 13 34 53 100 
1999 6 28 66 100 
Sources: Tilastokeskus (www.stat.fi); Hjerppe, Suomen talous 1860–1985: 
Kasvu ja rakennemuutos, 286 – 291; Hjerppe, The Finnish Economy 1860–1985. 
Growth and Structural Change, 63; Tykkyläinen and Kavilo, Maaseudun 
asuttaminen ja talouden rakennemuutos Suomessa, 14; Kuhmonen, Maatalouden 
alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka, 15 – 16. 
 
The structural change of the Finnish economy can be viewed 
from the macro level as a change from agriculture to a service 
economy in a short period of time. As Riitta Hjerppe has pointed 
out, the development of the Finnish economy differs from those 
of many other Western European countries, such as Sweden, 
Germany, or United Kingdom: the structural transition of the 
economy happened directly from primary production to services, 
without a period of industrial dominance in the economy – both 
in terms of labour force and share of the GDP.7 Yet agriculture 
was a major source of livelihood for a number of people until the 
end of the century. Even in the early 21st century ‘farmer’ was 
among the most common classifications of employment in Finland; 
for example, in 2002 there were almost 80,000 farmers in Finland8.  
This article purports to answer the question how and why the 
change occurred. The structural change of Finnish agriculture 
during the post-war period has not yet been studied accurately 
enough. This paper tries to describe the basic development patterns 
by using the current research literature as well as statistical material 
as sources for the study. First, we will concentrate on the general 
structural changes in the Finnish economy by stressing the 
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institutional constraints, and second, on the change in the 
productivity of Finnish agriculture, with emphasis on the 
modernisation and commercialisation of agricultural production. 
For starters, some conceptual considerations are made.  
 
2 Conceptual Setting 
What were the possibilities for individual farmers in Finland to 
develop their agricultural production during the post-war era? 
On one hand, one might stress the exogenous constraints: the 
international competition on farm products which lowered their 
prices and made the domestic production highly difficult without 
the aid provided by the state. On the other hand, one might say 
that these subsidies by the state constrained production even 
further. These points are worth keeping in mind, though it is 
necessary to point out that even though these exogenous 
pressures existed there was still room for individual strategies 
not only at the governmental level for the national agricultural 
policies, but also for the individual farmers. Therefore, the key 
issue in the development of Finnish agriculture during the post-
war era is to understand macro-level exogenous constraints and 
micro-level endogenous possibilities, and the co-evolutionary 
historical paths of these two levels.  
The concept ‘co-evolution’ is being used in describing the long 
term development of industries in different societies. As Johann 
Peter Murmann has pointed out, in order to understand the ‘paths’ 
– either success or failure – of certain industries in certain 
countries, the role played by society, and the governmental role in 
particular, have to be taken into the analysis. Firms and industries 
are related to the society where they emerge and develop, and 
furthermore, the society as well is dependent on the evolution of 
the industries and other branches of the economy.9 Following this 
line of thought, also the development of agriculture should be seen 
as a product of co-evolution of society and production, people and 
politics. As Jon Lauck has pointed out, also in the United States 
during the post-war period farmers and politics interacted, 
launching processes of competition and concentration10. 
In describing the evolution of Finnish agriculture, a number of 
rather complicated concepts are used, such as modernisation, 
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technological change, innovation, productivity, (structural) 
change, continuity (discontinuity), and the role played by the 
institutions. Even ‘agriculture’ itself is a highly problematic 
concept in the Finnish context. Namely, when analysing primary 
sources of livelihood for the agrarian people in this time period, 
the farm itself did not necessarily provide the main income for 
the family. The role of forestry was especially pronounced in 
providing extra income in many parts of Finland. Furthermore, 
working outside the farm was also common.11 
The possibilities for individual farmers to influence their 
sources of livelihood were seen in the contemporary texts as well 
as in research narrow – on the contrary the role played by the state 
as ‘rule maker’ is stressed. Regulation and protection in a semi-
closed and protected economy was characteristic of all economic 
activities in Finland up to the early 1980s, of agricultural 
production in particular. Furthermore, protection and regulation 
were characteristic of the agricultural production and trade on 
agricultural products also in an international setting throughout 
the post-war era up to the 1990s, though attempts were made to 
‘open’ and deregulate production and especially trade12. 
State intervention is usually understood as a necessity to 
correct market failures. By referring to the institutional economics 
the institutions should, however, be seen in a broader context. 
Following Douglass C. North, we stress that institutions should 
be understood as the ‘rules of the game’, whilst individual actors 
and organisations are ‘players’. These rules include not only 
formal state legislation, but also various informal constraints, 
such as codes of conduct, values and historical dependencies.13 
The school of ‘public choice’ has paid more attention to the 
interaction between institutions, organisations and individuals.14 
The development of Finnish agriculture during the post-war 
period was highly dependent – at least at the political level – on 
the nexus-of-contracts and interplay between a number of actors. 
In the corporatist system the role played by the farmers’ interest 
group, The Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest 
Owners (MTK) was paramount. Farmers succeeded in 
influencing national (agricultural) policies through it. The 
situation was similar in Sweden. The corporate decision making 
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process enabled MTK to get a more powerful position in the 
negotiations during the 1980s than it should have had in 
proportion to agriculture’s share in GDP and the number of 
members in the interest group.15 
‘Modernisation’ is in this paper understood as an outcome of a 
number of technological and institutional innovations. A number 
of factors contributed to the modernisation in agriculture, 
including the biological and natural conditions for agricultural 
production; the urban environment and industrialisation as a 
background for the demand of agricultural products but also in 
supplying tools and machinery for agricultural production; 
professional activity of farmers, including training, education 
and the services provided by a number of advisor organisations. 
Finally, modernisation is highly dependent on the possibilities of 
the individual farm to adapt to innovations, whether in terms of 
mental readiness for change or due to financial possibilities.16 
Institutional innovations are here understood mainly as the 
results of national agricultural policies – though they were 
products of long processes in which the different actors had 
possibilities to exercise influence on the outcomes. Technological 
innovations include not only the mechanisation of agricultural 
production, but also cereal and cattle breeding, schooling of far-
mers, farm advising organisations and so on. Furthermore, neither 
the institutional nor the technological innovations are important 
before they are taken into common use.17 Within the technological 
innovations productivity and efficiency of production is usually 
stressed – as well in contemporary discussion as in the research. 
The growth of productivity was among the key issues in Finnish 
agricultural policy throughout the period – the concept, its causes 
and consequences were not called into question. However, even 
the measurement of productivity is tricky18. Although the growth 
of productivity enabled more production with less human input, it 
required more capital input. Therefore, agricultural production 
changed from labour-intensive to capital-intensive. This caused 
financial difficulties to individual farms due to investments to 
more efficient machines and better facilities, and also due to a 
number of environmental problems caused by massive utilization 
of artificial fertilizers and pesticides.19 
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The changes in Finnish agricultural production did not occur 
in a vacuum. On the contrary, the international structural 
changes in agriculture, food industries, politics and the trade of 
agricultural products describe a lot of the ‘Finnish story’ – 
especially from the late 1980s onwards when Finnish agriculture 
had to be adjusted not only to the standards and restrictions of 
the European Union, but also to GATT and WTO agreements.20 
 
3 The Change of the Finnish Economy and Agriculture 
The basic patterns that influenced Finnish agriculture during the 
different decades are described in Table 2. In its perspective 
institutional patterns are overemphasized – the production and 
productivity patterns, as well as technological development will 
be described later. The general trend in the Table marks the 
primary problems in each time period, whilst ‘key issues’ refers 
especially to the debates in agricultural policy. The role played by 
the state is prominent. As a whole the principal aims of Finnish 
agricultural policy since the 1950s have been efficiency, self-
sufficiency in farm products, an adequate income level for the 
farming population, ensuring the availability of foodstuffs, and 
the need to maintain settlement over the whole country21. The 
two last columns, namely type of production and ownership 
refer to the actor-level changes in individual farms. 
Immediately after the war the key issue in Finnish domestic 
politics was the resettlement of the soldiers and the people from 
the lost Karelia.22 The process was enforced by a land acquisition 
act. Altogether 100,000 new homesteads were founded. From 
these homesteads one third were engaged in full-time 
agriculture, c. 15% practised agriculture as a secondary source of 
income, and the rest were not engaged in farming at all. The 
homesteads were established either by dividing the farmland of 
the older farms or by clearing land for cultivation. Over 9% of all 
farming land in the 1950s was created through land acquisition. 
Since the urban centres in Finland did not provide enough 
possibilities and the poor post-war country did not have 
anything else to offer, the resettlement to the countryside was an 
act of necessity in the post-war situation, but had long- term 
consequences. First, the average size of Finnish farms decreased 
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due to the fact that the new farms were small-sized, practically all 
below 15 hectares. Second, the resettlement partly delayed the 
urbanisation process in Finland, which began only during the 
1960s when the people from the rural areas started to move in 
masses to the urban areas. Third, again partly due to the 
resettlement, agriculture remained as one of the most important 
sources of livelihood for the majority of the people. Fourth, 
resettlement was one of the major reasons for the problems 
related to the overproduction during the 1960s and 1970s.23 
 
Table 2. 
Phases of development in Finnish agriculture, from the 1940s to the 21st century 
 1940s and 
1950s 
1960s and 
1980s 
1990s and the 
early third 
millennium 
General trend Adaptation to 
the post-war 
economy 
Overproduction Adaptation to 
the European 
Union 
Key issues Resettlement, 
controlled 
economy, 
encouragement 
of agricultural 
production 
Restrictions on 
production, 
out-migration 
from rural 
areas 
Growth and 
structural 
change, 
viability of the 
rural Finland; 
Commerciali-
sation 
Type of 
production 
Diversified, 
central role 
played by the 
additional 
incomes 
Concentrated, 
additional 
income 
important 
Concentration 
Typical farm 
ownership 
Small, family 
owned 
Middle sized 
farms, family 
ownership 
‘Euro-sized’ 
production 
units, family 
owned 
 
Until the mid-1950s the Finnish economy was tightly 
controlled, especially food production due to the lack of some 
vital foodstuffs. Therefore, agricultural production as a whole 
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was encouraged to meet the growing demand. The resettlement 
of the armed forces and Karelian people were parts in this 
process as well. By the end of the 1950s the encouragement of 
greater agricultural production even proved to be too successful: 
agriculture was suffering from severe overproduction. 
The restrictions of the agricultural production were among the 
most debated issues in Finnish politics throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. Critical political borderlines were drawn according to the 
standpoints concerning the future of agriculture. The Agrarian 
Party (later Centre Party) had deep roots in the countryside and 
close connections to the Central Union of Agricultural Producers 
and Forest Owners (MTK) and supported policies that would 
have kept Finnish agriculture profitable, whilst the Social 
Democrats opposed further subsidies to agricultural production. 
Among the debated issues from the 1950s on was, for example, 
how to ensure through incomes policies similar wage trends to 
farmers as the workers in the society had24. The overproduction 
became a topic of public discussion in the late 1950s. Especially 
the overproduction of dairy products and eggs caused problems. 
Four special governmental committees were established to cope 
with the problems, the main concern being overproduction. The 
first committee (1958–1962) concentrated on the acute problems 
of exporting agricultural products to European countries and on 
the structural changes in rural areas. The second committee 
(1965–1967) concentrated more clearly on the overproduction and 
recommended quite unique solutions. The third (1977–1980) and 
fourth (1985–1987) committees concentrated on similar issues, 
with more emphasis on the structural changes not only in 
agriculture, but in the rural areas of Finland as whole.25  
The role played by the state in regulating agricultural 
production was important. Already in the beginning of Finnish 
independence it was regarded as a necessity to secure the 
domestic production of food in the case of crises. Therefore, 
domestic production was being subsidized, which was even 
highlighted in the post-war resettlement. Already during the late 
1950s Finnish agriculture produced more food than could be 
consumed in domestic markets (Table 3). This continued in the 
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1970s, 1980s and 1990s, though there were annual changes in self-
sufficiency in foodstuffs. 
The export of agricultural products was problematic. In most of 
the industrialised countries, the import of agricultural products has 
been under control throughout the post-war era – these restrictions 
in import and farming subsidies are sometimes accused of being the 
main reasons for the high prices of agricultural products and 
overproduction26. Finland, among other countries, has used import 
duties and quotas as the central tools in maintaining domestic 
agricultural production – the fact was that the production of 
agricultural products in Finland was not competitive in world 
markets. Therefore, export of the overproduction needed, again, 
governmental subsidies. Thus, it became evident that domestic 
production had to be cut. This was, however, politically difficult – 
the leading party (Agrarian Party) was dependent on rural votes. 
Cuts in the production could have also led to dramatic 
consequences in the Finnish economy as a whole.  
 
Table 3. 
Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs: production as percent of consumption 
Product group 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Cereals 114 70 175 103 
Dairy products – liquids .. 129 122 112 
Dairy products – fats 126 128 143 132 
Beef 110 102 109 93 
Pork 110 119 114 101 
Eggs 136 151 137 114 
Sugar 27 60 91 71 
Source: Official Statistics of Finland (www.stat.fi); Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (http://tike.mmm.fi). 
 
Due to overproduction, agriculture became to be highly 
subsidized in most of the Western countries. In Finland the 
subsidies to agriculture were highly controversial. The restriction 
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methods and subsidies formed a complex system, in which most 
of the export subsidies were paid by the farmers themselves.27  
More drastic measures to cut the overproduction were 
introduced during the 1960s and 1970s. Among the most 
innovative institutional restrictions was the field reservation 
system, suggested by the second agricultural committee in 1969. 
Within the field reservation system compensation was paid for 
fields allowed to lie fallow. Around 10% of the total area of 
cultivated land was withdrawn from active cultivation. The field 
reservation system was widely criticised, on the one hand on 
emotional grounds: it was seen as the embodiment of the 
stagnation of rural areas, where now the areas previously cleared 
for farming land with hard work were abandoned or reforested. 
On the other hand, the field reservation system also proved to be 
an insufficient measure to deal with the problems of 
overproduction. At the same time the market situation became 
easier due to the sales to the Soviet Union, weak crops and oil 
crises, which all increased world market prices for agricultural 
products. Furthermore, the massive out-migration from almost 
all the rural areas of the country diminished the number of active 
farms, especially small sized ones.28 The migration did not 
include only a flow of people, but also a flow of capital from rural 
to urban areas – the patterns of forest ownership changed 
drastically, in particular. The outcome of migration was profound 
in the whole of Finnish society: in 1950 around one third of the 
population lived in urban centres, whilst by the end of the 
millennium the share was about 67%.29  
The measures by the state to restrict production somewhat 
stabilised the situation but at the same time restricted ‘natural’ 
development of the individual farms. For example, the 
production quotas on the dairy farms meant that the production 
had to be adjusted to a certain level for years to come.30 The 
production quotas allotted to milk production were defined in 
the middle of the 1980s and were still in use in the early 21st 
century, though farms were enabled to ‘buy’ more quotas from 
each other from the 1990s on. 
During the 1990s Finnish agriculture again faced a period of 
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change. The main determinant was Finnish membership in the 
European Union: Finnish agriculture had to adjust itself to its 
agricultural politics, diminishing farming subsidies, production 
quotas and other restrictions. Though Finland got a number of 
advantages to agriculture in the Treaty of Accession to the EU, 
joining the EU has caused the most profound structural changes 
in production since the resettlement after the Second World War. 
The number of active farms was decreasing rapidly, people were 
again moving from the countryside to urban centres, and the 
population in rural areas was growing old. The number of milk 
suppliers decreased to over half in 1990–2002, namely from about 
43,500 to 20,000 farms. Furthermore, about 74,000 farms applied 
for the basic forms of agricultural support in 2002, whilst the 
number in 1994 was about 105,600 farms.31 Thus almost 30% of 
active farms had disappeared in less than ten years. More 
emphasis in political discussion was put on the viability of the 
rural areas, on the need to keep the countryside inhabited. The 
cultural values of the rural areas and landscape were stressed in 
public discussion. 
Environmental considerations such as the pollutant impact of 
agriculture gained more interest in public discussion throughout 
the period. The massive use of fertilizers emerged. However, 
their use has decreased during the 1990s, due to growing interest 
in organic production, on the one hand, and because of the 
decrease of production on the other. Also, the development of 
fertilizers has enabled a decrease in their use. During the 1980s 
the use of fertilizers increased from ca. 1,000 million kilos to 1,200 
million kilos, but during the 1990s it decreased to circa 750 
million kilos (in 2002). When proportioning the amount of used 
fertilizers to the area in production, the decrease of usage was 
over 35% in 1990–2002.32 The organic production of dairy pro-
ducts started in the 1960s. State subsidized organic production, 
and the number of organic farms grew to 671 in 1990 and to 5,000 
in 2001. Finnish organic farms comprised 6.5% of all Finnish 
farms in 2001 and took 5.5% of the country’s arable area, i.e. 
150,000 hectares was under organic cultivation.33 
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4 The Changes in Agriculture on Farms 
Behind the macro level changes from the 1940s to the end of the 
1990s a number of changes occurred in the individual farms as well. 
A ‘typical’ Finnish farm cannot be found because of the variation in 
types of production (for example, from grain growing in the 
southernmost parts of the country to reindeer-keeping in the north) 
and because geographic and climatic conditions are so different in 
different parts of the country. Nevertheless, some general micro-
level features might be listed.34 Even though there were different 
types of farms, the structures were rather similar and farms 
developed to become more similar during the time period under 
investigation. The institutional constraints or normative pressures – 
especially domestic and EU laws – forced the farms to adapt to 
similar kind of structures and production. Furthermore, the 
competitive environment including technical (and even climatic) 
opportunities was the same to most of the farms.35 
The most typical Finnish farm throughout the period was owned 
by the family. In 2002 private persons owned 88% of farms, heirs and 
family companies eleven, corporations, foundations and cooperatives 
0.7 and the state, municipalities and congregations 0.1%.36 Family 
ownership of farms was not questioned in public debate and it seems 
to be evident that other modes of ownership were simply not 
regarded as possible in Finland thanks to the traditions of private 
ownership of farms and forests.37 Furthermore, there have arisen 
problems related to the uneven – young people sought jobs in towns 
– age structure of farmers. To solve them, a number of measures were 
taken in order to facilitate the transfer of farms to descendants.38 
Throughout the period the employment of an extra labour force 
has been rare, except in the largest farms. Rather farmers 
themselves have sought auxiliary incomes, for example, in 
industries and services, either as a salaried employee or as a 
private entrepreneur. Statistics show that in 1951–1952 55.6% of the 
average income of Finnish farmers came from agriculture, 28.3% 
from forestry, and 15.3% from secondary sources. The share of 
additional income was larger in small-sized farms.39 In 2002 over 
one fourth of Finnish farmers practised other entrepreneurship 
besides traditional farming; of them almost 70% were engaged in 
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different services such as contracting and tourism.40 
Forestry has always played an important role. As was with 
farm land, the private ownership of forest land remains 
dominant in Finland: in 2003 private families owned two-thirds 
of the country’s forests and the remaining one-third belonged to 
the state, municipalities and companies. In the early 21st century an 
average farm had 58 hectares forest. During the 1960s over 50% of 
forest land was owned by farms; this number decreased to around 
34% in 1986–1994, and in 2001 only 18% of the owners of the forest 
were farmers.41 This development is due to the fact that in a 
number of cases the partition of the forest was carried out between 
heirs, out of whom an increasing number lived in urban centres. In 
many parts of the country, one can argue, forestry is actually a 
more important source of income for farmers than agriculture. In 
general, the arable land area is larger and correspondingly, the 
forest area is smaller in the south than in the north.42  
‘Typical’ farming changed from diversified production to a 
more concentrated type of production. This meant that farms 
specialised in different types of production; in the early 1960s 
almost all Finnish farms produced dairy products (milk), whilst 
in the early 1980s only one third of Finnish farms still had cows43. 
The proportional share of dairy production in Finnish agriculture 
has further decreased during the 1990s and early 21st century: in 
1995 one third of farms produced dairy products, whilst in 2002 
the share was a little over one fourth. At the same time the share 
of crop farms increased from 42 to 55%.44 Certain farm animals 
such as sheep almost disappeared from the rural areas.45 
Especially from the 1980s onward the average size of the farms 
has been growing; together with modernisation of production 
equipment the ‘typical’ early 21st century Finnish farm has 
become quite different when compared to its late 1940s prede-
cessor. The average area of arable land in 1950 was around eight 
hectares, whilst in 2000 it was already 25 hectares. At the same 
time the number of cows on an average dairy farm grew from 
four to fifteen, but the arable land and the labour force engaged 
in agriculture decreased. Therefore, the productivity of Finnish 
agriculture grew significantly. 
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5 Production and Productivity 
The most typical farm was small, having around 5 to 10 hectares 
during the 1950s.46 The rural settlement measures favouring 
small-sized farms implemented in the early years of indepen-
dence and after the Second World War resulted in this, and 
actually already from the mid-19th century the average size of 
farms had decreased due to the settlement and partition of 
farms.47 During the 1950s only a number of small farms with less 
than 10 hectares land increased (Table 4). The problems related to 
the small farm size were also recognized in governmental 
regulation: from the early 1960s on the centre of gravity within 
Finnish agricultural policies was to rationalise by increasing the 
size of farms.48 The total number of farms decreased rapidly from 
the 1960s on; from 1972 to 1992 approximately 5500 farms were 
closed down every year49. During the period under scrutiny, the 
number of small farms decreased rapidly, whilst in the largest 
farms it grew still: the number of farms with 30–50 hectares of 
arable land area increased 1.5-fold, and the number of the largest 
farms with over 50 hectares was almost eight times the number in 
2002 than it was in 1950. Most of the growth of the largest farms 
occurred in the 1990s. The average size of the farm in the late 
1960s was still under ten hectares, in the late 1980s it was around 
12.5 hectares, in 1990 about 17 hectares, whilst in 2002 it was 
already 30 hectares50. The most important reason for the rela-
tively small size of the farms after the war was the land 
acquisition legislation at the beginning of Finnish independence 
and after the war. In 1950 of all active farms around 13% were 
created right after independence by the Leaseholders’ Act and 
19% by the land acquisition laws after the war. Thus the ‘old’ 
farms constituted below 70% of all farms though the area of 
arable land and the number of animals on the ‘old’ farms was 
higher than on the ‘new’ farms.51 
The area of arable land decreased during the post-war era by 
about one fifth, the number of farms to one fourth and the 
agricultural labour force to one eighth (Table 5). However, at the 
same time the production of the crop yield (combined production 
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of wheat, rye, barley and oats) increased almost threefold, and 
total milk production decreased only by about one third. 
Consequently, the productivity within the agricultural sector 
grew (Table 6).  
 
Table 4. Number of Finnish farms by size of arable land area, 1950 – 2000 
Year 1–10 10–3052 30–5053 50– Total 
1950 231,371 62,478 9,931 1,507 305,287 
1959 249,506 70,533 9,652 1,572 331,263 
1969 206,731 77,575 11,034 1,912 297,252 
1980 138,616 74,399 8,753 2,953 224,721 
1990 47,035 64,637 12,678 4,764 129,114 
2000 17,209 35,163 15,621 10,897 78,890 
Sources: Niemelä, Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja 
niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle, 351, 420; 
Kuhmonen, Maatalouden alueellinen rakennekehitys ja rakennepolitiikka, 16–18; 
Finnish Official Statistics (www.stat.fi); Information Centre of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (http://tike.mmm.fi).  
 
In order to measure the productivity of agriculture one has to 
take into consideration the number of farms and the labour force 
in farms compared to the production output. To put it simply, 
one can argue that productivity corresponds with the size of a 
farm; the average size of farms (arable land in use) increased 
threefold during the time period under study. Nevertheless, it 
has been emphasized in several studies that the small sized farms 
actually operate quite efficiently54. The growth of average-size 
farms during the 1980s was approximately at the same level as in 
EC-countries at the time. However, the agricultural labour-force 
decreased more rapidly in Finland than in Europe. In a long-term 
perspective, the productivity of Finnish agriculture already 
increased before the Second World War significantly, but right 
after the war it diminished: the productivity in 1947 and 1948 was 
one fourth lower than it had been before the war. From the early 
1950s on, however, agricultural productivity increased, but not as 
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much as in Finnish industries.55 During the 1990s the 
productivity of agriculture increased more rapidly, for instance, 
in Sweden and in Denmark than in Finland.56 In OECD-countries 
the productivity growth rate of agriculture was higher than the 
growth of productivity in manufacturing or services, or the 
growth of productivity per capita GDP during the post-war era.57 
Other productivity figures of Table 6 also show significant 
increase. Average milk production per cow doubled and the 
production of milk by dairy farms grew sevenfold – at the same 
time the number of cows diminished to one third (from 1.1 
million to 355,000). The productivity growth in milk production 
was due to the fact that the small farms with only one or two 
cows ceased to exist. Furthermore, agriculture was specialized so 
that certain farms started to produce, for example, milk, and 
others concentrated on grain production. Thus, in 1950 over 90% 
of all farms produced milk, whilst in 2000 their share was below 
30%. Average production per cow presumably grew even more 
than can be detected from Table 6, because the production is 
calculated only from the farms under the cattle control system – 
in the early 1950s only about one fourth of cows were monitored 
by the system, whilst in early 2000 the share was around three 
fourths. Crop yield production per farm increased over tenfold, 
even though the milk farms are included in the numbers. The 
overall productivity growth of the labour force can be seen from 
the fact that the arable land area per worker increased almost 
sevenfold during the time period. 
However, the figures in Table 6 emphasize labour-related 
productivity at the expense of capital productivity. In order to 
produce more with less labour input, investments to modern 
technology have been necessary. Therefore, the productivity of 
capital, and with it, the total factor productivity has not 
necessarily developed as favourably as labour productivity. This 
also leads to the conclusion that despite the relative increase in 
productivity, agricultural production was not profitable during 
the 1990s. Similar phenomena also occurred in Finnish industry 
at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s.58 
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Table 5.  
Production indices in Finnish agriculture 1950 – 2000 (1950 = 100) 
 Arable land 
in use 
Agricultural 
labour force 
Number 
of farms 
Crop yield 
(total) 
Milk 
(total) 
1950 100 100 100 100 100 
1960 108 79 109 152 69 
1970 113 47 97 202 77 
1980 103 31 74 236 81 
1990 86 22 42 306 72 
2000 83 12 26 291 65 
Sources: Niemelä, Lääninlampureista maaseutukeskuksiin: maaseutukeskusten ja 
niiden edeltäjien maatalousneuvonta 1700-luvulta 1990-luvulle; STV, Suomen 
tilastollinen vuosikirja (Statistical yearbook of Finland); SVT, Suomen 
Virallinen Tilasto III, Maatalous; Maatalouslaskenta, Maatalouslaskenta 
1990 (Agricultural cencus 1990); Maataloustilastollinen, Maataloustilastolli-
nen vuosikirja 2002; Silntanen and Ala-Mantila, Maatalouden kokonaislaskel-
mat 1980 - 1988, 6 - 7. 
 
Table 6. Productivity indices in Finnish agriculture 1950 – 2000 (1950 = 100) 
 Average 
size 
(arable 
land) 
Milk/cow Production 
of milk/ 
milk farms
Production 
of crop 
yield/all 
farms 
Arable land 
area/worker
(hectarage) 
1950 100 100 100 100 100 
1960 100 116 70 140 137 
1970 116 142 101 207 240 
1980 140 170 222 320 336 
1990 203 105 410 725 394 
2000 316 207 710 1115 664 
Sources: see previous table. 
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6 Mechanization and Commercialization 
Productivity growth was highly dependent on the commer-
cialisation and the technological change in agricultural pro-
duction. Technological development included not only mechani-
sation, namely, machinery and tools, but also better production 
plants (for example, barns, piggeries, grain driers), and even 
cereal and cattle breeding. Also, centralised advising played an 
important role. As in all technological development the inno-
vations as such are not important until they are taken into use. 
For example, tractors first came to Finnish fields already in the 
early 20th century, but it was only after the Second World War 
that the tractors replaced the older means of cultivating and har-
vesting in the fields. As an outcome, farming took on charac-
teristics of factory-like production – ‘an industrial logic or ideal in 
agriculture’ emerged, as Deborah Fitzgerald has pointed out in 
the case of the United States - and the primary sector was com-
mercialized towards ‘agribusiness’.59 Though the commerciali-
zation or industrialization of agriculture in the Finnish case did 
not reach the level of the United States or some other major 
producers of agricultural products, the progress was all the same 
significant – especially when taking into consideration the 
climatic, geographical, population and capital constraints. 
In the work on fields mechanisation was by no means the most 
important factor in the productivity growth; mechanization in 
field crops resulted in greatly increased hectarage (as seen in 
Table 6)60. Furthermore, the use of fertilizers increased signifi-
cantly production of crop yield. In milk production mechani-
sation alone cannot explain the growth in productivity, though 
mechanical milking machines and highly equipped dairy barns 
made it possible to increase the number of cows in farms. The 
growth of milk production per cow was related to the cattle cont-
rol system which included all kinds of counselling from animal 
feeding to best-practise working methods. 
The first phase of mechanisation in Finnish agriculture occur-
red during the latter part of the 19th century. At the time the most 
important inventions were new types of equipment used with 
horses in field work. The second mechanisation period occurred 
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from the 1950s to the 1970s, when tractors replaced horses and 
the combine harvesters became general61  
Technological development has made it possible to overcome 
a number of climatic and geographical constraints that Finnish 
agriculture has faced throughout history. Mäkelä has pointed to 
three big problems in Finnish agriculture: a cold climate, small 
farm size and long distances from consumption centres. The cold 
climate and the short growing season do not only limit the 
possibilities for cultivation and crops, but also cause high pro-
duction costs for dairy farming: warm buildings are needed for 
the cattle throughout the wintertime. The small size of the farms 
is partly related to the climate: it has been argued that it takes 
more time to take care of twenty cows in Finland than fifty cows 
in France or 150 cows in New Zealand. Thus, for example, in 1995 
the average number of cows per dairy farm in Finland was only 
11, in Germany it was 23, in Sweden 26, in Denmark 40, and in 
Great Britain 6462. In sparsely populated Finland marketing agri-
cultural products is problematic and transportation costs are 
high.63 Together they contribute to high production and trans-
action costs. With technological development, however, Finnish 
farms have at least partly been able to overcome these problems 
by more efficient machinery in fields and barns. Due to the short 
growing season and disadvantageous weather conditions Finnish 
agriculture is forced to use efficient machinery in the fields, and, 
for example, drying grain in special grain driers.64  
Usually there is only a limited time both for sowing in the 
spring and for harvesting in the autumn: therefore the work has 
to be completed as rapidly and efficiently as possible. As the 
average size of the farms increased but the possibilities to use a 
hired workforce remained limited, technology offered a solution 
to the problem. In field work the most important technological 
innovations that were taken into common use were tractors with 
all possible equipment and accessories, and the self-propelled 
combine harvester.  
The general attitude in the rural areas towards modernisation 
has been, according to several studies, mainly supportive. 
Efficient farm production, modern production machines and faci-
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lities, commercialisation, and progressiveness are understood 
among the farmers as positive values. They were also supported 
by agricultural politics; for example, the taxation system suppor-
ted (even to excess) investments to modern production techno-
logy, such as tractors from the late 1960s on.65 The positive 
attitude toward investments can be seen in the fact that from 
1995–2002 around one fifth of the production costs in Finnish 
agriculture came from machinery and equipment. Together with 
building costs (10%) investments constituted almost one third of 
all production costs. The relative share of investments can be 
partly explained by the fact that the share of hired labour of 
production costs was below 10% for ‘outside’ labour was not 
typical for Finnish agriculture.66 
 
Table 7. The number of tractors and horses on Finnish farms 
Year Tractors Horses 
1920 147 391,000 
1930 1,924 357,000 
1941 5,916 350,000 
1950 17,000 409,000 
1960 87,000 225,000 
1970 155,000 90,000 
1980 220,000 21,000 
1990 235,000 44,000 
2000 333,000 58,000 
Source: Aarnio, ‘Traktori’, 99; Jussila, Spatial Diffusion of Modernization. A 
Study of Farm Mechanization in Finland at Regional and Local Levels, 53; Tilas-
tokatsaus, Tilastokatsaus IV, 35; Maataloustilastollinen, Maataloustilastolli-
nen vuosikirja 2002; STV, Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja (Statistical year-
book of Finland); SVT, Suomen Virallinen Tilasto III, Maatalous; Maata-
louslaskenta, Maatalouslaskenta 1990 (Agricultural cencus 1990), 262. 
 
The coming of tractors to farming is usually used as an 
indicator of the mechanisation of agriculture. As can be seen in 
Table 7, the number of tractors surpassed the number of horses 
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during the 1960s. During the 1930s there was approximately one 
tractor to every 200 farms, while by the late 1970s practically 
every farm had at least one tractor. Actually, the change was 
even more drastic as a consequence of the development of 
tractors: average horse power grew and the four wheel drive 
became common in the 1980s: by the end of the decade about 80% 
of the newly-bought tractors were four-wheel driven.67 For an 
individual farm the purchase of a tractor was a huge investment. 
The tractors alone constituted, for example, in 2000 c. 50% of the 
value of sales of all farm machinery. Furthermore, different kinds 
of accessories and equipment for tractors (ploughs, harrows, 
fertilizers, and trailers) together constituted over 25% of all 
investments.68 
It was not the tractors themselves that made a change in the 
fieldwork methods, but the equipment that could be connected to 
them – especially after hydraulic lifting and three-point 
connection had became general. Tractors carried all kinds of 
equipment in sowing and harvesting time, but they were widely 
used also in forestry work, as well as in removing snow. Among 
the most important equipment and machinery one can mention, 
for example, combined drills which are said to have increased the 
crops of grains from 10% to 15% during the 1960s and 1970s.69 In 
grain growing the single most important technological inno-
vation that was adapted into common use was the self-propelled 
combine harvester.70 In forestry chain saw made a huge impact 
also on agriculture, since especially for the small-sized farms fo-
restry with traditional methods had provided important extra 
incomes. Thus, technological development as a whole led to 
structural change and to internal migration from the countryside 
to urban centres.71 
The agricultural machines were at first mainly imported to 
Finland, but domestic production began quite early. Thus also 
the production of agriculture machinery followed the standard 
steps of technology transfer: from adaptation to own production 
and even to own development72. For example, the first Finnish-
made tractors were produced already in 1918, but tractor 
production gained more importance only in the post-war period 
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when the tractor became common on farms. Governmentally 
owned tractor producer started to produce them during the 1950s 
– first under the name Valmet, lately under the name Valtra.73 The 
company grew to be the leading producer in Scandinavia and 
among the most important producers in the world by the end of 
the century. After a number of corporate arrangements, the 
production of Valtra tractors was sold to US-based Acgo in 2003. 
Besides tractors, Finnish industrial companies started to produce, 
for example, self-propelled combine harvesters, different kinds of 
equipment, and especially machinery for forestry. 
Besides heavy investment in machinery such as tractors and 
equipment, farm buildings were also improved. Plant breeding 
and the use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides became more 
common. On dairy farms the evolution of silage took place – the 
adaptation of the AIV-method on a large scale and flail forage 
harvesters played an important role.74 Cattle breeding, better 
feeding, improvements in dairy barns and milking machinery, as 
well as farming advice and overall professionalization in 
agriculture is reflected particularly in the growth of productivity 
in dairy production. As an average one cow produced in 1950 c. 
3,300 kg milk in a year, while in the late 1960s the production was 
already around 4,400 and in 2002 the medium yield was 7,100 kg 
of milk in a year.75 
But it was not only machinery, tools, plant breeding or other 
rather obvious technological changes that took place. Also, 
practical training and, in its vein, human capital accumulation 
has been stated as one reason for more efficient agricultural pro-
duction. However, in recent studies it has been argued that the 
education of agricultural people actually increased productivity 
of work outside the farm rather than in farming itself; namely, 
educated youth moved away from the rural areas.76  
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7 The Defeat of Cooperative Organizations 
During the period under study here, agricultural production 
changed from labour-intensive working methods to capital-inten-
sive production – ‘agribusiness’ also emerged in an international 
context77. This commercialization of production led to speciali-
zation in production and to overall adjustment of the production 
to the market economy. When analysing Finnish agriculture and 
its functioning within the Finnish economy, the role played by 
the (production) cooperatives is central. Large cooperatives func-
tioned as collective marketing mechanisms. As in other Nordic 
countries (e.g. Denmark), the cooperatives were linked either to 
workers’ movement or to rural communities. The rural coopera-
tives were formed to secure cheap commodities (retail trade co-
operatives) to people who lived in the countryside, but also to 
offer financing (bank cooperatives), and to buy the products pro-
duced in the district (dairy, meat, cereal and forest product co-
operatives). The cooperatives were jointly owned by the people 
who joined them. Cooperatives were seen, at least in the begin-
ning, as organisations that satisfied the needs of the people better 
than purely business-oriented organisations. Thus, ideological 
stress was pronounced when cooperatives were created. 
From the late 19th and early 20th century on the cooperatives 
played a crucial role in buying the products from farmers, in 
manufacturing the products and marketing them to customers. 
There were usually local cooperatives for dairy products, and 
they together formed powerful and influential national coopera-
tives. These national cooperatives, such as Valio in dairy products 
and Atria in meat, and Metsäliitto in forestry, were farmer-cont-
rolled marketing organizations that helped to blunt the impact of 
monopoly in prices by enabling producers to assert collective 
control over the sale of their commodities to processors.78 Thus 
these cooperatives also had an important impact on industriali-
sation in the country, especially in the food industry. Further-
more, a specialised cooperative was founded to sell machines and 
equipments to farmers (Hankkija), and even the retail stores and 
banks in rural areas were dominated by cooperatives (SOK in 
retail trade, and Osuuspankki in banking). Common to all these 
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cooperatives was that though they were ‘companies’, they did 
not act according to the ‘rules’ of the market economy. Namely, 
the aim of the cooperatives was not to create value-add but to 
take care of the interests of the owners, namely, rural people in 
the wider sense. Thus, for example, the aim of Metsäliitto (a forest 
cooperative) was not only to sell forest products (pulp, paper, 
timber) profitably, but also to buy raw wood at a reasonable price 
from the forest owners79. Rather than produce ‘market value’, 
Valio’s major aim was to keep producer prices of milk at a 
reasonable level, as was Atria’s to achieve the same with the price 
of meat. Beside these cooperatives a number of privatively 
owned companies operated in the same businesses. 
A major change occurred in cooperative structures during the 
1980s and 1990s: in practice all national cooperatives were refor-
med to be more market oriented. This had a huge impact on the 
commercialization of the whole ‘agribusiness’ in Finland. For 
example, Valio was no longer (necessarily) the ‘most reliable’ 
buyer of milk-products, neither was Atria of meat, nor Metsäliitto 
of raw wood. Furthermore, some cooperatives collapsed in bank-
ruptcies as was the case with Hankkija.80 In many parts of the 
country, however, (small) local cooperatives held their ground – 
some of them even separated from the national cooperatives.  
Intensive investments to the modern technology, land acquisi-
tions, and expansion of the estates produced financial difficulties 
especially from the 1980s on. Before that time period bank loans had 
been relatively hard to obtain and high inflation rates kept interest 
rates low. However, during the 1980s certain measures were made to 
free lending– it was now, for example, possible to obtain foreign 
loans. This provoked (over)investments. At the same time the interest 
rates started to rise, inflation decreased, and during the turn of the 
1980s and 1990s stagnation hit the whole country. In this situation 
many farms fell into debt and even into bankruptcy.  
In commercialization certain changes in mental patterns of 
people living in rural areas can be stressed in order to understand 
development during the time period. For instance, the general 
attitude towards farming and agriculture changed from seeing it 
as a way of life to regarding it as a source of livelihood. Farms 
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became more like enterprises, and farmers transformed from 
peasants to entrepreneurs. Furthermore, according to Jussila 
among the farmers a positive attitude toward efficient production 
emerged, especially during the 1980s.81 
 
8 Conclusions 
Finnish agricultural production during the post-war period faced 
at least four major institutional changes: the resettlement after the 
war, overproduction from the turn of the 1950s and 1960s 
onwards, out-migration from the rural areas, and the adaptation 
to the European Union during the 1990s and first years of the 21st 
century. At the same time, major technological change took place: 
the mechanisation of production, commercialisation of farming 
and overall productivity growth – which also led to the problems 
related to overproduction. 
Why did Finnish agriculture develop as it did during the post-
war period? 
The whole development of Finnish agriculture can easily be 
seen deterministically as if it were a matter of necessity —the 
actors, whether politicians, technology developers, or individual 
farmers, did not really have any other choices than the ones that 
were realised. Change and modernisation are usually seen as 
matters of necessity, though at the same time the ‘nature’ of 
agricultural production as history dependent is underlined, 
showing slow changes and agriculture itself as a conservative 
and homogeneous activity. Sometimes agriculture is understood 
more as way of living than as a source of livelihood. Agriculture 
has not been able, according to, for example, T.W. Shultz, to cope 
with the rapid structural changes and growth in the economy. 
Modernisation, including the growth of the average size of farms 
in western countries as well as the mechanisation of production, 
was the solution that sought to cope with the change.82 Thus also 
agriculture faced modernisation, and the actors were actively 
seeking possibilities of, for example, more efficient production. 
The evolution of Finnish agriculture during the post-war era 
was a continuous readjustment to the climatic and geographical 
constraints, as well as to the political, economical and techno-
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logical changes. Some of the institutional constraints were old (as 
the patterns of land ownership), some were formulated during 
the period. The drastic institutional changes were faced especially 
right after the war and after Finland joined the European Union. 
During both of these changes old structures were reformed, and 
even the mental patterns in rural areas changed. The adaptation to 
new and efficient production technology also occurred during the 
time period. A significant feature is that still after the war technology 
was mostly imported, whilst in the 1990s Finland was among the 
leading producers and designers of agricultural technology. 
The role played by the state in manoeuvring, controlling, 
constraining, restricting, subsidising, and enabling agricultural 
production – and sometimes even technological changes – was 
without doubt a central piece in the puzzle to understand the post-
war development of the Finnish agriculture. Governmental regu-
lation itself was a mixed process, with a lot of political tensions 
and activity of interest groups. At the same time the state had to 
secure self-sufficiency of foodstuffs, deal with the problems of 
overproduction and negotiate the levels of agricultural production 
in an international setting. The most obvious solution to the 
problem would have been to increase the average size of farms 
and mechanisation of production. However, the state had to take 
into consideration a number of issues related to regional policy, 
and the fact that the number of people involved in agricultural 
production was still high until the late 1960s. Thus, for example, in 
the reports of the agricultural committees during the 1960s and 
1980s, the issues related to self sufficiency as well as to the regional 
issues (such as employment in the rural areas), and ensuring a 
reasonable income level for farmers were being emphasized. 
Quality and price of domestically produced agricultural products 
were also key issues for policymakers.83 
Finnish agricultural production also had its own specialities 
that lasted over the structural changes in the time period. Despite 
the constraints and exogenous pressures the rural areas remained 
inhabited and agriculture was preserved. 
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